Game Theory in Cricket

Author (Your Name)

Shabab Ahmed, Colby CollegeFollow

Date of Award

2019

Document Type

Honors Thesis (Open Access)

Department

Colby College. Economics Dept.

Advisor(s)

Timothy Hubbard

Second Advisor

Lindsey Novak

Abstract

The paper uses the natural setting of cricket to test theoretical predictions in game theory. In this setting, the agents play a one-shot-two-person constant sum game. The paper assesses whether trained professionals in cricket follow the `mix' of strategies predicted by Nash equilibria. The test uses a unique dataset derived from commentary data comprising of bowler and batsman strategies and outcomes. The paper creates a model for bowler-bastman interactions in cricket and uses this in conjunction with the data to generate predicted Nash equilibrium frequencies. These predicted frequencies are then compared with the actual frequencies from the data. My study finds that players follow equilibrium play when we consider a model with simplified strategy sets, that is, their predicted Nash frequencies of strategies are within two standard deviations of the actual frequencies. However, the paper finds that equilibrium play is not followed when the strategy sets in the model are made more elaborate. The findings of the study are important because it provides evidence of equilibrium play even if it is in the simplified setting. Furthermore, this paper can be used to provide strategy implications for cricket players.

Keywords

Game Theory, Cricket, Economic Theory, Nash equilibrium

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