The Interpretation of Iliad 6.145-9 and the Sympotic Contribution to Rhetoric

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The Interpretation of Iliad 6.145-9 and the Sympotic Contribution to Rhetoric*

By HAYDEN PELLICCIA

"Τυθείδη μεγάθυμε, τή γενεήν ἐρείπειν;
οἴη περ φύλλαυ γενεήν, τοίῃ δὲ καὶ ἄνδρων.
φύλλα τὰ μὲν τ' ἄνειμος χαμάδις χεῖε, ἄλλα δὲ δ' ὑλή
τπλεβώσασα φύει, ἔφαρος δ' ἐπηγίγνεται ὁρἡ.
ὡς ἄνδρων γενεήν ἢ μὲν φύει ἢ δ' ἀπολήγει . . . ."

(II. 6.145-49)

"High-hearted son of Tydeus, why ask of my generation? 
As is the generation of leaves, so is that of humanity. 
The wind scatters the leaves on the ground, but the live timber 
burgeons with leaves again in the season of spring returning. 
So one generation of men grows while another dies . . . ."

Trans. Lattimore (1951)

The comparison of lives and leaves was very popular among early Greek poets.\(^1\) It is impossible to know if Homer was the source for the others, or along with them was just another exponent of a widespread and previously established trend.\(^2\) The direct quotation of line 146, prefixed by an explicit attribution of it to Χῖς ἄνηρ, in Simonides 8.1-2 West\(^1\) (= Simonides 19.1-2 West\(^2\)) may be taken to suggest the former,\(^3\) but that inference has been complicated by the publication a decade ago of a papyrus in which the same poem (more or less) appeared without the lines quoting “Homer” (= Simonides 20. West\(^2\)).\(^4\) In view of all the interest the comparison has aroused, it is surprising how little understood is Glaucus’ use of it here.

*Substantial passages of Greek in the body of the text are accompanied by translations; where the translation is taken from a published source, that source is identified by translator and date of publication, with full information given in the Bibliography; where no source is given the translation is mine. I would like to thank Charles Brittain, Margalit Finkelberg, Donald Lateiner, Michael Lloyd, William H. Race, Andrew Ramage, Hanna Roisman, Bob Rust, and Calvert Watkins for their comments and suggestions.—A. Ford’s excellent “Odysseus after Dinner: Od. 9.2-11 and the Traditions of Sympotic Song” (Kazazis, J.N. and Rengakos, A. [1999]. Euphrosyne: Studies in Ancient Epic and its Legacy in Honor of Dimitris N. Maronitis, 109-23. Stuttgart) came to my attention after this article had been submitted. Our ideas about the sympotic background to Homer dovetail very nicely.

1. See especially Griffith (1975) and Sider (2001).
2. See Davison (1968) 73, for a tersely skeptical consideration of the evidence and its possibilities.
3. While the recurrence of the image at II. 21.464-66 supports the latter.
4. P.Oxy. 3965 fr. 26, in which Simonides 8. 6-13 West\(^1\) (= Simonides 20.5-12 West\(^2\)) appear preceded by at least 4 lines (= Simonides 20.1-4 West\(^2\)) that demonstrably do not quote II. 6.146, or in any other respect.

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An advance was made recently by E.R. Lowry, Jr. He pointed out that although most interpreters, presumably influenced by the subsequent history of the comparison, especially in elegy, see Glaucus in 146ff. as “pensive and sorrowful,” nonetheless the context of the speech (as well as Glaucus’ character as displayed elsewhere in the Iliad) suggest that the “image of the leaves [is] not primarily a spontaneous overflow of powerful pessimism engendered by human mortality or the brevity of youth,” but rather “serve[s] to discredit Diomedes” as part of Glaucus’ “verbal offensive” against him. In supporting this claim Lowry made the correct move of looking to other Iliadic taunting speeches for the appropriate comparisons; like most of his predecessors, however, he based his comparative argument on thematic content (primarily the leaf image and the genealogical lore), and so neglected certain formal features of Glaucus’ opening lines that I believe will, if properly appreciated, demonstrate the cogency of his insight that the passage is more in the nature of competitive banter than a sincere meditation of the *eheu fugaces* type, ingenuously offered up for Diomedes to take to heart.

1. *Not a simile*

In outline *Il.* 6.145-50 looks straightforward: the φύλλων γευη is compared to the ἀνδρῶν γευη. As many commentators have remarked, however, problems arise when the details of the comparison are pressed. For example, what on the human side corresponds to the forest, what to the leaves? Similarly, how does the meaning of γευη within the comparison relate to its meaning in 145, and thus to the question (“Who are you?”) that the passage as a whole is ostensibly answering? In mitigation of these difficulties attention might be drawn to the scholarly commonplace that point-for-point correspondence between the elements of a Homeric simile and whatever it modifies must not be expected. But is Glaucus’ comparison “a Homeric simile”? That is the nub. Most scholars who discuss the comparison use the word “simile” to refer to it, though with what degree of deliberateness it is hard to tell. A moment’s reflection, however, should tell us that this common usage is inappropriate. Its prevalence is likely

5. The quotations are from Lowry (1995) 194, 195, and 198, respectively. Cf. Kirk’s note on 144-51: “Glaucos’ reply to Diomedes’ taunts is both witty and clever.”
7. For example, Fränkel (1921) 40ff., treats it as unexceptional; likewise, Moulon (1977) 30 n.18., and Lee (1964) 2 and 33, group it indifferently with narrative similes. Most recently, Criboire (1994) and Sider (2001) refer to it regularly as a simile.
nonetheless to have contributed to the all but universal failure to recognize the comparison’s true genre, and hence tone.

We can start with the obvious: *II.* 6.146-49 is part of a speech, and the typical Homeric simile is almost entirely a creature of narrative. Does that fact point to a difference of accident or essence? I think most people will on reflection concede that Glaucus’ image “feels” different from the narrative reflection concede that Glaucus’ image “feels” different from the narrative type: it seems to propose a direct analogy more in the manner of reasoned argument than of poetic imagery.

Perhaps these intuitions can be brought into sharper focus. The familiar simile of Homeric narrative is essentially adverbial (thus its characteristic correlators are ὧς/ὡς): it fills out, as a modifier, our picture of an action in the story. As an adverb, such a comparative clause is not formally an assertion: even if we might feel that there is an implication that “Achilles is like a lion,” the form of the simile does not state the matter thus; it simply says that as a lion leaps, so Achilles leapt. In short, the primary aim of the simile does not seem to be to assert what Achilles is like, but to bring his leaping more vividly to the eye.

We can add that narrative similes not only do not formally assert the comparisons they make, but neither are they deployed in support of assertions—they are not, for example, connected to their contexts by logical particles (or equivalents) like “for . . . .”

Glaucus’ comparison differs on both these points. First, it is introduced with an explicit summary assertion of the likeness: “X is like Y”; this statement of the likeness is then worked out (and thereby justified) in what follows. Second, the comparison as a whole serves an argumentative purpose, namely, to give the grounds for the dismissal implied in the question that immediately precedes it (τίνι γενεὴν ἐρείνεις;): “Why do you ask? (You must not know that) a human γενεὴ is like a leaf γενεὴ. Leaves do such and such; so do humans.” (“And so”—presumably—“my point is made: your question was misguided.”) The whole sequence forms a tight argumentative chain defending the proposition, rhetorically formulated as a question, that Diomedes’ inquiry into his opponent’s γενεὴ was somehow unsuitable. 8 The successive stages of the argument (146 and 146-49) are introduced with the kind of asyndeton (on the use of which in such contexts see note 65 below) that is roughly characterized by Kühner-Gerth (II p.344) as equivalent to γόρρο

8. Of course Glaucus immediately proceeds to “dignify the question with a response”—of some 60 lines. I do not in this article address the cultural-rhetorical conventions which allow Homeric warriors to dilate upon their glorious lineages while affecting an overall “fight, don’t talk” attitude. The most glaring example is to be found at *II.* 20.200-58 (20.213£.=6.150f.), where the speaker gives a detailed genealogy even in the absence of any inquiry into his identity, perfectly well known to his opponent anyhow.
The observations above serve to confirm our suspicion that Glaucus’ comparison is not a simile. What then is it? I propose to relate it to a phenomenon known to ancient scholars and rhetoricians variously as the "eikáζειν" or "eikáσμος" or "eikáσμα." 10 In a classic modern discussion, Eduard Fraenkel pointed out that in certain comparisons found at the beginning of comic monologues

Fraenkel here gives a good description of what is perhaps the most clearly and narrowly defined subcategory of a larger class of stylized comparisons that seem to have flourished especially in sympotic conversation. Since Fraenkel’s subcategory is so easily identified and defined, 12 we can use some examples of it as an introduction to the whole genus; but it must be kept in

comedy takes up and continues an old party-game (Gesellschaftsspiel) popular in Athens and probably the whole Greek world, called the "eikáζειν," wherein one member of the company asks another, "Do you know what you most resemble?", and then caricatures him by way of a comparison (δι’ eikýνος); the companion so-caricatured can or must then respond with a counter-comparison (προτέτικαζείν). 11

9. My discussion throughout is heavily indebted to Fraenkel (1922) 169ff. (=1960) 160ff.) and (1950) 773ff., and Monaco (1963); apart from the few passages that I noticed myself (e.g., the two Herodotus passages discussed below), almost all of the examples I cite were culled from these three works. My disagreements with the two scholars will be made clear. Other useful discussions are to be found in Rivier (1952) 51ff. (where the device is placed in its intellectual-historical context; cf. Lloyd [1966] ch. 3, and esp. 189f.) and McCall (1969) ch. 1.

10. Strictly speaking, we should distinguish between the device (called eikáζειν, eikáσμος, and eikáσμα in the texts quoted in the next note), and the image or comparison generated by it (as early as Aristophanes, Clouds 559 called eików, but cf. Tryphon below). I will follow the custom initiated by Fraenkel and simply use the same word eikáζειν to refer to the overall device and to the comparison proper within it. For discussion of the "pre-Aristotelian" terminology for comparisons of many kinds, including the eikáζειν, see McCall, ch. 1.

11. Fraenkel (1922) 171f. (1960) 162f. Fraenkel is drawing upon ancient rhetorical and grammatical traditions for which the following passages, taken here primarily from Monaco (1963) 18ff., provide the chief evidence (on the nature of the treatises—lexica, in fact—from which the definitions derive, see West [1965]): Tryphon I (on Tryphon I and Tryphon II, see West, ibid., 231-33), de tropis Walz (1832-36) viii p.751/Spengel (1854-85) iii 202: eikáσμος ἐστιν ὸμιοίτης ἐθίους, περιπτώσα τὴν φαντάσιαν πρὸς τὸ γελοιοτέρον, ὅ δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν σκόμματα καλείταν διαφέρει δὲ τῆς ἐκόνος. ὡς γένος ἐθίους ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐκόνων οὐκ ἐνθέους εἰκάσμος, ὥς τί δὲ ἐκόνως πάντως ἐκόνων; [Herodian], de figuris Walz viii 591/Spengel; iii 92: τῆς δὲ ἐφορεώςις καθότητι εἶναι τὰ λεπτομερέστερα τάδε, σαρκασμός, διασυνάρμος, ἲπτερτότης, κάταγελος, εἰκάσμος, χαραστύσις; Walz viii 592/Spengel iii 92: εἰκάσμος δὲ ἐστὶν ὅταν μετὰ τοῦ παρατίθεται τό ὄμοιον καθαρωμένον τοῦ πέλας, οἶνον [Od. 18.26.1] ὅ τόποι ὡς ὁ μολοβός ἐπιτροπαχθέν ἀγορεύει / γέρῳ καμίου ἵσος; Hesychius, ε 807: εἰκάζειν, ἐνθέους, ἐνθέους, τὸ λέγειν ὧμιοιος τῇ τρόδῃ; cf. a 482: ἀνεκάσσασαν ἀπάσκασαν: Coudurier, de tropis Walz viii 789/Spengel iii 236: τὸ δὲ εἰκάσμα ἐστὶ σκόμμα καθ’ ὸμιοίτητα, ὡς ἔχει τὸ παρ’ Εὐπόλιδον [fr.337 PCG]: κατεικάζουσαν ἡμᾶς + σχάδα / βολάζω.

12. Monaco’s study (1963) is devoted entirely to this type, and this type alone. As some of his reviewers, especially Schäfer, pointed out, this narrowness of focus undermined his understanding of the phenomenon and severely reduced the usefulness of his work overall.
mind that this burlesque type represents only one segment of a wider spectrum of possibilities.\(^1\)

A passage from Aristophanes’ *Wasps* provides a very pure specimen of the “game” as Fraenkel described it, and locates it in its characteristic milieu, the symposium. Towards the end of the play, Bdelycleon gives his father Philocleon a crash course in the manners and mores of upper-class society (1122-1248), and then takes him off to a dinner party; afterwards, the old man’s attendant slave reports his master’s drunken antics, giving special attention to his grotesque exchanges with the other guests, which are summed up in the words (1319f.) περίπροσευχήν αὐτούς ἐν μέρει/ σκώπτον ἄγροικος, “each in turn he insulted with his crude banter.” The central episode in the slave’s report begins with another guest’s comment on the old man’s over-exuberant behavior, in particular a gratuitous beating of the slave himself (Wasps 1307-14):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{kάτωπτε δὴ μὲ νεανικῶς “παι παῖ” καλῶν.} \\
\text{eἰ’ αὐτόν, ὡς εἰδ’, ἦκασεν Λυσίστατος.} \\
\text{“ἴοικας, ὡ πρεβύτα, νεοπλούτω τρυγί} \\
\text{κλητήρι τ’ εἰς ἀχυρον ἀποδεδρακότι.”} \\
\text{ὁ δὲ ἀνακραγωγὸν ἀντήκασ’ αὐτών πάρνωτι} \\
\text{τὰ θρία τοῦ τρίβωνος ἀποβεβλικότι.} \\
\text{Σθενέλω τε τὰ σκωμάρια διακεκαρέμω.} \\
\text{οἱ δ’ ἀνεκρότηταν κτλ. . . .}
\end{align*}
\]

And he gave me a right lusty beating, all the while yelling “boy, boy.”

Lysistratus took one look at him and made a comparison: “Old fellow, you’re like a nouveau riche teenager, or an ass that’s slipped away to a bran pile!” And he bellowed back with his own comparison of Lysistratus to a locust that’s lost the wings off its cloak, or Sthenelus shorn of his stage props. Everyone applauded...


Lines 1308-14 give us an exchange just as Fraenkel describes it: first Lysistratus draws two comparisons (ἡκασεν, ἔοικας) of Philocleon, then in return Philocleon draws two of him (ἀντήκασε); the rest of the guests immediately render judgement (ἀνεκρότηταν κτλ.).

The same pattern informs an exchange between Meno and Socrates, though in this case the second party explicitly declines to respond in kind (Plato, *Meno*, 79e7-80c6 with omissions; the εἰκάζειν proper is in bold):

13. Martin (1931) 10-15 is a valuable short discussion of the symposiastic function of the εἰκάζειν. Monaco’s fifth chapter is called “i. simposii,” and is also useful; but it is a defect of both his and Fraenkel’s accounts of the εἰκάζειν that they fail to appreciate the primacy of its connection with the symposium. Huss (1999) 343, on the other hand, assumes that the symposiastic association of the εἰκάζειν is so basic that he feels constrained to point out that “als eine liberale plastische Sprechweise” it is not limited to the symposium, and appears otherwise especially in comedy.
MEN. ὅ Σώκρατες, ἤκουσιν μὲν ἐγώγει πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορείς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορείν καὶ ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπάδεις, ὡστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δὲι τι καὶ σκέψαιι, ὀμοιότατος εἰναί τὸ τε ἔδος καὶ τάλα ταύτη τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκη τῇ βαλαττίᾳ καὶ γάρ αὐτή τὸν ἂει πλησίαζοντα καὶ ἀπτόμενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτον τι πεποιηκέναι ἄληθῶς γάρ ἐγώγει καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὑπίσχεσθαι σοι . . .

Σ. Παυοὐργός εἰ, ὁ Μένων, καὶ ὀλίγου ξηπάτησάς με.

MEN. Τί μᾶλλον, ὁ Σώκρατες:

Σ. Γυμνώσκω οὖ ἐνεκά με ἡκασάς.

MEN. Τίνος ἤθε σοι:

Σ. Ἰνά σε ἀντεικάσω. ἐγὼ δὲ τούτο οἶδα περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ἐτι χαίρομεν εἰκαζόμενον λυσιτελεῖ γάρ αὐτοῖς· καλαὶ γάρ οἴμαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες· ἄλλ' οὖν ἀντεικάσομαι σε.

MENO: Socrates, before I even met you I used to hear that you are always in a state of perplexity and that you bring others to the same state, and now I think you are bewitching and beguiling me, simply putting me under a spell, so that I am quite perplexed. Indeed, if a joke is in order, you seem, in appearance and in every other way, to be like the broad torpedo fish, for it too makes anyone who comes close and touches it feel numb, and you now seem to have had that kind of effect on me, for both my mind and my tongue are numb, and I have no answer to give you. . .

SOCRATES: You are a rascal, Meno, and you nearly deceived me.

MENO: Why so particularly, Socrates?

SOCRATES: I know why you drew this image of me.

MENO: Why do you think I did?

SOCRATES: So that I should draw an image of you in return. I know that all handsome men rejoice in images of themselves; it is to their advantage, for I think that the images of beautiful people are also beautiful, but I will draw no image of you in turn. . . .


Meno’s εἰκάζειν here gives a good example of what might be called the fuller form of the device: he (a) states the comparison: “X is like Y”; (b) describes Y: “Y does such and such”; and (c) states the point of resemblance of X to Y: “X also does such and such.”14 Some instances suppress one or the other of these elements, or combine two of them into one.

14. Cf. Fraenkel (1950) 773: “The general arrangement of [the εἰκάζειν] is . . . : first the . . . statement [of similarity or dissimilarity], then its justification in two parts, ὁ μὲν γάρ . . . οὖ δὲ (or ἡμεῖς δὲ or something corresponding) κτλ.”

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Two formal features of the εἰκάζειν (as opposed to the normal Homeric narrative simile), then, are that it opens with an assertion of the likeness (“X is like Y”), and that it is deployed in the service of some argumentative point. Neither of these features is absolutely guaranteed; in particular, the “argument” in service of which the asserted likeness is being made is, in the second-person insulting type (see immediately below), often not explicitly expressed, as shown by the Wasps passage: the implicit claim in this type is usually just “You are contemptible/ridiculous.” Meno, on the other hand, uses the comparison to justify his inability to answer Socrates’ arguments (and, as Socrates realizes, to sidetrack the discussants into the kind of sympotic banter that is the εἰκάζειν’s native milieu).

The use of the verb σκώπτειν by both Philocleon’s slave and Meno suggests skoptic as an adjective to characterize the customary spirit of the burlesque type. We may remark now that by and large second-person instances of the εἰκάζειν tend to be skoptic, and skoptic instances tend to be second-person. The third person, on the other hand, provides an opportunity for more reflective, “philosophical” applications.

It might be assumed on the basis of this distinction that the “amoebic” character of the εἰκάζειν, proclaimed by the use of the verb ἀντεικαξέειν in both passages above, is also going to be most commonly associated with second-person instances. But that assumption would be mistaken: the amoebic character of the εἰκάζειν is simply a specific reflex of the competitive character of sympotic utterances in general. When a given competitive utterance is made in the second person, the response naturally will be returned in the second person—that is, will be “amoebic.” But the

15. Or equivalent: 3rd-person comparisons are sometimes spoken in the hearing of the subject himself—a device encouraged by the layout of the symposium. One example of this is Od. 18.26ff., quoted below in the text at the beginning of section 3; another is to be found in Xenophon, Symp. 6.8-9, where the attempts of another guest to insult Socrates provoke Antisthenes to say to Philip the buffoon (1:11: Φίλιππος ὁ γελωτοποιός ἵνα μένει δινός ἐκ, ὃς Φίλιππε, εἰκαξέειν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἀνήρ οὗτος λοιδορεῖται θηλυκομένοι εἰκάνειν; “Nai ma tov Δί,” ἔρη, “kai ἀλλης ye polloi.” On the pragmatics of some 3rd-person-through-3rd-person insults in Homer, see Pelliccia (1995) 169ff., 179ff., and 270ff.

16. An especially clear insight into the competitive nature of sympotic conversation overall is given in the “instructional” passage of the Wasps referred to earlier: in 1219-48 Bdelycleon, having brought his imaginary dinner party to the moment of the presympotic libation, lists the guests in their due order, and then says to his father τοῦτοι ξυνῶν ταῦτα ἐπ' ὅποιος δέξαι καλῶς. The emphasis laid here and elsewhere in the passage on “taking up” the singing where the guest before has left off (δέχομαι, again at 1225 and 1243; cf., e.g., 1236-39, τί δ', ὅταν Θέερος τροχὸς ποδῶν κατακινεῖμενος θῆκη Κλέωνος λαβομένος τῆς δέξιας . . . τούτῳ τὰ λέξεις σκόλιον;) gives the clue; each contribution is conceived as a display or “performance” which the next speaker must try to top or at least equal. See further West (1974) 176.

17. But when Fraenkel says that the person addressed first “can or must respond with an ἀντεικαξέειν” (emphasis added), we should resist the implication, also lurking in Fraenkel’s use of the term “Spiel” (Gesellschaftsspiel), that the εἰκάζειν is a real game played by set rules. It takes Socrates a moment’s reflection to realize that Meno is fishing for an ἀντεικαξέειν in return; this hesitation is at odds with the automatic quality of the proceeding implied by Fraenkel. For what it’s worth, the ancient discussions of the εἰκαζέειν (above, n.11) do not treat it as a game. For them it is a figure or trope: a subform of εἰκανεία in [Herodian], of the εἰκῶν (a τρόπος τῆς φράσεως) in Ἰταπιθ 1 (as quoted in n.11 above). Conversely, the entries in, e.g., Hesychius and the Suda for real games, such as the κότταβος, are just what we would expect:

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The key point here concerns the εἰκάζειν overall, not just in its second-person uses: its native home is, as the Wasps passage indicates, the symposium, and its usage conforms to the usage of that environment.

I will take this observation a step further: so pronounced is the sympotic character of the εἰκάζειν that it will often be enlightening to consider the possibility that a given instance occurring outside the symposium is intended to evoke it. We can call this kind of secondary evocation of the symposium "parasympotic," and will examine its nature and implications as the discussion proceeds. In the Aristophanes passage, both pairs of comparisons (Lysistratus' and Philocleon's) illustrate both possibilities. In Lysistratus' case the comparisons are stylized by their dependence on metaphors coming from a contrasted realm: Philocleon is like a newly rich young man, but the word for "young man" is metaphorically derived from the natural world—young, unfermented wine, τρυφεῖς, in the next line this clever inversion is itself inverted: the old man is compared not to a human metaphorically designated in natural-world terms, but to a natural-world item, an animal, metaphorically referred to as a "repertorio dei paragoni."
designated in human terms: the word for donkey, κλητήρ, is based on the equation of the animal’s insistent braying with that of a legal “summoner.”

Although both parts of Philocleon’s ἄντεικνεῖν are somewhat obscure, the first (1311ff.), with its triple embedding of animal, plant, and human images, looks as if it beats Lysistratus at his own kind of stylization: he is like a locust (animal) who has cast off the fig-leaves (plant, metaphorically for locust-wings) that constitute its cloak (τρίβων: back to the human).

BEFORE WE CONSIDER some instances of non-skoptic, non-second-person uses of the εἰκάζειν, a question of lone needs to be settled. Fraenkel put forward the opinion that the device was intrinsically lower class and vulgar. This judgement was pronounced most clearly in a note on the Ἀγαμήμον. I will first quote the passage of the play that occasioned the note, Ἀγ. 1625-30, and then the relevant parts of the note itself.

The passage begins in a duly skoptic manner with the chorus’s apostrophizing of Aegisthus as a woman:

Χ. γύναι, εὐ τοὺς ἰκόνας ἐκ μάχης νέον
καὶ ταῦτα τάπη τλαύματων ἀρχηγενῆ.

Α. ὥσπερ δὲ γλώσσαν τὴν ἐνοντίαν ἔχειν,
μὲν γὰρ ἂν πάντα ποὺ φθογγῆς χαρῆ,
οὐ δὲ ἐξορίσας νηπίως ἑλάγμασιν
ἀξίνε καταθεῖς δὲ ἡμέρωτερος φανή.

(Ag. 1625-32)

Chorus: Thou woman, thou: to do this to those newly come from battle, and, while as a stay-at-home thou wast defiling the man’s bed, to plot this death against the general in the field!

21. See especially the discussion in Taillardat (1962) 37ff. Also, Monaco (1963) 31 f.

22. It is often hard to get what is supposed to be so funny about these comparisons (“εἰκόνες seem to us a rather frigid kind of humour”: Dover [1968] on Ἀρ., Clouds, 559). On the other hand, the other symposiasts show their admiration for Philocleon’s εἰκάζειν by clapping, not by laughing, so our assumption that the chief emphasis is on humor may be misguided. What seems to be sought after is a virtuoso wielding of, above all, animal and plant images—a feature that cannot help but remind us of the language of Aeschylus.

23. The suggestion of MacDowell (1971) in his note on 1313, that the point of Philocleon’s comparison lies in the real Lysistratus’ “habit of going around inadequately dressed,” i.e., τρίβων-less, would be so flat (“he, who has no τρίβων, is like a locust who has cast aside his τρίβων”) as to render the symposiasts’ approval incomprehensible.

24. Fraenkel took the occasion offered by this passage to draw attention to the not infrequent inversions of the εἰκάζειν, wherein what is proposed is not resemblance, but its opposite, i.e., the statement of likeness becomes an ἐνάντιον-statement,” as Fraenkel puts it. Other examples he lists here are Ἀρ., Birds 30-35, Wealth 1204-07, and Xenophon, Ἀρ. 5.8.24, the last of which is especially clear: ἢν οὖν σωφρονίτη, τοῦτον τάναντα ποίησετε ἢ τοὺς κύκας ποιούσι: τούς μὲν γὰρ κύκας τοὺς χαλεποὺς ταῖς μὲν ἡμέραῖς διδάσκεις, τὰς δὲ νύκτας ἀφίοι, τοῦτον δὲ, ἢν σωφρονίτη, τὴν νύκτα μὲν δησετε, τὴν δὲ ἡμέραν ἀφίθετε.
The social discriminations Fraenkel so indignantly draws here inevitably seem a trifle quaint nowadays, but we must remember that ancient Greece was an intensely class-conscious culture. Fraenkel’s denigration of Aegisthus bears some resemblance, in reverse, to his notoriously starry-eyed exaltation of Agamemnon, who he claimed was in Aeschylus’ rendering “a great gentleman”—a perverse judgement he is said later to have renounced. But while we must certainly accept that Aeschylus, both here and in the rest of the scene, puts into Aegisthus’ mouth language designed to expose him as suffering a nearly pathological lack of sense, judgement, and taste, did the poet really need to imply, in order to round out the picture, that this “Pelopid” belonged to “the lower orders of society” to boot? Surely what is shocking about Aegisthus’ εἰκάζειν is not its class markings, but its implication that the chorus’ moral outrage over the crimes of adultery, murder, regicide, and all the rest, is a suitable occasion for the kind of stylized verbal sparring at home in the symposium. No doubt the apparent frivolity of the gesture contributes to its success as an expression of contempt, but though the move may well be “over the top,” there doesn’t

Fraenkel’s note is on lines 1629ff.:

The form employed here leads us unmistakably into the sphere of those witticisms with which the lower orders of society and people of modest intellectual pretensions are accustomed to amuse themselves. Of the same kind as the form is the content, the vulgarity of dragging in Orpheus and the forced βωμολοχία of ἰγες and δέξιον. That Aegisthus has the face to employ such devices at such a juncture characterizes the man who, though in origin a Pelopid, is through and through made of common stuff. The effect must have been very startling to the Athenians. Even without taking into account the traditional dignity of tragic princes (of course messengers, heralds, servants, and their like stand on a lower level), we can be fairly certain that in consequence of the strict rules of Attic εὐσχῆμοσύνη no one who was the Athenian counterpart of what is called in England “a gentleman” and in Basle "ein wirklicher Herr" would, in similar circumstances, have behaved in such a way as this. . . . The accumulated effect is that of a certain vulgarity.

25. The phrase “a great gentleman” is to be found in his note on 915; cf. notes on 811 (with esp. p.372 n.4), 939f., 944f., 948, and p.441. For the renunciation, see Taplin (1977) 312 (“in private conversation Fraenkel retracted his discussion.”)

26. Cf. Denniston and Page on 1577-78: Aegisthus “speaks in a style unlike that of any other character in Aeschylus, high or low.”
seem to be any reason to take it as also showing that the speaker is "made of common stuff."

The broader question raised by Fraenkel’s comment is significant for my characterization of the εἰκαζεῖν as a whole, since I have claimed that the device’s close association with the institution of the symposium is an essential and defining feature of its nature. Obviously, the symposium is itself upper class. Indeed, it is a primary locus for upper-class self-definition. That is the whole premise of the instructional scene from the Wasps: to prepare Philocleon for upper-class life is to prepare him for the symposium. The implication must be that, if the εἰκαζεῖν has any intrinsic class leanings at all, they should, pace Fraenkel, tend more upwards than downwards.

That this view is correct, and Fraenkel’s wrong, can I think be quickly established by citing what is, surprisingly enough, Fraenkel’s own second example of the εἰκαζεῖν (in his original discussion), namely, Plato, Symp. 215a6-b3. In using this passage, Fraenkel simply excerpted the likeness proper, ἠμιά γὰρ ὁμοιότατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς σιλπυοῖς τούτοις ἐν τοῖς ἔμμογυλφείοις καθημένοις, without giving any contextual information. This context we can supply. That the setting is “sympotic” does not need belaboring. But the key point is that the speaker is, of course, Alcibiades. Now, was there ever an Athenian more in-your-face-edly aristocratic than Alcibiades was? And, in case there is any doubt, the comparison Fraenkel quotes is not an isolated aberration on the drunken princeling’s part—he immediately goes on to add another one (to the satyr Marsyas).

Consideration of this one passage alone should have caused Fraenkel to hesitate to pronounce the εἰκαζεῖν “vulgar.” How could he have gotten the matter so wrong? I suspect that he was misled by focusing too exclusively on the burlesque second-person instances. It is in the nature of the beast that skeptic use should often decline into vulgar abuse, and many a comic εἰκαζεῖν no doubt looks pretty “low.” But, as Socrates remarked to Protagoras, though most symposiasts are not intelligent or well-educated enough to extract an evening’s entertainment from their own wit (and so must rely on hired performers), not all symptic conversation is therefore condemned to being rowdy and stupid. The guests at Agathon’s dinner party adhere closely to acknowledged symptic rules, and yet Plato’s Symposium puts on display brilliant and civilized conversation. Our understanding of

27. Thus it cannot be argued that Philocleon’s use of an εἰκαζεῖν itself shows the device’s intrinsic vulgarity (i.e., since he is irredeemably vulgar): it is the upper-class Lysistratta who starts the round of comparisons, not Philocleon.
how the εἰκάζειν can find a place for itself in this more exalted kind of discourse will be advanced by looking at some instances in the third person.

Fraenkel’s own first example was from comedy (Alexis 46 PCG):

ομοιότατος ἀνθρώπος οὐχ ἡν φύσιν
tρόπον τιν’ ἐστὶ, καὶ γὰρ οἴνου τὸν νέον
πολλὴ ἵνα ἀπόκρυψαι καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα ἀποτέλεσαι
πρῶτοτον ἀφυδίσας τι, ἀπανθίζεσαν δὲ
σκληρὸν γενέθαι, παρακμάσαντα δὲ ὧν λέγοι
τούτων ἀπάντησιν, ἀπαραθέτειν τὴν ἄνω
tαύτην ἄνισον ἐπιπλάξουσαν, τότε
πότιμον γενέθαι καὶ καταστήσαι πάλιν,
ηδὸν δ᾽ ἀπασι τούπιλιοποι διαστελεῖν.

A man is in a way most like wine in nature. It's inescapable that both wine and man at first ferment and offend, but then, after the bloom has gone, turn bitter. Now, though, having peaked out and passed all this that I mention, and been skimmed free of that stupidity that had risen to the top, they both calm down and become palatable, and sweet to all for the future they remain.

What is so useful about this passage is that it is in effect a recasting of Ar., Wasps 1309 (quoted above).29 there Lysistratus compared a specific human (“you”=Philocleon) to a “young wine” (τρύξ), and the effect was insulting and ribald; here, not a specific person, but humanity as a whole is compared to the same thing, and the effect is not skoptic, but “philosophical,” though evidently witty and ingenious. The difference between the natural tendencies of the second- and third-person formulations could not be more succinctly exposed.30

29. Wine-comparisons were common; in Alexis himself cf. frr. 280 PCG (taking the opposite line [on this type see n.24 above]: a man is nothing like wine): οὐδὲν (καὶ) ὦ τίν’ ἀνθρώπος οὐχ ἡν φύσιν / οū μεν ἀπογνάρωσαν ἄθης γίνεται, / οūν δὲ τὸν παλαιότατον απουκαθεσθεί / οūν δὲν δάκαι γάρ, ὦ δ' ἢ ἀκοή ἡμᾶς ποιεῖ, and 284 PCG: ἀποτόπον γε τὸν μὲν οἴνου εὐθυμικομεν ἀφόρα / πάρα ταῖς ἐταιρίας τοῦ ποταίον, ἀνδρὰ δὲ / μὴ τοῦ ποταίου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ νεωτέρου. Cf. Eubulus 122 PCG: ἀποτόπον γε τὸν μὲν οἴνου εὐθυμικομεν δὲ / πάρα ταῖς ἐταιρίας τοῦ ποταίου, ἀνδρὰ δὲ / μὴ τοῦ ποταίου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ νεωτέρου. (For other apparent or claimed thefts, see the next note and below in section 4).

30. The basic tendency is for 3rd-person instances to be more generalized or abstract, though not necessarily unhumorous. In addition to the passages from Alexis and Eubulus quoted in the preceding note, good examples are Thgn. 457-61, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοφοροῦν ἐστὶ γυνὴ μὲν ἄνδρι γέροντι: / οὐ γάρ πηδαλίων πεθεῖται ὡς ἄκατος, / οὐδ' ἀγκαταξία ἔχοντος ἀπορρίζεσθαι δε δειμα / παλαίκειν ἐκ νυκτῶν ἀλλην ἔχει λυώναι, also in Thesp. 6 PCG: οὔ μυρίφορον νέα 'τι προαποτινυ γυνή / ἢσπερ γάρ ἄκατον οὐδὲ μικρὸν πεθεῖται / ἢ πηδαλίω, τὸ πεῖσμα ἀπορρίζεσθαι δὲ / ἢν νυκτὸς ἔτερον λυμεν ἔχουσα ἐξευηρεῖθη, Cf. Anaxilas 32 PCG: οὶ κόλακες εἰς τὸν ἔχοντος οὐσίαν / σκύληρες, εἰς ὄλος δάκοιον ἀνθρώπου τρόπου / εἰσίν ἀκαταξίας ἔκαθεν καθημένος, / ἤκος ἢ ἢσπερ πυρὸν ἀποτείχει κενὸν. / ἐπεὶ δ' οὔ λέμει τυεύς, / ο ἢτερον δάκαι. (Some 3rd-person examples are without a doubt ribald, but even here the sting is blunted by the generalized formulation, as illustrated in PMG 905: πόρη καὶ βαλανεις τούτων ἔχουσα ἐμπέδως ἔδος: / ἐν ταύτῃ τυληλὸν τοῦ τι ἄγαθου τον τε κακὸν λαῖς.) Many of the examples cited by Fraenkel and Monaco from Roman comedy are "philosophical" reflections upon human life; behind most of them lie Greek originals. Philolaches' elaborately worked out comparison...
That the εἰκόνεια should have non-skoptic uses accords well with its close association with the symposium, an institution which, within a fairly rigid formal framework, permits, indeed encourages, a wide variety of behaviors and moods. It is instructive in this context to recall the diverse use of the most characteristic sympotic verse-form, elegy.\(^3\)\(^1\) No doubt the activity designated by the verb σκόπτειν played a great part in the symposium, and a portion of the remains of elegiac and other sympotic verse is duly skoptic. But symposiasts did things other than insult one another,\(^3\)\(^2\) and neither is all elegy skoptic—far from it. Likewise, I suggest, for the εἰκόνεια: the skoptic function is prominent, and perhaps most characteristic. But it is not the whole story.

I earlier proposed the term “parasympotic” to cover instances of the εἰκόνεια occurring outside the symposium, but arguably intended to evoke it. Many eikastic comparisons come to us in fragments of comic poets without any indication of speech-context—for example, Alexis 46 above.\(^3\)\(^3\) Comedy’s tendency to invoke and incorporate into itself various other genres and modes (tragic, dithyrambic, epithalamial, etc.) is conspicuous, and the suggestion that it should often bring the symposium onto stage seems unlikely to arouse controversy.\(^3\)\(^4\) But again it would be helpful if we had more context for these fragmentary comic examples; unfortunately, the εἰκόνεια seems to invite excision as a discrete and independent unit, a point to which we will return at the end of this article. But as the situation stands, we do not know for many of them if we should consider them sympotic, parasympotic, or something else again.

A good candidate for being classed parasympotic is the εἰκόνεια of Aegisthus in Aeschylus, Agamemnon 1629ff., considered above. Obviously judgement about whether or not a given nonsympotic εἰκόνεια is “intended to evoke the symposium” is always going to be more or less subjective, but crediting Aegisthus with an untimely evocation of sympotic styles seems not between a human youth and a new building in Plautus, Most. I. ii, is in fact the occasion for Fraenkel’s whole 1922 discussion. Cf. Cato quoted in n.44 below.

\(^3\)\(^1\) The recognition that what unifies the incoherent jumble that constitutes extant elegy is its occasion—the symposium—is quite recent; see Bowie (1986).

\(^3\)\(^2\) The problem of sympotic violence arising from insults is acknowledged from our earliest texts forward, especially the Odyssey, of course (see Slater [1990]). The formulating of sympotic rules against skptic excess can be glimpsed at least as early as Anacreon 2 West and Xenophanes 1 West (both preserved in the same passage of Athenaeus), and recurs regularly. A pithy statement of the need to avoid insults is given in fragment 1087 (Nauck) of Euripides: εὐφρατία γὰρ παρὰ σπανθάσοι κάλλιστον (οἱ κάλλιστοι—statements as a topos of the symposium, see below in the text on Herodotus 1.29-33).

\(^3\)\(^3\) Among other examples cited elsewhere in this article are Alexis 35 and 284 PCG, Anaxilas 32 PCG, Eubulus 122 PCG, and Theophilus 4 PCG.

\(^3\)\(^4\) Cf. Arrnot (1996) 160: the “frequent use of the εἰκόνεια in comedy is doubtless explained by their popularity as a form of sympodial wit.”
only to accord perfectly with the rest of his comportment, but to add as an interpretative bonus some information about "where he's coming from." Of course, his eikázein is skeptic, that is, the most common kind, which makes the argument easier. I will conclude our discussion of the eikázein with an examination of two non-skoptic parasympotic instances from Herodotus, which I hope will illustrate the value of maintaining the category "parasympotic."

In Book 1.29-33, Solon appears at the court of Croesus. Croesus entertains his distinguished visitor, with whose fame he is represented as being acquainted, and displays to him his incomparable wealth. Later, Croesus asks the Athenian to select, from all the number of mortals he has seen in his lengthy travels, the one who is happiest. The question, which is given a somewhat convoluted formulation in Herodotus' account (νῦν ὁν ἴμερος ἐπείρεσθαί μοι ἑπήλθε σε εἰ τινα ἥδη πάντων εἶδες ὀλβιώτατον), when recast into a more direct form (τοι ὁ ὀλβιώτατος·), bears a striking resemblance to one of the most popular and venerable ξητήματα of Greek culture: τί τὸ κάλλιστον [or ἦδιστον or ἄριστον];35 The latter's popularity as a sympotic conversation-starter can be inferred from the abundance of answers provided in the surviving remains of convivial poetry.36 The opening priamel of Sappho 16 (οἱ μὲν ἵππημον στρότον, οἱ δὲ πέσδου) / οἱ δὲ νάων φαῖο' ἐτὶ γὰν µέλαιναν / ἐξεµεναι κάλλιστον), with its exhilaratingly scandalous assertion of a totally subjective relativism in the climax (ἔγῳ δὲ κῆν ὃτι - τῳ τις ζήσαι),

35. See especially Vischer (1965) 40-42, "Exkurs über die superlativischen Fragen" (with extensive bibliography)—an appendix to his discussion of the Solon and Croesus scene in Herodotus. Cf. Fraenkel (1950) 407f. The τί κάλλιστον question is so much a part of Greek life that Praxilla 1 PMG can imagine its being carried over into death: Adonis, asked on arrival in the underworld what was fairest in the life he has now left behind, answers κάλλιστον μὲν ἔγῳ λέιπων φάοι ἥµιλιοι, / δεύτερον δτρα φαινεια σεληναις τη πρόοσην την ήδη και ὁράουν σικιόν και µῆλα και γύρια. The supposed stupidity of this reply (speaking of cucumbers and the like in the same breath as the sun) became proverbial. Cal Watkins points out, however, that the third line is a variant of the kind of paradise-descriptions of ever-bearing trees exemplified by Od. 7.115f. (discussed in the text below in section 3) δύναται και ροιαι και µῆλαι ἀγγλακαρποι / συκεαι τυ γλυκεαι και ελαιαι τηλειδοσαι, and so forms an appropriate rather than stupid answer. Furthermore, Praxilla may have substituted the derided cucumbers, σικιοι, for figs, συκεια, as a kind of half-revealed sphragis: she is herself a native of Sicyon.

36. In addition to those cited in the text (including the Simonides 8.1 West'=19.1 West'= ἐν κάλλιστον) and the appended footnotes, see the skolion PMG 890 (a ranking like that of τὸ Δηλακον επίγρασμα, quoted in the text below); υγαίανει και τὸ δριστον ἄνδρι θυτη, / δευτερον δι καλον φιλαν γενεθαι, / το τρίτον δε πλουτουν δαλδος, / και το τέταρτον ήβαν μετα των φιλων, and Pindar, Ol. 1.1: δριστον μου άδωρ, ο δρ χρυσος κτλ. (explicitly sympotic notes begin to be sounded at 11, εστιαν, and 15-17, µουσικας εν ἅωτον, οι παιζουν φιλαν / άνδρει άμφει θαμα τραγων), At Od. 9.5-11 (ου γάρ εγα γε το φημι της χαριστερον ειναι / ἢ 3το ἐφουροιναι μεν ήχο κατα δήμον ἄταντα / τοτο τοι µι κάλλιστον ενα ρησει ειδεται ειναι) and Pindar, Nem. 4.1f. (δριστος εφουροιναι ποικων κεκριμευνων / ιστρος) the symposium itself is singed out as superlatively best. Cf. Euripides quoted in n.32 above. These comparative judgements are often formulated dramatically, as priamels. On the superlative in them, see especially Bundy (1962) 11 n.33 and Race (1982) 15 n.48: "behind such priamels as Sappho fr. 16.1-4 and Pindar Ol. 1.1-7 are the questions τί κάλλιστον; τί ἄριστον;"
provides good evidence that by the end of the seventh century a high premium was already being placed on the ability to deliver excitingly paradoxical new answers to what was already no doubt felt to be a hackneyed conversational theme. The more piously proper answers were enshrined in an elegiac couplet inscribed on the temple of Leto on Delos (the pentameter of which noticeably resembles Sappho’s more radical proposal in 16): κάλλιστον τό δικαιότατον λέοντον δ’ ύγιαινειν / πράγμα δὲ τερπνότατον, τού τις ἔρα, τὸ τυχεῖν.37 But even within the non-frivolous moralizing tradition a thirst for paradox asserted itself (Theognis 425-28):38

\[
\text{πάντων μὲν μὴ φύσι \ ἐπιξυθονίσωσιν ἄριστων}
\]

\[
\text{μηδ’ ἔστι δέκα ὤγας ὄξεος ἡμείου,}
\]

\[
\text{φύντα δ’ ὡς γείστα πύλας \ Ἀλκαῖο περήσαι}
\]

\[
\text{kai κείθαι πολλὴν γῇν ἐπαμηνάμενον.}
\]

Best of all for earth-dwelling men is not to be born, and not see the beams of the piercing sun, but once born, to cross through the gates of Hades as quickly as possible, get buried under a great heap of earth, and lie dead.

It is in the light of this sympotic background that we must understand the exchange between Croesus and Solon. Like the future Ptolemaic kings of Hellenistic Egypt, Croesus and his wealth attract (in Herodotus’ somewhat implausible telling) a steady stream of itinerant Greek wits (1.29.1, ἀπικνέονται ἐς Σάρδις ἀκμαζόωσις πλούτῳ ἄλλοι τε τις πάντες ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος σοφισταί κτλ.). Solon’s “outrageous” answers to Croesus’ question are well chosen to satisfy the craving for paradox, and the “indignation” they provoke in the host (σπερχθεὶς, 1.32.1) provides the occasion for the Athenian’s trotting out of a magnificently Gorgianic set piece (1.32.1-9), packed with elaborate displays of pseudo-learning, and recalling in its wordplay the end of Agathon’s speech in Plato’s Symposium.39

The climax is as follows (32.8-9):

\[
\text{τὰ πάντα μὲν νυ ταῦτα συλλαβεῖν ἀνθρώπων ἐόντα ἄδικατόν}
\]

\[
\text{ἐστι, ὡσπερ χώρῃ ὀυδεμίᾳ καταρκῇ πάντα ἐσωτήρ παρέχουσα,}
\]

\[
\text{ἄλλα ἄλλο μὲν ἔχει, ἔτέρων δὲ ἐπείδεται: ἢ δὲ ἂν τὰ πλείστα}
\]

\[
\text{ἔχων, αὐτὴ ἄριστα, ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐν ὀυδὲν}
\]

\[
\text{αὐτάρκες ἐστι: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει, ἄλλος δὲ ἐνδεξίς ἐστι: ὡς δ’ ἂν}
\]

\[
\text{αὐτῶν πλείστα ἔχων διατελέσῃ καὶ ἐπείτα τελευτήσῃ}
\]

Croesus’ question is given its final answer in an εἰκάζειν, which conforms to type by positing an analogy between a (nonspecific) human being and the natural world.⁴⁰ Herodotus does not tell us the specific local circumstances under which the conversation between Croesus and Solon took place.⁴¹ In the Greek world, the natural occasion for setting a conversational hare like τίς ὁ ὀλβιώτατος; would of course be the symposium,⁴² and we can note that Croesus’ purpose in turning the discussion in this direction is precisely the same as that ascribed by Socrates to Meno’s εἰκάζειν, viz., to evoke praise of himself. Likewise, Solon’s series of paradoxical answers brilliantly fulfills the sympotic expectation of conversational one-upsmanship (especially of Greek over foreigner).

Our second example from Herodotus might have comforted Fraenkel in his belief that the εἰκάζειν possessed an intrinsically demotic character, in that we are told that the speaker of it is of humble origins, albeit a king of Egypt of humble origins. This is Amasis, whom the Egyptians at first despised ἀτε δὴ διημότην τὸ πρὶν ἐόντα καὶ οἰκίς οὐκ ἐπιφανέος,

40. I note now two features of Solon’s comparison that are relevant to the subsequent discussion: first, it looks as if it has been rather artificially introduced into its context, since the comparandum, χόρη, has no bearing at all on the point being made about the comparanda (δι’ ἀν... τελευτησε εὐχαριστος τον βιον); this inevitably gives the comparison a pre-made look. Second, the statement introducing the comparison, τὰ πάντα μὲν νυν ταῦτα συλλαβεῖν ἄθρωτον ἑόντα ἀδύνατον ἄτι, ἄσπερ χόρη οὐδεμία κτλ., bears a strong thematic similarity to the long disquisition with which Odysseus follows up his ἀντικαίζειν of Euryalus in Od. 8.166 (267f., ὥστως οὐ πάντεσσοι θεοί χαίρουσι διδοῦσιν, ἀνδραῖον κτλ.), discussed below in section 3.

41. Lydian influence on the establishment of Greek sympotic customs was suggested by von der Mühll (1975) 485. Cf. Findar fr. 125, locating Terpander and the barbaros ἐν διείσνουσι Λυδον; cf. Teleses 810 PMG. See also Hanfmann (1974) esp. 298; and (1983) 72, for the evidence of dining couches in Sardis. It is noteworthy that in the famous passage (1.94.1) in which he asserts that Lydians follow the same νόμοι as the Greeks (χόρης ὥστε τα βήματα τέκνα κατακατηγορεύοντο), Herodotus devotes most attention to the matter of σαγουλια (1.94.2-3). The invention of these latter he then connects (1.94.4-7) with the supposed Lydian colonization of central Italy as the proto-Etruscans (on Etruscan entertainment practices the infamous locus classicus is Theopompus FGrH 115 F 204= Athenaeus XII 517d-515b). The eastern coast of Italy, or rather, Pithecusae just off of it, is the home of what has been persuasively identified as the earliest evidence for the Greek adoption of the symposium: Nestor's cup. See Murray (1994) and cf. Rathje (1990).

42. Cf. Vischer (1965) 40: “Superlativische Fragen... sind bei den Griechen von alters her üblich... Sie gelten als willkommener Mittel, den Scharfsinn des Gesprächspartners zu erproben und zugleich den eigenen Witz und die eigene Pfiffigkeit unter Beweis zu stellen. Daher haben sie ihren festen Platz in Streitgesprächen aller Art: beim Gelage, beim dichterischen Wettkampf, bei der Befragung weiser Männer.”
2.172.2; indeed, his early life of depravity at one time actually degenerated into criminality (2.174). A folkloric trickster figure, he is a difficult character to interpret in social terms, not least because he looks like an example of Herodotus’ tendency to depict foreigners as Hellenes (a Greek habit already well established in Homer). Amasis’ early debaucheries, which, in spite of his alleged plebeian background, have about them a strong flavor of Prince Hal or the Earl of Rochester (AeyovTEs' 6

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Herodotus ascribes to Amasis as king a regimen of assiduously attending to royal business until noon, followed by similarly assiduous drinking for the rest of the day. The account is put into explicitly sympotic terms (2.173.1): ἔχρατο δὲ καταστάσιν πρηγμάτων τοιήδε: τὸ μὲν ὅρθριον μέχρι ὀτεὶ πληθώρης ἄγορῆς προθύμως ἔπρησε τὰ προφερόμενα πρήγματα, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦτον ἐπινε τε καὶ κατέσκωπτε τοὺς συμπότας καὶ ἦν μάταιος τε καὶ παιγνιημένον (He used to organize his working day on a regular principle: from dawn till the time the markets fill up, at mid-morning, he gave all his attention to such business as was brought to him, after which he spent the day in frivolous amusements, drinking and joking with his fellow symposiasts. Trans. de Sélincourt [1954], modified). Concerned friends intervene, urging more throne, less av8pwv (2.173.2):

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Herodotus: The Interpretation of Iliad 6.145-9 and the Symptic Contribution

Hayden Pelliccia 213

Trans. de Sélincourt [1954], modified). Concerned friends intervene, urging more throne, less av8pwv (2.173.2): ἀχθεοθέντες δὲ τούτοισιν ὁι φίλοι αὐτοῦ ἐνούθετον αὐτὸν τοιὰδε λέγοντες: "ὡς βασιλεὺς, οὐκ ὅρθως σεωτοῦ προεστηκας ἐς τὸ ἀγαν φαύλον προάγων σεωτόν ὦ γὰρ ἔχρην ἐν τρόνῳ σεμνὸ σεμνὸν δικένουται δι' ἡμέρας πρήσειν τὰ πρήγματα: καὶ οὐτὼι Αἰγύπτιοι τ' ἀν ἡπιστεᾶτο ὡς ὑπ' ἄνδρος μεγάλου ἀρχοῦνται καὶ άμεινον ὥν ἔν ἥκους: νῦν δὲ ποιεῖς οὐδαμῶς βασιλικά" (His well-wishers were pained by this behavior, and advised him to mend his ways; “My lord,” they said, “this excessive levity is not the thing to maintain your royal dignity. You ought to sit all day in state upon a stately throne, attending to your kingly affairs; for then the Egyptians would feel that a great man ruled them, and you would have a better name amongst them. Your present conduct, on the contrary, is not at all suitable to a king.” Trans. de Sélincourt [1954]). The king replies with an eikάζειν (2.173.3-4):

The king replies with an eikάζειν (2.173.3-4):

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There is nothing skoptic about this answer. It is, on the contrary, dignified and wise, though clever enough to be interesting and memorable—and it triumphs, which is not all that surprising, since it exemplifies the kind of ethical insight Herodotus loves. As to the identification of the passage as parasympotic, it seems to me a small but valuable interpretative gain if we allow that by using an εἰκάζειν Amasis has couched his defense of sympotic behavior in recognizably sympotic terms.

3. The εἰκάζειν in Homer

In Od. 18.26f. the beggar Irus responds to the challenge issued by his apparent competitor, the disguised Odysseus, as follows: "Ὁ πότοι, Ὁς μολὼβρος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγορέυει, / γρηγορία καμινοὶ ἰδοὺ κτλ. . . ." ("Shame on how the old hulk rolls along in his speech, like / an old woman at the oven." Trans. Lattimore [1967]). Monaco quoted the passage as the earliest instance of the skoptic type of εἰκάζειν he was studying. The situation in which the comparison is made—the feasting place of a group of young aristocrats—might fairly be called quasi-sympotic.

Both Monaco and Fraenkel cited Od. 6.149-52 as well, Odysseus’ first speech to Nausicaa:

43. Compare Amasis’ coarsely abusive response to Apries’ messenger at 2.162 (ἐπάρσας ἀπεμαθάνει καὶ τοῦτο μιᾷ ἐκέλευ Απριή ἀπάγειν). Incidentally, it must not be assumed that this latter act is “vulgar” in Fraenkel’s class sense. As a rule, our ability to gauge class distinctions for ancient Greece is not great, and, e.g., the behavior of the aristocrat Hippocleides in 6.127-29 should make us hesitate to generalize.

44. Cato apud Aulus Gellius 11.2.6, cited by Fraenkel (1922) 170 n.1 (=1960) 161 n.2) is reminiscent of it: vita humana prope uti ferrum est. Si exercere, conteritur; si non exercere, tamen robigo interfectic. Item homines exercendo videmus conteri; si nihil exercere, inertia atque torpore plus detrimenti facit quam exercitio.

45. Monaco (1963) 21f. (Cf. [Herodian] as quoted in note 11 above.) Note that Iru’s comparison is an example of the 3rd person used pragmatically as a 2nd person (i.e., spoken in the hearing of the 3rd-person subject).

46. Monaco (1963) 12, discusses it as a kind of forerunner; Fraenkel (1960) 422 quoted 151f. as an example of the superlative in “the εἰκάζειν formula.” Another good Homeric candidate for an εἰκάζειν, likening humans to animals in a decidedly skoptic fashion, is il. 4.243-46.
This is a curious sort of εικάζειν, however, since what the speaker is claiming (whether we believe him or not is irrelevant) is not so much that he has spotted a resemblance between his addressee and Artemis, but that he is fully convinced she really might be Artemis. As commentators have pointed out, in such contexts the meaning of expressions with the dative like Ε'λοκώιειν tends away from "you look to me like X" towards "I suspect you are X." Nonetheless, Fraenkel and Monaco were undoubtedly right to identify Odysseus' comparison (which comes, as Fraenkel had noted was typical, at speech-beginning) as a form of εικάζειν, not least in view of the second comparison Odysseus draws in this speech (160-64):

"... I have never seen with these eyes anything like you, neither man nor woman. Wonder takes me as I look on you. Yet in Delos once I saw such a thing, by Apollo's altar. I saw the stalk of a young palm shooting up...."

Trans. Lattimore (1967)
after Odysseus declines Laodamas' invitation to participate in the games; Euryalus speaks first (158-166):

\[
\text{τὸν ἄρ' Ἐυρύαλος ἀπαμείβετο νεῖκεσε τ' ἀντιν.}
\]
\[
\text{"οὐ γὰρ σ' οὐδὲ, ξείνε, δαίμονι φατὶ ἐσκόω}
\]
\[
\text{ἄθλων, οἷά τε πολλὰ μὲτ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλονται,}
\]
\[
\text{ἀλλὰ τῷ, δὲ ἄμα νηὶ πολυκλήθιδα βαμίζων,}
\]
\[
\text{ἀρχὸς ναυτάαω, οialized τε πρηκτήρες έασι,}
\]
\[
\text{φόρτου τε μνήμων καὶ ἐπίσκοπος ἦσιν ὁδαίων}
\]
\[
\text{κερδέων β' ἀρπαλέων οὔτ' ἀθλητήρι ἑοικας."}
\]

Euryalus answered him to his face and spoke to him roughly:

\[
\text{"No, stranger, for I do not see that you are like one versed}
\]
\[
\text{in contests, such as now are practiced much among people,}
\]
\[
\text{but rather to one who plies his ways in his many-locked vessel,}
\]
\[
\text{master over mariners who also are men of business,}
\]
\[
\text{a man who, careful of his cargo and grasping for profits,}
\]
\[
\text{goes carefully on his way. You do not resemble an athlete."}
\]

Then looking at him darkly resourceful Odysseus answered:

\[
\text{"Friend, that was not well spoken; you seem like one who is}
\]
\[
\text{reckless . . . ."}
\]

Trans. Lattimore (1967)

This is a textbook skoptic exchange, featuring both εἰκάζειν and ἀντεικάζειν. As in the opening of Odysseus’ speech to Nausicaa, the language of the εἰκάζειν (ἐλθκο, ἐοικας) is used not to draw a real comparison (to, e.g., an animal or plant), but to make a surmise, in the present case highly disadvantageous to the addressee. 49

W.J. Slater has persuasively argued that all of Od. 8 is best understood as an exploration of “sympotic ethics.” 50 We may add that Euryalus’ ill-advised sneer states the book’s theme: is Odysseus one of “us,” or one of “them”—is he upper, or is he lower—an athlete/warrior/symposiast, or an upstart “in commerce”? It would accord well with Slater’s thesis if the εἰκάζειν—language with which Euryalus denies Odysseus upper-class status were recognized by the audience as itself being upper class, i.e., by virtue of being sympotic. (This point carries over to Odysseus’ response.) That the exchange does not in fact take place in the dining room, or inside a house at

character . . . is confronted with something strange or new, and often his reaction, in such a situation, is to liken the new person or object to something.” Since I believe that Odysseus is practicing insincerity in professing that he thinks Nausicaa might be Artemis, and that Euryalus is not trying to “grasp” Odysseus, but is insulting him, I cannot accept Lloyd’s analysis as valid.

49. Another Odyssean example of the use of εἰκάζειν—language to insult someone, in a quasi-sympotic setting (i.e., amidst the suitors) is at 21.172f., where Antinous chides Leodes, after the latter has failed with the bow: οὐ γάρ τοι β' ἔγεινατο πότινα μήτηρ / οἶνον τε ρυτήρα βιοῦ τ' ἠμενα καὶ ὀστᾶν. The use of correlative οἱος/τοίος is reminiscent of Il. 6.146, as pointed out in n.60 below.

all, makes no difference; on the contrary, that fact brings to light an essential point about the whole phenomenon of parasympoticism: for Greek aristocrats what conversation and the other convivial arts are to the symposium, athletics and war are for the world outside. Either of the two spheres can at any time be spoken of in terms borrowed from the other—for, as Heraclitus might say, they are one and the same.

**That Glauclus' Comparison in II. 6.146-49 is an eikáζεωv should by now be evident.** Apart from its formal resemblance to many of the examples discussed so far, it also conforms to the established pattern of comparing a given human, or humankind in general, to an item drawn from the natural world; it also fulfills Fraenkel's typological requirement (really only a tendency) that an eikáζεωv should come at the beginning of a speech.

Of greater interest still is the comparison's elaborate stylization and wordplay, both noted earlier as desirable features. Let us examine the lines more closely:

```
"Τυδείδη μεγάθυμε, τί θενείν ἑρείνεις;
οἳν περ φύλλων γενεί, τοῖν δὲ καὶ ἄνδρῶν.
φύλλα τα μέν τ’ ἀνείμος χαμάδις χεῖ, ἄλλα δὲ β’ ὕλη
tηλθόσωσα φυεί, ἔαρος δ’ ἐπισκυνεῖται ζωρή;
ὡς ἄνδρῶν γενείν ἡ μὲν φύει ἡ δ’ ἀπολήγειε ... ."
```

**(II. 6.145-49)**

"High-hearted son of Tydeus, why ask of my generation?
As is the generation of leaves, so is that of humanity.
The wind scatters the leaves on the ground, but the live timber
burgeons with leaves again in the season of spring returning.
So one generation of men grows while another dies ...
"

Trans. Lattimore (1951)

Hermann Fränkel noted that γενεί has different meanings in the comparison (where it must mean something like "the generating of . . .") at least in 146-48 and in the frame (where it means "lineage" in 145, but something like "generation" as in "the older generation" in 149), and argued on that basis that the comparison was, in effect, an interpolation.\(^{51}\) I would suggest that the changes in meaning provide, as virtuoso display, much of the point: Glauclus is taking Diomedes' use of the word γενεί as the occasion for an exercise in variation and ornamentation. That the transitions are artificial is to be readily admitted, on the understanding that "artificial" means "artful" with a hint of "mannered." (The detachable quality detected by Fränkel is also to be admitted, as will be made clear below.) Line 147 to 148a obliquely brings a hint of paradox to the exercise, in that thematically and configurationally the

words recall descriptions of golden ages or realms from which death and decay have been banished. The description of the orchards outside of Alcinoos’ palace (Od. 7.114-21) is the closest parallel:

εὔθα δὲ δὲνδρα αμακρὰ περύκασι τηλεθέοντα,
όγχια καὶ ροιαὶ καὶ μιλέαι ἀγαλάκαρτοι
συκέα τε κυλεραι καὶ ἐλαῖαι τηλεθώσαι.

τάξων οὐ ποτὲ καρποὺς ἀπόλλυται οὐδ’ ἀπολεῖται
χειμᾶτος οὐδὲ θέρεις, ἑπτήσιος: ἄλλα μᾶλ’ αἰεὶ
ζευγρίην πνεύσασα τὰ μὲν φύει, ἄλλα δὲ πέσασι,
όγχυν ἐπ’ ὄγχυν γηράκει, μῆλον δ’ ἐπὶ μῆλῳ,
αὐτάρ ἐπὶ σταφυλὴ σταφυλῆ, σῶκου δ’ ἐπὶ σῶκῳ.

. . . there is the place where his fruit trees are grown tall and flourishing,
pear trees and pomegranate trees and apple trees with their shining
fruit, and the sweet fig trees and the flourishing olive.
Never is the fruit spoiled on these, never does it give out,
neither in winter time nor summer, but always the West Wind
blowing on the fruits brings some to ripeness while he starts others.
Pear matures on pear in that place, apple upon apple,
grape cluster on grape cluster, fig upon fig.

Trans. Lattimore (1967)

But the account of the isles of the blessed in Pindar, Ol. 2.72f., shows the
same theme (flowers instead of trees) in a similar configuration:

ἀνθεμα δὲ χρυσοῦ φλέγει,
τὰ μὲν χερσαθεὺν ἀπ’ ἀγαλαχων δενδρέων,
ὑδρῷ δ’ ἄλλα φέρβει

flowers of gold are ablaze,

some from radiant trees on land, while the water
nurtures others . . .

Trans. Race (1997)

Since it is otherwise post-Homeric, the intransitive use of φύω in line 148 of
Glaucus’ speech has also been thought to incriminate the passage; the
presence of the normal transitive usage in the immediately previous verse is
seen as exacerbating the anomaly.52 This point is fairly taken, especially in
view of the somewhat mechanical repetition exhibited in the correlated
clauses of many examples of the ἐκδείχνων.53 But the Pindar passage tells us a
different story, and suggests that we have to do here with a tension between

52. See, e.g., the commentaries of Leaf and Kirk, ad loc. Schwyzer (Gr.Gr. II, 219) accepts the
intransitive use, and cites other Homeric instances of transitive verbs used intransitively.
53. See, e.g., Xen. Anab. 5.8.24 (quoted fully in n.24 above), διδέοι . . . ἀφίησι . . . δῆστε . . .
ἀφήσετε. In Theoc. 1.82-91 (quoted below n.61), τάκει ὄφθαλμος (91) reproduces the sense of the
responding τάκεται ὄφθαλμος (88), just as does the repetition of exercæa et al. in the Cato passage
quoted in n.44 above.
the εἰκάζειν's natural leaning toward repetition, and the inverted mirror symmetry of a different kind of topos that has been brought in by Glaucus. The Pindar passage illustrates the pattern: to match the chiastic order whereby, in the μέν-clause, the flowers (τὰ μέν) come first, and their source (ἀπ’ ἀγλαῶν δενδρέων) second, while in the δὲ-clause, the source (ὐδωρ) comes first, and the flowers second (δ’ ἄλλα), there is a corresponding symmetrical inversion of the verbal voice, from the intransitive μέν-clause's φλέγει, carried over from the preceding line, to the transitive φέρβει of the δὲ-clause, so that whereas τὰ μέν is subject in its clause, its counterpart δ’ ἄλλα is object in its. Lines 147-48b of Glaucus' speech, of course, constitute a further example of this phenomenon.55 What needs to be pointed out is that it is in the nature of the antithetical dynamics of such passages to bring about linguistic innovation. Thus in Hesiod's little "hymn to Zeus" (Op. 3-6)

Through him mortal men are famed or unfamed, sung or unsung alike, as great Zeus will. (5) For easily he makes strong, and easily he brings the strong man low; easily he humbles the proud and raises the obscure.

Trans. Evelyn-White (Loeb)

in one and the same line (5) the active of βριάω is first transitive, and then intransitive; the first is the norm, the second an innovation, generated by the accumulated momentum of the preceding antithetical lines.56 So also in Glaucus' εἰκάζειν, the antithetical logic of the whole, and the ἦ μέν/ἡ δέ-structure of line 149 in particular, make possible the innovative intransitive

54. The two verbs at the successive line-ends, φέρβει and φλέγει, have been chosen for their phonetic similarity, which adds further to the symmetry of the passage.

55. Cf. Aesch. Septem 758-60, κακόν δ’ ὡστερ θάλασσα κύρ’ ἄγει. / τὸ μὲν πίτυνον, ἄλλο δ’ ἀείρι / τρίχαλον. It should be pointed out that in Aegisthus' εἰκάζειν in Aesch. Ag. 1628-30 (quoted and discussed earlier in the text) what Fraenkel condemned as "the forced ἄξιος λόγοι of ἐτ χεὶς and ἐντῇ" is simply another instance of this same kind of shift in verbal voice. On the whole phenomenon, and on its manifestation in Hesiod Op. 5 in particular, see Watkins (1995) 99ff.

56. LSJ's way of handling this innovation is amusing: founding their entry on four instances, they first give the transitive use, and cite Hes. Th. 447. Then, under "Il. intr.", they cite Oppian, Halieutica 5.96. Finally comes "in both senses," with quotation of Op. 5—as if listing Oppian before Op. 5 somehow disinfected the latter of irregularity.

57. This line exhibits another kind of artistry, again of a recognizable type: it is as "epimerism," whereby a stated category is named, and then broken down into its constituent parts (usually with μὲν . . . δὲ): examples are Hes., Op.11-13 οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἔνα "Ερίδων γένος, ἄλλ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἑοὶ δῶξς τὴν μὲν . . . ἦ δ’ . . .; Pindar, Nem. 8.2f. παῖδων . . . τὸν μὲν . . . ἔτερον δ’ . . .; Minnemus 2.5-7 Κήρες . . . ἦ μὲν . . . ἦ δ’ ἔτερον. The grammarian Alexios in the b'T scholium ad loc. complained πῶς ἐνικῴς ἄρα τὰ γενέα ἐπιμεριζόται δύναται; to which comes the reply: κακός; δύναται γάρ καὶ θ’ ἐνικοῦ ἐπιμερισμὸς γενέσθαι (it should be said in Alexios' defense that he may have meant "how can γενετι in the
use of φύω, the novelty of which must be accepted as a further manifestation of the speaker’s artistic panache.

So it would seem that Glaucus opens his speech with an εἰκάζειν. We are left with the question why. Presumably Glaucus is doing something similar to what Euryalus does with his more overtly skeptic (second-person) εἰκάζειν in Od. 8: he is identifying himself as a member of symposiastic society, and indeed as an adept of the art of conversational “warfare.” But what motivates his decision to present himself thus here? Clearly, it is something in the preceding speech of Diomedes. A clue may lie in the way Diomedes presents his own question: Are you a mortal or a god? Odysseus, in the passage already quoted (Od. 6.149-52), had charmingly put the same question to Nausicaa, with something like an εἰκάζειν: θεὸς νῦ τις ἤ βροτὸς ἐσσι; / εἰ μὲν τις θεὸς ἐσσι . . . / ’Αρτέμιδι σε ἔγω γε . . . / εἰδὸς τε μέγεθος τε φυὴ τ’ ἀγχιστα έίδοκω. The sequence of θεὸς νῦ τις ἤ βροτὸς ἐσσι; following by . . . έίδοκω, recalls the ludic interrogative type of εἰκάζειν exemplified in Sappho 115.1 Voigt: τίω σε . . . εἰκάσδω; (cf. Ar., Birds 804, οἰοθ’ ὃ μάλιστ’ εἰσικας ἐπτερωμένος;). It doesn’t seem impossible that Glaucus is imagined as having caught a whiff of this in Diomedes’ speech, the similarity of which to Odysseus’ is plain: τίς δὲ σὺ ἔσσι, φέριστε (123) . . . εἰ δὲ τις ἄθανάτων γε κατ’ οὐρανοῦ εἰλήλουθας (128) . . . εἰ δὲ τίς ἔσσι βροτῶν, οἴ ἀροῦρης καρπὸν ἐδοκινήσειν, κτλ. (142).

At any rate, the mere fact of having been asked to identify himself poses a subtle challenge for the addressee. Diomedes’ question carries demeaning insinuations: (1) you are too insignificant to have come to my notice, or perhaps (2), you are a malingerer and thus have been invisible hitherto (124 f., οὐ μὲν γὰρ ποτ ὅποτα μάχη ἐνι κυδιανείρῃ / τὸ πρῶτον).58 A blustering reply will be self-condemnatory, confirming the suspicion already floated that we have to deal with a talker rather than a fighter. With his elegantly composed εἰκάζειν, however, Glaucus succeeds in hitting the perfect note of detached urbanity, “both witty and clever,” as Kirk observed. By removing the discussion into the realm of the symposium, Glaucus’ use of the device suggests that he doesn’t take Diomedes’ aggression too seriously. It proves him a member of the symptotically cultivated class, and a

meanings it has had in the comparison hitherto [i.e., “lineage,” and then “generating principle”] be subdivided?). A parallel for the epimerism of a singular collective noun is furnished by Od. 8.117-19 quoted above in the text, where καρπός in 117 reappears in 119 as τὰ μὲν . . . ἀλλὰ δέ. Alexion seems to have supported the alternative reading γενεὴ ἡμῶν φύει ήδ᾽ ἀπολήγει, a device to which Crates also had recourse in “solving” the “problem” of the two separate tribes of Aethiopians at Od. 1.23f. See Bekker (1863) 58, discussing both passages.

58. The first suggestion of the exegetic scholium to the line in effect endorses (2): δευτέραν γὰρ ἔχων τάξιν Σαρπιδώνος οὐ προειμάχει.
skilled practitioner of the verbal jousting in which the Homeric hero revealed. 59 Aegisthus, too, we may recall, countered an enemy’s questioning with an εἰκάζειν, though his use of the second-person form was overtly skeptic, and, as Fraenkel sensed, infinitely less dignified than Glauclus’. Similarly aggressive was Euryalus’ use of the εἰκάζειν–form with Odysseus in Od. 8. Glauclus is a much more polished performer, but producing an εἰκάζειν remains, even in his hands, a competitive act.

4. Rhetorical detachment

I think there is some strong if unrecognized evidence that Glauclus’ comparison was indeed understood in antiquity to be an εἰκάζειν. Earlier we looked at a passage from the comic poet Alexis (fr. 46 PCG); another fragment from the same author compares life to dice (35 PCG):

τοιοῦτο τὸ ξῆν ἐστιν ὡσπερ οἱ κύβοι οὐ ταῦτ’ ἂεὶ πίπτουσιν, οὐδὲ τῶ βίῳ ταῦτόν διαμένει σχῆμα, μεταβολὰς δ’ ἔχει.

That’s the nature of life: as dice don’t give the same roll every time, neither does the shape of a man’s life stay the same to the end, but it goes through changes.

Arnott ad loc. points out that, though dice-analogies are quite common, the “direct comparison between life and the hazards of dice-play” does not occur in extant authors earlier than Alexis and an anonymous Hellenistic hexameter poet (CA Epica Adespota 4.9-15):

άλλοτε γὰρ ἄλλοις ἄλβοι λάχος ἀνθρώποις:
οί τοι πεσοῦν δίκη, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἄλβοι:
πεσός ἀμειβόμενος ποτε μὲν τοίς, ἄλλοτε τοῖς
eis ἄγαθον πίπτει καὶ ἀφενέν ἄγα Τίθης
πρόσθεν ἀνυλβίεστοι, εὐνεύεστοι δ’ ἄνυλβοι:

59. In Pelliccia (1995) 150-78 I have argued that many of the taunting speeches found in both epics exhibit a remarkable, almost Hellenistic, stylization (see especially 169 n.106). Glauclus’ comparison belongs with them.—Fraenkel, in the same note quoted earlier condemning Aegisthus’ εἰκάζειν ([1950] n. on 1629ff.), invoked Soph., Aj. 1142ff. in support of his view that by putting an εἰκάζειν into Aegisthus’ mouth Aeschylus meant to show him up as a lout: “Sophocles uses an exactly corresponding means to characterize his Menelaus in the dispute scene of the Ajax. There Menelaus, when driven into a corner, insults his opponent under the transparent cover of an αῖτος or ἀπέλογος, and in so doing he keeps in every detail the primitive form of a coarse popular custom, whereupon Teucer pays him back in the same coin.” But consistency in that case should require that Teucer be tarred with the same brush. And surely if diminishment of Menelaus was Sophocles’ aim, he would have had Teucer rise above the provocation. Fraenkel, if anyone, knew perfectly well that not all αἰτοι are “coarse.” The exchange of αἰτοι between Menelaus and Teucer is valuable precisely because it shows how two Greek antagonists can in moments of excitement switch into these to us oddly formal, stylized mini-genres of abuse. The sequence is very similar to that of Od. 17.238-54, discussed in these terms at Pelliccia (1995) 270ff.
I find it hard to believe that line 10 here was not deliberately patterned after Il. 6.146, a line famous in antiquity, and yet one whose configuration (verse-initial οἶος with correlative τοῖος after the line’s main break at the fourth foot caesura) is all but unique.60 The thematic similarities between the two passages are obvious. Fraenkel, had he considered the passage in this context, would not have hesitated to class it as an εἰκάζειν (especially since the speaker, an impoverished old woman, conforms to his erroneous view of the device’s social affiliations).61

We had already known, or thought we had known, that Il. 6.146 had proved a useful resource for later poets, from the opening of Simonides 8 West1 (=19.2 West2):

60. Neither Powell, CA ad loc., nor Arnott, 1996, loc. cit., notes the resemblance; but Hollis (1990) 29f., in a detailed discussion of the fragment (arguing against Callimachian authorship), remarks (30 n.15) that the “style of the anonymous piece is . . . in places strongly reminiscent of Homer”: “compare l. 10 with the structure of Il. 6. 146.” In Pandora searches for forms of οἶος in poems labelled “Epic” and “Eleg.” On the TLG E disk, and in the Homeric Hymns, the Orphica, and other hexametric corpora that came to mind, I have found no example of such a line-configuration besides Il. 6.146, Simonides’ quotation of Il. 6.146 in 8.2 West1 (=19.2 West2), and CA loc. cit. (But I have become very skeptical about the reliability of Pandora searches.) Cf. also Empedocles 17.3 D-K, a passage that is closely dependent for both theme and style upon Il. 6.146-49 (the debt is noted by Sider [2001] 287). The formulation of a given comparison as an assertion, at its beginning, is one of the features that we remarked in section 1 as distinguishing Il. 6.146-49 from the normal Homeric narrative simile, and in section 2 as being characteristic of the εἰκάζειν. We can note now that οἶος/τοῖος are used only rarely with “real” similes (Il. 5.554-59, 864-66, 7.63-65, 208-11, 13.298-304, 17.53-59—otherwise only singly, in correlation with, e.g., ως), and then the pair are not configured as a “head” for the comparison but, in the normal manner of similes, as the coordinators of its two members—as, e.g., at Il. 5. 864-67: οὔ δ’ ἐκ νεφελών ἐμβεβηκαί ἀθηρό / καύματος ἐξ / ἀνέμων δυσατος ὀρνιμένου, / τοῖος Τυδείδη Διομήδης θάλασσας Ἀρης / φαίνετθ’ κτλ. . . . (and that is all there is to it, i.e., there is no subsequent working out of the points of the comparison as in Il. 6.147-49. On another instance of οἶος/τοῖος in an εἰκάζειν-like passage, see n.49 above on Od. 21.172f.

61. The assessment of such matters of social nuance, difficult for the archaic and classical periods, as noted earlier, becomes even more complicated for Hellenistic poetry, especially because poets like Callimachus and Theocritus delight in incongruities such as having herdsmen and peasants produce, e.g., hexameters of exquisite refinement. An excellent, grossly coarse, and quite funny example of a bucolic εἰκάζειν (noted by Dover [1971] ad loc., but not mentioned by Maecenas or Fraenkel) is spoken skopically by Priapus to Daphnis in Theocritus 1 (82-91): “βούτας μὲν ἐλέγετο, νῦν δ’ αἰτήματα ἄνδρι ἔλεγες / ὑπόπλοκος, δική ἐσσιρ τῆς μηδᾶς οὐαί διατετείχαί, / ἀκάτα θραλλώμενος δι’ οὐ τράγος αὐτὸς ἐγένετο / και τ’ δ’ ἐπεί κ’ ἐσσιρ τῆς παρθῆνος οὐαί γελάτι / τάκεια ντραλλώμενοι ὤτι οὐ μετὰ ταύτα χορεύειν.” The general import is that goatherds are specially prey to illegitimate sexual wants and consequently to irregular anxieties (see Gow ad loc.), and that Daphnis is exhibiting symptoms of these. It seems likely that Priapus’ charge is not that Daphnis wants to have intercourse with the laughing maidens and cannot (as per Dover, 83-85), but rather that he wants to become one of them (as the goatherd desires a change in species); such a desire would explain Daphnis’ lack of interest in the girl and his fatal enmity in general, and would be of a piece with other impossibilita sought by him in 132-36.
The one best thing the Chian man said was this:
"As is the generation of leaves, so is that of humanity."
But few men taking this into their ears take it also into their hearts; for hope is present in each,
sown into their breasts when young.

Now a recently published papyrus has appeared preserving much of the rest of the poem as previously known, in a context that all but guarantees Simonides' authorship, which had been uncertain. The problem is that the new version differs from the old in a crucial respect: it doesn't include the line from Glaucus' speech, or indeed anything else from the five lines quoted above. It gives us instead lines 6-13 prefaced by 4 lines too fragmentary to reconstruct, but preserved well enough to be identifiably other than the old 1-5.62

One explanation that has been suggested is that Stobaeus silently excerpted: the lines he gives as 1-5 actually came from earlier in the same poem; the papyrus preserves lines from the intervening passage Stobaeus omitted.63

Another possibility would obviously be that we have to do with two different compositions, both of which included the same passage (6-13 in the Stobaean version, 5-12 in the papyrus).

THESE OBSERVATIONS FORM the prelude to the speculations with which I wish to conclude the present article. I continue with a few further points. The first has to do with the detachability of the εἰκάζειν. Among the examples to have come down to us are two identical pairs, Thgn. 457-61 and Theophilus 4 PCG, and Alexis 284 PCG and Eubulus 122 PCG.64 We do not have any surrounding context for any of them, which is a perfectly normal state of affairs for both the Theognidea and the fragments of comedy. We may have a suspicion, however, that comparisons like these would be prey to detachment to an exceptional degree because they are so eminently detachable—because they are discrete units usually well able to survive on their own. This suspicion would be correct. So detachable are they, in fact, that we know

62. See n.4 above for the references, and for an excellent statement of the facts and discussion of the issues see Sider (2001).
64. See nn.29 and 30 above.
they were stolen: Aristophanes tells us so himself, at Clouds 559, where he indignantly characterizes other comic poets as τὰς εἰκούς τῶν ἐγχέλων τὰς ἐμὰς μιμούμενοι. (The stolen εἰκάζειν is to be found at Knights 864ff.). Which is to say that a given εἰκάζειν might appear in different contexts in different places: in the presumed originator or author, e.g., Aristophanes, or “Theognis,” or Eubulus, or Alexis, etc., and then in the works of his alleged imitators.

This mobility, as we can call it, surely mirrors the realities of symposiastic practice. Not everybody who went to symposia will have been gifted with the kind of poetic skill and creativity prized there. It is the suggestion of B. Rust that anthologies such as we have in the surviving Theognidea functioned as prep-books for symposiasts: memorize a few—the collection features poems for every occasion—and fit them into the evening’s conversation as opportunity allows.65 We happen to have preserved for us on papyrus an εἰκάζειν-collection of just this type—an εἰκάζειν for every occasion, that is, for every physical type—ready-made for the uninspired symposiast hoping to make a splash.66

The trick, or perhaps τέχνη, of symposiastic conversation was to have at your command a repertoire of set pieces. Obviously, the higher the quality and originality of your set pieces, and the more of them you had mastered, the better. Imagination and creativity and wit will be manifested not so much, in your ability to improvise new material on the spot (since this would not be within the capability of many),67 but in your deployment of the pieces at your command—your startling ability to adapt set piece X to new context Y.68 (We may be seeing an example of this when Protagoras produces his “myth” in the Platonic dialogue that bears his name.)

The feature of this procedure that may be hard for us to accept is that it is perfectly acceptable for the seams to show. In fact, within limits, it may be

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65. Rust, in progress, developing upon Reitzenstein (1893) 45-86, esp. 76ff. Cf. Barns (1950-51) i-19, West (1974) 57, and Bremmer (1997) 14-18. The idea that people might memorize set texts for performance at symposia is confirmed by Theophrastus, Char. 27.2: ὁ δὲ ὀρμαθὴς τικουτῶς τῆς, οἷς ἡμεὶς μανθάνοιμεν ἔξηκοντα ἑτε γεγονός καὶ ταύτας λέγων παρὰ πότον ἐπιλαυνόμενοι. Chapter 5 of Cole (1991) 80ff. is given over to arguing that the earliest rhetorical handbooks were collections of model speeches (such as we have in the surviving works of Gorgias and the Tetralogies of Antiphon) to be memorized by the student, and then adapted to suit such occasions as presented themselves. I note here that while many examples of the εἰκάζειν attest the working out of the comparison to its opening statement with γάρ, some have recourse to the explanatory asyndeton that we noted earlier Kühner-Gerth II p.344 characterized as “equivalent to γάρ.” Besides ll. 6.146-49 itself, other examples are Carm. Pop. 22 (PMG 905), quoted in n.31, and Powell (1925) CA Epica Aespota 4.10-13 and Alexis 35, both quoted in the text immediately above. It seems clear that the asyndetic types will have been those most adaptable for transference to other contexts.


67. West (1974) 17: “a victim [of elegiac skeptic] abuse] might want to answer back. If he was to do it in song, he would need some facility at improvisation, but that is attested far Simonides at least (eleg. 6-7),” West goes on to discuss various interactive poetic games.

68. See Barns 3f., who shows that Aristophanes both uses and ridicules the technique.
originality and dash—provided, of course, that, e.g., your lack of taste and style doesn’t make the whole thing fall flat.\textsuperscript{69}

This suggestion implies an aesthetic at odds with our own and later antiquity’s preference for an \textit{ars adeo latet arte sua} approach. If the claimed taste seems incredible, I ask the reader to consider that some of the most memorable gnomic and parainetic passages of early Greek and classical Greek literature exhibit precisely this quality, and have often been called into question for it:

1. The fable of the Hawk and the Nightingale in Hesiod, \textit{Op.} 202-12. Hesiod “does not succeed in making effective use of [the traditional pattern in which fables are deployed]. The hawk’s hybris matches the king’s without putting it in a ridiculous light or showing it to be ill-advised. They might more aptly have told the tale to Hesiod . . . . As it is, Hesiod can only proceed by saying ‘Well, don’t you behave like that’ (213). . . . This is to negate the parallelism of animal and man which is fundamental to the genus fable. He may well be adapting an existing fable.” (West on 202-12.)

2. Phoenix introduces the Meleager exemplum at \textit{ll.} 9.599 in support of his claim (524-26) that heroes of old allowed themselves to be persuaded by gifts and prayers; but Meleager turns out to be a negative exemplar: he had to give in \textit{even without recompense}: “When the story was introduced, we were led to expect encouragement rather than warning; Meleagros cannot be called δωρητός. This is only one more of the awkwardnesses in this curious narrative” (Leaf on 599).\textsuperscript{70}

3. The Niobe-exemplum held out to Priam by Achilles at \textit{ll.} 24.601-19: “Niobe’s situation as described is clearly very like Priam’s, only more so. Priam has lost one son: Niobe lost all twelve; and yet Niobe ate food. \textit{A fortiori} Priam should eat. . . . [It is more than improbable that there was any legend at all that Niobe had eaten food after her children had been killed. The detail is irrelevant to the universal story that she was turned into stone. . . . The situation is not that Homer has chosen a suitable mythological example as an encouragement to Priam—rather he has invented it.”\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{69}. Opinions then as now could differ: the exchange of comparisons between Lysistratus and Philocleon in \textit{Ar.}, \textit{Wasps} 1308-14, quoted in section 2 above, concludes, as I quoted it, with a round of applause accorded to the old man. But the passage goes on to record dissent, duly noted and rebuked by Philocleon (1314-18): \textit{οί δὲ ἀνεκράτησαν, πλὴν γε Θουφραστοῦ μόνου / ὁτίς δὲ δειμύλλοται, ὡς δὴ δεξίος, / ὥς γέρον δὲ τῶν Θουφραστοῦ ἤρτε: ‘ἐπί τὸν κοιμῆς καὶ κομμὸς έἶναι προσποιεῖ. / κομμὸδολοχοῦν περὶ τὸν εὗ πράττοντ’ ἄτε;’} The key phrase is ὡς δὴ δεξίος: Θουφραστος is a connoisseur of apparently fastidious standards, and is ridiculed for these pretensions. It might be thought that the Hesiodic fable of the Hawk and the Nightingale, discussed below, is an example of an attempt that has failed to be brought off.

\textsuperscript{70}. Cf. Hainsworth on 524-605: “It [the Meleager parable] is not the happiest of choices . . .”; on 599: “It is not . . . very felicitous that the climax of the parable should be ‘yielding to his θυμός’ when the point of Phoenix’ discourse is ‘overcome your θυμός’ (496).”

\textsuperscript{71}. Willcock (1964) 141, following Kakridis (1949) 96-105.
Each of the passages poses a different kind of problem, and I will not enter into discussion of them here. The element common to all is that the speaker takes the audience somewhere it cannot have expected to go: the train of thought goes in one hole and comes out another. M.L. West noted the apparent illogicality of certain Hesiodic transitions, and observed that "this kind of inconsequence, a series of thoughts ABC, where A and B and B and C make a coherent sequence, but ABC taken as a whole seem to lack all cohesion, is characteristic of archaic Greek literature" (note on Th. 94-97). One of the passages he mentions is Op. 359-63, which forms part of a discussion of gift-giving versus theft:

West remarks that "361-62 cohere with 359-60 only if taken in one way, and with 363 only if taken in another," i.e., 361-62 function as the "pivot" on which a thematic transition is made from theft to thrift.

We can briefly note some further examples. After his spectacular discus-throw Odysseus issues challenges in other events, and boasts of particular skill with the bow; of all archers at Troy, he was better than all but Philoctetes:

4. In Herodotus 5.92 Sosicles, the Corinthian ambassador present when the Spartans propose restoring the Peisistratids in Athens, relates, as a negative exemplum about tyranny, the history of the Cypselid dynasty, and at length (5 full pages in the OCT): the "speech is incredibly inapt to the occasion. . . . Of the stories told, that of Cypselus' childhood is not in point, since it does not illustrate the evils of tyranny, nor is there any attempt to show that a tyranny at Athens would injure Sparta and her allies" (How and Wells on 5.92.1). "[T]his is an exemplum, as is clear from the moral drawn afterward . . . . But the fact to be exemplified is not, as one might expect, contained in the [ending], which [is itself] quite irrelevant to the point being made" (Slater [1983] 123f.).

It should be noted that Slater (1983) does not regard the irrelevance of the ending as a defect.

All but the Hesiod are analyzed in Slater (1983), chiefly as examples of ring composition.
Eurytus is introduced as setting a standard of bowmanship Odysseus cannot be. Similarly, in the Hymn to Apollo, the poet circles around the topic of the god’s birth on Delos, before, not with Herakles nor Eurytos of Oichalia, who rivalled the immortals in bowmanship. And therefore great Eurytus died suddenly nor came to old age in his own mansions, since Apollo in anger against him killed him, because he had challenged Apollo in archery.

Trans. Lattimore (1967) modified

But I will say that I stand far out ahead of all others such as are living mortals now and feed on the earth. Only I will not set myself against men of the generations before, not with Herakles nor Eurytos of Oichalia, who rivalled the immortals in bowmanship. And therefore great Eurytos died suddenly nor came to old age in his own mansions, since Apollo in anger against him killed him, because he had challenged Apollo in archery.

74. Of course this is the climax of Odysseus’ disagreeable but crucial encounter with Euryalus examined above as beginning with an exchange of ekózein and ἀντεικάζειν.
between the catalogue’s beginning and its end. But obviously that will have been the whole point: the pleasure comes from going into a list of the places Apollo now timelessly rules over and coming out of it to discover yourself in the past of that one occasion when Leto visited them.

Any doubts about an archaic poet’s willingness to do such a thing should be quelled by noting that Hesiod does it too, though in reverse, with his catalogue of the Muses at Th. 75-80: this catalogue begins as part of the past-tense birth narrative, but at its end delivers us into a timeless characterization of the goddesses’ spheres of influence. (A similar and closely succeeding passage, 94-97, was the occasion for West’s note on archaic transitions, quoted directly above.) It seems entirely reasonable that catalogues, which tend not to have verbs, be employed to segue from one temporality to another in this way. Indeed, the same “trick” is played within the hom. h. Ap. itself: immediately after his birth, Apollo is described as visiting various places, first with an aorist, ἐβήσσο (141), and then with an iterative imperfect, ἡλάσκαζες (142). These two lines are succeeded by three listing the kind of places dear to Apollo, without any verb at all. We emerge from them in line 146 into what is unambiguously the timeless present: ἀλλὰ οὐ Δήλῳ Φοῖβε μάλιστ’ ἐπιτέρπεσαι ἦτορ.

The editors who have been tempted to tamper with these passages on account of their “irregularities” should not be judged too harshly. If interpolation is the working into one passage of another that was not originally composed for it, then it seems quite likely that many of the exempla and σῖνοι which we have been examining fill the bill. The editors’ intuition is, in short, right. What needs to be adjusted is our understanding of what constituted “success” in working a ready-to-hand exemplum or fable in: Achilles’ manipulation of the Niobe story pleases because it renews the traditional tale in an unpredictable yet opportune way. Slater perceptive

76. The situation in which Priam’s supplication takes place is, like that of Odysseus’ supplication of Arete in Od. 7.152ff., and that of the embassy to Achilles in ll. 9, postprandial, i.e., potentially sympotic (ll. 24.475ff., νέον Ἐνύλήγον ἰδωρίζει / ἐθνα να καὶ πῶς ἑτεῖ καὶ παρθέκτο τότεπέζα; cf. Od. 7.174; these apparent anachronisms dismayed the ancient commentators; see the scholia ad loc., and Athenaeus 1.111f.-12c.). Though Homer lacks dining couches, his world teems with symposium-reminiscent matter; cf. Rathje (1990) and Murray (1994). I draw attention to two other items from the secondary literature: (1) Martin, in his typological study of symposium literature (Martin, [1931]), devoted 15 richly documented pages to the topos of “the uninvited guest,” of which category Alcibiades in Plato’s Symposium is undoubtedly the most famous classical example; Martin begins his discussion (64 with n.1) with the Homeric evidence, and although he does not make reference to the two Iliadic passages I have cited, he does mention Odyssey’s unexpected appearance in the Phaeacian court at Od. 7.152ff., and, in addition, 1.118ff. (Athena on Ithaca), 3.32ff. (Athena and Telemachus at Pylos), 4.15ff. (Telemachus and Peisistratus at Sparta), and ll. 2.408 (Menelaus’ arrival uninvited at Agamemnon’s feast, so memorably put to use in Plato, Symp. 174b); (2) West (1974) 10-13, had argued that the well-known reports in Philochorus and Lycurgus of the singing of Tyrtaeus’ poems by Spartan soldiers on campaign demonstrated that “martial elegy” had to be accepted as a nonsymptic circumstance for the use of the verse-form; but Bowie (1986) 15f., pointed out that the reports show that “Tyrtaeus’ elegies were sung after a banquet in the king’s skene, and the participants were a select group analogous to the
remarks that the surprise negative twist Phoenix gives the Meleager exemplum at its end serves a purpose: Phoenix "implies that all he is concerned to illustrate is the need to take gifts before the ships are burned and not afterwards; but his negative example discreetly conceals his assumption that Achilles will fight only when the ships are in danger and Patroclus asks him." It follows from all this that Achilles and Phoenix are being depicted by Homer as skilled adepts of sympotic conversation.

So also Glaucus. That his comparison shares with these other passages their "detached/detachable" look is made clear by the suspicions cast upon it by modern scholars, and by its having in fact been "detached" in the subsequent tradition preserved for us: the incorporation of its opening line into the Stobaean version of Simonides' elegy. It follows that we should not insist one of the two versions that we now have of this poem to be a defective variant of the other, since both could be Simonidean: if the poet could detach it once from Glaucus' speech, he could re-detach it from his own poem. Cobbling together new versions on the spot is just the kind of trick you would expect from Simonides when you invited him to dinner.

It is at a dinner-party, of course, that Simonides is said to have had the insight that led to his developing what became the ancient rhetorical art of memory. As the story is told in Cicero (de oratore 2.352-54), Simonides was called out of the banquet hall by two young men (i.e., the benevolent Dioscuri); when he went outside to answer the summons, he found nobody; the building thereupon collapsed behind him, utterly destroying everyone aristocratic neoi who were the characteristic symposiasts in Ionian cities. More individuals may have been involved than in symposia elsewhere, but the context is clearly related to a symposium. See more fully Bowie (1990). Cf. Murray (1991) who emphasizes the differences between the institution of Homeric "commensality" and that of the symposium as part of his thesis associating the latter with the adoption of hoplite tactics.

77. Slater (1983) 126.
78. Fränkel (1921) 40, claims that the linguistic irregularities of the lines (the variations in the meaning of γεφέρι, the intransitive use of φόεο) indicate that it was inorganically attached to the passage (hin ein zurückzuschmelzen). Cf. Cribiore (1994) 8: "It is undeniable that the simile is slightly out of place in the Homeric text. ... The connective texture of the poem here seems less smooth and homogeneous and lets come to the fore the point of juncture of different motifs."
79. G. Nagy proposed the "mouvance" exhibited in the variant versions of the poems of Jaufre Rudel as a model for the alleged re-composition of Greek epic (Nagy [1996] ch. 1). The model is far more appropriate to Greek sympotic versifying like Simonides' here. Cribiore (1994) presents a fascinating papyrus in which II. 6.147-49 appear to have served for a writing exercise: she discusses the identifiable ancient habits in excerpting the passage, and what I have called its "detachability" in general; see esp. 8: "The man-leaves simile had freed itself, and probably very early, from its multiple connections with the narrative context. All the instances of quotations of this comparison exhibit direct knowledge of the Homeric text, but suggest a desire to disembodied the image from its context and record it for preservation in memory or in writing. ... It is not improbable that the man-leaves simile was already a topos in funereal, consolatory, threnodic poetry before the poet of the Iliad adopted it to the battle narrative." Martin (1997), argues that the supposedly late linguistic features of Homeric narrative similes may in fact reflect genre differences: the similes, Martin suggests, have been incorporated into epic from lyric and elegiac poetry. Rutherford (1997) 14ff. discusses the third triad of Pindar, Pae. 6, in terms of "detachement," "supplement," and "split performance."
80. See Molyneux (1971) for an examination of the historical evidence for this event.
still within; the poet, however, was able to identify the remains for the bereft relations by reconstructing the order in which the dead had reclined—that is, by recollecting their placement in the sympotic order: *hac tum re admonitus invenisse fertur ordinem esse maxume qui memoriae lumen adferret.*

The attribution to Simonides of the invention of this visual and above all architectural mnemonic technique, upon which classical rhetoric was founded,\(^81\) has an intuitive appeal: Simonides was also supposedly the founder of epinician, the ancient poetic genre that has proved most happily susceptible to “rhetorical” analysis. But Cicero’s account of the poet’s primal act of *Toposforschung* must make us wonder what he was doing memorizing the order of dinner-guest placement in the first place? The answer would of course be that he did it to prepare for the conversational battle that was going to begin after the meal was done. It is well known from Plato’s *Symposium* what common sense alone might have suggested: the place to which your host assigns you will determine your turn at speaking, and placement will therefore be critical in determining outcomes. “We who have to speak last are at a great disadvantage,” Socrates says (Plato, *Symp.* 177e3-4): all the obvious good points and approaches will have already been exhausted.

So in studying the competition, and memorizing their sequence (*ordo*), Simonides is simply behaving like the consummate symposiastic professional we know him to be. He is in effect surveying the disposition of the enemy forces. And he is also no doubt preparing for his own performances in the battle to come—constructing what he is going to say on the basis of the spatial model we know was used in the memory art of the ancient orators.

Some such calculations may have lain behind the recently revealed variants of the famous elegy: for one dinner group a version that included the quotation from Glaucus’ speech was somehow deemed apropos, for another, not. We obviously cannot know the basis for these discriminations, if they in fact were Simonidean. At any rate, we have now seen that in detaching Glaucus’ comparison from the “Chian man’s” poem and incorporating it into an elegy of his own, Simonides in effect simply returned it to the sympotic context in which it was bred.

\(^81\). On the art, see Yates (1966) ch. 1.