Date of Award


Document Type

Honors Thesis (Open Access)


Colby College. Economics Dept.


Timothy Hubbard

Second Advisor

Dale Skrien


This thesis consists of two independent albeit related chapters. The first chapter introduces concepts from mechanism design and matching theory, and discusses potential applications of this theory, particularly in relation to dorm allocations in colleges. The second chapter investigates a subset of the dorm allocation problem, namely that of matching roommates. In particular, the paper looks at the probability of solvability of random instances of the stable roommates game under the condition that preferences are not completely random and exogenous but endogenously determined through a dependence on room choice. These probabilities are estimated using Monte-Carlo simulations and then compared with probabilities of solving a completely random instance of the stable roommates game. Our results portray a complex relationship between the two probabilities, suggesting avenues for future research.


Game Theory, Stable Marriage, Irving's Algorithm, College room allotment