Solidifying Citizenship: Ethnonationalism, Cosmopolitanism, and Morality

Joshua Rothenburg

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Introduction

In November of 1945, with Europe scarred and bloodied by war, a tribunal held session in Nuremburg. This was the first session of what was to become known as the Nuremberg Trials which, aside from punishing the members of the defeated Nazi regime, specified that all countries had duties to humanity, and were thus subject not only to their compatriots under the internal law of states but also to humanity under international law. In the words of Robert Jackson, the Chief Counsel for the United States, the Nuremburg tribunal “represents mankind’s desperate effort to apply the discipline of law to statesman… The refuge of the defendants can be only their hope that International Law will lag so far behind the moral sense of mankind that conduct which is crime in the moral sense must be regarded as innocent in law.”¹ Nuremburg thus essentially applied the moral law of humanity to the actions of states through their leaders. These trials followed a conflict, arguably the bloodiest in human history, and an attempted genocide perpetrated by the Nazi government of Germany. Both the Nazis and their opponents were steeped in the historical forces of nationalism, and both sides committed atrocities (although the scale of these atrocities was far from equal) due to the intense power of these nationalist drives.

The power of nationalistic forces, however, was not only used for destruction. In the United States, much of the groundwork for the modern welfare state was laid down before 1945, and on the same basis. Germany’s ethnonationalist fervor enabled them to recover from the economic and military weakness that was the legacy of the Treaty of Versailles, not to mention establish itself as a power prior to World War One. A century and a half before Nuremburg,  

ethnonationalism had caused the greatest democratic transformation in history, enabling the transformation of the corrupt French Monarchical government into a democratic republic, however briefly. The French Revolution set the stage not only for the later French republics, but also for the democratization of all of Western Europe.

The Nuremberg Trials are one of very few vindications of the cosmopolitan ideology, along with the founding of the United Nations around the same time. The French Revolution and the nationalist military build up of Nazi Germany are two of many examples of the power of ethnonationalism, as well as its moral ambivalence. These two ideologies, ethnonationalism and cosmopolitanism, have created tension in the international arena throughout the latter half of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st. Many people simultaneously assert that we have moral obligations to everyone and that we must do what is in our ethnonational interest. Consider, for example, the Rwandan genocide. The West, including and especially the United States, chose to calculate between our duty to those getting slaughtered and our interest in not financing or suffering the losses of a military incursion. The time this calculation and debate took resulted in no state taking action soon enough to prevent nationalist tensions from exploding into genocide. For many liberals, including myself, the failure of the West to intervene in an attempted genocide represents a serious challenge to the way our world is ordered, specifically in how states relate to those they represent and those they do not. In other words, the relationship in the world of nation-states between the ethnonational group in one state and the rest of humanity creates an uncaring world. The selfishness of the current nation-state model causes them to behave so neglectfully of the rights of humanity as to be immoral.

The rarity of truly cosmopolitan institutions throughout history and the fact that most nationalist states are so self-focused that they fail to act morally perplexes those of us who want
a moral world order. On the one hand, cosmopolitanism has not been the prevalent ideology in world history, except in rare moments, but on the other hand nationalism in its current form tends to fail to enforce and live up to liberal values. This tension between facts and values leads naturally to the question of how to make a world in which we can have a practical answer to the normative demands of liberalism.

In order to answer that question—even to formulate it precisely—I must rely on a key set of terms that I will define precisely and use technically, even though these words have a variety of colloquial uses and are also defined variously in the works of different political scientists and philosophers. I will define the key terms here, and explain the reasons for using these particular definitions:

- The simplest term is *state*, which refers to the bureaucratic and organizing structures that serve as a government. It includes the holders of offices, the various institutions that comprise the public authority, as well as the founding documents that define the scope and structure of governing authorities.

- A *country* refers to a state and the territory that it controls.

- State and country are both distinct from the *nation*, a term I use interchangeably with *ethnonation*. The nation or ethnonation refers to an aggregation of people that self-identifies as a group based on some combination of cultural, regional, racial, religious, and/or linguistic similarity.

An ethnicity, from which the “ethno-“ in ethnonation derives, often refers to a group of people who are genetically related. The child of two Russian immigrants to American would thus be ethnically Slavic, but nationally American. While recognizing this usage of ethnic, I depart from it in my use of the term “ethnonation” for two reasons. First, the idea that ethnicities can be
defined through genetics is too simplistic. Ethnicity is more socially constructed than genetic: I consider myself ethnically Jewish, but genetically I likely have more in common with a Czech than with a Sephardic Jew. Second, drawing borders based on genetics is arbitrary, and thus uncertain. All humans are genetically related. How far the sense of being genetically related reaches is up for debate: whether or not there is a conscious effort made to follow cultural traditions less so. Additionally, it is beneficial to use ethnonation to avoid the confusion between nation and state, which has become prevalent since rise of the nation-state, another term that requires definition.

- The nation-state refers to states created around pre-existing nations, and is now the dominant form of political organization. Modern day France, Germany and Poland are three examples of states today that are formed for and around the national groups that comprise the majority of the citizenry.

- The modern nation-state is characteristically based upon a particular conception of legitimacy, grounded in the ideas of liberalism, that is, freedom and equality.

- I will refer to a legitimate state as a state that is democratic, republican and liberal. It is worth noting that these characteristics are sometimes claimed by illiberal states, for instance through rigged elections and claimed freedom of speech. However, faking liberalism and democracy does not stop a state from being illegitimate.

- A democratic state is one in which the people is sovereign, which requires that the people vote regularly in free, fair, and open elections.

- A republican state is one in which the will of the people is reflected in the laws, and there is rule of law, with the government and the people tending to obey the laws they generate.
A liberal state is one that protects essential rights defined by liberalism, such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and protection from discrimination based on physical characteristics.

The people in a democracy is the citizenry, those who are enfranchised and protected by the state: the citizenry is the sovereign of a democracy. Rarely do we observe a citizenry comprised entirely of one ethnonation, but there is often one ethnonation that constitutes a sufficiently large majority as to dominate a given citizenry.

Any citizenry or ethnonation presupposes a form of solidarity, a sense of togetherness that exists among individuals which causes them to be not merely a random aggregation of individuals, but a distinct people.

Applied to politics, there is civic solidarity, solidarity between citizens. This solidarity refers to a solidarity that unites any citizenry, regardless of whether it has an ethnonational majority or not.

National or ethnonational solidarity, refers to solidarity among the members of an ethnonation. This solidarity is based upon the same factors that ethnonational groups are, language, culture, race, and religion.

Nationalism or ethnonationalism refers to the theory that a state is or should be composed of a citizenry drawn from one ethnonational group, and that the state’s function is to advance the interests and goals of that ethnonational group. This ideology’s success has resulted in a world of nation-states, in which ethnonational solidarity has caused some people to be willing to place members of their own ethnonational group above others in both estimation and treatment. This focus on one ethnonational group has both positive and negative consequences. On one hand it allows for welfare policies for
co-nationals, but on the other, it does not recommend any duty towards ethnonational others.

Diametrically opposed to the ethnonationalist view are the various forms of non-ethnonational beliefs that are categorized under the umbrella term cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism has supposedly existed since ancient Greece, when the Cynic Diogenes declared himself “a citizen of the world.”

- A cosmopolitan morality or outlook is one in which a person views their humanity as the prime factor in their mixture of identities, and so has to duties to all other humans.
- Political cosmopolitanism may be thought of in two forms. There is the idea of a cosmopolitan state, a world state that would fully realize the liberal values of freedom and equality on a global scale, and that of a cosmopolitan order, an international constellation of separate states that belong to a variety of shared trans- and supra-national institutions.
- Trans-national organizations refer to organizations that regulate non-state conduct that occurs in the international sphere, such as businesses and NGOs. Supra-national organizations, such as the United Nations, refer to those that claim authority above that of individual states.

In this paper, I will be using cosmopolitanism to refer to the theory that a state is or should be by, for, and of its citizens regardless of their ethnonational identity, and without a

\[\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{2}}} \text{Diogenes, quotes in Diogenes Laertius, } \textit{Lives of Eminent Philosophers}, \text{ trans. R.D.Hicks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925), 65.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{3}}} \text{I use “international” for want of a better word. “Interstate” would be more technically correct, but the United States’ transformation of that phrase to mean between provinces, and specifically highways, makes “interstate” unsuitable, and so I have resigned myself to the definition of “international” as between states.}\]
preference for any ethnonational group within the system, even if that group is the majority. This could be called multi- or pan-national solidarity.

- I will refer to multi- and pan-national solidarity as **cosmopolitan solidarity**, for the reason that this form of solidarity only requires a person to be human and subscribe to a set of intellectual beliefs, as well as the fact that it is the only form of solidarity compatible with the cosmopolitan ideal. Thus civic solidarity holding together a multinational state would be a form of cosmopolitan solidarity. Additionally, a legitimate state based on cosmopolitan solidarity could come together with other states to form a cosmopolitan order, on ideal of political cosmopolitanism.

Cosmopolitan solidarity is based on the belief that certain values are necessarily reached by all cultures eventually that are inherently good and proper to adopt. These are the values of liberalism, based on freedom, equality, and human rights. The particular interpretations of these values may differ from one country to the next, but the general principles remain the same, and underlie all cosmopolitan theory.

We are now ready to see that our main question—whether cosmopolitanism is a better basis for a state than ethnonationalism—in fact amounts to four distinct questions.

The first question is normative: Is ethnonationalism or cosmopolitanism *morally* better? Ethnonationalism answers that it is, based on its ability to preserve of culture and express the will of an already formed people. Cosmopolitanism claims that its superiority lies in the end of ethnonational wars, and the moral ground of ensuring the triumph of liberalism and feeling solidarity with all of humanity in every citizenry.

The second and third questions are pragmatic: Do the institutions favored by ethnonationalism inherently create instability? Is cosmopolitanism possible? Normally, these
questions would be empirical and outside the realm of theory. However the lack of true cosmopolitan states, and indeed, any legitimate alternative to ethnonationalism suggests that this is a moment when only political theory can answer this question, whether to lead the way towards cosmopolitanism, prevent us from going down a pathway that is a dead end, or reveal the best way to make cosmopolitan morality compatible with the current world order. The instability argument against ethnonationalism comes from the multinational character emerging in many states, as with the growing Middle Eastern populations of European states. The impossibility of cosmopolitans is posited by its detractors based on the distinct lack of stable, legitimate, multinational states in the world.

The final question is the calculation based on the first three: given the earlier answers, what should we do? These questions are broad, and the subject of many historical and theoretical arguments. At the same time, they demand answers, as these general questions serve to answer specific ones: how seriously should demands for ethnonational self-determination be taken? What obligations do we have to influence our governments into setting up trans- and supranational organizations? Do we have a moral obligation to favor our co-nationals in questions of welfare and government support, or are we equally obligated to all members of the citizenry?

In the nation-state model, states that supposedly are created to speak for one nation dominate the world, and yet there are still conflicts along ethnonational lines. One of the best examples of a legitimate multinational state until recently was the United Kingdom, which is comprised of four relatively ethnonationally homogenous and geographically concentrated member-nations: Northern Ireland, Scotland, England, and Wales. Recently, however, the UK has undergone a “devolution of power,” in which the three national parliaments have increased authority. This process has resulted in a Scottish referendum for independence set for September
of 2014. It is not clear which direction the Scottish people will chose to take, with 42% in favor and some as yet undecided, but suffice it to say, the fact that the referendum is coming up with enough support that it could pass suggests that significant cracks exist in the multinational character of the UK. This is just one example. The crisis in Crimea, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the issues in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria with the Kurds are all further examples of the instability of multinational states.

To investigate the tension between the moral demands of cosmopolitanism and the reality of ethnonationalism, I present an argument in four parts. Like any good political theory investigation, this one stands on the shoulders of giants. The first three parts are thus investigations of other theories. The first focuses on Jean-Jacques Rousseau. A citizen of Geneva who wrote in the mid-18th Century, Rousseau was the founder of the theoretical basis for liberal, republican democracy, and also one of the first theorists to introduce ethnonational identity as an essential basis for legitimate governance and democracy. Combined with his understanding of the human psyche, this makes Rousseau the strongest defender of nationalism given his influence in the framework of the modern world. I will use Rousseau’s argument not only as the basis for nationalism, but also the argument for liberal, republican democracy. Following Rousseau’s explanation of the development of a political people will elucidate the connection between nationalism and legitimacy, revealing the ways in which ethnonationalism interfaces with legitimate democracy, and the ways in which he sought to protect the world from excessive nationalistic fervor. The key idea in Rousseau’s works is the **general will**. To explain this concept, imagine the citizenry as uniting to form a collective person, the body politic, which wills the common good. Thus the general will is the will of the body politic, which is directed

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towards the good of the whole. This concept, deeply embedded in republican though as a whole, will prove to be the entry point for ethnonationalism into the equation of legitimacy. I will seek to explain and evaluate Rousseau’s theory, and cast it in its strongest terms.

The second part shall present a cosmopolitan interlocutor. As the first part explains the strongest argument for nationalism, this section will seek to present the strongest form of cosmopolitanism. For this difficult task, I have selected Jürgen Habermas, heir to the Frankfurt School and a Kantian-Marxist. Rousseau heavily influences both of Habermas’s philosophical lineages: Marx’s anti-bourgeois philosophy draws on Rousseau’s use of the word bourgeois, and Kant is the direct follower of Rousseau in the republican tradition. Indeed, Kant’s respect for Rousseau is well documented. When Kant received his copy of Émile, Rousseau’s work on education, he is said to have broken his daily routine to focus on the text, one of the only instances in which he ever did so. Habermas, knowingly or not, is therefore a theoretical descendant of Rousseau. Like Kant before him, however, Habermas departs from Rousseau’s nationalism in favor of a cosmopolitan outlook. His theory also has a practical component, given its tie to the European Union. Habermas considers cosmopolitanism from many angles in a changing world. The modern order of the international sphere, Habermas contends, is in a post-national constellation, in which the nation-state can no longer serve to control the processes of economics or protect its citizenry from them. The post-national constellation recommends a form of cosmopolitan order designed to deal with the modern world. He focuses on a changing world with historical processes leading towards cosmopolitanism, and the practical development of the European Union within the past quarter of a century. This chapter will trace Habermas’s argument, seeking to aid him in proving that cosmopolitanism is both possible and normatively necessary. His suggestion for the basis of cosmopolitan solidarity is constitutional patriotism, a
form of civic solidarity in which people feel connected to each other and the state through rational acceptance of constitutional principles. At the end of this chapter, I will begin to compare Rousseau and Habermas.

Following these in depth portraits, I will briefly gloss three other theories that seek to bring cosmopolitan and ethnonationalism closer together. The first is Yael Tamir’s *Liberal Nationalism*, which attempts to reconcile nationalism’s normative issues with liberalism. This will serve as an attempt to update nationalistic theory for a world of multinational states. The eponymous term, **liberal nationalism** refers to the normative ideal behind states based on ethnonational solidarity that push liberal values to the fore and so blunt the dangers of ethnonationalism. Oren Yiftachel’s *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine* is included to provide the type of virulent attack on ethnonationalism that Habermas stays firmly away from. It provides the normative argument against ethnonationalism. Its title, **ethnocracy** denotes a regime which, by design or practice, favors one ethnonational group over all others. This creates an ethnonational “other” that is institutionally excluded from the state. Finally, I will use Kwame Anthony Appiah to show the normative argument in favor of cosmopolitan morality. His argument is not necessarily for any political cosmopolitanism, but it serves well when considering how a nation-state should behave. These three theorists, taken in conjunction, serve to present and justify a third position, articulating a state that is based on ethnonational solidarity but conforms to the demands of cosmopolitan morality. In doing so, this argument is able to draw the strength of ethnonationalism and the morality of cosmopolitanism together.

The fourth and concluding chapter will consider all of these theories and attempt to reach an answer of whether cosmopolitanism or ethnonationalism is better, as well as what this answer implies. It will seek to unwind the intricacies of the question above: what should we do?
Rousseau: the Groundwork of Nationalism

Introduction

Jean-Jacques Rousseau played an important role in the history of political theory. It was he who first reconciled freedom and the rule of law through the idea of republican government as the basis of legitimacy. In any examination of the theory of nationalism, Rousseau stands out as the philosopher who provided the bedrock on which the modern concepts of the nation-state and nationalism rest. In addition to his contributions to democracy, a group of political scientists lead by E.H. Carr found that Rousseau’s role “in the development of the idea of nationalism can hardly be exaggerated… Rousseau provided the theoretical foundations upon which alone the nationalism of the nineteenth century could be built.”

Not only did Rousseau lay “the foundations of a coherent and systematic theory of nationalism, but [he] also established [the] association between nationalism and democracy.” Assertions like these are found throughout the literature on the theoretical development of nationalism. It is therefore natural to view Rousseau’s theory as essential in discussing the evolution of modern nationalism. Due to his key role, I will allow Rousseau to lay the groundwork for this debate on a blank canvas.

Rousseau, it must be noted, did not use the word nationalism, nor is it clear that the word existed during his lifetime. However, he did rely on a form of civic solidarity to create legitimacy. While he “called it *patriotisme…* it was patriotism with a twist.” In reality, Rousseau was beginning to discover nationalism. It may be argued that he did not have the framework for it truly in mind and that this is an anachronistic projection, but it is just as likely,

6 Carr et al., *Nationalism*, 30.
7 Carr et al., *Nationalism*, 27.
and just as impossible to prove, that we might never have had a concept of nationalism without him. Whichever interpretation one follows, that some scholars have suggested a clear “development of political ideas from Rousseau through Hegel to Mussolini and Hitler” confirms Rousseau’s prominent place in the creation of the nationalism that we both live with and fear today.  

Nationalism in Rousseau’s philosophy is most evident in his Considerations on the Government of Poland and his Plan for Corsica. These two works are practical in nature, and therefore some argue that any conclusions drawn from them represents Rousseau’s conclusions when the ideal is not possible. If their argument is correct, that practical works do not suggest theory, then the most significant and evident parts of Rousseau’s nationalism would not exist, and they do not according to the theorists who subscribe to this reading. Alfred Cobban, for instance, claims that since these are practical works, in them Rousseau “is not concerned with patriotism as an ideal.” But while these works are an essential part of Rousseau’s thoughts on nationalism, the theoretical groundwork for them is laid in his philosophical works, especially the Discourse on Inequality, the Social Contract and the Discourse on Political Economy. This groundwork should therefore be examined first, and then the nationalism of Rousseau’s practical works should be considered in light of it. By examining the theory first it becomes clear that nationalism is essential at all levels of Rousseau’s works, and so there seems to be an inherent connection between nationalism and republican democracy.

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8 Carr et al., Nationalism, 334.
Theoretical Works

The basis for Rousseau’s understanding of government, right, and legitimacy is a portrait of the State of Nature, or society before there was government. The *Discourse on Inequality* is the work in which Rousseau’s State of Nature is most clearly laid out. The State of Nature is of import for Rousseau because it is the “ignorance of the nature of man that casts such uncertainty and obscurity on the genuine definition of natural right,” and it is from natural right that we may understand social right (DI, 125). The State of Nature is also the phase where the term “Nation” appears. Rousseau’s description of a nation differs very little from the modern definition introduced above.

The formation of identity begins to take place during the State of Nature. Rousseau’s State of Nature is split into three phases, which may be referred to as Natural Man, Nascent Society, and Total War. Of these three phases, Nascent Society is the most important in the formation of identity and the nation. It is during this phase that “Men, who until now had roamed in the Woods, having become more settled, gradually come together, unite in various troops, and finally in every region form a particular Nation” (DI, 165). This passage is important in several respects. Since “Rousseau frequently capitalizes the terms of his technical vocabulary,” his choice to capitalize the word “Nation” suggests that it is a technical term so that in later works it can be assumed to have the same meaning. This moment of formation is therefore an essential definitional moment for Rousseau. He defines these nations as “united in morals and character, not by Rules or Laws, but by the same kind of life and of foods, and the influence of a shared Climate” (DI, 165).


There is some disagreement on the meaning of Rousseau’s definition of “nation,” and not all theorists agree on its consistency across texts. Marc Plattner, for instance, believes that Rousseau does not “define the term *la nation* or seem to use it with the same care and rigor” as other terms. Plattner’s opinion is that “Rousseau appears to employ *la nation* more or less interchangeably with *le peuple*.” His confusion stems from the fact that Rousseau refers to nations as both pre-political and political groups. While referring to nations as originating in Nascent Society, he also refers to lawgivers as “fathers of nations,” implying that nations are born with their laws (SC, 71). In order to resolve the apparent tension, Plattner turns to Cobban and Anne Cohler’s interpretations of the nation. According to them, Rousseau believes that the nation is pre-political, but that a nation’s character may be transformed by giving it laws. This reading is insightful and correct. Rousseau’s understanding of the nation is that it formed from natural factors, but reacts and interacts with other factors and transforms accordingly. This interpretation fits well with Rousseau’s use of nation throughout his works. However, Plattner is incorrect in assuming that this definition means that “nation” is ill-defined. There is no tension in the text, but rather a nuanced understanding of the way that a nation is created and recreated. For Rousseau, the nation is defined as a purely cultural and non-political phenomenon that provides a sense of solidarity through shared mores developed in response to environmental factors. It is united and distinguished from others by culture, and if acted upon by laws can be transformed.

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13 Plattner, *Rousseau and the Origins of Nationalism*, 190
into a political people. The ethnonation therefore exists before the citizenry, and is the substrate from which a citizenry may arise.

The bond of the nation also gives rise to the passion that ultimately will cause nationalism. As culture developed, claims Rousseau, “everyone began to look at everyone else and to wish to be looked at himself, and public esteem acquired a price” (DI, 166). At this point, therefore, a form of self-love was born. To Rousseau, self-love is split into two categories. In his notes to the Discourse on Inequality, he defines the two as, “Amour propre [vanity] and Amour de soi-même [self-love], two very different passions in their nature and their effects, [which] should not be confused” (DI, 218). Amour de soi-même is a form of natural desire for self-preservation and “which, guided in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue” (DI, 218). Amour de soi-même is therefore a positive passion, which is an inherent part of human nature. It has very little to do with nationalism, if anything at all, as amour de soi-même does not involve comparison. In as far as amour de soi-même is related to the nation, it is the desire for cultural preservation rather than national solidarity. Rousseau claims that amour-propre, by contrast, “is only a relative sentiment, factitious, and born in society, which inclines every individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone else, [and] inspires men with all the evils they do one another” (DI, 218). This is the source of nationalism in Rousseau’s theory.

Rousseau does not ever use the word nationalism, but he does describe patriotism in some detail. As will be explained later, the legitimate state is inherently based national factors, which are needed to cause a group of individuals to perceive themselves as a people, and perceive a government as a shared institution that is not alien to them. As such it can be assumed that in Rousseau’s theory, patriotism is linked to nationalism, since the nation is an essential part of what a patriot loves. Rousseau defines patriotism as a “gentle and lively sentiment which
combines the force of amour propre with all the beauty of virtue, endows it with an energy which, without disfiguring it, makes it the most heroic of passions” (PE, 16).\(^{16}\) This passion is “love of the fatherland” (PE, 16). Inherent in his definition is the idea that there is a fatherland (patrie), not just a country (pays). The fatherland is the legitimate state, in which the people are only subjects of the general will, as opposed to a country, which has a populace living under shared laws not produced by a general will (E, 473).\(^{17}\)

By encouraging patriotic sentiments, Rousseau redirects the passions of the individual towards the good of the collective, and away from the selfish benefit of one person. Patriotism, however, is only for legitimate states, as it presupposes a fatherland as its object. Rousseau’s flowery explanations of it roughly translate to the inspiration put the patrie above the self.

However, basing the ability to experience solidarity in amour-propre creates a significant problem, since amour-propre can only exist as a relative sentiment. As in the distinction drawn in Rousseau’s notes to the Discourse on Inequality above, amour-propre is often seen as just “vanity.” Vanity only captures part of the passion. Frederick Neuhouser notes that “In attempting to understand Rousseau’s conception of amour-propre English speakers face… serious linguistic obstacles,” specifically that there is no English rendering that is proper, and rather than the negative connotations that come with most English translations, amour-propre can “enrich and elevate human existence.”\(^{18}\) His rendering puts amour-propre “as a need or desire to be


valued.”¹⁹ Neuhouser splits the relative components of *amour-propre* into two parts: the “desire to have a certain standing in relation to the standing of some group of relevant others” and “its satisfaction requires—indeed, consists in—the opinion’s of one’s fellow beings.”²⁰ The requirement for other’s esteem leads to the benefits possible from *amour-propre*. In requiring that we understand the opinions of others, *amour-propre* demands and creates “the ability to step outside one’s own perspective in order to see oneself from the point of view of another.”²¹ Questions of identity and our ability to recognize others as the same as or different from ourselves, and to extend our positive identification with ourselves to others are thus manifestations of *amour-propre*.

Translated onto the macro-level, *amour-propre* is best seen in concepts such as American exceptionalism and the idea that any group is the greatest nation on Earth. What these examples of pride fail to include are the elements of envy and possessiveness inherent in the concept of *amour-propre*. These factors are essential to nationalism. Extreme nationalism often arises when a nation attempts to prove its independence, or seek retribution for some slight it has suffered. Therefore, nationalism should be understood to encompass any reaction to a comparison that assigns a ranking, along with the belief that the in-group is or should be the best. Nationalism, therefore, is the national reaction to a ranking amongst nations. For Rousseau this competition is inevitable and necessarily each nation wishes to be the best, at least according to some metric that it values. *Amour-propre*, as the fount of national solidarity thus turns it into the nationalism we see today.

This need to be compared favorably with others is probably the reason that “every patriot is harsh to foreigners” (E, 39). The general will only applies to those willing it, the citizens. With respect to foreigners, citizens remain in a state of nature. By definition, the patriot identifies with his compatriots far more than with foreigners. Additionally, the patriot must be able to identify with the facets of the state, including the government. This means that a fatherland cannot be “nothing more to [its citizens] than it is to foreigners, and grant them only what it cannot refuse to anyone” (PE, 16). Citizens must draw some distinctive benefit beyond the liberties that anyone has in their state. Specifically, they gain positive freedom, that is, they are only subject to their own general will whereas the foreigner is subject to an external will. Therefore, in Rousseau’s view, the legitimate state must be first for its citizens, and like its citizens, may mistreat foreigners. Rousseau’s patriotism is therefore of a sort that requires the fatherland to be primarily for its citizens and be uncaring towards foreigners, if not worse.

The Social Contract, in which Rousseau expounds his theory of democratic legitimacy, picks up the political story where the Discourse on Inequality leaves off. In the Social Contract Rousseau makes it clear that not all aggregates of people can be subjected to the legitimate rule of law. A social contract must be formed among the members of a group that is able to be united into a body politic (SC, 50). For a people to be fit for legislation, it must be “already bound together by some union of origin, interest, or convention” (SC, 77). The pre-political people is therefore culturally united. Additionally, it is clear that to Rousseau this unification must be nationally based, given his belief that “for Nations as for men there is a time of maturity for which one has to wait before subjecting them to laws” (SC, 73). The fatherland is thus forged from a pre-political nation united into a body politic. Given its national character, the love of the fatherland must involve a certain love for the nation as well. The patriots that a person loves are
therefore members of their own ethnonational group, while the foreigners that patriots may be harsh to are members of a different people. A fatherland will take its political people and transform them culturally to be ethnonationally different from all other groups.

Thus for there to be patriotism, there must be an ethnonation. The need for patriotism in Rousseau’s theory comes out of his philosophy of freedom and moral psychology. Rousseau seeks a way that laws may “subjugate men in order to make them free” (PE, 9). In other words, it is necessary to find a way to make people constrained by law, but at the same time not enslaved to laws that are against their will. Rousseau begins this task by declaring that “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains,” and that he “can make [government] legitimate” (SC, 41). In describing this legitimacy, Rousseau created a theory for democracy and the will of the people that became the foundation for the modern litmus test of a government’s legitimacy: if it expresses the will of the people, a government is legitimate. Citizens will view their laws as springing from themselves. Even if a person votes against a given law, he will accept its passage as his compatriots trying to do what is right for the entire nation. Therefore, the ethnonation’s solidarity allows it easily to will as a body politic, and thus means that ethnonational states are able to become legitimate more easily than states based on any other form of solidarity.

Rousseau’s test of legitimacy rests on a complex understanding of the relationship between a state and its citizenry, as well as on an investigation into exactly what will the government should follow. For a regime to be legitimate, it is necessary that each person places himself under the power of all, meaning that each “gives himself to no one, and since there is no associate over whom one does not acquire the same rights as one grants over oneself, one gains the equivalent of all one loses” making the association “equal for all” (SC, 50). This equality under the law is necessary, because it means that power will be evenly distributed. Ultimately,
the social contract “can be reduced to the following terms: Each of us puts his person and his full power in common under the supreme direction of the general will” (SC, 50). The truly legitimate state, therefore, is one in which the all members of the citizenry are equal under this general will.

The general will must be a will, of course. Willing is the process of wanting through reason with the force of desire. A will, therefore, is the faculty which wills, including both the desire and the process that combines the rational wish with the emotional drive. However, there must be something that makes the general will unlike particular wills. Indeed, it is distinguished from particular wills in several ways. The social contract “produces a moral and collective body… which receives by this same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will” (SC 50). This body is the body politic, and its will is the general will (PE, 6). The ability to share a will comes from the fact that “So long as several men united consider themselves a single body, they have but a single will, which is concerned with the common preservation and the general welfare” (SC, 121). The general will’s composition is therefore described as, “the steady will of all the members of the state” (SC, 124). It is not, however, merely an aggregate will, as

there is often a considerable difference between the will of all and the general will: the latter looks only to the common interest, the former looks to private interest, and is nothing but a sum of particular wills; but if, from these same wills, one takes away the pluses and minuses which cancel each other out, what is left as the sum of their differences is the general will (SC, 60).

The general will, therefore, is the true will of a political people, one that wills the good of the people as a whole. What follows is the question of what allows a people to will as a people and how the general will can be present in the majority of the citizenry.

While the general will as the foundation of legitimacy is a clear thread throughout Rousseau’s works, Rousseau does not directly address the relationship between the general will and the nation. Cobban’s interpretation of this relation posits a strong link between the general will and the nation: the formulation of the general will in which Rousseau’s “originality lies…
leads him irresistibly to the idea of nationality. Here he stands alone."\textsuperscript{22} Cohler, however, follows the connection from the rule law to the shape of a people somewhat differently. She claims that “truly following the law as the expression of the general will requires that the government shape the will and actions of the people so as to make of them a citizenry.”\textsuperscript{23} Cohler takes this to mean that Rousseau’s “argument is circular because the problem is circular,” because “in practice, [a government] uses its power to create or destroy… the general will itself.”\textsuperscript{24} She therefore implies that because the general will is recast by the government, the government cannot be based on it. What Cobban grasps that Cohler misses is that the pre-political nation can satisfy this ability to will. Indeed, it must.

The identification between people occurs initially among those who live near one another (DI, 164-165). This is the necessary “natural base on which to form conventional ties” (E, 363). Ultimately, “the love of one’s nearest [is] the principle of the love one owes the state” (E, 363). So, for the general will to be formed, people must first learn to will collectively with small groups of people, such as family and local community. The first “we” that a person experiences is the family or a small circle of friends, and it is through this that he learns more generally to have a shared identity. The process through which people learn to will communally allows for a shared will to be formed between the members of a nation pre-politically, which can be turned into a general will via the social contract. It is important to recognize that the shared will does not, and cannot form in a non-ethnonational group pre-politically. This extension of \textit{amour-propre} and will is necessary to move people to obey the law. For Rousseau, the general will and the ability to extend \textit{amour-propre} is thus “an alternative to [the forceful] method of holding the

\textsuperscript{22}Cobban, \textit{Rousseau and the Modern State}, 104.
\textsuperscript{23}Cohler, \textit{Rousseau and Nationalism}, 168.
\textsuperscript{24}Cohler, \textit{Rousseau and Nationalism}, 169.
state together."²⁵ By extending *amour-propre*, Rousseau means identifying with someone so closely that we take pride in their success, and feel pain with their suffering. Nationalism is therefore the only way that we can have the obedience to the law that is not based on fear and despotism.

On a theoretical level Rousseau does support nationalism. His theory of identity creation and of how a body politic is formed show a distinct connection to the concept of the nation-state. While Rousseau does not create a direct link between the nation and the body politic in any one work, by taking his theoretical works together, it is becomes clear that Rousseau did indeed see both a natural foundation of the nation and a need for the nation to provide the basis for a general will and thus legitimacy. The requirement for a form of solidarity in transforming a pre-political people into a political people is thus best satisfied by a shared national identity.

**The Practicality of Nationalism**

The theoretical backing for nationalism comes to its fullest development and furthest extent in two later, practical works. The *Plan for a Constitution for Corsica* was never actually published, but was penned in the year following the publication of *The Social Contract* and *Emile*, while *Considerations on the Government of Poland* was written ten years later.²⁶ These texts are often thought of as works in which Rousseau stretches or cuts his theory, forcing it to fit the practical world. However, this does not make the theory in them any less philosophical. Indeed, the practicality of these pieces enhances their value in the context of nationalism, with one of the strongest defenses of nationalism lying in its inherent pragmatic value.

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The *Corsica* originally was written due to a claim that Rousseau made in the *Social Contract*: “There is one country left in Europe capable of receiving legislation; it is the island of Corsica” (SC, 78). This comes directly as the practical answer to Rousseau’s question of “Which people… is fit for legislation” (SC, 77). As such, the *Corsica* can be assumed to be as close as possible to an ideal practical theory, and the Corsican people may be assumed to have “the simplicity of nature linked with the needs of society” (SC, 78). The work itself suggests that Corsicans should strive to build a small, agrarian state, which ignores trade and other aspects of modern economic development in favor of self-sufficiency. It assumes equality among the populace, and urges the Corsicans to maintain this equality and to live a life of prudence rather than opulence, so as to make the island appear less important to international powers. Their status as an island, according to Rousseau, will further allow them to practice a somewhat anti-modern isolationism. This falls in line with a project to push Corsica to become an idealized version of Rousseau’s home, Geneva.

As Allan Bloom points out, “if [Rousseau’s ideal state] were possible, it would be so only in a few small places with very special circumstances, like Corsica.”27 By contrast, Poland was too large and had already been subject to laws, thus making Rousseau’s views on it less tied to his general theoretical prescriptions. A proper investigation of his practical works for governments therefore works its way from the *Corsica* to the *Poland*. Investigating the *Poland* last also continues the project of tracing Rousseau’s texts through the order in which they were written. His later works, the *Poland* and *Corsica*, vividly display the role of ethnonationalism in legitimate states.

At the beginning of the *Corsica*, Rousseau rephrases one of his central political beliefs, that countries are fundamentally harmed by “separating two inseparable things, namely the body which governs and the body which is governed” (C, 123). He wants instead a government that brings the people and the sovereign power together formally. Because of this goal, “the wisest people, observing relations of suitability, form the government for the nation. Nevertheless, there is something much better to do, that is to form the nation for the government” (C, 123). Before analyzing further, it must be noted that Rousseau assumes and takes for granted that the “body which is governed” is a nation. He does not explain this conclusion here, but it seems to confirm that the already unified people that he spoke of in the *Social Contract* as being fit for legislation is indeed an ethnonational group.

Rousseau moves on to explain that if the government is formed for the nation, “to the extent that the government declines while the nation stays the same, the conformity vanishes” (C, 123). The issue is therefore that when the government is molded to the nation, the nation will not be changed or shaped by the laws or institutions. This results in a discrepancy between the nation, which is best thought of as retaining a measure of its pre-political nature, and the government, an inherently political institution. The creation of a gap between the nation and the government would be inevitable so long as they remain in different states of development. By contrast, if the nation is shaped to fit the government, “everything changes at an even pace and the nation, dragging the government along by its force, maintains it when it maintains itself and makes it decline when it declines. The one is always suited to the other” (C, 123). The most interesting thing about this quotation is that aside from merely solving the issues above,

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Rousseau in no uncertain terms exposes the power of the nation over the government. Whether the government is made to fit the people, in which case the nation outlasts it, or the nation to fit the government, in which case the government is dragged along behind it, the nation remains the stronger of the two.

Because of this strength, it would be difficult to entirely form the nation to the government. Rousseau realizes this, telling the Corsicans to “not draw conclusions from other nations to fit yours. Maxims drawn from your own experience are the best upon which you can govern yourself” (C, 125). Beyond this, however, Rousseau does not say much in the Corsica to point directly towards nationalism, with the exception of two notable passages. While discussing the former occupiers of Corsica, he claims that while they “wanted only to debase the nobility… you want to ennoble the nation” (C, 129). This quotation is both a clever play on words and a simple statement of fact: to solidify the national character, it should be treated with a high degree of respect and perhaps reverence. Our pride should be in the nation, our *amour-propre* directed at upholding its honor.

The second passage does not relate to the nation, but rather provides a clarification on the parts of *amour-propre*. Rousseau claims that “in order to awaken a nation’s activity it is necessary to give it great desires, great hopes, great positive motives for acting. When well examined… you will find that everything is reduced almost to vanity alone” (C, 153). However, “This name, vanity, is not well chosen, because it is only one of the two branches of amour-propre” (C, 154). The other branch, pride, “is more natural than vanity” (C, 154). Pride is greater than vanity, and is less comparative and more focused on the victory of the self than vanity, which focuses on the failure of others (See E 264-265).
Rousseau moves from this discussion of *amour-propre* to talk about nations. He claims that “at first every people that is formed is prideful. But no new people was ever vain, because by nature vanity is individual; it cannot be the instrument of such a great thing as forming the body of a nation” (C, 154). At this point, Rousseau implies that an older people is often vain, in countering the assumption that they were at their formation. He has therefore clarified the role that *amour-propre* plays in the development of a nation: the pride of its members causes them to differentiate their nation from others. It should be remembered, however, that Rousseau is clear that a new people is not yet ready to be a political people, but that rather it must be a people that is old pre-politically, that is, an ethnonational group.

The *Poland*, by contrast, is a completed work with a definite argument. In the *Poland*, Rousseau seeks to explain not only how the Poles should govern themselves, but also how they might survive further invasions and attempts to assimilate them. His answer proves to be twofold. As expected, he recommends moving the country towards democratic sovereignty, although this must be done slowly, given the cultural arrangements of nobles and serfs. This gradualism represents a recognition on Rousseau’s part that his ideal theory as spelled out in the *Social Contract* cannot be put in place immediately in all places, but rather should come slowly as cultural changes allow it. Rousseau’s insistence on small states remains intact: he recommends that the Poles “[b]egin by contracting your boundaries… It would no doubt be a great evil for the dismembered parts; but it would be a great good for the body of the nation” (P, 194). On the other hand, he does make some concessions to Polish tradition, including allowing for a king and a house of nobles. The other branch of his argument, however, is how to make the Polish nation

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indestructible by its neighbors. It is this branch that is more pressing in a discussion of nationalism.

A lawgiver must influence the post-political nation in order to survive the tortures of international relations, such as war and occupation. The role of a lawgiver is best summed up at the end of a discussion on the three most accomplished lawgivers in history: Moses, Lycurgus, and Numa. All three “sought bonds that might attach the Citizens to the fatherland and to one another, and they found them in… [cultural practices] which by their very nature were always exclusive and national” (P, 181). The message of the Poland, therefore, is that if “a Pole can never become a Russian… Russia will never subjugate Poland” (P, 183). This statement has two essential theoretical consequences. Firstly, it ultimately and entirely rejects the possibility of assimilation in a solidly formed and exclusive nation. This position is also shown by his analysis of Jews, the “singular nation, so often subjugated, so often scattered and apparently destroyed… [which] has nevertheless maintained itself down to our days, scattered among the other nations without ever merging with them… and will endure as long as the world itself does, in spite of the hatred and persecution by the rest of mankind” (P, 180). The inability to assimilate is therefore the result of a properly legislated nation, unified in more ways than a merely pre-political nation.

Secondly, Rousseau implies here that legitimate states cannot truly be multinational. While multiple pre-political nations could hypothetically be incorporated by a gifted lawgiver into a single political one, once a nation has been properly sculpted it cannot be incorporated into a state in which it is a minority. While it may be “overwhelmed by its enemies a hundred times,” such a nation will eventually “be in a position to resist them” (P, 183). The political nation will eventually gain self-determination. It is not clear whether a future lawgiver can reform a political nation, but based on Rousseau’s examples it seems that they could not: from the evidence of his
time, Greece was splintered and controlled by external forces and Italy merely splintered. The Jewish people was scattered throughout the world, still relying on Moses’ laws for solidarity. Reform in a properly created political people was not present in these archetypes, and there is no reason to assume that it would be in other nations.

The distinctions above reveal an important point in Rousseau’s thought that he alludes to at the beginning of the *Poland*. Rousseau writes about “the case of a fully instituted nation” (P, 177). As Cohler points out, this statement “implies that a nation may not be completely established.” This implication leads further to the fact that “the political order to be formed on the nation will [not] leave it the same as before.” The distinction and self-focus that are created by the legislator may therefore be understood as making a nation fully instituted. In Cohler’s words, “It is now on purpose that which it was by accident.” To complete the nation, therefore, there must be a designer who wills the national cohesion, as opposed to it merely being a historical and geographical contingency.

It is for this reason that there “are no more Frenchmen, Germans, Spaniards, [or] even Englishmen, nowadays, regardless of what people may say; there are only Europeans… because none has been given a national form by a distinctive institution” (P, 184). Rousseau goes on to lament this fact, although it is not clear that he is upset that “all will do the same things under the same circumstances,” as much as by the behaviors themselves, a distinctively capitalist lip-service to morality and attempt to acquire wealth (P, 184, see also *Discourse on the Sciences and Arts*).

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31 Cohler, *Rousseau and Nationalism*, 34.
32 Cohler, *Rousseau and Nationalism*, 35.
That there is national differentiation and self-focus inherent in a nation only shows that there is an essential place for national identity in the state. It does not yet suggest a need for nationalism as such. While the Corsica hints at the place of nationalism, it does not directly point to it. In the Poland, however, Rousseau makes it clear that it “is national institutions which form the genius, the character, the tastes, and the morals of a people… which inspire in it that ardent love of fatherland,” or, as he calls it elsewhere, patriotism (P, 183). The most important of these institutions is education, which “must give souls the national form, and so direct their tastes and opinions that they will be patriotic by inclination, passion, necessity” (P, 189). Rousseau proceeds to wax poetic on the bond between the individual and the nation:

Upon opening its eyes, a child should see the fatherland, and see only it until his dying day. Every true republican drank love of fatherland, that is to say, love of the laws and of freedom, with his mother’s milk. This love makes up his whole existence; he sees only his fatherland, he lives only for it; when he is alone, he is nothing: when he no longer has a fatherland, he no longer is, and if he is not dead, he is worse than dead (P, 189).

To call this quotation an endorsement of a deep emotional attachment to a nationally based fatherland would be an understatement. If the fatherland must be everything to a patriot, it is only because of its national character, and the true patriot is therefore immersed in his national sentiments as well. Therefore, Rousseau writes, at “twenty a Pole should not be just another man; he should be a Pole… in all of Poland there [should] not be a single great deed or illustrious person of which his memory and heart are not full” (P, 189). The national character that Rousseau suggests Poles develop is therefore imbued with the full force of _amour-propre_, both pride and vanity. Education in the heroic achievements of Poles satisfies the pride side of _amour-propre_, while the vanity aspect is satisfied when the young Pole compares the achievements of his people to his sparse knowledge of other peoples. By having practices that are distinctly Polish, it will “give [Poles] a natural revulsion to mingling with foreigners” (P, 185). The Poles
therefore love their national group and are harsh to others, and forge a full identification between
the nation and the state.

Rousseau’s practical works therefore extend his nationalism. They serve to clarify his
thoughts that are not fully developed in his theoretical works. The Corsica details both the exact
ways in which governments can and should be connected to nations, and the precise relation
between amour-propre and national unity. In the Poland, Rousseau makes clear the exact level
of fervor for the nation that patriotism contains. He also explains the level of power that a nation
has over governments, when properly instituted, which itself brings forth an understanding of the
way that a nation is strengthened when its basic laws have been laid down. These two works are
important parts of a study of Rousseau’s nationalism, especially on the practical level, in which
Rousseau reveals his belief in the true strength of nations, and that in the practical world,
ethnonational solidarity plays perhaps an even larger role than in the ideal one.

A Cosmopolitan Bent?

Despite the obvious nationalist tilt of his later works, there are some who interpret
Rousseau as proposing a form of cosmopolitanism. If this view is correct, then Rousseau would
not in fact wish to create a national state, and so the link between nationalism and legitimate
democracy would be rather weak. The cosmopolitan reading therefore deserves a careful
examination, although I ultimately will reject it. In Rousseau’s terms, a cosmopolitan is one who
seeks to place his will under the general will of humanity. Readings of Rousseau as a
cosmopolitan are based largely on the understanding of Emile as the education of a man who
could be a citizen anywhere, or who is the truly cosmopolitan man. According to this view, the
Discourse on the Sciences and Arts and the passages in Considerations on the Government of
Poland relating to cosmopolitans are attacks on fake cosmopolitanism, or on the specific form that that cosmopolitanism had taken in Rousseau’s time, namely a soft bourgeois lack of virtue. This cosmopolitan interpretation of Rousseau is not without merit, and yet it focuses entirely on one of Rousseau’s ideal works, and ignores all of the practical ones. Additionally, it confuses his theory with his wishes, assuming that just because he might want cosmopolitanism in *Emile*, he would want it for a legitimate state, or think it practical for a fatherland.

Any positive view of cosmopolitanism in Rousseau should first consider several passages of the primary texts. Perhaps the most support of cosmopolitanism is found in the *Discourse on Inequality* in which Rousseau mentions the “few great Cosmopolitan Souls who cross the imaginary boundaries that separate Peoples and… embrace the whole of Mankind in their benevolence” (*DI*, 174). This passage is particularly interesting both in Rousseau’s endorsement of cosmopolitanism and because Rousseau claims that the differences among peoples are imaginary. While Rousseau recognizes that these divides are inherently social in nature, they do not in fact seem to be imaginary on the cultural level (*See DI*, 166). Admittedly, the first quotation relates not only to nascent society, but also to citizenries, which are more removed from nature. As discussed above, a proper legislator will create laws that shape the nation, implying that the distinctions in a body politic are real, if socially created (*See Considerations on the Government of Poland*). Thus a cosmopolitan sees beyond the cultural forms of identity that a good legislator or set of laws imparts. The ringing endorsement of cosmopolitanism here is undeniable, and leads to the main argument in *Emile*.

The interpretation of Rousseau’s imaginary pupil, Emile, as a cosmopolitan man focuses on the extension of pity and Emile’s related ability to recognize and respect the rights of all people that he meets. In order to accomplish this extension of sentiment and passion, “an
individual’s awareness of the larger claims of humanity must be nurtured… by the art and care of a deliberate and farsighted pedagogy.” This cosmopolitan reading of Rousseau is largely based on two passages in *Emile*. The first, found in Book IV, appears at the beginning of Emile’s encounter with *amour-propre*. Rousseau wants to “extend *amour-propre* to other beings [and thus] transform it into a virtue” (E, 252). Emile’s ability to extend his pride to others “will in the first place be limited to his fellows… [those] whose nature has a more manifest identity with his own and thus make him more disposed to love himself” (E, 233). This type of connection is most obvious in the family, where momentous occasions are as shared moments of joy, or of great calamity. Up to this point, Rousseau is still clear that it is difficult for people to extend their *amour-propre* over a large number of people, especially those whom they see as different from themselves. It is for this reason that Rousseau initially sees something bonding a community together as a prerequisite to becoming a body politic.

In discussing Emile’s first stirrings of affection in his entrance to the social world of comparison, however, Rousseau claims that “after having cultivated his nature in countless ways, after many reflections on his own sentiments and on those he observes in others” Emile will be able to extend his *amour-propre* even further (E, 233). This goal is achieved if Emile is “able to get to the point of generalizing his individual notions under the abstract idea of humanity and to join to his particular affections those which can make him identify with his species” (E, 233). According to cosmopolitan readings of this passage, found in Grace Roosevelt’s argument, Emile is here learning to accept an identity as human. This identification is assumed to be able to take the place of national identity in the extension of *amour-propre*, pity, and compassion. For

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Roosevelt, the need to cultivate nature before gaining the abstract idea of cosmopolitanism is “a clear parallel with Rousseau’s account of the genesis of the general will in the ‘Geneva Manuscript.’” This passage can, however, be interpreted as Emile learning that all humans have *rights*, and thus the only effect on nationalism that occurs here is a slight softening of the harshness that patriotism creates. He likely would refuse, however, to follow the unjust law that a citizen would obey out of the love of his fatherland.

The second passage pointed to by cosmopolitans is the episode in which Emile finally earns Sophie’s hand. Emile and his tutor have arrived a day late to a meeting with Sophie, upsetting her because she had been worried about them in their absence. After his tutor explains that they were late because they needed to help a couple who were in need, Emile defends his conduct to Sophie, saying the following: although “you can make me die of pain… do not hope to make me forget the rights of humanity. They are more sacred to me than yours. I will never give them up for you” (E, 441). Roosevelt argues that in this way, Rousseau shows “that Emile’s love for Sophie has not weakened his social consciousness.” Emile has never had a passion as strong as his love for Sophie, but even this love cannot prevent Emile from caring for all people he meets, recognizing their humanity and treating them accordingly. Since love is the passion from which *amour-propre* springs and Emile’s love for Sophie is the strongest he has known, it is implied that this means Emile’s character is good, and that no bad form of *amour-propre* will be able to disabuse him of his belief in human rights.

After Emile has encountered and passed this test, Rousseau finally allows him to be educated in matters of politics and culture. This education “does not turn him into either a patriot or a revolutionary,” Roosevelt argues, but rather leads him to seek out a quiet life in the country.

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34 Roosevelt, *Reading Rousseau*, 167.
with Sophie.\textsuperscript{36} Therefore, Roosevelt concludes that Rousseau has succeeded in creating a “gentle and cosmopolitan Emile… [who] emerges as a ‘humanitarian’ citizen—one who is comfortable in the world at large.”\textsuperscript{37} Emile travels with his tutor before returning to settle in France are the method by which Emile is inoculated against nationalism and turned to cosmopolitanism. Meeting and corresponding with people in many nations, Rousseau believes, is “an excellent precaution against the empire of national prejudices… Nothing is more likely to deprive such prejudices of their hold than disinterested interchange with sensible people whom one esteems” (E, 471). In other words, the cosmopolitanism that Rousseau suggests rests ultimately on the ability of people to extend their compassion and pity to those they are close to, and then through them extend these passions to entire nations weakly, disabusing any negative stereotypes and assuring that Emile will see any person from another nation as a person, rather than just a national archetype. This inoculation against prejudice allows him to follow “the eternal laws of nature and order… written in the depth of his heart by conscience and reason” no matter where he settles (E, 473).

The cosmopolitan reading of \textit{Emile} therefore has significant weight. However, Emile’s education is designed for one who does not have a \textit{patrie}. It is not, Rousseau makes clear, a public education. Considering that Rousseau’s philosophies of government suggest that the legitimate state is a \textit{patrie}, the education that Emile receives should be viewed as a back up, that when raising the son of a nobleman in France in the 1760s there are no better options. However, these specific circumstances are not the best, nor present in the modern world, and so whether or not \textit{Emile} portrays the education of a cosmopolitan individual, it need not be an endorsement of political cosmopolitanism.

\textsuperscript{36} Roosevelt, \textit{Reading Rousseau}, 172.  
\textsuperscript{37} Roosevelt, \textit{Reading Rousseau}, 172.
Furthermore, the cosmopolitanism present in *Emile* is moral cosmopolitanism, not cosmopolitan solidarity. Rousseau is not suggesting creating a nation or a state of Emiles. He is suggesting that when living as a man in a world without legitimate states, it is proper to be a moral cosmopolitan. There is no endorsement of a cosmopolitan state or citizenry implied here, merely a suggestion of moral behavior.

**Conclusion**

Since Rousseau does not recommend cosmopolitanism as a form of solidarity or political legitimacy, we are led back to Rousseau as a nationalist. His theory is nuanced and powerful. It relies on two essential factors: the difficulty of extending identity past the family to an entire citizenry and the ability of a lawgiver to shape the character of a nation. Given the latter, Rousseau believes that it is possible to forge a sense of shared identity, but also that there are also natural nationalities that political nations should be established on top of. This identity is essential in creating the potential for a group to will as a body politic, and thus the ability to truly live both freely and under law.

This legitimacy is made more nationalistic by the use of patriotism to bring individual wills in line with the general will, and thus create citizens. The attachment of a citizen to his nation-state is solidified by this ardent love for it and for his compatriots. This same love makes the citizen harsh to foreigners, meaning that it bears the hallmarks of nationalism. Although the concept would not truly enter the popular ethos during Rousseau’s life, his theory thus provided the groundwork for our modern conceptions of the nation-state and our love of fatherland. Rousseau’s nationalism is also untainted by the historical evils associated with ethnonationalism. By contrast, modern nationalists must apologize for the excesses of the World Wars.
Rousseau’s nationalism therefore holds an incredibly important place in the history of nationalism, providing the essential basis of nationalistic theory. From him, we gain an understanding of the detailed steps in the argument for nationalism: to be fit for legislation, a people must have a shared will, only present in a cultural, pre-political nation. Upon becoming political, the *amour-propre* of the citizenry helps form and maintain the bonds of civic solidarity, allowing for a general will that in turn provides legitimacy to the laws. However, *amour-propre* also taints this will, with the very force causing solidarity also causing comparison and competition with other ethnonational groups. This competitive spirit gives rise to a harshness in the citizenry, and from them, the state directed against foreigners. Finally, the harshness of an ethnonational citizenry results in the ethnonationalism that we know and fear today. In examining the struggle between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, Rousseau’s theory is therefore the perfect representative of nationalism for an investigation of the merits of nationalism as opposed to cosmopolitanism. Both sides of this debate ultimately make arguments either updating Rousseau’s theory or attempting to refute it, since it expresses the fundamental tenets underlying all nationalism.
A Pragmatic Cosmopolitan?

**Introduction**

With the ties between ethnonationalism and the patriotic republican state firmly established, there is a great burden on anyone seeking to prove that there is a better form of solidarity than ethnonational solidarity for modern democratic republics. Jürgen Habermas seeks to meet this challenge in two ways. He first attacks the problem of cosmopolitanism’s supposed impracticality. He argues that the history of state and nation formation shows that ethnonationalism is artificial and thus unnecessary. There was a time when theorists, including Rousseau, did not believe that national solidarity could extend to reach as many people as currently constitute the citizenry in most modern states. Given that national solidarity has become a dominant force since the 18th century, Habermas seeks to prove that solidarity can expand further after it reaches the level of national solidarity, and thus that cosmopolitanism is possible. Rather than denying the role of nationalism, he gives it historical weight, but seeks to argue that the forces of the modern world have created a post-national constellation in which nation-states are no longer normatively or practically suitable. The second strand of Habermas’s argument is thus that the conditions of the modern world make cosmopolitanism a normative necessity.

**The History of Solidarity**

If cosmopolitanism is possible, where are the legitimate, multinational states based on cosmopolitan solidarity? This is one of the greatest empirical questions regarding the practicality of cosmopolitan solidarity. The question is in reality a challenge, the suggestion that the lack of multinational, legitimate states is due to their impossibility. In the modern world, there are few
states that can be described as truly legitimate and multinational. There were several states that maintained a multinational character at the expense of democracy, such as the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. These empires were destroyed by war, but some illiberal multinational states, such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, have broken into ethnonational pieces as they became free from Soviet domination, and liberalized.

As for the legitimate states with a claim to multinationalism, all have serious ethnonational issues. The United States is currently suffering from demographic tension, in which the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant plurality feels threatened by growing blocks of minorities. The Swiss Confederation has created a statewide ethnonational sentiment, forcing the linguistic differences down to a sub-national level. The United Kingdom is splintering on ethnonational lines, having lost most of Ireland and with Scotland facing a referendum to secede. Canada similarly faces periodic secession attempts by its French Canadian minority. If legitimate states based on cosmopolitan solidarity are possible and desirable, then there should be states that are multinational and do not suffer from ethnonational conflict, and yet it seems that there are none. Does their absence mean that they are not possible? Habermas uses the history of solidarity to explain that the creation of cosmopolitanism is a matter not of a state naturally developing, but rather being constructed artificially and purposefully. Therefore, we do not see cosmopolitan compatible states simply because no one has made them yet. Habermas explains this in several stages.

Habermas’s investigation begins with the historical development of states. Tracing the paths that pre-modern states took to turn into democratic republics allows Habermas to explain how a national solidarity could extend to the size of a modern citizenry. Not only does this history allow Habermas to reveal his similarities with Rousseau through a whole-hearted
endorsement of republicanism, but it also allows him to suggest that new forms of solidarity may be possible if they are developed by and for a citizenry already united.

Republicanism demands and requires solidarity. Rousseau made it clear that in the world he saw, solidarity extended as far as a people who can know and debate one another. Indeed, Rousseau argues that “the Sovereign can act only when the people is assembled” (SC, 110). Therefore, in Rousseau’s ideal republican democracy “the people” as a whole would need to be able to assemble. The size of most states in the modern world, however, is doubtless too large for this to be possible, and many states are large democratic republics. Despite the size difference, the modern legitimate state realizes much of Rousseau’s vision, in that laws are often perceived to be a manifestation of shared political will, and basic laws like the U.S. Constitution are accepted as a concrete manifestations of that will. While perhaps not having as much positive freedom as Rousseau hoped, there is still a large amount. Citizens may conceive of themselves as governed only by their own will, and thus be subject to the laws yet free. Therefore, something occurred historically that has allowed for the expansion of small republics into large ones.

According to Habermas, to feel civic solidarity is to be “prepared to make ‘sacrifices’—as in military service or the burden of redistributive taxation” (PNC, 64-65);\(^{38}\) when citizens from different ethnonational groups are prepared to “vouch for one another” (TT, 87);\(^{39}\) or when “members [of a group] can feel responsible for one another” (TIO, 113).\(^{40}\) In other words, civic solidarity is what causes people to feel responsible for the well being of others, or for seeking retribution for harm done to them. Ultimately, this form of responsibility is what makes


individuals recognize one another as compatriots rather than merely people who happen to live under the same set of laws and invented lines on a map. The first countrywide form of civic solidarity proved to be nationalism.

To describe the formation of nationalism, Habermas focuses on the difference between pre-modern and modern states to discover what changed. While noting what distinguishes the modern executive from the royal administration of a pre-modern state, he specifically notes the separation of the state from Hegelian civil society. While the royal state kept the economy in their control, the early modern state “limits itself to essentially administrative tasks” creating the landscape in which the individual citizen “first acquires at least a core of private autonomy” (TIO, 108, 109). This autonomy became essential for national unity, as it allowed people to participate in the public sphere, where will-formation occurs.

It is very clear that the emergence of personal autonomy is not the sufficient condition for the creation of national unity, however, as modern “states existed long before there were ‘nations’ in the modern sense, that is, the state structure of the nation-state came into being before the nation. State and nation have fused into the nation-state only since the revolutions of the late eighteenth century” (TIO, 109). The difference between states and nations provokes the questions of where nations came from. Nations, Habermas believes, “were originally communities of shared descent which were integrated geographically… and culturally through their common language, customs, and traditions; but they were not yet integrated politically through the organizational form of a state” (TIO, 110). For Habermas the nation is not natural, but it is founded upon natural relations. Nevertheless, in pre-modern states elite individuals used their ethnonational identity to differentiate themselves from upper class members of different states, and so ethnonationalism was used as a “negative demarcation of foreigners from one’s
own people” (TIO, 110). Peasants, however, remained peasants. Like so much else in feudalism, nations were reserved for the nobles. Parallel to the development of modern democracy, it was not until the late 18th century that the nation of nobility began to become the nation of the people (TIO, 110). The democratization of the nation did not change its substance. For the people as for the nobility, the “positive self-understanding of one’s own nation… became an efficient mechanism for… devaluing other nations” (TIO, 111). In other words, as people understood themselves as members of an ethnonation and valued their membership, they began to consider their ethnonation better than all others. Thus for Habermas, people who identify with an ethnonation tend to mistreat other nationals as an inherent part of using their nation to self-identify.

This democratization of the nation “played the role of a catalyst in the transformation of the early modern state into a democratic republic” (TIO, 111). Habermas recognizes that, as Rousseau theorized, “Popular national self-consciousness provided the cultural background against which ‘subjects’ could become politically active ‘citizens.’ Belonging to the ‘nation’ made possible for the first time a relation of solidarity between persons who had… been strangers” (TIO, 111). Being part of a nation therefore makes it possible for citizens to recognize themselves as part of a collective body, and therefore for the people to perceive a shared will. By forming this general will, they are able to become active citizens, who engage in politics through expressing their understanding of the community’s will.

Not only does Habermas recognize the power of nationalism in creating solidarity, he also accepts Rousseau’s basic premise for why the nation-state is desirable: “the achievement of the nation-state consisted in solving two problems at once: it made possible a new mode of legitimation based on a new, more abstract form of social integration” (TIO, 111). Rousseau
seems to have been too close to the tapestry of history to see the possible next, cosmopolitan, form of legitimation. This transformation from monarchy and empire to republic is a key turning point in the development of national identity. However, Habermas writes that this “legal-political transformation would have lacked driving force, and formally established republics would have lacked staying power, if a nation of more or less self-conscious citizens had not emerged from a people defined by its subjection to state power” (TIO, 112). Thus the transformation from the subjects if a monarchy to national citizens of a democratic republican state could not have occurred if the national citizenry had not been subjects of the same monarchy before becoming free.

The formation of the nation around a group held together initially by monarchical power is an alternative explanation to the national myth of the ascribed nation. By this formulation, the nation came about in response to the need “for an idea that was vivid and powerful enough to shape people’s convictions and appealed more strongly to their hearts and minds than the dry ideas of popular sovereignty and human rights” (TIO, 113). For Habermas, while the nation managed to meet this need, “this thoroughly artificial fusion of older loyalties” was in essence only possible due to the collection of a people already created as subjects of a non-democratic state (TIO, 113). There was thus ample ground for nation-states to arise within pre-existing borders but based on a new form of solidarity. The French republic was formed, more or less, out of the subjects of the French monarchy because their culture had developed together under shared laws, and they were identified in opposition to other nations through the wars between European monarchies.

The interaction between expanding frameworks of solidarity and the demand for self-governance in republicanism creates ethnonationalistic solidarity. As people are more easily able
to identify with one another and demand democracy, they gain solidarity as an ethnonational group. Habermas looks at the history of the nation state, separating “classical” nation states in Northern and Western Europe from “belated” nations such as Germany and Italy. These two paths “from state to nation vs. from nation to state” create different conditions for the rise of the nation (TIO, 105). Descriptively in both fact and feeling, the former class was created by bureaucrats and the latter by intellectuals and artists. Thus in the first case the process was a slow one, in which shared laws gradually brought a people together, while the second occurred rapidly as artists and intellectuals inspired nationalism in a people only weakly connected beforehand. There exists also a third, modern category of nation-states that formed after decolonization, in which “artificial states had to be first ‘filled’ by nations that coalesced only later” (TIO, 107). The third category does not represent a strong form of ethnonational solidarity, and non-national divisions still plague many states that tried to form nations in this manner, such as tribal identities in Algeria and Yemen.

Habermas thus explains the way that the sphere of solidarity expands through the interaction of culture and ruling institutions. The three forms of the development of nationalism that Habermas describes are created through historical political unity, almost accidentally; by the works of intellectuals and artists stirring up nationalistic sentiment; and finally by the activities of governments attempting to create a sense of solidarity within borders imposed upon them. These three forms of instituting nationalism all reveal one essential truth about ethnonational solidarity: it is artificial. However, national solidarity is the form that is created historically before any other because it rationally follows from the monarchic organization. Since national solidarity is artificially created through many interactions, it should in principle be possible to create other forms of solidarity.
The answer to the claim that there are no cosmopolitan states because they cannot be created is that historically it was possible to create ethnonational solidarity, which is a necessary step in creating larger forms of solidarity. Its artificiality, however, means that it is not a necessary characteristic of republican democracy. So, the reason that no stable, legitimate, multinational states exist is because a new form of solidarity has yet to overcome ethnonational solidarity.

**How is Cosmopolitanism Possible?**

Given this answer, Habermas begins to examine they way cosmopolitanism could be created. He uses the concept of the public sphere to explain how shared wills may be formed among people who cannot know one another. Focusing on the multinational character of modern states, Habermas suggests that the connection to rational, liberal values may serve as the substrate for a new form of solidarity. This substrate is formed through cultural differences and the process of forming a shared constitution. Thus Habermas’s ideal solidarity requires a preservation of culture combined with common ground on some values, which can be achieved through creating a hybridization of liberal culture and ethnonational values.

Practically, Habermas believes that the nation is now a vestigial part of the modern, legitimate nation-state. As discussed above, ethnonationalism played an essential role in making legitimate states larger than face-to-face states, that is, larger than Rousseau believed possible. Beyond its catalyzing role in the formation of liberal democratic republics, pre-political identification (the nation) “becomes superfluous to the extent that public, discursively structured processes of opinion- and will-formation make a reasonable political understanding possible even among strangers” (PNC, 73). Habermas thus introduces the public sphere, a social sphere
containing not only politics, but all forms of discourse. It is in this sphere that a shared will can be formed. Thus the public sphere and discourse can ensure social integration. The democratic process “can respond to the changed cultural composition of a population by generating a common political culture” (PNC, 74). As there needs to be a common political culture for multiculturalism to occur, the public sphere must incorporate more than one ethnonational group. For Habermas, the fact that “the national basis for civic solidarity has become second nature” causes “the identity of each individual citizen [to be] woven together with collective identities, and [so all] must be stabilized in a network of mutual recognition” (PNC, 74). In less technical terms, he is saying that because people have accepted the connection of state, the political identity of the citizen is tied to their ethnonational identity. To move to a post-national solidarity, Habermas thus suggests a different type of recognition for ethnonations. This network of mutual recognition is normatively necessary, but practical dangers may interfere with it:

For nation-states with their own national histories, a politics that seeks the coexistence of different ethnic communities… under equal rights naturally entails a process as precarious as it is painful. The majority culture, supposing itself to be identical with the national culture as such, has to free itself from its historical identification with a general political culture, if all citizens are able to identify on equal terms with the political culture of their own country (PNC, 74).

Therefore the liberalization of nation-states leads towards cosmopolitanism, but to do this it must go through the painful, and as we shall see, risky step where the concepts of nation and citizenry are disentangled. Habermas’s normative worry about the nation-state is found is within the phrase “we the people.” The tragic example of Jim Crow laws in the United States shows what happens when the “we” is ethnonationally based. White Americans assumed their opinion to be the national culture. Breaking this connection allowed for a more representative political culture, one in which liberal values of freedom and equality could be upheld. Without this, minority
groups live in constant peril. At any moment, the majority can impose unjust and unacceptable sanctions upon them through the strength of its numbers.

At the heart of Habermas’s attempt to create a cosmopolitan world order is his desire for the values and structures of liberal republicanism to be adopted by all. Habermas’s definition of republicanism is Rousseau’s theory of the general will simplified to its essence. Indeed, the only thing that appears transformed from Rousseau is the language: “The central idea of republicanism is that the democratic process can serve at the same time as a guarantor for the social integration of an increasingly differentiated society” (TIO, 117). However, whereas Rousseau demanded ethnonational homogeneity, which in his time was arguably possible, Habermas is dealing with states that already have a multinational population. Thus he worries that republicanism is destroyed by ethnonationalism:

In a society characterized by cultural and religious pluralism, this task cannot be displaced from the level of political will formation and public communication onto the seemingly natural substrate of a supposedly homogenous nation. The latter would merely serve as a façade for a hegemonic majority culture (TIO, 117).

Therefore, so long as homogeneity is not possible, liberal democratic republicanism is not truly being realized. Our world, Habermas’s world, is different from Rousseau’s in the essential way that it would be nigh impossible to create a homogenous state without dismembering the states that have developed over the course of history. As a purely theoretical matter, Rousseau would not oppose a grand redrawing of borders from large nation-states into small republics if it could be accomplished peacefully and properly, but both he and Habermas are too practical to view this as a possible solution. Habermas therefore must propose a different solution, which for him is to destroy the fusion of the general will with the particular will of an ethnonational group. This leads directly to the question of what can take the place of national solidarity.
Habermas’s answer to this question is constitutional patriotism. Constitutional patriotism is the substitute for ethnonationalism and creates a form of solidarity based on the enshrined principles of republican government. Constitutional patriotism does not take the same form everywhere, however. Habermas holds that “Each national culture develops a distinctive interpretation of those constitutional principles that are equally embodied in other republican constitutions—such as popular sovereignty and human rights—in light of its own national history” (TIO, 118). This interpretation of the relationship between distinct cultures and human rights is Habermas’s attempt to have his cake and eat it too. Like many modern liberals, Habermas wants to respect every culture, and preserve its right to exist, but at the same time believes that there is a set of universal values in order to advocate for republican democracy as the best and only proper form of government. National histories, however, may influence these values in a variety of ways. The United States and Western Europe are fairly liberal, but they treat liberal values differently, and their constitutional patriotisms differ accordingly. For example, European laws for free speech do not allow for certain kinds of political speech due to the lessons learned from the heinous crimes of Nazi Germany. American law also protects free speech but to a further extent, allowing for speech that is altogether despicable and hateful. For Americans, this greater freedom is a source of pride. After all, we consider ourselves “the freest nation in the world.” By contrast, the Europeans value their laws for protecting them from types of speech deemed irreconcilable with morality. By comparing the different interpretations of freedom of speech, citizenries may generate solidarity by viewing their laws as superior and thus honoring their constitution as the best.

One might object that constitutional patriotism is significantly weaker than nationalism, in that people may be willing to sacrifice less for those they share a cosmopolitan solidarity with.
than those in their ethnonational group. Habermas is not insensitive to these concerns, although he may not share them. If the question is not just about another form of solidarity, but rather a form of solidarity as strong as nationalism, it becomes: “under what conditions can a liberal political culture provide a sufficient cushion to prevent a nation of citizens, which can no longer rely on ethnic associations, from dissolving into fragments?” (TIO, 118). Habermas suggests that the most likely condition is that “multicultural societies can be held together by a political culture… only if democratic citizenship pays off not only in terms of liberal individual rights and the rights of political participation, but also in the enjoyment of social and cultural rights” (TIO, 118). Here we find the cosmopolitan answer to the reciprocity argument in ethnonationalism. Some argue that solidarity, like the family, relies on the idea that one benefits from reciprocal care. It is in my interest to have all of my co-nationals taken care of so that they may take care of me. However, the cosmopolitan view of reciprocity is exemplified as follows: I have the same benefits from the Federal Government as a Southerner. In a Rawlsian fashion, I am motivated for these benefits to be eligible to all. It is in the interest of anyone in the United States to have a program like Social Security for the day in which we need it. This form of argument leads Habermas to a whole-hearted endorsement of the welfare state as it has evolved in Europe. Insofar as people are aware of the benefits of political citizenship (as opposed to ethnonational membership), they value the implementation of welfare policy, thus the benefits to the citizens, over the national myth. This recalls Rousseau’s instruction that the nation must be more to its citizens than to foreigners (PE, 16). Both Habermas and Rousseau are recognizing that the services rendered by government may forge a form of solidarity by connecting the citizenry to

41 His precise introduction to this question is that “constitutional patriotism appears to many observers to represent too weak a bond” (TIO, 118). I hold that this is Habermas saying that it is not in fact too weak, but that he will address this objection nonetheless.
the government, and through the government to the other citizens. For Rousseau, this is a bug, capable of wrecking the solidarity and thus the general will, but for Habermas, it is a feature.

Given that there is a candidate for cosmopolitan solidarity, it remains to be shown how it is possible to transition from ethnonational solidarity to cosmopolitan solidarity. Habermas holds that there are four preconditions necessary for “an association of citizens… to be able to regulate their coexistence democratically” (TT, 76). They are listed below:

- “There must be an effective political apparatus through which collectively binding decisions can be implemented;
- There must be a clearly defined ‘self’ for the purposes of political self-determination and self-transformation to which collectively binding decisions can be ascribed;
- There must be a citizenry that can be mobilized for participation in political opinion-formation and will-formation oriented to the common good; and
- There must be an economic and social milieu in which a democratically programmed administration can provide legitimacy-enhancing steering and organization” (TT, 76).

A constitutional-creation process addresses two of these preconditions. The text of a constitution provides a third, (i.e., for the creation of the necessary political apparatus). Given that he desires a pan-European referendum on a constitution for the European Union, Habermas presumably believes that the fourth, a proper economic and social milieu, is present in Europe already, although this is part of what is lacking in creating a global federation. The process of creating a constitution therefore is focused on defining and creating the “self,” the demos, and thus creating the citizenry capable of forming a will oriented to the common good, or in Rousseau’s terms, a general will. A referendum on a constitution causes the mobilization of those who become a citizenry, and their participation in such referenda makes them a citizenry who may be mobilized again. The United States’ Constitution’s ratification displays the strength of the constitution forming process. Not only did the process help to define those that adopted it as a citizenry, through the act of voting together on the issue, but it also mobilized them politically, in the debate over the Constitution and its contents.
Furthermore, the voter’s agreement to a constitution causes them to recognize each other as part of a collective, political we: a citizenry. Adopting the United States Constitution made all the individual states that adopted it accept that their citizens were citizens of the federal state. The process of constitution creation thus successfully addresses three of the four preconditions for forging a democratically legitimate citizenry. Therefore, Habermas differs from Rousseau in believing that a general will can be created *solely* through the dialectic processes that form a social contract, as exemplified by the formation of a constitution, given the time to produce the proper milieu. This final necessary factor, the appropriate social and economic milieu, is difficult to quantify, and proves to be one of the largest issues with cosmopolitanism. Given that Habermas advances the idea of a non-national general will creating solidarity, the cosmopolitan state would be possible. Indeed, had civic solidarity first arisen on grounds other than the ethnonation, cosmopolitan solidarity would be the only kind we would know.

Unfortunately, since nationalism was a necessary step in the expansion of solidarity from the local to the national level, identification with a nation inherently occurs in the creation of large-scale democratic republics. If, however, the “decoupling of political culture from [ethnonational] majority culture succeeds, the solidarity of citizens is shifted onto the more abstract foundation of a ‘constitutional patriotism’” (PNC, 74). Habermas holds that though more abstract, the solidarity is shifted from one type to the other—presumably, therefore, it is as strong as it was, a horizontal shift rather than a vertical one, a shift in type not in strength. Additionally, at first this constitutional patriotism is based on a people forged through nationalistic factors, much as national solidarity was first created around people who existed under the rule of one pre-national, pre-modern government. As in the case of nationalism’s beginning, being united in one state creates an easier transition. If both the United States and Canada become accustomed to
constitutional patriotism as the form of solidarity that binds together the citizens of the pre-existing states, they will more easily be able to accept uniting the states under some form of supranational arrangement through an extension of civic solidarity.

The decoupling of majority culture from the culture of the state is, of course, the positive scenario. “If it fails, then the collective collapses into subcultures that seal themselves off from one another” (PNC, 74). This outcome has disastrous effects, reinforcing nationalism and making ethnonational solidarity harsher.

What causes a shift towards constitutional patriotism to be successful? It must be accomplished through bringing cultures together in some manner, that is, making them compatible. Noting that globalization “levels out even the strongest national differences, and weakens even the strongest local traditions,” Habermas focuses on the “remarkable dialectic between leveling and creative differentiations” that allows for the hybridization of various ethnic cultures and the overarching, English-speaking, capitalistic and materialistic globalized culture (PNC, 75). The hybridization, however, makes each version of these general features unique. The way that value is determined in capitalism would not be global, as different cultures would create their own systems of what was important. While all might speak English, for most it would not be their primary language and their understanding of it would be informed by the structure of their culture’s traditional language. Thus cultural differences are preserved while simultaneously containing enough shared social understanding to communicate, deliberate, and participate in will-formation. Therefore it may be inferred that such hybridization will create a culture that is sufficient to serve as a shared basis for constitutional patriotism.

For this hybridization, it is necessary for minorities to be incorporated into the public sphere. According to Habermas, “A discursively instituted process of legislation and political
decision-making… must take account of values and norms as well as existing preferences. As such, it is well qualified to fulfill the task of providing a political substitute for processes of integration” (TIO, 139). By this, Habermas seems to be indicating the ability of democracy to incorporate minority as well as majority groups. Essentially, he seeks to prove that “such a political order keeps itself open to the equal protection of those who suffer discrimination and to the integration of the marginalized, but without imprisoning them in the uniformity of a homogenized ethnic community” (TIO, 139).

Culture must be preserved and protected in order to avoid persecution. Habermas therefore believes in special protection for “political issues that bear on the ethical self-understanding and the identity of citizens” (TIO, 144). This is easy for modern liberal republics to understand. Consider, for example, the protection of religious freedom in the United States. This protection ensures that Christianity (let alone a particular strain of Protestant Christianity) cannot be established as the national religion, nor may I, as a Jew, be forced to pay lip service to the Christian Bible by the government or any public institution. Thus my minority status is protected. A multinational body politic is therefore “composed of persons who, as a result of socialization processes, also embody the forms of life in which they formed their identities, even if as adults they renounce the traditions in which they were brought up” (TIO, 145). Thus multiculturalism can be consistent with a democratically established rule of law if and only if there are proper protections enforced, but it can be normatively justified. These special protections allow for the preservation of cultures, while hybridizing it with general liberal values.

To explain how this hybridization is possible and not merely a screen for hegemony, it is necessary to explain how cultures and solidarity evolve. Habermas believes that the various forms of solidarity based communities “can all open and close themselves in relation to their
environments. This dynamic transforms the horizon of the lifeworld, the fabric of social integration, the spheres of differentiated forms of life, and individual life projects” (PNC, 82). Essential in this is the lifeworld, the positive socially created and necessarily cultural world in which people interact, and which can be transformed through response to environmental stimuli. Indeed, it is only with reference to this concept that solidarity may be understood in Habermas’s thought: there is “a ‘social integration’ of the collective lifeworld of those who share a collective identity; a social integration based on mutual understanding, intersubjectively shared norms, and collective values” (PNC, 82). The forces of globalization act on the lifeworld by bringing together the formerly anonymous foreigner or other into a pluralistic community. As communications technology becomes increasingly omnipresent, we are introduced to cultures different from our own, leading us to sympathize with and understand the cultures producing the images and stories we consume. This “growing pluralism loosens ascriptive ties to family, locality, social background, and tradition, and initiates a formal transformation of social integration… [I]ntersubjectively shared lifeworlds open, so that they can reorganize, and then close once more” (PNC, 83). The spread of feminism, for instance, forced many cultures and subcultures to reconsider their relationship with gender. Some took this as a sign to accord further rights to women, as in the United States, while some like Saudi Arabia viewed it as a threat and became more oppressive. In both cases, a new idea entered the lifeworld and restructured the societal relations between men and women. The opening of the shared lifeworld consists of “the liberation from relationships that are as orienting and protective as they are prejudicial and imprisoning… It opens [people’s] eyes to new possibilities, but also increases their risk of making mistakes” (PNC, 83). What this means is that individuals’ perceptions of the social world change in a way that frees them from previously held conceptions. In the example
above, feminism allowed the United States to explore new possibilities, but caused Saudi Arabia to make grievous moral errors. The challenge is that “the lifeworld must successfully reorganize the structures of self-consciousness, self-determination, and self-realization… [before the lifeworlds] close themselves anew—now, of course, with expanded horizons” (PNC, 83). In doing this, the change in lifeworld causes individuals to understand their world differently, and thus allows for “an increased latitude for a reflective appropriation of identity-forming traditions” (PNC, 83). In the United States at various times we have seen a group, be it Irish, Italian, or Jewish, use the opening of the lifeworld to redefine its relationship to the ethnonationally based citizenry. In the case of the first two, the reflection on identity and identity formation have allowed near total assimilation, and in the third, an acceptance into the “we” without complete assimilation. In all three cases, however, who “we the people” meant in the United States was altered to allow a societal “other” to become “one of us.”

In the lifeworld and its transformative potential Habermas’s answer to how constitutional patriotism may be strong enough to hold together a nation is found: Constitutional patriotic solidarity appropriates its strength from earlier ascriptive ties, like those to family, tradition, and locality and reorients this strength towards the ties to others through constitutional values. According to Habermas, cosmopolitanism is therefore a practical possibility.

**Normative and Pragmatic Necessity**

Given that cosmopolitan solidarity is possible, the question becomes whether or not it is necessary, either pragmatically or normatively. The outset of this investigation should be normative, specifically, on the dangers of ethnonationalism. Habermas goes on to explain how cosmopolitanism can create positive freedom, first rejecting the arguments of national self-
determination, and then proposing a federal model that allows for positive freedom combined with a governmental structure that meets the need of the post-national constellation.

The problem with ethnonational solidarity is that “the connection between republicanism and nationalism also engenders dangerous ambivalences” (TIO, 113). The danger arises in defense of the nation, which necessitates a concept of freedom for the nation as a whole. The freedom of the nation is the idea that the citizenry of a state requires freedom from the coercive control of other states. Habermas believes that there are two ways that this freedom be construed. The first occurs “if the nation is primarily conceived as a legally constituted entity,” and so the citizens “construe the freedom of the nation—following Kant—in cosmopolitan terms, namely as the authorization and obligation… to establish a balance of interests with other nations” (TIO, 114). Habermas clearly favors this view of national freedom. By contrast, the “naturalistic conception of the nation as a prepolitical identity” creates an interpretation in which “the freedom of the nation consists essentially in its ability to assert its independence by military means if necessary” (TIO, 114). Adopting this framework, “peoples pursue their respective interests in the free-for-all of international power politics” (TIO, 114). This second framework, it seems, is the one that Habermas believes to be prevalent, and certainly is the conception of national freedom that worries him.

The second and more dangerous view of national freedom displays the tensions between national ideology and republican ideology. The fundamental tension between the two is the commonly cited issue between modern liberals and nationalism: between “the universalism of an egalitarian legal community and the particularism of a community united by historical destiny,” that is, between the values of liberalism and the idea that the nation is ascribed, not artificial (TIO, 115). The non-naturalistic conception of the nation does not admit this problem. Citizens
gain benefits because they are citizens, those who the state is created for. Unfortunately, there are a number of reasons why nation-states begin to “lurch into nationalism” (TIO, 115). There are two reasons that Habermas thinks are particularly salient. The first is conceptual, relating to the question of why a particular group bounded in a particular way comes together to form citizenry. Nationalism can provide a normative answer to this question- “the ‘organic’ nation can conceal the contingency of the historically more or less arbitrary boundaries of the political community and can lend them an aura of imitated substance and ‘inherited’ legitimacy” (TIO, 116). Through this fiction, we can explain why France is one country simply by saying that it is the country where the French live. Aside from this substantial reason, the second is that “the artificiality of national myths, both in their learned origins and their dissemination through propaganda, makes nationalism intrinsically susceptible to misuse by political elites” (TIO, 116). Political actors can use national myths “to mobilize the masses for political goals that can scarcely be reconciled with republican principles” (TIO, 116). Politicians and other political activists, well aware of the potential uses of ethnonationalism, therefore attempt to reinforce it. Therefore, in a nation-state, there is a philosophically compelling reason to continue and expand the national myth, and there are those with an interest in doing so. Habermas does not say that this makes nation-states tend towards the naturalistic conception of the ethnonation, but he might as well. Taken together, the two reasons for tilting in an ethnonational direction naturally leads to that conclusion.

As compelling as nationalism is, the contemporary era contains processes challenging the nation-state. As it “finds itself challenged from within by the explosive potential of multiculturalism and from without by the pressure of globalization, the question arises of whether there exists a functional equivalent for the fusion of the [citizenry] with the ethnic nation” (TIO, 117). It must be stressed that for Habermas, we now stand a critical juncture in
history, like that preceding the rise of the nation-state, that is, the late 18\textsuperscript{th} century in France. He is therefore not proposing any change to nation-states for solely normative reasons. The increasing diversity of populations within states means that the nation-state must change (TIO, 117). The conditions of the modern era mean that “republicanism must learn to stand on its own feet,” Habermas warning that “there is no alternative [to adjusting to an ethnically heterogeneous citizenry]… except at the normatively intolerable cost of ethnic cleansing” (TIO, 117). It is therefore not just possible but necessary for the contemporary republic to move beyond nationalistic solidarity.

Failing a revision of republicanism, Habermas worries that the nation-state will simply fail. This anarchistic vision, in which “not only the nation-state has run its course but along with it all forms of \textit{political} integration” is not a particularly heartening picture (TIO, 124). There are thus ample reasons to desire “the competing reading according to which the nation-state should be ‘transformed’ rather than abolished” (TIO, 127).

This optimistic vision is plagued by two problems. The first, and most commonly cited argument in opposition, is “the troubling question of whether democratic opinion- and will-formation could ever achieve a binding force that extends beyond the level of the nation-state” (TIO, 127). As shown above, Habermas answers this question with an emphatic yes. The second is a question of positive freedom. In a democracy of ten people, every person has precisely one tenth of the vote. In a democracy of seven billion, each person has one seven-billionth of every vote. As those of bemoaning the electoral college in America often note, the less a person’s vote “counts for,” the less free and connected that person feels. Thus a New Yorker like myself feels less as though I have a share in electing the President of the U.S. than a Buckeye or a Floridian.
Habermas does not address this question directly, but his theory ultimately (and perhaps accidentally) provides an answer.

The first step in Habermas’s argument is to prove the normative undesirability of nationalism. Non-naturalistic solidarity is difficult both due to the historical linkage between republican democracy and ethnonational solidarity, and the needs of multiculturalism. The historical foundation of the state depended “on the development of a national consciousness to provide it with the cultural substrate for a civic solidarity” (PNC, 64). However, any difficulty that non-national solidarity faces is outweighed by the dangers nationalism carries with it—“Our own prosperous societies are witnessing a rise of ethnocentric reactions against anything foreign… also against marginalized groups, the handicapped and—once again—Jews” (PNC, 72). There are two aspects to this loss of solidarity, “the cognitive dissonances that lead to a hardening of national identities… [and] the hybrid differentiations that soften native cultures and comparatively homogenous forms of life in the wake of assimilation into a single material world culture” (PNC, 72-73). Thus on the one hand the nation becomes harsher to foreigners while at the same time losing their cultural distinctiveness, losing any justification for this harshness. These aspects do not provide a positive outlook, but there are far better prospects implied from normative views. Indeed, “the fact that the democratic process must always be embedded in a common political culture doesn’t imply the exclusivist project of realizing national particularity, but rather has the inclusive meaning of a practice of self-legislation that includes all citizens equally” (PNC, 73).

In order to overturn ethnonationalism, Habermas first needs to explain how national-self-determination is not the worthy value the modern world assumes it to be. Turning to the history of colonialism, Habermas notes that “the injustices against which legitimate resistance is directed
do not result from the violation of a supposed collective right of national self-determination but from the violation of the basic rights of individuals” (TIO, 142). Thus the lack of fair and equal treatment of individuals is the standard for secession, and ethnonational group must be mistreated in order for a right of national self-determination to exist as such. In part this is because “The formation of nation-states under the banner of ethnonationalism has almost always been accompanied by bloody purification rituals… Often enough, the persecuted themselves mutated into persecutors once they succeeded in emancipating themselves” (TIO, 142). These kinds of bloody rituals have been seen in a number of cases, from the Indian-Pakistani conflict to the genocide against the Native Americans. The subtext is clear: There is a large normative cost associated with self-determination, and so it “cannot be justified without taking into account the legitimacy of the status quo” (TIO, 143). Thus there is a balancing act between repression, which Habermas believes generally unjustifiable, and attempts at national self-determination, which comes with normatively burdensome results. This is a normative view against the nation, however, so there is a further step in proving non-national sovereignty pragmatically and normatively necessary.

The possible normative burden of positive freedom, however, remains. The larger the state, the smaller share each citizen has, and the less her vote counts for. Habermas’s attempt to create positive freedom is distinctly familiar to those of us in the US: if there must be a large state, or in this case, a supranational structure that does not constitute a world state, then it is possible to simply divide power across the levels of governance. Habermas is very clear about one point: “I am indeed looking beyond Europe toward a global domestic politics without a world government” (TT, 6 emphasis mine). Habermasean cosmopolitanism, “does not require a world state that enjoys a monopoly on the means of violence or a global government” (TT, 26).
Habermas “proposes a tripartite model of global governance in which the *national* level would retain a considerable degree of autonomy from the *transnational* and *supranational* levels, and all three levels would form integral parts of a unified constitutional system.”\(^{42}\) The inter- and supra-national levels are necessary due to the organization of the world order. We live in a community of shared risk, in which the nation-state cannot protect its citizenry from transnational organizations, nor can it regulate global issues such as climate change. The nation-state therefore necessarily is not enough to govern the world today.

Using this system, Habermas constructs a form of divided government, with a supranational order containing the coercive force necessary to enforce human rights and transnational cooperation, while nation-states retain a “limited sovereignty.” I believe that this limited sovereignty is Habermas’s answer to the problem of positive freedom. Limited sovereignty over domestic affairs allows for states that are part of the international order to control a sufficient amount of their affairs. Thus insofar as the current states, which this order would be based on, allow sufficient positive freedom, so would the post-national world. Each person’s vote would count precisely the same as it does presently in matters covered by this limited sovereignty, while having slightly less on the inter- and supra-national levels. Therefore, through a federal system in which the supranational state is granted certain powers and the nation-state endowed with others, so that people have the maximum positive freedom possible when voting on every issue.

Therefore, it is normatively beneficial to move to cosmopolitan solidarity, and pragmatically necessary to move beyond national politics. The combination of these two factors creates a normative necessity to shift civic solidarity towards a cosmopolitan basis.

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Differences with Rousseau and the European Union

A comparison between Rousseau’s insistence on ethnonational solidarity and Habermas’s rejection of it is warranted. Rousseau proves to be more interested as passion as motivation, while Habermas focuses on rationality, and they have different competing outlooks and agendas. Habermas’s agenda leads us to an examination of how the European Union has failed to develop properly according to Habermas’s theory.

A serious disagreement between the theorists rests in the debate of head versus heart. Rousseau is, fundamentally, a theorist of emotion. Passion underlies human action. The primary motivating principles of human action are *amour-propre* and *amour de soi-meme*. For Rousseau, passion is reason dependent, but are not directed by it. The desire for status, wealth, or power typically is part rational, part emotional. Understanding this, Rousseau creates a complex portrait of humanity that takes into account both sides, weaving together not only head and heart, but also comparative and absolute goals to illustrate what moves people.

In direct contrast to this nuanced and complete theory of motivation, Habermas’s theory of identity follows a more Kantian portrait of humanity. Constitutional patriotism relies strongly on rationality moving emotion, not the other way around. At the very least, emotion is to be directly attached to rational sources. Rational solidarity is unlikely to be more than a fantasy based on a Kantian idealist view of humans as rational. However, rational sources of constitutional patriotism can be infused with sufficient emotion to create connections. The United States again provides an example of emotional connection to rational ideas. The glorification of the Constitution, especially certain Amendments in the Bill of Rights (specifically the First and Second) have provoked enhanced rhetoric and heightened emotional
tensions whenever they become the subject of political debate. As such, they are rationally adopted principles that are endowed with the necessary passion to provide solidarity. It is easy to imagine people willing to lay down their lives to protect the freedom of speech: our Founding Fathers, for instance, fought against the British Empire for the values enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. It is not clear, however, that this solidarity would come into being without an already existent form of national solidarity. Nonetheless, if this is indeed Habermas’s belief, it strays far enough from the Kantian position of pure rationality to properly account for solidarity.

For Rousseau, it must be remembered, the attempt to extend *amour-propre* beyond those who can be known is difficult, as *amour-propre* creates weaker connections if people cannot know one another. Rousseau’s view could be used to explain the modern state if we consider the idea that our connection to our ethnonational identity allows us to view co-nationals as “one of our own,” whether or not we have met them before. However, the tie remains emotional even in this account. Thus while Habermas and Rousseau may be closer than they at first appear, there is still a gulf between Habermas’s semi-rational view of cosmopolitan solidarity and Rousseau’s emotionally-driven ethnonational solidarity.

Perhaps the most important differences between Habermas and Rousseau are their agendas and corresponding outlooks. Rousseau appears to be largely pessimistic. His native Geneva was slipping away from democracy, and given his strict requirements for states eligible for legitimate governance (small, isolated, and homogenous), there were few locations that could ever be legitimate republics in Rousseau’s view. By the end of Rousseau’s life, he likely did not see a future in which any form of republican democracy became one of the most common forms of government. States like Corsica, which Rousseau believed could adopt a patriotic republican
constitution were invaded and ruined, and Geneva was squarely in the pockets of the oligarchs. From his vantage point, therefore, solidarity based on fear and oppression was the future of politics, with general wills ignored and suppressed. It does somewhat reveal Rousseau’s agenda, however, which seems to have been an attempt to set down the proper principles of legitimate government, without hope of these principles being adopted in the near future. Fortunately, his fear proved wrong.

Thus by Habermas’s and our time, Europe is largely run through democracies that are caught between the republican and liberal traditions. Throughout his life, Habermas has seen Europe gather from individual nation-states into welfare-focused constellations of economic and political union, suggesting a growth and strengthening of solidarity. Habermas’s cosmopolitan writings seem to have begun around the time of German Reunification. He would thus have begun dealing with questions of solidarity at the same time as getting a reminder of the strength of ethnonational ties, and the desire for national self-determination. At the same time, however, Habermas saw what Rousseau never did: a strong, will-based solidarity that extended far past people who could know one another. This extension helped Habermas understand the public sphere as more than the political one, that is, that will-formation is induced by all cultural factors, not just in the political forums and therefore can extend as far as the public sphere reaches. Habermas has a clear agenda related to this: to stabilize and reform the European Union into a proper supranational institution, and pave the way for a peacefully governed cosmopolitan order.

The reality of the European union, however, has challenged Habermas’s theory. Thus far all referenda on the EU or any EU constitution have shown a distinct lack of popular support for a supranational state. In states that have held referenda on European Union constitutional
treaties, a strong majority has been against them: in 2005 France’s referendum failed to ratify the treaty by a 55% majority, and the Netherlands by 60%. Habermas argues that the referenda are rejected because of the questions being posed, and that a graduated integration might allow for each step of integration to be accepted, specifically the creation of a directly elected President and further economic harmonization (E:TFP, 103). Furthermore, he holds that “the two [failed] referenda were so much overshadowed by extraneous domestic political controversies and emotions that they could not provide an undistorted expression of opinions concerning Europe” (E:TFP, 101). This focus on emotion might suggest to some that Rousseau’s interpretation is right. Instead, Habermas focuses on poll data to support his position. He claims that polling “results suggest that a latent, rather Europe-friendly, mood predominates among the citizens in all of the member states [with certain exceptions]. The governments are the stumbling block, not their populations,” (E:TFP, 101). This debate is deep, and largely empirical. Rousseau would likely claim that these referenda represent people unwilling to part with their positive freedom. Habermas, however, asserts that the data show a support for Europe when aggregated, but that governments and the media array themselves against any referenda, causing them to fail.

However, there is no reason to assume that his view of the data is any more correct than a reading that holds that the populations support further unification in the abstract, but not in the particulars. Empirical questions such as this one are up for debate in the political theaters of Europe. What cannot be denied, however, is that the referenda did indeed fail to accomplish what Habermas hoped they would. Whether this is a true lack of popular support, poor particular proposals, or opposition of entrenched governments and other intransigent institutions, the

failure of referenda suggest that something in Habermas’s theory is not playing out in actuality the way he supposed it would. Unfortunately, rather than addressing what is missing, Habermas clings to the idea that there is popular support, instead imploring institutions to give up their opposition to the project, and for the constitution to be drafted differently.

Conclusion

Habermas’s argument in its strongest form makes cosmopolitanism not only a possibility, but in fact necessary to maintain a stable and moral world order. Not every cosmopolitan order is necessarily good, but the moral detriments of ethnonational solidarity and demands for ethnonational self-determination carry with them negative moral consequences such that it is necessary to find a type of cosmopolitan order that is good. Habermas’s proposal of a tripartite model successfully addresses questions of positive freedom while counteracting the negative forces of globalization. His argument thus must be taken seriously, but its flaws are also significant. Chief among them and most damning is the fact that despite multiple opportunities, the European Union has refused to conform to Habermas’s theory. However, his pragmatism recommends his theory. Habermas is able to propose a cosmopolitan theory that does not sound like a starry-eyed wish, but rather a sound plan to move the world according to normative necessity.
A Moderate Solution?

Introduction

Rousseau and Habermas represent the extreme poles that deserve consideration in this debate. Rousseau was not interested in advancing any nationalistic ideology, but rather had a nationalistic byproduct of his theory of democracy, which itself was not meant for every state. Habermas’s theory began to form before the European Union, and much of the nationalistic fervor in Europe is thought to have been spent in the two World Wars. Correct or incorrect, this portrait of Europe as the old man who has outgrown his youthful indiscretions of nationalism is assumed in the ability for solidarity to move beyond it. Habermas distinguishes the question of Europe in general becoming post-national from “nationalist conflicts such as those in the Basque regions of Spain, or in Northern Ireland,” which are “the delayed consequences of a history of nation-building that has generated historical fault lines” (PNC, 71-72). The rest of Europe presumably faced those consequences between 1914 and 1945. However, the contemporary era is seeing its share of nationalistic conflicts. For example, at the time of this writing, there is a crisis in Eastern Europe as Crimea, a majority Russian peninsula, seceded from Ukraine and is attempting to join the Russian Federation. These contemporary issues of ethnonationalism demand contemporary responses, and ones rooted in the understanding of ethnic nations’ position in the modern organization of states.

This chapter examines modern scholarship that seeks to bridge the gap between cosmopolitan solidarity and morality, and nationalism. The three theorists discussed in this chapter all attempt to bring national and cosmopolitan solidarity together, although in different ways. Yael Tamir seeks to make the nation-state look like the state-level of Habermas’s tri-level cosmopolitan system, although with more focus on preserving the nation. Oren Yiftachel attacks
the fully ethnonational state, and suggests that states should treat all their citizens equally, regardless of ethnonational affiliation, in order to maintain stability. Kwame Anthony Appiah’s focus on cosmopolitan morality similarly attempts to create a cosmopolitan consciousness in a nationalistic system. All three of these theories suggest that the proper way to answer the dangers of ethnonationalism and the weakness of cosmopolitan solidarity is to find a middle ground between them.

Much of the innovative modern scholarship on the issue of nationalism is coming out of Israel, a country that understandably worries about issues of multiple ethnic groups coming into conflict. That the creation of an explicitly Jewish State was the goal of Zionism as it developed is obvious. Theodor Herzl, widely regarded as the father of modern Zionism, wrote that “A State is created by a nation’s struggle for existence… The Jews who wish for a State will have it. We shall live at last as free men on our own soil.”\(^{45}\) Chaim Weizmann, a president of the Zionist Organization and first President of Israel, noted that “a genuine manifestation of the Jewish national will” was the foundation and cause of Zionism.\(^{46}\) The father of the Israeli right wing, Ze’ev Jabotinsky once said, “A Jewish state is as vital as light and air.”\(^{47}\) Similar references are found throughout the writings of the Zionist movement, all making clear that the foundation of Israel is the ethnonation. That principle is finally enshrined in the Proclamation of Independence of Israel: “the right of the Jewish people to establish their State… is the natural right of the Jewish People to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign


State.” This ethnonational solidarity served as the foundation for the state. As such, even as nationalism was becoming less and less acceptable to a Western or Westernized intellectual audience in the wake of World War Two, Israeli scholars continued to produce scholarship regarding their state’s relationship with the ethnonational group it is based upon.

Beyond being founded for a specific ethnic group, Israel has a significant minority population made up of Arabs, many of whom are descended from residents in the areas that became Israel. This makes the pride of creating a state for a people that lacked one and faced oppression for nearly two millennia somewhat more complicated, because the state must also contend with ethnic pluralism. I will consider two Israeli theorists. The first, Yael Tamir, attempts to resolve the tension between ethnonationalism and the modern liberal democracy in her work *Liberal Nationalism*. Tamir updates nationalistic theory from Rousseau’s more simple formulation. She presents a view of pre-political people seeking to assert a shared will, but one that includes the tenets of liberal democracy in the modern world. Oren Yiftachel’s philippic against ethnonationalism, *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine* will be used as Tamir’s interlocutor. Given the structure of their respective arguments, Tamir’s defense and recasting of nationalism will be followed, and then Yiftachel’s attacks on overly nationalistic states will be used to drive at the question from the other direction. Finally, I will move to discuss Kwame Anthony Appiah’s cosmopolitanism which, in theorizing a moral cosmopolitanism, provides the groundwork for holding to cosmopolitanism even in ethnonationally based states.


49 This work is not on Israel or the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Like every student of government, I have my opinions on this subject. This is not the forum in which I intend to address them. This work seeks to be neutral on the issue.
Softening Nationalism

*Liberal Nationalism* begins by accepting two premises familiar from Habermas: “The era of homogenous and viable nation-states is over… [and t]he twenty-first century is unlikely to see nationalism fade away.”

Therefore, like Habermas, Tamir notes that “[w]ere homogenous nation-states possible, liberal nationalism would pose no problems[, b]ut most contemporary states are multinational.”

Habermas concludes from these premises that there must be a major shift in the order of states. Tamir, however, tries to reconcile the larger schools of liberalism and nationalism, attempting to ease the tension between the two. She holds that “Underlying nationalism is a… set of praiseworthy values.”

Nationalism “encourages members to develop relations based on care and cooperation,… account[s] for our intuition that we have a reason, at least in some cases, to favour those who share their life with us,… [and] it is possible for individuals who care about particular others… to agree on principles of justice.” These values come from the fact that communities create language and culture. Without community, peoples’ “lives become meaningless; there is no substance to their reflection, no set of norms and values in light of which they can make choices.”

Therefore, much of the system of morality comes from the nationally based values. “Liberals are challenged to accommodate those worthy elements, and lend substance to national values within the boundaries of liberalism.”

The challenge Tamir takes up is thus to make nationalism compatible with liberalism, not the other way around, and she does so in order to incorporate the benefits of nationalism into liberal states.

52 Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, 5.
The first step in meeting this challenge is to prove that demands for national values can be fulfilled in a liberal order. Like Habermas, Tamir believes that “nationalist demands for self determination” may be satisfied by “a public sphere where the national culture might be expressed.”\(^5\) Such cultural expression can be achieved in any arrangement that allows ethnonational autonomy, such as federalism. The issue is thus not necessarily an institutional one. Rather, it is a question of making values compatible. How does freedom interact with a given culture’s taboo? In a state based on a nation that does not eat pork, liberalism would hold that a butcher may sell whatever they wish, but nationalism might support a ban or prohibitive tax on the importation of pigs for slaughter. Liberal values, it must be remembered, are a necessary component of cosmopolitan morality and solidarity. Therefore, in making nationalism compatible with liberalism, Tamir is, at the least, taking an important step in making cosmopolitan solidarity compatible with nationalism. If, as many cosmopolitans suggest, liberal values necessarily lead to cosmopolitanism, then she is making the whole leap.

Tamir focuses on the similarities between ethnonationalism and liberalism. Her example is that “both schools of thought can agree on a characterisation of individuals as agents who look to society to lend context to their personal thought.”\(^5\) Thus there is common ground in seeing individuals as autonomous, decision makers who are influenced by their societal context. To reach this form of similarity, however, the great wall of ascribed identity versus chosen identity must be breached. If individuals are to have agency, there cannot be identities that a person is unable to opt out of, that is, a person cannot be forced into a national identity by having it ascribed from birth. Tamir’s explanation for the difference between national and moral identity is that there are, in reality, two broad categories of identity: “Moral identity, built around the

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\(^5\) Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, 18.
question of what sort of person I would like to be… and communal identity, reflecting [a
person’s] social affiliation." Liberals are focused on the former, nationalists on the latter. By
recognizing the two as distinct, Tamir is able to lay the foundation for self-reflection in a liberal
nationalist world. The ability of a person to reflect allows them to choose liberal values and solve
conflicts between liberalism and nationalism. To allow for free choice, therefore, reflection must
be possible. When people reflect, “they hold constant to one aspect of their identity, either their
communal membership or their moral identity, and reflect on the other.” Reforming identity is
thus a pivot, with one pole of identity remaining fixed as the other shifts. However, the demand
of liberalism is that people truly have free choice in the construction of their, personal sense of
identity, so it must not always be the communal identity that remains fixed. Tamir holds that
“individuals can assimilate or embrace the national identity of their forefathers.” There is thus
sufficient choice to assume that identity is not completely predetermined, and to allow for
individual growth and choice.

The ability to reflect and choose results in the fact that “a national culture is not a prison
and cultural ties are not shackles.” Additionally, members of an ethnonational group become
able “to define the meanings attached to [their] membership.” An Ultraorthodox Jew and a
Reform Jew may both consider themselves ethnonationally Jewish, but the meanings of being
Jewish and methods of expressing it are very different. However, while subscribing to a
particular group or subgroup may be a “personal choice,… this does not imply that members
have chosen to be a minority. This status is imposed upon them by the choices of

58 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 20.
59 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 22.
60 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 27.
61 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 37.
62 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 37.
nonmembers.”\textsuperscript{63} It follows that there is a right to culture that individuals have to protect them from the possibility of a tyranny of the majority, but that individuals, not groups, hold the right. This individual protection may not be sufficient, however. The fact that groups are minority groups results in their being “more limited in their ability to practice their national culture.”\textsuperscript{64} They may therefore feel relatively deprived, and seek ethnonational self-determination. The Kurdish issues in modern day Turkey exemplify this. Prohibitions on use of a national language and teaching a national history are grievances that have motivated the Kurdish secessionist movement. Here the question begins to take on its decidedly political bent.

Many points of Tamir’s argument, that the nation and state are different, that states seek a national character for legitimacy, and that national and political freedom are seen as entwined have been sufficiently addressed in chapters two and three of this work. From these points, Tamir concludes that “national claims are not synonymous with demands for political sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{65} An ethnonational claim may be asserted politically, but it may also be asserted culturally. Tamir favors the cultural assertions, in which the right to national self-determination is “the right of individuals to express their national identity, to protect, preserve, and cultivate the existence of their nation as a distinct entity.”\textsuperscript{66} In other words, it is the right to a national public sphere. Presumably this public sphere may inhabit part of the general public sphere, creating a niche area for the national minority. Much like Habermas, Tamir therefore believes that so long as individuals live in a system with “provisions aimed at protecting the cultural, religious, and linguistic identity of minorities and assuring them an opportunity to live alongside the majority,”

\textsuperscript{63} Tamir, \textit{Liberal Nationalism}, 42.  
\textsuperscript{64} Tamir, \textit{Liberal Nationalism}, 56.  
\textsuperscript{65} Tamir, \textit{Liberal Nationalism}, 57.  
\textsuperscript{66} Tamir, \textit{Liberal Nationalism}, 72-73.
there is no need for each cultural group to establish its own, separate nation-state.67 The ability to have ethnonationalist impulses satisfied by an ethnonational public sphere allows for other structures to not rely on ethnonational solidarity.

However, people must live under some government and, like Tamir, many people want a liberal state. Tamir argues that the values that nationalism produces are not only compatible with, but also beneficial to a liberal state. Both promote liberal policies and explain human behavior. Less justified, however, is Tamir’s view that “notwithstanding prevalent views, the implications of the morality of community regarding attitudes towards non-members are no more, and, in fact, probably less selfinterested, than those derived from liberal theory.”68 This assertion stands in opposition to Rousseau’s view that the nation entails harshness to the foreigner. While Tamir may be correct that harshness can be theoretically separated from the morality of community, it seems that that would depend on the community, and it is too hopeful to assume that longstanding and deep hatreds are not too entrenched already to be done away with by hope alone. I am speaking here of conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian and India-Pakistani ones, in which old hatreds have festered long enough that it will be the work of centuries undoing them. A stronger argument for blunting nationalism, however, is seen in Tamir’s observation that “modern individuals belong to a complex network of memberships, which is conducive to allaying fears about nonmembers.”69 Nationalism may still entail some harshness to nonnationals, but it can be softened by cross-cutting ties resulting from individuals belonging to many communities. With the first three positive benefits of nationalism and the fourth claim defended not by nationalism, but by circumstances curtailing nationalism, it is possible to see the

67 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 76.
68 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 96.
69 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 114.
benefits resulting from the morality of community: strong solidarity causing people to sacrifice for others, at the same time as justifying their desire to sacrifice more for those closest to them.

Not only are nationalistic values compatible with and helpful to liberalism, but the liberal state is in fact based on nationalism. In Tamir’s words, “the liberal welfare state is necessarily predicated on certain ‘nationalist beliefs.’”70 In an idea familiar from Rousseau, this assumes that people are more willing to sacrifice for those they perceive as one of their own. The main example of the utility of ethnonationalism is found in boundaries, both physical and in terms of citizenship. Given that “most liberal states automatically grant citizenship to their citizens’ decedents” whether they want it or not, it is obvious that in liberal states something more than mere values binds the citizenry together.71 The reason for the automatic citizenship in liberal states must be that there is either a practical or normative need to keep the bounds of a citizenry closed. Tamir argues that it is for the sake of liberalism. Like Rousseau (who indeed she credits), Tamir notes that “the liberal notion that the legitimacy of a state’s authority is to be grounded on the consent of most, if not all, citizens, can be best accomplished in the world of nation-states” because of the communal nature of political obligations.72 Thus the basic argument for nationalism returns to explain liberalism’s need of it.

Tamir’s final chapter explains her ideal theory and then a theory that compromises with the modern world. Her order in this chapter seems to me backwards. The last point she addresses is that a cosmopolitanism that flattens out ethnonational differences “is more a nightmare than a utopian vision.”73 I think that Tamir suggests what a liberal nationalism can look like in order to save us from her nightmare. She rejects the idea of an ethnonationally neutral state in which

70 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 117.
71 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 125.
72 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 60, 139.
73 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 167.
culture is banned from the public sphere as impractical, “since cultural differences are part and parcel of the political reality rather than merely private matters.”

A state without a welfare component could be weak or “thin” enough to not touch ethnonational differences, but to generate political support for a welfare, a more potent form of solidarity is needed, and Tamir takes for granted the need for a welfare state.

Indeed, as a welfare state is arguably essential in fulfilling liberal values, it may be necessary for cosmopolitan solidarity. There must be enough solidarity that taxation for policies to fund welfare are accepted by the citizenry.

Tamir analyzes the present global constellation as one in which we have “a morally biased state, unwilling to acknowledge its own inclinations and deluding itself into believing that it [is] free from any particular conception of the good,” a state of affairs that is clearly normatively not ideal.

Therefore, she concludes that through “modest solutions such as local autonomous powers, federative or confederative arrangements… all nations [could] come to enjoy an equal scheme of national rights.” These states, in turn, would be part of regional organizations “likely to foster toleration and diversity.” Tamir’s answer here thus turns out to be quite Habermasean. But I do not think that it is the ideal answer in her view. At the beginning of her conclusion, Tamir mourns a type of state that could have been. “These two schools of thought could have joined in an ideal marriage,” she writes,

Nationalism could have supplied the parameters for demarcating state boundaries, buttressing the view of the state as a community characterised by the mutual responsibility and the internal cohesion required by a welfare state, while liberalism could have provided the moral principles needed to guide personal and institutional behaviour.

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74 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 145.
75 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 145-146.
76 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 147.
77 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 151.
78 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 153.
79 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 140.
Areas that are inhabited by one ethnonation as a majority would bound the state, but the state would be one in which the minority was cared for by the values of liberalism, and guaranteed their own corner of the public sphere to validate their culture. History, unfortunately, did not bear out this promising possibility. I believe, however, that this outcome is the ideal liberal nationalist state, not the confederative or federative model. While it is difficult to find homogenous states, this idea should be the guiding star of a liberal nationalist constellation.

*Liberal Nationalism* therefore describes the ability of liberal and nationalist values to be brought into concert. It weakens the ethnonationalist ideological commitment to a nationalist state, and explains how it is possible to satisfy both ethnonationalism and cosmopolitan morality, in an argument that seems to fit well with Habermas’s overall theory. The argument falls short, however, in justifying why it wants what it wants. It is entirely a normative argument *for* a position, but fails to argue why other positions are not desirable. Tamir assumes both that the claim that nationalist solidarity is strong is correct and that liberal values are indeed valuable. Although I happen to agree with both of these assumptions, there is a significant amount more work to do to *prove* the desirability of the middle position between ethnonational solidarity and cosmopolitanism.

Tamir represents a highly intellectual argument, from normative ideals and the assumption of liberalism, that results in a strong case for a liberal nationalism. Oren Yiftachel attacks the problem fiercely from the opposite direction, arguing why a state that is ethnonationalist and illiberal is inherently bad on a normative and practical level.
Attacking Ethnocracies

Oren Yiftachel’s *Ethnocracy* manages to do part of the normative work that Tamir does not. He explains clearly, fervently, and uncompromisingly why moving too far towards ethnonational solidarity creates serious normative problems that recommend Tamir’s favor of a mild, intermediate position, although Yiftachel might object to her rosy presentation of nationalism. Yiftachel’s fervor recommends his book, but it is based so strongly in facts on the ground that my analysis of him must be more critical in order to bring him into the theoretical discussion created above.

*Ethnocracy* is plagued by one issue that complicates its use here that should be noted from the outset. It is motivated by, explained by, and targeted at Israel and the Israeli situation. Because of this intensive focus, Yiftachel occasionally makes his definitions and theory too narrow to serve a larger purpose in the theoretical debate between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. To define the titular term, Yiftachel focuses on what an ethnocratic regime does, but even in this initial definition his narrowness is evident. He writes: “Ethnocratic regimes promote the expansion of the dominant group in contested territory and its domination of power structures while maintaining a democratic façade.”80 This definition is inadequate for use in a general context in two ways. One Yiftachel admits nine pages later, “Ethnocratic regimes may arise in a variety of forms, including cases of ethnic dictatorships.”81 Thus he is incorrect in claiming that ethnocracies operate while “maintaining a democratic façade.” This characteristic may be present in many ethnocratic regimes. However, it is likely that this feature is a result of the modern world order, which demands democratic justification because many of the most

81 Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*, 12.
powerful countries in the world hold ideologies that reify democracy. Therefore, all forms of regime attempt to create external (not to mention internal) legitimacy through democratic procedures, both real and for show.

The second error is in tying ethnocratic regimes to contested territory. Certainly land use can be a form of ethnocratic control. Yiftachel gives three examples of ethnocratic privilege being tied to land in the Israeli case. Bedouin Arabs’ transient use of land resulted in “their use of state land be[ing] considered an invasion, while their fellow Jewish citizens are encouraged to come and use the same land;” settlers in the Occupied Territories coming from locations such as the Soviet Union evict “indigenous groups who have lived on the land for generations;” and there are Jewish politicians protected by “Israel’s breach of a series of international conventions and norms” when they encourage settlement on territory captured through war.82 Yiftachel’s focus on land here makes sense, as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, among other things, a territorial conflict. Because of the “issues of land, borders, immigration, settlement, development and political conflict” are so linked and important in the Israeli context, Yiftachel “focuses on the nexus of space, ethnicity and power.”83 The narrowness of this definition makes it difficult to apply to other contexts. For instance, in the United States between the Reconstruction and Civil Rights Eras, Jim Crow laws and practices such as literacy tests constituted a country in which the dominant group used the institutional and political structure of the state to make another group second-class citizens, though the territory itself was not necessarily racially segregated. Yiftachel’s theory is much more consistent and general if considered in light of the inherent message of the land-based politics: “the structural elevation of Jewish over Arab citizens; [and]

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82 Yiftachel, Ethnocracy, 5.
83 Yiftachel, Ethnocracy, 5.
the privileging of Jewish diasporas (and hence immigrants) over local Arab citizens.”

These issues are about power and group domination, privilege and control. In other words, they are about general issues found wherever there is ethnic conflict.

Yiftachel could be seen as thus attacking a theory like Tamir’s on the grounds that whenever there is a dominant ethnonational group, minorities are automatically relegated to second-class citizenship. Given his treatment of the term nation-state as distinct from ethnocracy, addressed below, and that the issues occur only when there is ethnic conflict, I do not hold him to say that. Rather, I take Yiftachel to meant that in regimes where the dominant ethnonational group and minorities have a conflict that is deeply tied with their identities, the problems he will discuss are present. By contrast, localities where there is no serious conflict but have a multinational population do not suffer from the evils of ethnocracies.

By removing the local subjectivities in Yiftachel’s theory, it is possible to reformulate a definition of ethnocracy in general terms: An ethnocracy is a regime in which the institutional and political arrangements operate so as to support a dominant group’s control of the power structures of a country in order to elevate its members, citizens or not, above the members of other groups. By transforming Yiftachel’s definition to encompass all regimes designed to promote and maintain the superiority of one ethnic group over all others, it is possible to apply his critiques of ethnocracy to all countries that exhibit tendencies towards one ethnic group through state structures. This critique proves to be the argument that pushes regimes founded on ethnonational solidarity towards liberal nationalism.

There are several problems with ethnocratic regimes. The main issue, however, is that “the notion of the demos is severely ruptured.” In other words, the citizenry does not conceive

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84 Yiftachel, Ethnocracy, 5.
of itself as a citizenry, but rather as a collection of ethnonational groups under one government by happenstance. Such a divided society, in turn, creates another problem: “long-term political instability.”

Yiftachel addresses several categories of instability. The first, religious splits, are likely more pronounced in Israel than most other countries. Certainly the fact that the Israeli government currently claims and pragmatically has the coercive military control over the Wailing Wall, the Dome of the Rock, and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher naturally makes Israel have to contend with heightened religious tension. However, that ethnicity and religion are often bound together is understandable, and certainly true in some cases, as with Jews and Judaism, the role of Catholicism and Protestant sects in various European countries, and Twelver Shi’a Islam in Iran, to name just a few examples. Yiftachel claims that “the histories, identities, and boundaries of the dominant nation in ethnocratic societies are never very far from its religious affiliation.” This claim is overstated, but to say the two often correlate is not. Religion is important in this equation in its ability to create a sense of legitimacy. It creates “‘objective’ or ‘G[-]d-given’ religious criteria [which] function as a basis for essentializing minorities and maintaining discriminatory policies in the allocation of resources, power, and prestige.” In other words, because one group is favored based on their devotion to the true religion, members of the group believe themselves to be justified in securing benefits for, and exclusive to, themselves.

Religion and ethnicity both enforce another category of ethnocratic instability, that of ethnoclass. The flow of capital in an ethnocratic regime results in “labor markets and

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85 Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*, 16.
86 Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*, 16.
87 Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*, 17.
88 Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*, 17.
development [which] are ethnically segmented, thereby creating an ethnoclass structure." This
“ethnoclass structure” is created by both political and cultural factors that result in the dominant
ethnic group composing the majority of the upper class, with other ethnicities tending to hit a
glass ceiling. The unequal division of money, a fault line in most societies already, is therefore
more pronounced under ethnocratic regimes. Inequality tracking onto ethnonational identity
therefore continues to contribute to the instability of the regime, and an objective lack of
fairness.

In both the ethnoclass and ethnic religion examples, Yiftachel is emphasizing the fact that
in ethnocratic regimes, an essential feature is a lack of cross-cutting identities. The early united
states similarly lacked cross-cutting identities: the upper-class, White, Anglo-Saxon, and
Protestant categories tended to overlap heavily. Cross-cutting ties tend to stabilize populations by
keeping any form of major political coalition one in which diverse interests must be addressed,
and a majority of groups partially satisfied. With groups homogenous in many different ways,
there can be major political blocs that focus only on one ethnonational group.

This instability argument is the argument in Ethnocracy most relevant to my
investigation. Yiftachel’s distinction between a nation-state and an ethnocracy bears noting,
however. In a nation-state, no matter how harsh or difficult the policies are, public policy or the
political culture “still leaves minorities an option of integration (often bearing a high cost).” By
contrast, “the ethnocratic project is often constructed specifically against these minorities… their
identity is well demarcated and structurally marginalized.” By this criterion, the contemporary
United States, for instance, would be a nation-state. By being willing to assimilate, many groups

89 Yiftachel, Ethnocracy, 15.
90 Yiftachel, Ethnocracy, 21.
91 Yiftachel, Ethnocracy, 21.
have been able to move from essentially non-American to American-Irish, Italian, and Jewish, to name three. Apartheid South Africa did not allow for this type of integration of minority groups. While there are differences, I would argue that Yiftachel’s view of the nation-state as distinct from the ethnocracy is incorrect. Yiftachel is trying to create a dichotomy on a spectrum from truly multicultural, and thus cosmopolitan compatible, to completely ethnocratic regimes. To impose a dichotomy, he is searching for an obvious line somewhere between the middle of the spectrum and the ethnocratic end, but no such line exists. I believe that many parts of his book benefit from this, but the idea that ethnically based regimes directly result in instability seems to be something that goes along with this scale. Full ethnocracies are no doubt less stable than nation-states, given that ethnonational groups are unwilling to accept obviously subordinate positions, but nation-states also feel the burden of this instability.

Given this understanding of instability on a sliding scale corresponding to the level of ethnocratic behavior, Yiftachel’s critique of ethnocracy can be applied to all states that are nationally based, with a variation in degree. He holds that the instability of ethnocracies “derives from a major contradiction: the ethnocratic state uses the rhetoric, language, institutions, and legal status of a nation-state, but its practices often undermine the foundations of this very order.”

By the definitions above, Yiftachel cannot mean nation-state in the sense of a state where solidarity is based on an ascribed identity. Since he believes that a nation-state is characterized by an uncompleted project of “making… an inclusive demos—a community of equal citizens within definable territory,” it seems that he is accepting the possibility of assimilation into the political will of a state, if not the cultural one. He seems to be using nation-state to mean a state created with republican legitimacy based on a demos unified through

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something other than pure ethnonationalism, that is, one in which the tradition a person is raised in does not determine their societal status. If this reading is correct, then what he means is that an ethnocracy undermines republican legitimacy, as indeed it does.

Yiftachel holds that this undermining creates instability because the “accumulating impact of ethnizing policies tends to exacerbate intergroup tension.” Agreeing with other researchers, he holds that “political instability [is] strongly related to the perception of regime illegitimacy by minorities.” Ethnocratic republics thus wrong minorities, creating political grievances; as democratic states, they provide their minority group citizens the tools and rhetoric to motivate them to destabilize the regime. This instability means that pragmatically ethnocratic republics are unsustainable. Their dynamics move “between the poles of democratization and ethnicization.” Thus sometimes an ethnocracy behaves like a liberal nationalist state, sometimes as an ethnocracy. A steady movement towards democratization would create more stability, but anywhere between the two poles creates difficulties for the regime, especially moving back and forth.

Regimes that are too far based in pre-political ethnic identities not only have normative costs associated with placing one group above all others, but also create a system that is unstable, and thus pragmatically undesirable. A moderate position, like liberal nationalism, is therefore the best pragmatic solution for anyone wishing to maintain current borders and state structures.

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96 Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*, 41.
A Cosmopolitan Morality

On the spectrum from ethnocratic to cosmopolitan states, Tamir has presented a position in the middle, and Yiftachel has argued that we must stay away from the ethnocratic end. With the status quo of modern legitimate states averaging decidedly on the nationalistic side and Yiftachel providing the forces pushing us towards the middle, it is necessary to examine the forces pulling us towards cosmopolitanism. Much as looking to Israeli theorists for opinions on ethnonationalism makes sense because of their background, Kwame Anthony Appiah is the perfect candidate to provide a normative recommendation for cosmopolitanism. Born in London, England to a Ghanaian father and an English mother, he was raised in Ghana, educated in England, and currently lives and teaches in America. He is, in short, an embodiment of cosmopolitanism, a topic he addresses in *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*. His work is notable not just for his heritage, but also for its clarity and concise formulations of key cosmopolitan principles.

Appiah’s argument begins simply by noting what humans have in common. “Our ancestors have been human for a very long time. If a normal baby girl born forty thousand years ago” was raised in today’s world, not only would she be a normal modern girl but “she would be unrecognizably different from the brothers and sisters she left behind.” 97 This fundamental similarity among humans does not, however, automatically result in the emergence of a humanity-wide cosmopolitan solidarity. Indeed, Appiah claims that for “most of human history, we were born into small societies of a few score people… and would see, on a typical day, only people we had known most of our lives.” 98 This state of affairs is well reflected in Rousseau’s

98 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, xi.
political theory. However, it is not the world we live in, where “most of those who spoke your language and shared your laws and grew the food on your table were people you would never know. It is… little short of miraculous that brains shaped by our long history could have been turned to this new way of life.” This miracle is the one that suggests to Habermas the ever-expanding nature of solidarity that allows for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

Similarly, Appiah recognizes that “in the past couple of centuries… have we come to a point where each of us can realistically imagine contacting any other of our six billion conspecifics.” Information, technology, and policies can all spread worldwide. The increasing global interconnection creates a moral imperative, because “Each person you know about and can affect is someone to whom your have responsibilities: to say this is just to affirm the very idea of morality. The challenge, then, is to take minds and hearts… and equip them with ideas and institutions that will allow us to live together as the global tribe we have become.”

Appiah’s idea of morality manages to be both strong and general. By defining it merely as having responsibilities to those you know about and can affect, he allows for morality to be both something that is easy to understand and that entails duties to all of humanity so long as we insist on interacting with the world as a whole.

The challenge to cosmopolitanism that Appiah sees is from positivism. Positivism views the world as split into facts and values. Facts are empirical and tangible, but values are “basic desires.” Since “no appeal to reasons can correct [values], then trying to change [people’s] minds [about their values] must involve appeal to something other than reason,” so Appiah

99 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, xii.
100 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, xii.
101 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, xiii.
102 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 22.
believes that relativism is the only logical conclusion of positivism. Positivists therefore may hold that not only ethnonationalism, but also ethnocracy are legitimized based on their ability to reflect the values of ethnonational groups. A cosmopolitan, however, does not want to give in so easily to relativism. Relativism makes it so that groups are “living effectively in different worlds.” This is far from the common understanding across humanity that Appiah needs to justify cosmopolitanism. However, the appeal of positivism is that it allows for normative and descriptive issues to be treated differently. Therefore, it can explain objective truths, such as scientific fact, while allowing for metaphysical and moral questions to be left alone by scientific inquiry. Appiah finds several weaknesses with positivism, but the main one is that “there will always be more than one possible reasonable account of the facts.” If facts are at issue, than positivism’s premise is undermined. Reasonable people can disagree on central issues because of the facts, and therefore there is no reason to suppose that there cannot be reasonable disagreements about values.

Disagreements about values, however, are problematic in arguing that there can be a shared cosmopolitan morality. In order to recognize the legitimacy of moral disagreement and yet also hold a binding humanity-wide value set, Appiah distinguishes local values from universal values. Although there may be a variety of cultural taboos, “these local values do not, of course, stop us from also recognizing, as we do, kindness, generosity, and compassion, or cruelty, stinginess, and inconsiderateness—virtues and vices that are recognized widely among human societies.” This cultural overlap serves as the necessary substrate for cosmopolitan solidarity. Indeed, “Cosmopolitans suppose that all cultures have enough overlap in their

103 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 22.
105 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 40.
106 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 56.
vocabulary of values to begin a conversation.” Both the way we speak about values and the
generalized values themselves are therefore shared between cultures enough that it is possible to
debate and deliberate about them. This cultural overlap is found in the basis of liberal values, as
well as in other general concepts such as kindness.

There are, however, many disagreements about values. General values “are what
philosophers call ‘open-textured’: two people who both know what they mean can reasonably
disagree about whether they apply in a particular case.” Disagreement is therefore possible
without undermining the shared character of those values. All people may agree that cruelty is
not good, but “applying value terms to new cases requires judgment and discretion. Indeed, it’s
often part of our understanding of these terms that their applications are meant to be argued
about.” Beyond just applying terms to cases, there is also the difficulty of recognizing how
others will take your actions. The potential reaction of people is difficult to gauge, and thus
makes it difficult to know what precisely what to do with regards to other individuals. Finally,
“we can disagree about the weight to give to different values.” Is loyalty more important than
lack of harm? The answer to that question can inform a variety of questions about war and
conflict, but different cultures may answer it differently.

In sum, there are three general sources of moral disagreement: “we can fail to share a
vocabulary of evaluation; we can give the same vocabulary different interpretations; and we can
give the same values different weights. Each of these problems seems more likely to arise if the
discussion involves people from different societies.”

107 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 57.
108 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 58.
109 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 59.
110 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 63.
111 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 66.
not, however, be seen as a strike against cosmopolitanism. Appiah gives three reasons that it is not: “we can agree about what to do even when we don’t agree why… we exaggerate the role of reasoned argument in reaching or failing to reach agreements about values… [and] most conflicts don’t arise from warring values in the first place.” Therefore, cosmopolitanism can allow for different values and views of values to compete while simultaneously producing a consensus on actions.

More important than producing a consensus is creating discussion. “Conversation doesn’t have to lead to consensus about anything, especially not values; it’s enough that it helps people get used to one another.” In other words, the very activity of dialogue itself creates solidarity. This focus on deliberation is very similar to Habermas’s belief that deliberation in the public sphere creates solidarity. Thus for Appiah as well as Habermas, the fact that there can be conversation about values, compounded with the fact that often people with different vocabularies or values come to the same conclusion allows for a significant formation of solidarity between members of different ethnonational groups.

With all this to explain the sources of difference and disagreement, Appiah must also explain the existence of universal values. Universals are not necessary for entry to conversations. In order to get a multinational conversation started, all that is needed “are things that are shared by those who are in the conversation. They do not need to be universal; all they need to be is what these particular people have in common.” This is not to say that there are no universals. Indeed, “Cross-cultural analysis reveals that there really are some basic mental traits that are

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113 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 85.
114 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 97.
There is “a shared human nature… that allows us to make sense of one another.” However, this highly abstract universal relies on shared particulars between individuals. “The problem of cross-cultural communication can seem immensely difficult in theory… But the great lesson of anthropology is that when the stranger is no longer imaginary, but real and present… you can make sense of each other in the end.”

Given this ability to create connection and shared understanding, it is necessary to explain how cultural difference may be preserved. Appiah goes in depth to discuss cultural preservation and contamination. For my purposes, it suffices to note that “One distinctively cosmopolitan commitment is to pluralism. Cosmopolitans think that there are many values worth living by and that you cannot live by all of them.” Therefore “cosmopolitan is, in a slogan, universality plus difference.” This definition reiterates that the universal values are necessary, but the differences may be preserved and people must not be forced into some universal conception in the name of creating solidarity.

Finally, Appiah addresses the strength of ties. “We can’t be intimate with billions; ergo, we can’t make the cosmopolitan judgment.” By rejecting cosmopolitan judgment, Appiah means that we wouldn’t risk our lives for non-ethnonational strangers. However, “to say that we have obligations to strangers isn’t to demand that they have the same grip on our sympathies as our nearest and dearest.” It is merely to admit that we have moral obligations to them. But Appiah does not want a great reordering to occur in world politics. Rather, he believes that “we

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115 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 96.
118 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 144.
119 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 151.
120 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 158.
121 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 158.
still have to play our part in ensuring that all states respect the rights and meet the needs of their citizens. If they cannot, than all of us—through our nations if they will do it, and in spite of them if they won’t—share the collective obligation to change them.”122 He believes that ensuring universal rights and ending challenges like third-world poverty “is a demand of simple morality. But it is one that will resonate more widely if we make our civilization more cosmopolitan.”123 Appiah therefore makes a simple positive argument for cosmopolitanism. There are some values that are universal, but the way in which they manifest as well as local values create distinctions between peoples. However, this difference does not prevent us from understanding one another.

Ultimately the argument is one of morality. We have duties to everyone that we can affect, and globalization means that we can affect everyone. Our duty to everyone requires us to ensure that their political situation is one in which all of their needs, physical and metaphysical, are met. In this, it is similar to Rousseau’s Emile, in creating individuals who respect the rights of all humans equally. This is a purely moral cosmopolitanism, but for Appiah it is associated with political consequences. It suggests that we should set up liberal, legitimate states throughout the world. It is not a far leap to assume that we need to set up trans- and supra-national organizations to ensure that all people are treated well and not exploited. This cosmopolitan morality, in fact, would require us to elect governments that could negotiate, and were not only looking out for one ethnonational group, but instead were interested in helping all of humanity.

Cosmopolitanism assures that we will do our duty by making us acutely aware of it. Ethnonationalism, by contrast, gets in the way of these duties by focusing our attention on the good of the in-group, and often foisting bad onto out-groups.

122 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 163.
123 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 174.
Conclusion

The theories above ultimately converge on the center of the ethnonational-cosmopolitan spectrum, creating together a strong case for a moderate position. Yael Tamir’s liberal nationalist state treats its citizens equally, and all are granted a national public sphere. She explains the strengths of nationalism, and how it may be compatible with liberalism. Tamir therefore suggests a non-ethnocratic nation-state, of the type Oren Yiftachel favors, that is, one closer to true democracy than ethnocracy. This state would lack the instability of a pure ethnocracy by granting its minority citizens a piece of the public sphere, and treating all citizens equally regardless of their ethnonational affiliation. It is not hard to imagine that Kwame Anthony Appiah’s cosmopolitan morality would shape the policies of this hypothetical, mild, liberal nationalist state. Certainly the strongest obligations would be internal, not external, but starvation and poverty, war and plague, genocide and natural disaster could move the liberal national state to defense of people who were fellow humans, but neither compatriots nor conationals. Together, therefore, these three theorists show that a moderate position is possible, and provide the normative justification for it. What remains to be seen is how this construct of three theories reacts and interacts with Rousseau and Habermas’s positions. This will be the focus of the final and concluding chapter.
Conclusion

Armed with the thoughts of five theorists, we can now formulate an answer to the for questions with which this inquiry began. The updated and transformed question attempts to make our world one that is institutionally compatible with moral imperatives, and asks simply: what do we do? The choice is therefore not between a patriotic republican state that purely follows Rousseau’s recommendation for small, agrarian states or a tri-level Habermasean post-national constellation of cosmopolitan republics in which there are cultures but no ethnonations. Both of these ideals are too far removed from today’s reality to be possible. The large states of the world have shown no desire to let territory go, and the processes of globalization are making it more and more difficult to carve out any state with the necessary homogeneity for Rousseau’s patriotic republican state. Furthermore, that Rousseau himself believed that few states could achieve the proper structure is concerning for anyone who wishes to see republican democracy as the dominant form of state organization in the world. Thus to create a world of Rousseau’s ideal states would require intense processes of reformation, geographic and ethnonational. The first is impossible given current technology, the second either normatively unconscionable or so slow to realize as to be impossible to organize. Rousseau’s ideal state is thus not on the table.

Similarly, Habermas’s ideal state cannot conform to reality. The troubles with the European Union alone suggest that Habermas may be up against stronger forces than he realizes. If we lived in a world where ethnonationalism had not reached the levels it did from the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries, perhaps we could have achieved a world where cultural differences were not synonymous with ethnonational ones, where the difference between French and English is no more politically salient than the differences between New Englanders and the inhabitants of the Bible Belt. Differences to be sure, but still undeniably part of the same citizenry. If languages
are nations, the cosmopolitan world would be one in which there were merely dialects. This state of affairs could yet arise in the future, but it is simply not the case in the modern era.

Given the hard wall of reality against which we must contend, the pragmatic questions are the ones I will seek to answer first. That ethnonational states are possible is not considered here. The evidence of personal experience, not to mention our news networks, proves their existence. The issue with ethnonational states is whether or not they are able to maintain stability in the world of states whose populations are not homogenous, that is, whether minority groups can be sufficiently validated in an ethnonationally based state. Yiftachel’s worry is well-taken, although his tone may not be. From his critique, we can learn how to stabilize a regime based in ethnonational solidarity. The more that an ethnonationally based regime focuses on pleasing its dominant constituents, the more that the non-dominant citizens will feel discriminated against, and the more motivation they will to create unrest. Understanding all nation-states run by democracy as existing on a spectrum extending from purely democratic, near Tamir’s liberal nationalism, to ethnocratic allows an answer. Insofar as a state based on ethnonationalism can keep itself towards the democratic end of the spectrum, it can create internal stability without normative or practical issues. The United States models this solution. Our constitutional rights protect minorities, and make the blatant favoring of an ethnic majority difficult when it would require discriminatory policies. Thus, if arranged properly, ethnonational solidarity can be the basis of a state that is just, and therefore likely to be stable.

The lack of cosmopolitan states raises the second question: Are cosmopolitan states possible? I am inclined to say that, theoretically, the answer is yes. Just as Rousseau was unable to imagine the possibility of a patriotic republican state as large as modern France or Germany, there may be a future for cosmopolitanism that is simply out of view as yet. The idea that a
citizenry may be created by a shared set of constitutional values is reasonable. Constitutional patriotism does seem strong based on the connections and divides within the United States. Our worst war was the Civil War, which was based in rational debate about the power of the federal government and what constitutes a person who deserves rights rather than culture. Solidarity created by non-national factors means that it would be possible to create a state out of this non-national substrate. If this is a theoretical possibility, then the question is whether or not it is a practical one.

I hold with Habermas that it is. As Habermas notes, however, cosmopolitan solidarity cannot come from nowhere. The processes leading up to it are complex and delicate, and moving too far too fast is dangerous for any attempt at creating cosmopolitan solidarity. Therefore, given the right conditions cosmopolitanism would be possible, but a misjudged attempt incredibly hazardous. Slowly moving the solidarity of previously ethnonational people towards a constitutional patriotism based around liberal beliefs thus will make a cosmopolitan world possible. However, this is not the stage we are at in history. Habermas is incorrect in believing that Europe has shifted far enough towards a non-national form of solidarity that the European Union can create a constitution. Without a successful constitution creating process, the EU will be plagued by its “democratic deficit,” and thus cannot be a legitimate model of republican democracy. While cosmopolitanism may be possible, the way has not been paved for it yet. The political sphere exhibits a practical, short-term ability to move in the direction of cosmopolitanism, and so even if it is not possible immediately, steps towards it are.

The normative question is therefore what decides the competition between cosmopolitanism and ethnonationalism. My instinct at the beginning of this project was that cosmopolitanism would win a normative battle every time. That instinct has been sorely tested.
Tamir’s ability to bring ethnonationalism in line with liberal values helps to reduce the normative burden usually associated with it, and Yiftachel’s examination of pure ethnocracies gives us a guide of what to avoid. Furthermore, Rousseau’s focus on positive freedom suggests a benefit of small states that cosmopolitans are in danger of overturning, based on the ability and tendency of cosmopolitanism to create larger states by merging smaller ones. This positive freedom argument combined with the argument that the ethnonation provides stability and strength are good arguments in favor of ethnonationalistic solidarity. With the arguments against ethnonationalism weakened, it falls on cosmopolitanism to justify itself.

The normative argument in favor of cosmopolitanism tends to be that it cannot create the excessive violence and hatred that ethnonationalism can induce. Cosmopolitanism therefore treats all people justly, so all people may be assured that their rights will be protected. In states organized around and for ethnonationalism, minority populations are always at the mercy of the dominant group, whether the majority takes advantage of this power or not. A swing into fiscal crisis, a war, or any form of disaster can, on its own or through political activists, turn into hatred against minorities. When the state is founded on cosmopolitan solidarity, this risk is far less present because the majority of citizens subscribe to liberal values. Habermas adds to the justice argument for cosmopolitanism the need for control over international organizations that are normatively required by the community of shared risk in a globalized world.

The greatest normative argument against cosmopolitanism seems to be that a cosmopolitan state would result in the destruction or disrespect of the distinct cultures of pre-existing ethnonational groups. Harming cultures is a serious danger to be sure, but it is unclear that cosmopolitanism would produce such results. Not all policies could be consistent with every culture, but the true danger critics of cosmopolitans are concerned about is that one culture
would gain a form of tyrannical hegemony in a cosmopolitan state, and that essentially all cultures would be forced to adopt Western-style capitalism. With all due respect to this position, that will happen, is happening, simply through globalization. Culture is being flattened. Around the world, I can eat at McDonalds and shop at a supermarket for the same products. It is not clear that cosmopolitanism would speed up or significantly change this juggernaut of a trend. It would, however, be able to assure that individual human rights are upheld at all levels, with state protecting the minorities from the majority, and supra-state organizations protecting minorities from the state.

The real risk associated with moving towards cosmopolitanism is that by moving too fast, we cause setbacks that revert ethnonationalism to its most primal, bloodthirsty form. A massive setback will occur if the world or a state is unready for cosmopolitanism or if it is implemented poorly. The readiness for cosmopolitanism is obviously something that a government can attempt to sculpt. If cosmopolitan solidarity is possible, and as discussed above I believe it is, and more desirable than ethnonational solidarity for the reasons above, then these small steps towards it should be taken.

Ultimately, I think that the goal of the modern state must be to embody a synthesis of the two theories. We should begin to move towards a constitutional patriotism as much as possible, but not abandon ethnonational solidarity. For example, by ensuring a public sphere not bound to any one religion, but that does not prevent any form to practice their religion. Habermas seems to think that strengthening cosmopolitan solidarity would require shifting the constellation of solidarity, that is, weakening ethnonational solidarity. That is a fair understanding; so long as ethnonational solidarity remains strong, it cannot be replaced. But I find that Habermas is incorrect in believing that ethnonationalism can be weakened and constitutional patriotism
strengthened to the point that it can serve as the only basis for the solidarity of a citizenry. Civic solidarity based on shared political ideals is too intellectual and ignores the emotions and spirit of humans. However, the solidarity of a citizenry may be moved closer to civic solidarity. By having civic solidarity shoulder as much of the burden of solidarity creation as possible, a normative balance can be achieved. While there may be Christmas displays and advertisements every December, there would be no calls for Christianity to be the source of the laws. Indeed, all citizens, including Christians, would defend the laws from any one religion as a basis, but at the same time all would defend the right of people to express their religion in the public (although not the political) sphere. On the one hand, the strength, stability, and size limits that ethnonationalism causes are preserved. On the other, minorities are permanently protected by sharing in the solidarity substrate, and constitutional prohibitions on harming minority groups are forever protected by the majority’s subscription and connection to them.

The synthesis of cosmopolitanism and ethnonationalism would not just be an ideal, but must become manifest in the structures of the state. While national symbols would remain omnipresent, there would be a wider variety of rights protecting the contributions of all to the public sphere and requiring the protection of minorities from general laws where possible. The extension of rights would be paired with the reification of these rights, making them inviolable due to a cultural acceptance of liberal values combined with a legal protection against violations of rights. Minorities will not be as validated as majorities, as their customs will not permeate the whole public sphere, but their communities will create distinctive corners of the public sphere in which their cultures are central and they are validated. The way to bring ethnonationalism into line with moral cosmopolitanism and open the door for international cooperation is thus found in the basis of the political arena, in constitutional protections.
By finding this happy medium between ethnonational and cosmopolitan solidarity, three things are accomplished. The first is that supra- and trans-national levels of governance may be based on the constitutional patriotic solidarity, which hypothetically tends towards shared liberal values, and thus would be shared by multiple countries. The second is the protection of minorities and the weakening of nationalistic rhetoric against non-nationals, to stave off the evils stemming from ethnocracy. The third is the preservation of culture and the maintenance of states. There can be no doubt about the strength of ethnonational solidarity, or its normative value. Like so much else, the answer to the solidarity question lies in moderation. In sum: at the beginning of my research I asked the wrong question—whether ethnonationalism or cosmopolitanism was the better basis for modern states. Ethnonationalism and cosmopolitanism properly understood are not mutually exclusive, and so we need not choose between them. Rather, we must find a balance between the two in order to gain the normative and practical benefits of both. This demands a difficult balancing act but without it states will inevitably continue to cause injustice and global instability. The merger of cosmopolitan and ethnonational solidarity will be difficult, but the benefits of both are practically desirable and normatively necessary.
Bibliography


