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The Interpretation of Iliad 6.145-9 and the Symptotic Contribution to Rhetoric*

By HAYDEN PELLICCIA

“Τυδείδη μεγάθυμε, τῇ γενεὴν ἐρείπων;
οἷς περ φύλλαυ γενεῦ, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.
φύλλα τὰ μὲν ὁ ἀνεμὸς χαμάδις χέει, ἄλλα δὲ δ᾽ ὑλή
ττιπεδόσα φύει, ξαρός δ᾽ ἐπιγίγνεται ὥρη.
ὁις ἄνδρων γενεὴ ἤ μὲν φύει ἤ δ᾽ ἀπολήγει . . . .”

(Iliad 6.145-49)

“High-hearted son of Tydeus, why ask of my generation?
As is the generation of leaves, so is that of humanity.
The wind scatters the leaves on the ground, but the live timber
burgeons with leaves again in the season of spring returning.
So one generation of men grows while another dies . . . .

Trans. Lattimore (1951)

The comparison of lives and leaves was very popular among early
Greek poets.1 It is impossible to know if Homer was the source for the
others, or along with them was just another exponent of a widespread
and previously established trend.2 The direct quotation of line 146, prefixed by an
explicit attribution of it to Χίως ἀνήρ, in Simonides 8.1-2 West1 (= Simonides
19.1-2 West2) may be taken to suggest the former,3 but that inference has
been complicated by the publication a decade ago of a papyrus in which the
same poem (more or less) appeared without the lines quoting “Homer”
(= Simonides 20. West2).4 In view of all the interest the comparison has
aroused, it is surprising how little understood is Glaucus’ use of it here.

*Substantial passages of Greek in the body of the text are accompanied by translations; where the
translation is taken from a published source, that source is identified by translator and date of publication, with
full information given in the Bibliography; where no source is given the translation is mine. I would like to
thank Charles Brittain, Margalit Finkelberg, Donald Lateiner, Michael Lloyd, William H. Race, Andrew
Ramage, Hanna Roisman, Bob Rust, and Calvert Watkins for their comments and suggestions.—A. Ford’s
excellent “Odysseus after Dinner: Od. 9.2-11 and the Traditions of Symptotic Song” (Kazazis, J.N. and
Rengakos, A. [1999]. Euphrosyne: Studies in Ancient Epic and its Legacy in Honor of Dimitris N. Maronitis,
109-23. Stuttgart) came to my attention after this article had been submitted. Our ideas about the sympotic
background to Homer dovetail very nicely.

1. See especially Griffith (1975) and Sider (2001).
2. See Davison (1968) 73, for a tersely skeptical consideration of the evidence and its possibilities.
3. While the recurrence of the image at Iliad 21.464-66 supports the latter.
4. P.Oxy. 3965 fr. 26, in which Simonides 8. 6-13 West1 (= Simonides 20.5-12 West2) appear preceded
by at least 4 lines (= Simonides 20.1-4 West2) that demonstrably do not quote Iliad 6.146, or in any other respect.

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An advance was made recently by E.R. Lowry, Jr. He pointed out that although most interpreters, presumably influenced by the subsequent history of the comparison, especially in elegy, see Glaucus in 146ff. as "pensive and sorrowful," nonetheless the context of the speech (as well as Glaucus’ character as displayed elsewhere in the Iliad) suggest that the “image of the leaves [is] not primarily a spontaneous overflow of powerful pessimism engendered by human mortality or the brevity of youth,” but rather “serve[s] to discredit Diomedes” as part of Glaucus’ “verbal offensive” against him. In supporting this claim Lowry made the correct move of looking to other Iliadic taunting speeches for the appropriate comparisons; like most of his predecessors, however, he based his comparative argument on thematic content (primarily the leaf image and the genealogical lore), and so neglected certain formal features of Glaucus’ opening lines that I believe will, if properly appreciated, demonstrate the cogency of his insight that the passage is more in the nature of competitive banter than a sincere meditation of the eheu fugaces type, ingenuously offered up for Diomedes to take to heart.

1. Not a simile

In outline Il. 6.145-50 looks straightforward: the φύλλα ψευδή is compared to the ἀνήρ διδων γέφερα. As many commentators have remarked, however, problems arise when the details of the comparison are pressed. For example, what on the human side corresponds to the forest, what to the leaves? Similarly, how does the meaning of γεφερα within the comparison relate to its meaning in 145, and thus to the question (“Who are you?”) that the passage as a whole is ostensibly answering? In mitigation of these difficulties attention might be drawn to the scholarly commonplace that point-for-point correspondence between the elements of a Homeric simile and whatever it modifies must not be expected. But is Glaucus’ comparison “a Homeric simile”? That is the nub. Most scholars who discuss the comparison use the word “simile” to refer to it, though with what degree of deliberateness it is hard to tell. A moment’s reflection, however, should tell us that this common usage is inappropriate. Its prevalence is likely

5. The quotations are from Lowry (1995) 194, 195, and 198, respectively. Cf. Kirk’s note on 144-51: “Glaukos’ reply to Diomedes’ taunts is both witty and clever.”
7. For example, Fränkel (1921) 40f., treats it as unexceptional; likewise, Moulon (1977) 30 n.18., and Lee (1964) 2 and 33, group it indifferently with narrative similes. Most recently, Critore (1994) and Sider (2001) refer to it regularly as a simile.
We can start with the obvious: *Il.* 6.146-49 is part of a speech, and the typical Homeric simile is almost entirely a creature of narrative. Does that fact point to a difference of accident or essence? I think most people will on reflection concede that Glaucus’ image “feels” different from the narrative type: it seems to propose a direct analogy more in the manner of reasoned argument than of poetic imagery.

Perhaps these intuitions can be brought into sharper focus. The familiar simile of Homeric narrative is essentially adverbial (thus its characteristic correlators are ως/ως): it fills out, as a modifier, our picture of an action in the story. As an adverb, such a comparative clause is not formally an assertion: even if we might feel that there is an implication that “Achilles is like a lion,” the form of the simile does not state the matter thus; it simply says that as a lion leaps, so Achilles leapt. In short, the primary aim of the simile does not seem to be to assert what Achilles is like, but to bring his leaping more vividly to the eye.

We can add that narrative similes not only do not formally assert the comparisons they make, but neither are they deployed in support of assertions—they are not, for example, connected to their contexts by logical particles (or equivalents) like “for . . .”

Glaucus’ comparison differs on both these points. First, it is introduced with an explicit summary assertion of the likeness: “X is like Y”; this statement of the likeness is then worked out (and thereby justified) in what follows. Second, the comparison as a whole serves an argumentative purpose, namely, to give the grounds for the dismissal implied in the question that immediately precedes it (τίν γενέην ἐρείενεις): “Why do you ask? (You must not know that) a human γενέη is like a leaf γενέη. Leaves do such and such; so do humans.” (“And so”—presumably—“my point is made: your question was misguided.”) The whole sequence forms a tight argumentative chain defending the proposition, rhetorically formulated as a question, that Diomedes’ inquiry into his opponent’s γενέη was somehow unsuitable. The successive stages of the argument (146 and 146-49) are introduced with the kind of asyndeton (on the use of which in such contexts see note 65 below) that is roughly characterized by Kühner-Gerth (II p.344) as equivalent to γόρ.

8. Of course Glaucus immediately proceeds to “dignify the question with a response”—of some 60 lines. I do not in this article address the cultural-rhetorical conventions which allow Homeric warriors to dilate upon their glorious lineages while affecting an overall “fight, don’t talk” attitude. The most glaring example is to be found at *Il.* 20.200-58 (20.213£.=6.150f.), where the speaker gives a detailed genealogy even in the absence of any inquiry into his identity, perfectly well known to his opponent anyhow.
The observations above serve to confirm our suspicion that Glaucus’ comparison is not a simile. What then is it? I propose to relate it to a phenomenon known to ancient scholars and rhetoricians variously as the ἐικάζειν or ἐικασμός or ἐικασμα. In a classic modern discussion, Eduard Fraenkel pointed out that in certain comparisons found at the beginning of comic monologues

comedy takes up and continues an old party-game (Gesellschaftsspiel) popular in Athens and probably the whole Greek world, called the ἐικάζειν, wherein one member of the company asks another, “Do you know what you most resemble?”, and then caricatures him by way of a comparison (δι’ ἐικόνας); the companion so-caricatured can or must then respond with a counter-comparison (Ἀντιἐικάζειν).

Fraenkel here gives a good description of what is perhaps the most clearly and narrowly defined subcategory of a larger class of stylized comparisons that seem to have flourished especially in sympotic conversation. Since Fraenkel’s subcategory is so easily identified and defined, we can use some examples of it as an introduction to the whole genus; but it must be kept in

9. My discussion throughout is heavily indebted to Fraenkel (1922) 169ff. (=[1960] 160ff.) and (1950) 773ff., and Monaco (1963); apart from the few passages that I noticed myself (e.g., the two Herodotus passages discussed below), almost all of the examples I cite were culled from these three works. My disagreements with the two scholars will be made clear. Other useful discussions are to be found in Rivier (1952) 51ff. (where the device is placed in its intellectual-historical context; cf. Lloyd [1966] ch. 3, and esp. 189f.) and McCall (1969) ch. 1.

10. Strictly speaking, we should distinguish between the device (called ἐικάζειν, ἐικασμός, and ἐικασμα in the texts in the next note), and the image or comparison generated by it (as early as Aristophanes, Clouds 559 called ἐικών, but cf. Tryphon below). I will follow the custom initiated by Fraenkel and simply use the same word ἐικάζειν to refer to the overall device and to the comparison proper within it. For discussion of the “pre-Aristotelian” terminology for comparisons of many kinds, including the ἐικάζειν, see McCall, ch. 1.

11. Fraenkel (1922) 171=(1960) 162f. Fraenkel is drawing upon ancient rhetorical and grammatical traditions for which the following passages, taken here primarily from Monaco (1963) 18ff., provide the chief evidence (on the nature of the treatises—lexica, in fact—from which the definitions derive, see West [1965]): Tryphon I (on Tryphon I and Tryphon II, see West, ibid., 231-33), de tropis Walz (1832-36) viii p.751/Spengel (1854-85) iii 202: ἐικασμός ἐστιν ὀμοίωτης ἔδος, περιπτῶσιν τὴν φαντασίαν πρὸς τὸ γελοιοτέρον, ὃ δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν σκόμματα καλέστα τις ἐν τῇ ἐικώνῃ, ὡς γένος ἔδος ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐικών ὕπερ ἐνθέους ἐικασμός, ὃ δὲ ἐικασμὸς πάντως ἐκών; [Herodian], de figuris Walz viii 591/Spengel: iii 92: τῆς δὲ ἐφόρουσας καθόστηκαν εἰδὴ τὰ λεπτομερέστατα τάδε, σαρκασμός, διασυνρίας, ἑπικρατήσεως, κατάγελος, ἐκασμός, χαρακτησίας; Walz viii 592/Spengel iii 92: ἐικασμὸς δὲ ἐστὶν ὦτο τοῦ παρατίθεν τὸ ὀμοίον καθαρωμένον τοῦ πέλας, οἷον [Od. 18.26.f.] ἡ ἄκοιδα ὡς ὁ μολοβὸς ἔπεινε οὐγορεύει / γερή καμίαν ῥοεῖ; Ἑσυχίας, ε ὀτε: ἐικάζειν σκόμμα, ἐοικαζειν, τὸ λέγεν “ὁμοίος εἰ ἄρδε”; cf. a 482: ἄνεικεσαίσας ἄποικωσαί; Cocondrius, de tropis Walz viii 789/Spengel iii 236: τὸ δὲ ἐικασμα ἐστί σκόμμα καθ’ ὀμοίωτητα, ὡς ἔχει τὸ παρ’ Ἕνπολίδι [fr.337 PCG]: κατακειάζουσαν ἦμᾶς + σχάδα / βολαζό.

12. Monaco’s study (1963) is devoted entirely to this type, and this type alone. As some of his reviewers, especially Schäfer, pointed out, this narrowness of focus undermined his understanding of the phenomenon and severely reduced the usefulness of his work overall.
mind that this burlesque type represents only one segment of a wider spectrum of possibilities.\(^{13}\)

A passage from Aristophanes’ *Wasps* provides a very pure specimen of the “game” as Fraenkel described it, and locates it in its characteristic milieu, the symposium. Towards the end of the play, Bdelycleon gives his father Philocleon a crash course in the manners and mores of upper-class society (1122-1248), and then takes him off to a dinner party; afterwards, the old man’s attendant slave reports his master’s drunken antics, giving special attention to his grotesque exchanges with the other guests, which are summed up in the words (1319f.) περιψήφιζεν αὐτούς ἐν μέρει/ σκόπτων ἄγροικως, “each in turn he insulted with his crude banter.” The central episode in the slave’s report begins with another guest’s comment on the old man’s over-exuberant behavior, in particular a gratuitous beating of the slave himself (*Wasps* 1307-14):

> κατυπτε δή με νεκανικός “παῖ παῖ” καλῶν. 
> εἶτ’ αὐτόν, ὡς εἶδ’, ἤκασεν Λυσίστατος: “ἔοικας, οὐ πρεβύτα, νεσπλούτω τρυγί κλητήρι τ’ εἰς ἄχυρον ἀποδεδακτότι.”
> ὦ δ’ ἀνακραγώνον ἀντήκασα’ αὐτῶν πάρνοπτι
> τὰ θρία τοῦ τρίβωνος ἀποβεβηλικότι,
> Ἀθένας τε τὰ σκαῦρα διακεκαριένω,
> οἴ δ’ ἀνεκρότησαν κτλ. . .

And he gave me a right lusty beating, all the while yelling “boy, boy.”

Lysistratus took one look at him and made a comparison: “Old fellow, you’re like a *nouveau riche* teenager, or an ass that’s slipped away to a bran pile!” And he bellowed back with his own comparison of Lysistratus to a locust that’s lost the wings off its cloak, or Sthenelus shorn of his stage props. Everyone applauded. . .


Lines 1308-14 give us an exchange just as Fraenkel describes it: first Lysistratus draws two comparisons (ἥκασεν, ἕοικας) of Philocleon, then in return Philocleon draws two of him (ἀντήκασε): the rest of the guests immediately render judgement (ἀνεκρότησαν κτλ.).

The same pattern informs an exchange between Meno and Socrates, though in this case the second party explicitly declines to respond in kind (Plato, *Meno*, 79e7-80c6 with omissions; the ἐικάζειν proper is in bold):

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13. Martin (1931) 10-15 is a valuable short discussion of the sympotic function of the ἐικάζειν. Monaco’s fifth chapter is called “i *simposi*,” and is also useful; but it is a defect of both his and Fraenkel’s accounts of the ἐικάζειν that they fail to appreciate the primacy of its connection with the symposium. Huss (1999) 343, on the other hand, assumes that the sympotic association of the ἐικάζειν is so basic that he feels constrained to point out that “als eine überaus plastische Sprechweise” it is not limited to the symposium, and appears otherwise especially in comedy.
MEN. Ὡ Σῶκρατες, ἢκουν μὲν ἐγώγει πρὶν καὶ συγγενεῖσθαι σοι ὅτι οὐ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπόρεις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν καὶ ύνων, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις μὲ καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπάθεις, ὡστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκάψαι, ὁμοίότατος εἶναι τὸ τε ἔθος καὶ τᾶλα ταύτη τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκη τῇ βαλάττικα· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν αἰεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἀπότομον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ δοκεῖς μοι ύνων ἐμοὶ τοιοῦτον τι πεποιηκέναι: ἀλλιθδός γάρ ἐγώγει καὶ τὴν νησκήν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνομαι σοι... 

Σ. Ἡποδρόγος εἰ, Μένον, καὶ ὀλίγου ἔξηστησάς με.

MEN. Τί μάλιστα, Σῶκρατες:

Σ. Γυμνώσκω οὐ ἐνέκα με ἡκασάς.

MEN. Τίνος δῆ σείει:

Σ. ἦν σε ἄντεικνοι. ἐγώ δὲ τούτο οἶδα περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ἔτι χαίρουσιν εἰκάζουμεν· λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ αὕτοις· καλὰ γάρ οἶμαι: τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκῶνες ἄλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀντεικάσομαι σε.

MENO: Socrates, before I even met you I used to hear that you are always in a state of perplexity and that you bring others to the same state, and now I think you are bewitching and beguiling me, simply putting me under a spell, so that I am quite perplexed. Indeed, if a joke is in order, you seem, in appearance and in every other way, to be like the broad torpedo fish, for it too makes anyone who comes close and touches it feel numb, and you now seem to have had that kind of effect on me, for both my mind and my tongue are numb, and I have no answer to give you. . . .

SOCRATES: You are a rascal, Meno, and you nearly deceived me.

MENO: Why so particularly, Socrates?

SOCRATES: I know why you drew this image of me.

MENO: Why do you think I did?

SOCRATES: So that I should draw an image of you in return. I know that all handsome men rejoice in images of themselves; it is to their advantage, for I think that the images of beautiful people are also beautiful, but I will draw no image of you in turn. . . .


Meno’s εἰκάζειν here gives a good example of what might be called the fuller form of the device: he (a) states the comparison: “X is like Y”; (b) describes Y: “Y does such and such”; and (c) states the point of resemblance of X to Y: “X also does such and such.”14 Some instances suppress one or the other of these elements, or combine two of them into one.

14. Cf. Fraenkel (1950) 773: “The general arrangement of [the εἰκάζειν] is . . . : first the . . . statement [of similarity or dissimilarity], then its justification in two parts, ὅ μὲν γὰρ . . . οὐ δὲ (or ἡμεῖς δὲ or something corresponding) κτλ.”
Two formal features of the εἰκάζειν (as opposed to the normal Homeric narrative simile), then, are that it opens with an assertion of the likeness (“X is like Y”), and that it is deployed in the service of some argumentative point. Neither of these features is absolutely guaranteed; in particular, the “argument” in service of which the asserted likeness is being made is, in the second-person insulting type (see immediately below), often not explicitly expressed, as shown by the Wasps passage: the implicit claim in this type is usually just “You are contemptible/ridiculous.” Meno, on the other hand, uses the comparison to justify his inability to answer Socrates’ arguments (and, as Socrates realizes, to sidetrack the discussants into the kind of sympotic banter that is the εἰκάζειν’s native milieu).

The use of the verb σκόπτειν by both Philocleon’s slave and Meno suggests skoptic as an adjective to characterize the customary spirit of the burlesque type. We may remark now that by and large second-person instances of the εἰκάζειν tend to be skptic, and skptic instances tend to be second-person. The third person, on the other hand, provides an opportunity for more reflective, “philosophical” applications.

It might be assumed on the basis of this distinction that the “amoebic” character of the εἰκάζειν, proclaimed by the use of the verb ἀντεικάζειν in both passages above, is also going to be most commonly associated with second-person instances. But that assumption would be mistaken: the amoebic character of the εἰκάζειν is simply a specific reflex of the competitive character of sympotic utterances in general. When a given competitive utterance is made in the second person, the response naturally will be returned in the second person—that is, will be “amoebic.” But the

13. Or equivalent: 3rd-person comparisons are sometimes spoken in the hearing of the subject himself—a device encouraged by the layout of the symposium. One example of this is Od. 18.26ff., quoted below in the text at the beginning of section 3; another is to be found in Xenophon, Symp. 6.8-9, where the attempts of another guest to insult Socrates provoke Antisthenes to say to Philip the buffoon (1.11: Φίλιππος ὁ γελωτοποίος) “οὐ μέντοι δίνος εἶ, ὥσι Φιλίππε, εἰκάζειν ὡς δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἄνθρωπος λιδηροῦσθαι θελομένου εἰς ἑαυτόν;” “Nai μὲ τὸν Δ',” ἔφη, “καὶ ἄλλοις γε πολλοῖς.” On the pragmatics of some 2nd-person-through-3rd-person insults in Homer, see Pelliccia (1995) 169ff., 179ff., and 270f.

16. An especially clear insight into the competitive nature of sympotic conversation overall is given in the “instructional” passage of the Wasps referred to earlier: in 1219-48 Bdelycleon, having brought his imaginary dinner party to the moment of the presympotic libation, lists the guests in their due order, and then says to his father τούτων ξυνών τὰ σκόλια ὡς προτέρους δεξαί καλῶς. The emphasis laid here and elsewhere in the passage on “taking up” the singing where the guest before has left off (δέχοσθαι, again at 1225 and 1243; cf., e.g., 1236-39, τί δ', ὃταν Θέαρος τρόσ ποδῶν κατακείμενος ἔδει Κλέωνος λαβομένος τῆς δέξιας... τούτω τι λέξεις σκόλιον;) gives the clue; each contribution is conceived as a display or “performance” which the next speaker must try to top or at least equal. See further West (1974) 17f.

17. But when Fraenkel says that the person addressed first “can or must respond with an ἀντεικάζειν” (emphasis added), we should resist the implication, also lurking in Fraenkel’s use of the term “Spiel” (Gesellschaftsspiel), that the εἰκάζειν is a real game played by set rules. It takes Socrates a moment’s reflection to realize that Meno is fishing for an ἀντεικάζειν in return; this hesitation is at odds with the automatic quality of the proceeding implied by Fraenkel. For what it’s worth, the ancient discussions of the εἰκάζειν (above, n.11) do not treat it as a game. For them it is a figure or trope: a subform of ἑπίκων in [Herod]an, of the εἰκών (a τρόπος τῆς φράσεως) in Typhon I (as quoted in n.11 above). Conversely, the entries in, e.g., Hesychius and the Suda for real games, such as the κόττοβος, are just what we would expect.
key point here concerns the εἰκάζειν overall, not just in its second-person uses: its native home is, as the Wasps passage indicates, the symposium, and its usage conforms to the usage of that environment.

I will take this observation a step further: so pronounced is the sympotic character of the εἰκάζειν that it will often be enlightening to consider the possibility that a given instance occurring outside the symposium is intended to evoke it. We can call this kind of secondary evocation of the symposium "parasympotic," and will examine its nature and implications as the discussion proceeds.¹⁸

The two passages quoted above illustrate another characteristic of the εἰκάζειν: its pronounced stylization in both form and content. This feature is evidently one of the chief vehicles for displaying the speaker's wit, skill, and ingenuity. The burlesque second-person type by definition has as its subject a specific human being (the "second person"); the comparatum is most typically drawn from animal or vegetative nature, or is another human being.¹⁹ In the Aristophanes passage, both pairs of comparisons (Lysistratus' and Philocleon's) illustrate both possibilities. In Lysistratus' case the comparisons are stylized by their dependence on metaphors coming from a contrasted realm: Philocleon is like a newly rich young man, but the word for "young man" is metaphorically derived from the natural world—young, unfermented wine, τρύξ;²⁰ in the next line this clever inversion is itself inverted: the old man is compared not to a human metaphorically designated in natural-world terms, but to a natural-world item, an animal, metaphorically

the entry on, e.g., κοτταβρίζειν in the Suda explicitly calls it a παίγνιον and lays out the rules, telling what wins and what loses. Further examples of the language of true games, none of which is applied anywhere to the εἰκάζειν, are, in addition to παιγνιον and παίζειν in the Suda, loc. cit., παιδεί in Hesychius s.v. κότταβς, and παιζειν s.v. παιος in both lexica; likewise, cf. the explicit references to victory in the gloss νικτηριος βόλος for the entries τρίς εξ (Hesychius) and ἦ τρίς εξ ἦ τρεῖς κοβοι (Suda, with detailed rules); similarly, ἐπανέξω in the sense "accord victory to" in the Suda s.v. μεθοσκότταβοι, again with detailed rules. The lengthy discussion of sympotic games—αι εν συμποσιοιων παιδαι—in Pollux, Onomasticon 9.94-129 does not include one called εἰκάζειν or εἰκαζομαι or the like.

18. If the burlesque 2nd-person type forms one extreme end of the spectrum covered by the sympotic comparison, i.e., the εἰκάζειν, the other end grades off towards the nonsympotic territory of "scientific" analogies purporting to provide true explanatory information. But once the skeptic and humorous elements have been removed, the border between sympotic or parasympotic uses and nonsympotic uses will be very difficult to define—an obvious and freely admitted weakness in my analysis. Nothing remains but to try in any given doubtful case to gauge "sympotic feel." I would say on that basis that the second passage from Herodotus examined below falls quite clearly on the sympotic side of the divide, while the first may be thought to cross over in the other direction. For an example of a "scientific" analogy, quite neatly apropos of Il. 6.146ff., see Lloyd (1966) 371: "When at GA 783b8ff. [Aristotle] compares the baldness of humans and other animals with the shedding of leaves in plants, he first asserts that the cause of both conditions is the deficiency of 'hot moisture', but then goes on to note that while plants lose their leaves, and some hibernating animals their hair, according to the seasons of the year, men become bald according to the 'seasons of life' (i.e. in old age, the 'winter' of life)."

19. See the "repertorio dei paragoni" in Monaco (1963) 91f.

20. In spite of Wilamowitz apud Fraenkel (1922) 172 n.1 (= [1960] 161 n.4), I agree with MacDowell in rejecting Kock's emendation to Φορυλι, and preserving τρυγι, the reading of all mss. but one.

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designated in human terms: the word for donkey, κλητήρ, is based on the
equation of the animal’s insistent braying with that of a legal “summoner.”\textsuperscript{21}

Although both parts of Philocleon’s ἀντεικάζειν are somewhat obscure,
the first (1311f.), with its triple embedding of animal, plant, and human
images, looks as if it beats Lysistratus at his own kind of stylization: \textsuperscript{22} he is
like a locust (animal) who has cast off the fig-leaves (plant, metaphorically
for locust-wings) that constitute its cloak (τρίβων: back to the human).\textsuperscript{23}

\section*{Before We Consider} some instances of non-skoptic, non-second-person
uses of the εἰκάζειν, a question of tone needs to be settled. Fraenkel put
forward the opinion that the device was intrinsically lower class and vulgar.
This judgement was pronounced most clearly in a note on the \textit{Agamemnon}.
I will first quote the passage of the play that occasioned the note, \textit{Ag.} 1625-30,
and then the relevant parts of the note itself.

The passage begins in a duly skoptic manner with the chorus’s
apostrophizing of Aegisthus as a woman:

\textit{χορ. γύναι, εὖ τοὺς ἱκόνας ἐκ μάχης νέον
οἰκουρὸς εὐνήν (τ?) ἄνδρος αἰσχύνον ὄμοια, ἀνδρὶ στρατηγῷ τόνδ’ ἔβούλευσας μόρον;}

\textit{αἰ. καὶ ταῦτα τάπη κλαμάτων ἀρχηγεῖν, ὅ όμοιος ἤ θεσσαλὸς τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ φαραγίνη,
σὺ δ’ ἐξορίας ὑπηκοίοις υλάμαισιν ἐξη τραπεθείς δ’ ἡμερώτερος φανή.
(Ag. 1625-32)}

Chorus: Thou woman, thou: to do this to those newly come from battle,
and, while as a stay-at-home thou wast defiling the man’s bed, to plot
this death against the general in the field!

\textsuperscript{21} See especially the discussion in Taillardat (1962) 37f. Also, Monaco (1963) 31 f.
\textsuperscript{22} It is often hard to get what is supposed to be so funny about these comparisons (“εἰκόνες seem to
us a rather frigid kind of humour”: Dover [1968] on \textit{Ar.}, Clouds, 559). On the other hand, the other
symposiasts show their admiration for Philocleon’s εἰκάζειν by clapping, not by laughing, so our assumption
that the chief emphasis is on humor may be misguided. What seems to be sought after is a virtuoso wielding
of, above all, animal and plant images—a feature that cannot help but remind us of the language of Aeschylus.
\textsuperscript{23} The suggestion of MacDowell (1971) in his note on 1313, that the point of Philocleon’s
comparison lies in the real Lysistratus’ “habit of going around inadequately dressed,” i.e., τρίβων-less, would
be so flat (“he, who has no τρίβων, is like a locust who has cast aside his τρίβων”) as to render the
symposiasts’ approval incomprehensible.

24. Fraenkel took the occasion offered by this passage to draw attention to the not infrequent
inversions of the εἰκάζειν, wherein what is proposed is not resemblance, but its opposite, i.e., the statement
of likeness becomes an “ἐναργίην-statement,” as Fraenkel puts it. Other examples he lists here are \textit{Ar.}, Birds 30-35,
\textit{Wealth} 1204-07, and Xenophon, \textit{Anab.} 5.8.24, the last of which is especially clear: ἥν οὖν οὐραροῦτη, τοῦτον τάναντια ποιήσετε ἢ τοὺς κύνας ποιοῦσι τοὺς μὲν γὰρ κύνας τοὺς χαλεποὺς τὰς μὲν ἡμέρας διδάσκει, τὰς δὲ νύκτας ἀφιάσαι, τοῦτον δὲ, ἥν οὐραροῦτη, τὴν νύκτα μὲν δησετε, τὴν δὲ ἡμέραν ἀφιάσετε.
Aegisthus: These words too are the breeders of a race of rueful cries. Thy tongue is the opposite of Orpheus’ tongue; for he, by his voice, led all things after him in delight, but thou stirrest up anger by foolish barkings and shalt be led away. But once mastered thou wilt show thyself more tame.

Trans. Fraenkel (1950)

Fraenkel’s note is on lines 1629ff.:

The form employed here leads us unmistakably into the sphere of those witticisms with which the lower orders of society and people of modest intellectual pretensions are accustomed to amuse themselves. Of the same kind as the form is the content, the vulgarity of dragging in Orpheus and the forced ἔμπορος of ἣγε and δέξη. That Aegisthus has the face to employ such devices at such a juncture characterizes the man who, though in origin a Pelopid, is through and through made of common stuff. The effect must have been very startling to the Athenians. Even without taking into account the traditional dignity of tragic princes (of course messengers, heralds, servants, and their like stand on a lower level), we can be fairly certain that in consequence of the strict rules of Attic εὐσχέτωρον νυν, no one who was the Athenian counterpart of what is called in England “a gentleman” and in Basle “ein wirklicher Herr” would, in similar circumstances, have behaved in such a way as this. . . . The accumulated effect is that of a certain vulgarity.

The social discriminations Fraenkel so indignantly draws here inevitably seem a trifle quaint nowadays, but we must remember that ancient Greece was an intensely class-conscious culture. Fraenkel’s denigration of Aegisthus bears some resemblance, in reverse, to his notoriously starry-eyed exaltation of Agamemnon, who he claimed was in Aeschylus’ rendering “a great gentleman”—a perverse judgement he is said later to have renounced. But while we must certainly accept that Aeschylus, both here and in the rest of the scene, puts into Aegisthus’ mouth language designed to expose him as suffering a nearly pathological lack of sense, judgement, and taste, did the poet really need to imply, in order to round out the picture, that this “Pelopid” belonged to “the lower orders of society” to boot? Surely what is shocking about Aegisthus’ εἰκάζειν is not its class markings, but its implication that the chorus’ moral outrage over the crimes of adultery, murder, regicide, and all the rest, is a suitable occasion for the kind of stylized verbal sparring at home in the symposium. No doubt the apparent frivolity of the gesture contributes to its success as an expression of contempt, but though the move may well be “over the top,” there doesn’t

25. The phrase “a great gentleman” is to be found in his note on 915; cf. notes on 811 (with esp. p. 372 n. 4), 939f., 944f., 948, and p. 441. For the renunciation, see Taplin (1977) 312 (“in private conversation Fraenkel retracted his discussion.”)

26. Cf. Denniston and Page on 1577-78: Aegisthus “speaks in a style unlike that of any other character in Aeschylus, high or low.”
seem to be any reason to take it as also showing that the speaker is “made of common stuff.”

The broader question raised by Fraenkel’s comment is significant for my characterization of the εἰκάζειν as a whole, since I have claimed that the device’s close association with the institution of the symposium is an essential and defining feature of its nature. Obviously, the symposium is itself upper class. Indeed, it is a primary locus for upper-class self-definition. That is the whole premise of the instructional scene from the *Wasps*: to prepare Philocleon for upper-class life is to prepare him for the symposium. The implication must be that, if the εἰκάζειν has any intrinsic class leanings at all, they should, *pace* Fraenkel, tend more upwards than downwards.

That this view is correct, and Fraenkel’s wrong, can I think be quickly established by citing what is, surprisingly enough, Fraenkel’s own second example of the εἰκάζειν (in his original discussion), namely, Plato, *Symp.* 215a6-b3. In using this passage, Fraenkel simply excerpted the likeness proper, φημὶ γὰρ δὴ ὀμοιότατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς σιλήνοις τούτοις ἐν τοῖς ἔρμογιλωφείοις καθημένοις, without giving any contextual information. This context we can supply. That the setting is “sympotic” does not need belaboring. But the key point is that the speaker is, of course, Alcibiades. Now, was there ever an Athenian more in-your-face-edly aristocratic than Alcibiades was? And, in case there is any doubt, the comparison Fraenkel quotes is not an isolated aberration on the drunken princeling’s part—he immediately goes on to add another one (to the satyr Marsyas).

Consideration of this one passage alone should have caused Fraenkel to hesitate to pronounce the εἰκάζειν “vulgar.” How could he have gotten the matter so wrong? I suspect that he was misled by focusing too exclusively on the burlesque second-person instances. It is in the nature of the beast that sképtic use should often decline into vulgar abuse, and many a comic εἰκάζειν no doubt looks pretty “low.” But, as Socrates remarked to Protagoras, though most sympocrats are not intelligent or well-educated enough to extract an evening’s entertainment from their own wit (and so must rely on hired performers), not all sympotic conversation is therefore condemned to being rowdy and stupid. The guests at Agathon’s dinner party adhere closely to acknowledged sympotic rules, and yet Plato’s *Symposium* puts on display brilliant and civilized conversation. Our understanding of

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27. Thus it cannot be argued that Philocleon’s use of an εἰκάζειν *itself* shows the device’s intrinsic vulgarity (i.e., since he is irredeemably vulgar): it is the upper-class Lysistratta who starts the round of comparisons, not Philocleon.

how the εἰκάζειν can find a place for itself in this more exalted kind of discourse will be advanced by looking at some instances in the third person.

Fraenkel’s own first example was from comedy (Alexis 46 PCG):

> οἷοιότατος ἀνθρώπος οὐχὶ τὴν φύσιν
> τρόπον τιν’ ἐστί. καὶ γὰρ οὗν τὸν νέον
> πολλὴν ὥσ’ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ἀνδρή ἄποζέαι
> πρῶτιστον ἀρνηθῆσαι τ’, ἀπανθησαντα δι’
> σκληρὸν γενέθθαι, παρακαθάσαντα δ’ ὧν λέγω
> τούτων ἀπάντων, ἀπαραθυμήτω τὴν ἴκνο
> ταῦταν ἁνοιαί εἰπολάζουσαν, τότε
> πότισμον γενέθθαι καὶ καταστήσας πάλιν,
> ἡδὺν θ’ ἀπασὶ τούπιλιοτοπν διαστελεῖν.

A man is in a way most like wine in nature. It’s inescapable that both wine and man at first ferment and offend, but then, after the bloom has gone, turn bitter. Now, though, having peaked out and passed all this that I mention, and been skirmished free of that stupidity that had risen to the top, they both calm down and become palatable, and sweet to all for the future they remain.

What is so useful about this passage is that it is in effect a recasting of Ar., *Wasps* 1309 (quoted above),29 there Lysistratus compared a specific human (“you”=Philocleon) to a “young wine” (τρύξ), and the effect was insulting and ribald; here, not a specific person, but humanity as a whole is compared to the same thing, and the effect is not skoptic, but “philosophical,” though evidently witty and ingenious. The difference between the natural tendencies of the second- and third-person formulations could not be more succinctly exposed.30

29. Wine-comparisons were common; in Alexis himself cf. frr. 280 PCG (taking the opposite line [on this type see n.24 above]: a man is nothing like wine): οὐδὲν (< ἐν' ἀνθρώπως οὐχὶ τὴν φύσιν / οὐ μὲν ἀπογνώμασαν ἀνθῆς γίνεται, / οὐδὲν δὲ τὸν παλαιότατον αποκαθάρομεν / οὐδὲν βάκτει γάρ, ὦ ἐλαροῖς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖ, and 284 PCG: ἀτοπόν γε τῶν μὲν οὗν εὐδοκεῖσιν ἄφοβα / παρὰ ταῖς ἀταίραις τοῦ παλαιοῦ, ἄνδρα δὲ / μῆς τοῦ παλαιοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν νεωτέρων. Cf. Eubulus 122 PCG: ἀτόπον γε τῶν μὲν οὗν εὐδοκεῖσιν δὲ / παρὰ ταῖς ἀταίραις τοῦ παλαιοῦ, ἄνδρα δὲ / μῆς τοῦ παλαιοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν νεωτέρων. (For other apparent or claimed thefts, see the next note and below in section 4).

30. The basic tendency is for 3rd-person instances to be more generalized or abstract, though not necessarily unhumorous. In addition to the passages from Alexis and Eubulus quoted in the preceding note, good examples are Thgn. 457-61, οὐ τοῖς αὐφαρμοῖς ἔστι γυνὴ νέα ἀνδρὶ γέροντι / οὐ γὰρ πηδάλιο πιθεῖται ὡς ἄκατος, / οὐδ’ ἀγκάραι ἔχουσαν ἀπορρίθτοσα δι’ ἔθημα / πολλάκις ἐκ νυκτὸς ἀλλὸν ἔξει λυώναι, also in Theophrastus 6 PCG: οὐ συμφέρων νέα ὑπὲρ προσβύ̄τη γυνὴ / ὤσπερ γὰρ ἄκατος οὐδὲ μικρὸν πιθεῖται / ἐν πηδάλιο, τὸ πεῖται: ἀπορρίθτοσα δὲ / ἐκ νυκτὸς ἔτερον λιμέν’ ἔχουσαν ἐξευρέθη, ἐν πηδάλιο, τὸ πεῖται: ἀπορρίθτοσα δὲ / ἐκ νυκτὸς ἐτερον λιμέν’ ἔχουσαν ἐξευρέθη. Cf. Anaxilas 32 PCG: οἱ κάλλεςει εἰς τὸν ἐξόντων οὐσίας / σκολήκες, εἰς σὺν δάκον αὐθρόπου τρόπον / εἰδὸς ἐκατόσο εὐθείᾳ καθήμενος, / ἤθικν ὦ ὤσπερ πυρὸν ἀποθείξει κενὸν. / ἐπείθ’ οὐ μὲν λεμέ’ ἑστι, ὦ δὲ ἐτερον δάκει. (Some 3rd-person examples are without a doubt ribald, but even here the sting is blunted by the generalized formulation, as illustrated in PMG 905: πόρνη καὶ βαλανεῖς τούτων ἔχουσαν ἐμπεδεῖν ἐθος / ἐν ταῦτα πυλήω τοῦ τ’ ἀγαθόν τοῦ τέκακὸν λόει.) Many of the examples cited by Fraenkel and Monaco from Roman comedy are “philosophical” reflections upon human life; behind most of them lie Greek originals. Philolaches’ elaborately worked out comparison
That the εἰκόζειν should have non-skoptic uses accords well with its close association with the symposium, an institution which, within a fairly rigid formal framework, permits, indeed encourages, a wide variety of behaviors and moods. It is instructive in this context to recall the diverse use of the most characteristic sympotic verse-form, elegy.\(^{31}\) No doubt the activity designated by the verb σκόππειν played a great part in the symposium, and a portion of the remains of elegiac and other sympotic verse is duly skoptic. But symposiasts did things other than insult one another,\(^{32}\) and neither is all elegy skoptic—far from it. Likewise, I suggest, for the εἰκόζειν: the skeptic function is prominent, and perhaps most characteristic. But it is not the whole story.

I earlier proposed the term “parasympotic” to cover instances of the εἰκόζειν occurring outside the symposium, but arguably intended to evoke it. Many eikastic comparisons come to us in fragments of comic poets without any indication of speech-context—for example, Alexis 46 above.\(^{33}\) Comedy’s tendency to invoke and incorporate into itself various other genres and modes (tragic, dithyrambic, epithalamial, etc.) is conspicuous, and the suggestion that it should often bring the symposium onto stage seems unlikely to arouse controversy.\(^{34}\) But again it would be helpful if we had more context for these fragmentary comic examples; unfortunately, the εἰκόζειν seems to invite excision as a discrete and independent unit, a point to which we will return at the end of this article. But as the situation stands, we do not know for many of them if we should consider them sympotic, parasympotic, or something else again.

A good candidate for being classed parasympotic is the εἰκόζειν of Aegisthus in Aeschylus, Agamemnon 1629ff., considered above. Obviously judgement about whether or not a given nonsympotic εἰκόζειν is “intended to evoke the symposium” is always going to be more or less subjective, but crediting Aegisthus with an untimely evocation of sympotic styles seems not between a human youth and a new building in Plautus, Most. I. ii, is in fact the occasion for Fraenkel’s whole 1922 discussion. Cf. Cato quoted in n.44 below.

\(^{31}\) The recognition that what unifies the incoherent jumble that constitutes extant elegy is its occasion—the symposium—is quite recent; see Bowie (1986).

\(^{32}\) The problem of sympotic violence arising from insults is acknowledged from our earliest texts forward, especially the Odyssey, of course (see Slater [1990]). The formulating of sympotic rules against skoptic excess can be glimpsed at least as early as Anacreon 2 West and Xenophanes 1 West (both preserved in the same passage of Athenaeus), and recurs regularly. A pithy statement of the need to avoid insults is given in fragment 1087 (Nauck) of Euripides: εὐφημία γὰρ παρὰ σπουδήσας κάλλιστον (on κάλλιστον—statements as a topos of the symposium, see below in the text on Herodotus 1.29-33).

\(^{33}\) Among other examples cited elsewhere in this article are Alexis 35 and 284 PCG, Anaxilas 32 PCG, Eubulus 122 PCG, and Theophilus 4 PCG.

\(^{34}\) Cf. Arnott (1996) 160: the “frequent use [of the εἰκόζειν] in comedy is doubtless explained by their popularity as a form of sympodial wit.”
only to accord perfectly with the rest of his comportment, but to add as an interpretative bonus some information about “where he’s coming from.” Of course, his еикαζείν is skoptic, that is, the most common kind, which makes the argument easier. I will conclude our discussion of the еикαζείν with an examination of two non-skoptic parasympotio instances from Herodotus, which I hope will illustrate the value of maintaining the category “parasympotic.”

In Book 1.29-33, Solon appears at the court of Croesus. Croesus entertains his distinguished visitor, with whose fame he is represented as being acquainted, and displays to him his incomparable wealth. Later, Croesus asks the Athenian to select, from all the number of mortals he has seen in his lengthy travels, the one who is happiest. The question, which is given a somewhat convoluted formulation in Herodotus’ account (γάν ὁν ἵμαρτος ἐπερεθήκη μοι ἐπηλθέ σε εἴ τινα ήδη πάντων ἔδειξε ὀλβιώτατον), when recast into a more direct form (τίς ὁ ὀλβιώτατος;), bears a striking resemblance to one of the most popular and venerable ζητήματα of Greek culture: τί τὸ κάλλιστον [or ἡδίστον or ἀριστον];

The latter’s popularity as a sympotic conversation-starter can be inferred from the abundance of answers provided in the surviving remains of convivial poetry. The opening priamel of Sappho 16 (οἱ μὲν ἐπιθήκων στρότων, οἱ δὲ πέσδων, / οἱ δὲ νάων φαίν’ ἐπὶ γὰν μέλαιναν / ἐξεμεναί κάλλιστον), with its exhilaratingly scandalous assertion of a totally subjective relativism in the climax (ἐγω δὲ κην’ ὅτ’- / τω τις ἔραται),

35. See especially Vischer (1965) 40-42, “Exkurs über die superlativischen Fragen” (with extensive bibliography)—an appendix to his discussion of the Solon and Croesus scene in Herodotus. Cf. Fraenkel (1995) 407f. The τί κάλλιστον question is so much a part of Greek life that Praxilla 1 PMG can imagine its being carried over into death: Adonis, asted on arrival in the underworld what was fairest in the life he has now left behind, answers κάλλιστον μὲν ἐγὼ λείπω φάς ἥμιλοι, / δεύτερον ἄστρα φαινά σεληνιαίς τε πρόωσωτον / ἠδὲ καὶ ὀραίους σκύους καὶ μῆλα καὶ δάνεισι. The supposed stupidity of this reply (speaking of cucumbers and the like in the same breath as the sun) became proverbial. Cal Watkins points out, however, that the third line is a variant of the kind of paradise-descriptions of ever-bearing trees exemplified by Od. 7.115f. (discussed in the text below in section 3) ὄξυναι καὶ βοσια καὶ μελαία ἄγλαδρακται / συκείαι τε γλυκεραί καὶ ελαία τηλεθέρααι, and so forms an appropriate rather than stupid answer. Furthermore, Praxilla may have substituted the derided cucumbers, ὀικίσκους, for figs, συκείαι, as a kind of half-revealed sphragis: she is herself a native of Sicyon.

36. In addition to those cited in the text (including the Simonides 8.1 West=19.1 West= έκ κάλλιστον) and the appended footnotes, see the skolion PMG 890 (a ranking like that of τὸ Δηλιάκων ἐπίγρασμα, quoted in the text below): ὑγείαι καίειν ἄριστον ἀνδρί νυμέτω, / δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φῶν γενέθη, / τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλούτων ἄδικοι, / καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἤδαι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, and Pindar, Ol. 1.1: ἀριστον μὲν ὑδρο, ὁ δὲ χρυσός κτλ. (explicitly sympotic notes begin to be sounded at 11, στιγμα, and 15-17, μοισείς ἐν ἀώτορι, οὔ παίζομεν φίλαι, ἀνδρὲς ἀμφε ἑμαῖς τράπεζαν). At Od. 9.5-11 (οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ γεῖ τῇ φημί τέκος χαρίστερον εἶναι / ἢ ὅτ᾽ ἐφφοροῦν μὲν ἔχει κάτα δήμον ἄταντα / ... τοῦτο τί μοι κάλλιστον ἐν φρεισίν εἴδεται εἶναι) and Pindar, Nem. 4.1f. (ἄριστος εὔφροσύνη πόσων κεκριμένων / ἱστρός) the symposium itself is singled out as superlatively best. Cf. Euripides quoted in n.32 above. These comparative judgements are often formulated dramatically, as priamels. On the superlative in them, see especially Bundy (1962) 11 n.33 and Race (1982) 15 n.48: “behind such priamels as Sappho fr. 16.1-4 and Pindar Ol. 1.1-7 are the questions τί κάλλιστον; τί ἀριστον;”
provides good evidence that by the end of the seventh century a high premium was already being placed on the ability to deliver excitingly paradoxical new answers to what was already no doubt felt to be a hackneyed conversational theme. The more piously proper answers were enshrined in what noticeably resembles Sappho’s more radical proposal in 16): κάλλιστον τὸ δικαίοτατον λέγοντον δ’ ὑγιαίνειν / πράγμα δὲ τερπνότατον, τοῦ τις ἐρᾷ, τὸ τυχεῖν.37 But even within the non-frivolous moralizing tradition a thirst for paradox asserted itself (Theognis 425-28):38

πάντων μὲν μὴ φύναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἀριστον 
μηδ’ ἐοδεῖν αὐγάς ὀξέος ἦλιου, 
φύντα δ’ ὡσας ὄκιστα πύλας Ἀἴδαο περῆσαι 
καὶ κείθαι πολλὴν γην ἐπαμπολέμουν.

Best of all for earth-dwelling men is not to be born, and not see the beams of the piercing sun, but once born, to cross through the gates of Hades as quickly as possible, get buried under a great heap of earth, and lie dead.

It is in the light of this sympotic background that we must understand the exchange between Croesus and Solon. Like the future Ptolemaic kings of Hellenistic Egypt, Croesus and his wealth attract (in Herodotus’ somewhat implausible telling) a steady stream of itinerant Greek wits (1.29.1, ἀπικυνέονται ἐς Σάρδης ἀκμαζόουσας πλοῦτω ἄλλοι τε οἱ πάντες ἐκ τῆς Ἐλλάδος σοφισταὶ κτλ.). Solon’s “outrageous” answers to Croesus’ question are well chosen to satisfy the craving for paradox, and the “indignation” they provoke in the host (σπερχθεῖς, 1.32.1) provides the occasion for the Athenian’s trotting out of a magnificently Gorgianic set piece (1.32.1-9), packed with elaborate displays of pseudo-learning, and recalling in its wordplay the end of Agathon’s speech in Plato’s Symposium.39 The climax is as follows (32.8-9):

τὰ πάντα μὲν νυν ταῦτα συλλαβεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἠόντα ἀδύνατον ἐστι, ὡσπερ χώρη σωματία καταρκεῖ πάντα ἐσωτήρ παρέχουσα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχει, ἐτέρου δὲ ἐπιδέσται: ἢ δὲ ἂν τὰ πλείστα ἔχη, αὕτη ἀριστεί, ὡς δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπον σώμα ἐν οὐδὲν αὐταρκεῖς ἔστι: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει, ἄλλου δὲ ἐνδεεῖς ἐστι': ὃς δ’ ἂν αὐτῶν πλείστα ἔχων διατελεῖ καὶ ἐπειτὰ τελετήσῃ

37. Imitated in Soph. 5.356 Radt, κάλλιστον ἵκων τοῦδικον περικέναι, κτλ.
Croesus' question is given its final answer in an εἰκάζειν, which conforms to type by positing an analogy between a (nonspecific) human being and the natural world.40 Herodotus does not tell us the specific local circumstances under which the conversation between Croesus and Solon took place.41 In the Greek world, the natural occasion for setting a conversational hare like ΤΗΣ 6 could, of course be the symposium,42 and we can note that Croesus' purpose in turning the discussion in this direction is precisely the same as that ascribed by Socrates to Meno's εἰκάζειν, viz., to evoke praise of himself. Likewise, Solon's series of paradoxical answers brilliantly fulfills the sympotic expectation of conversational one-upsmanship (especially of Greek over foreigner).

Our second example from Herodotus might have comforted Fraenkel in his belief that the εἰκάζειν possessed an intrinsically demotic character, in that we are told that the speaker of it is of humble origins, albeit a king of Egypt of humble origins. This is Amasis, whom the Egyptians at first despised ἄτε δὴ δημότην τὸ πρὶν ἐόντα καὶ οἰκίς ὅποι ἐπιφανέως,

40 I note now two features of Solon's comparison that are relevant to the subsequent discussion: first, it looks as if it has been rather artificially introduced into its context, since the comparandum, χρόνη, has no bearing at all on the point being made about the comparanda (δὲ δὲ ἀν ... τελευτητὸς εὐχαρίστως τὸν βίον); this inevitably gives the comparison a pre-made look. Second, the statement introducing the comparison, τὰ πάντα μὲν υπὸ τοῦτο συλλαβεῖν ἄθρωπον ἔόντα ἀδύνατὸν ἐτοι, ἐστι χρόνη οὐδέμια κτλ., bears a strong thematic similarity to the long disquisition with which Odysseus follows up his ἀντεικάζειν of Euryalus in Od. 8.166 (267f., οὕτως οὐ πάντεσσι θεοί χαλάντα διδοσιν' / ἄνδρας κτλ.), discussed below in section 3.

41 Lydian influence on the establishment of Greek sympotic customs was suggested by von der Mühll (1975) 485. Cf. Findar fr. 125, locating Terpander and the ἄρβιτος ἐν δεινόνναι Λυδίων; cf. Teleses 810 PMG. See also Hanfmann (1974) esp. 298; and (1983) 72, for the evidence of dining couches in Sardis. It is noteworthy that in the famous passage (1.94.1) in which he asserts that Lydians follow the same νόμοι as the Greeks (χρόνης ἡ γὰρ τὰ δὴ ἡδεία τέκνα καταπορόθοντο), Herodotus devotes most attention to the matter of παιγνία (1.94.2-3). The invention of these latter he then connects (1.94.4-7) with the supposed Lydian colonization of central Italy as the proto-Etruscans (on Etruscan entertainment practices the infamous λοχὸς clarius is Theopompos FGmH 115 F 204= Athenaeus XII 517d-515b). The eastern coast of Italy, or rather, Pithecusae just off of it, is the home of what has been persuasively identified as the earliest evidence for the Greek adoption of the symposium: Nestor's cup. See Murray (1994) and cf. Rathje (1990).

42 Cf. Vischer (1965) 40: "Superlativische Fragen ... sind bei den Griechen von alters her üblich ... Sie gelten als willkommenes Mittel, den Scharfsinn des Gesprächspartners zu erproben und zugleich den eigenen Witz und die eigene Pfiffigkeit unter Beweis zu stellen. Daher haben sie ihren festen Platz in Streitgesprächen aller Art: beim Gelage, beim dichterischen Wettkampf, bei der Befragung weiser Männer."
2.172.2; indeed, his early life of depravity at one time actually degenerated into criminality (2.174). A folkloric trickster figure, he is a difficult character to interpret in social terms, not least because he looks like an example of Herodotus’ tendency to depict foreigners as Hellenes (a Greek habit already well established in Homer). Amasis’ early debaucheries, which, in spite of his alleged plebeian background, have about them a strong flavor of Prince Hal or the Earl of Rochester (λέγεται δὲ ὁ Ἀμασίς, καὶ ὅτε ἦν ἰδιώτης, ὡς φιλοπότης ἦν καὶ φιλοσκώμων καὶ οὐδαμῶς κατεστρασμένος ἀνήρ, 2.174.1), survived his accession to the throne, and thereupon occasioned the conversation we are to look at.

Herodotus ascribes to Amasis as king a regimen of assiduously attending to royal business until noon, followed by similarly assiduous drinking for the rest of the day. The account is put into explicitly sympotic terms (2.173.1): ἔχρατο δὲ καταστάσιν πρηγμάτων τοιχήδε τὸ μὲν ὀρθρίον μέχρι ὤτε πληθώρης ἀγορῆς προθύμους ἔπηρσε τὰ προσφερόμενα πρήγματα, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐπινε ὁ καὶ κατέσκωπτε τοὺς συμπότας καὶ ἦν μάταιος τοις καὶ παιγνιήμων (He used to organize his working day on a regular principle: from dawn till the time the markets fill up, at mid-morning, he gave all his attention to such business as was brought to him, after which he spent the day in frivolous amusements, drinking and joking with his fellow symposiasts. Trans. de Sélincourt [1954], modified). Concerned friends intervene, urging more throne, less ἄνδρων (2.173.2): ἀχθεοθέντες δὲ τούτοισι οἱ φίλοι αὐτοῦ ἐνουθέτευσαν αὐτὸν τοῖαδε λέγουντες: "ὦ βασιλεῦ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς σεωτοὺς προεστηκάς ἐς τὸ ἄγαν φαύλον προάχουσα σεωτόν· οὗ γὰρ ἔχρην ἐν βρόνῳ σεμνῷ σεμνόν θωκέουσα δι’ ἡμέρας πρήσειν τὰ πρήγματα· καὶ οὔτως Αἰγύπτιοι τ’ ἁν ἡπιστέατο ὦς ὑπ’ ἄνδρως μεγάλου ἀρχονταὶ καὶ ἅμεινον ὅ ἄν ἥκουες· νῦν δὲ ποιεῖς οὐδαμῶς βασιλικά" (His well-wishers were pained by this behavior, and advised him to mend his ways; "My lord," they said, "this excessive levity is not the thing to maintain your royal dignity. You ought to sit all day in state upon a stately throne, attending to your kingly affairs: for then the Egyptians would feel that a great man ruled them, and you would have a better name amongst them. Your present conduct, on the contrary, is not at all suitable to a king." Trans. de Sélincourt [1954]).

The king replies with an εἰκάζων (2.173.3-4):

"ο δ’ ἀμείβετο τοίοθε αὐτοῦ· "τὰ τόξα οἱ ἐκτιμένοι, ἐπεάν μὲν δεσνύται χράοθαι, ἐνταῦνουσι, ἐπεάν δὲ χρήσονται, ἐκλύοσι. εἰ γὰρ δὴ τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἐντεταμένα εἶπ, ἐκραγεὶν ἄν, ὡστε ἐστὶ τὸ δέον οὖν ἄν ἔχοιν αὑτοίς χράοθαι. οὔτω δ’ καὶ ἄνθρωποι κατάτασσαι· εἰ θέλοις κατεστρασάσθαι αἰεὶ μὴ δὲ ἐς παιγνίην τὸ μέρος ἐσωτὸν ἀνίεναι, λάθοι ἄν ὢτοι μανεῖς ἔγε ἀπόπληκτος"
There is nothing skptic about this answer. It is, on the contrary, dignified and wise, though clever enough to be interesting and memorable—and it triumphs, which is not all that surprising, since it exemplifies the kind of ethical insight Herodotus loves. As to the identification of the passage as parasympotic, it seems to me a small but valuable interpretative gain if we allow that by using an ἐικάζειν Amasis has couched his defense of sympotic behavior in recognizably sympotic terms.

3. The ἐικάζειν in Homer

In Od. 18.26f. the beggar Irus responds to the challenge issued by his apparent competitor, the disguised Odysseus, as follows: “ὢ πότοι, ὡς μολοβρὸς ἐπιτροχάδην ἄγορευει, / γρη ἱκανοὶ ἰδος’ ΚΤΛ...” (“Shame on how the old hulk rolls along in his speech, like / an old woman at the oven.” Trans. Lattimore [1967]). Monaco quoted the passage as the earliest instance of the skptic type of ἐικάζειν he was studying. The situation in which the comparison is made—the feasting place of a group of young aristocrats—might fairly be called quasi-sympotic.

Both Monaco and Fraenkel cited Od. 6.149-52 as well, Odysseus’ first speech to Nausicaa.
"γοναυώμαι σε, ἄνασσα: θεός νῦ τις ἦ βροτός ἔσσοι;
εἰ μὲν τις θεός ἔσσοι, τοι οὐρανὸν εἰρύν ἔχουσιν,
"Αρτέμιδι σε ἐγὼ γε, Δίὸς κούρης μεγάλης,
εἶδός τε μέγεθος τε φυλή τ' ἀγγίστα ἔσκοις
εἰ δὲ τις ἔσσος βροτόν, οἱ ἐπὶ χόδινα ναιετάσουσι, κτλ."

"I am at your knees, O queen. But are you mortal or goddess?
If indeed you are one of the gods who hold wide heaven,
then I must find in you the nearest likeness to Artemis
the daughter of great Zeus, for beauty, figure, and stature.
But if you are among those mortals who dwell on the earth . . .”

Trans. Lattimore (1967), modified

This is a curious sort of εἰκάζειν, however, since what the speaker is
claiming (whether we believe him or not is irrelevant) is not so much that he
has spotted a resemblance between his addressee and Artemis, but that he is
fully convinced she really might be Artemis. As commentators have pointed
out, in such contexts the meaning of expressions with the dative like ἔσκοις
σε and ἔσκας tends away from “you look to me like X” towards “I suspect
you are X.” Nonetheless, Fraenkel and Monaco were undoubtedly right to
identify Odysseus’ comparison (which comes, as Fraenkel had noted was
typical, at speech-beginning) as a form of εἰκάζειν, not least in view of the
second comparison Odysseus draws in this speech (160-64):

"οὐ γάρ πω τοιοῦτον ἵθελ βροτὸν ὀφθαλμοῖς,
οὐτ' ἀνδρ' οὐτε γυναῖκα-σέβας μ' ἔχει εἰσορόωτα.
Δῆλῳ δὴ ποτε τοίον Ἀπόλλωνος παρά βοώῳ
φῶτικος νέον ἔρνος ἀνερχόμενον ἐνόησα- κτλ.”

". . . I have never seen with these eyes anything like you,
neither man nor woman. Wonder takes me as I look on you.
Yet in Delos once I saw such a thing, by Apollo’s altar.
I saw the stalk of a young palm shooting up. . . .”

Trans. Lattimore (1967)

The comparison of a young person to the sprout or shoot of a plant is
established very early on in the traceable history of the εἰκάζειν, as shown by
Alcman (?)47 110 PMG/PMGF (=155 Calame), οἶκας μὲν ὀφραῖῳ λίνῳ,
and Sappho 115, τίς σ’, ϝ φίλε γάμβρε, κάλως ἐικάςδω; / ὀρπακι
βραδίνῳ σε μάλιστ’ εἰκάςδω.

In view of their acceptance into the canon of the problematic (and
entirely non-skptic) εἰκάζειν of Od. 6.149-52, it is surprising that Fraenkel
and Monaco make no mention of Od. 8.158-66.48 The relevant part comes

47. The form οἰκας is Ionic, which made Page suggest attributing the fragment to Anacreon rather than
Alcman; to preserve the attribution to Alcman some editors, e.g., Calame, have read ἔκας.
48. Lloyd (1966) 189, however, linked both this passage and Od. 6.151f. with the εἰκάζειν as described
by Fraenkel. Both passages, he suggested, illustrate “the role of comparisons to grasp the unknown . . . when a
after Odysseus declines Laodamas’ invitation to participate in the games; Euryalus speaks first (158-166):

Euryalus answered him to his face and spoke to him roughly:
“No, stranger, for I do not see that you are like one versed in contests, such as now are practiced much among people, but rather to one who plies his ways in his many-locked vessel, master over mariners who also are men of business, a man who, careful of his cargo and grasping for profits, goes carefully on his way. You do not resemble an athlete.”

Then looking at him darkly resourceful Odysseus answered:
“Friend, that was not well spoken; you seem like one who is reckless...”

Trans. Lattimore (1967)

This is a textbook skoptic exchange, featuring both εἰκάζειν and ἀντεικάζειν. As in the opening of Odysseus’ speech to Nausicaa, the language of the εἰκάζειν (ἔθοκο, ἔοικας) is used not to draw a real comparison (to, e.g., an animal or plant), but to make a surmise, in the present case highly disadvantageous to the addressee.

W.J. Slater has persuasively argued that all of Od. 8 is best understood as an exploration of “symptotic ethics.” We may add that Euryalus’ ill-advised sneer states the book’s theme: is Odysseus one of “us,” or one of “them”—is he upper, or is he lower—an athlete/warrior/symposiast, or an upstart “in commerce”? It would accord well with Slater’s thesis if the εἰκάζειν—language with which Euryalus denies Odysseus upper-class status were recognized by the audience as itself being upper class, i.e., by virtue of being symptotic. (This point carries over to Odysseus’ response.) That the exchange does not in fact take place in the dining room, or inside a house at
all, makes no difference; on the contrary, that fact brings to light an essential point about the whole phenomenon of parasympoticism: for Greek aristocrats anything be spoken of in terms borrowed from the other—for, as Heraclitus might say, they are one and the same.

That Glauclus' comparison in II. 6.146-49 is an eikáζειν should by now be evident. Apart from its formal resemblance to many of the examples discussed so far, it also conforms to the established pattern of comparing a given human, or humankind in general, to an item drawn from the natural world; it also fulfills Fraenkel's typological requirement (really only a tendency) that an eikáζειν should come at the beginning of a speech.

Of greater interest still is the comparison's elaborate stylization and wordplay, both noted earlier as desirable features. Let us examine the lines more closely:

"Τυδεῖδη μεγάθυμε, τιν γενεὴν ἐρείδεις;
οὴ περ φυλλῶν γενεῆ, τοὶ δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.
φύλλα τὰ μὲν τ' άνειμος χαμάνδις χέει, ἄλλα δὲ θ' ὑλή
tηλεδώσα γὰρ φεύει, ταρὸς δ' ἐπιγίγνεται ἐστὶ;
ὡς ἀνδρῶν γενεῆ ἥ μὲν φεύει ἣ δ' ἀπολήγει..."

(II. 6.145-49)

"High-hearted son of Tydeus, why ask of my generation?
As is the generation of leaves, so is that of humanity.
The wind scatters the leaves on the ground, but the live timber burgeons with leaves again in the season of spring returning.
So one generation of men grows while another dies..."

Trans. Lattimore (1951)

Hermann Fränkel noted that γενεῆ has different meanings in the comparison (where it must mean something like "the generating of...", at least in 146-48) and in the frame (where it means "lineage" in 145, but something like "generation" as in "the older generation" in 149), and argued on that basis that the comparison was, in effect, an interpolation. I would suggest that the changes in meaning provide, as virtuoso display, much of the point: Glauclus is taking Diomedes' use of the word γενεῆ as the occasion for an exercise in variation and ornamentation. That the transitions are artificial is to be readily admitted, on the understanding that "artificial" means "artful" with a hint of "mannered." (The detachable quality detected by Fränkel is also to be admitted, as will be made clear below.) Line 147 to 148a obliquely brings a hint of paradox to the exercise, in that thematically and configurationally the

words recall descriptions of golden ages or realms from which death and decay have been banished. The description of the orchards outside of Alcinoos’ palace (Od. 7.114-21) is the closest parallel:


... there is the place where his fruit trees are grown tall and flourishing, pear trees and pomegranate trees and apple trees with their shining fruit, and the sweet fig trees and the flourishing olive. Never is the fruit spoiled on these, never does it give out, neither in winter time nor summer, but always the West Wind blowing on the fruits brings some to ripeness while he starts others. Pear matures on pear in that place, apple upon apple, grape cluster on grape cluster, fig upon fig.

Trans. Lattimore (1967)

But the account of the isles of the blessed in Pindar, Ol. 2.72f., shows the same theme (flowers instead of trees) in a similar configuration:


Since it is otherwise post-Homeric, the intransitive use of φύω in line 148 of Glaucus’ speech has also been thought to incriminate the passage; the presence of the normal transitive usage in the immediately previous verse is seen as exacerbating the anomaly. This point is fairly taken, especially in view of the somewhat mechanical repetition exhibited in the correlated clauses of many examples of the ἐκδείκνυ̇ν.53 But the Pindar passage tells us a different story, and suggests that we have to do here with a tension between

52. See, e.g., the commentaries of Leaf and Kirk, ad loc. Schwzyzer (Gr.Gr. II, 219) accepts the intransitive use, and cites other Homeric instances of transitive verbs used intransitively.
53. See, e.g., Xen. Anab. 5.8.24 (quoted fully in n.24 above), διδάσκω... ἀφάντα... ἀφήσητε. In Theocr. 1.82-91 (quoted below n.61), τάκεσθι ὀρθαλίμως (91) reproduces the sense of the corresponding τάκεται ὀρθαλίμως (88), just as does the repetition of exercæs et al. in the Cato passage quoted in n.44 above.
the εἰκάζειν’s natural leaning toward repetition, and the inverted mirror symmetry of a different kind of topos that has been brought in by Glaucus. The Pindar passage illustrates the pattern: to match the chiastic order whereby, in the μέν–clause, the flowers (τά μέν) come first, and their source (ἀπ’ ἀγλαών δενδρέων) second, while in the δε–clause, the source (ūδωρ) comes first, and the flowers second (δ’ ἄλλα), there is a corresponding symmetrical inversion of the verbal voice, from the intransitive μέν–clause’s φλέγει, carried over from the preceding line, to the transitive φέρβει of the δε–clause, so that whereas τά μέν is subject in its clause, its counterpart δ’ ἄλλα is object in its. Lines 147-48b of Glaucus’ speech, of course, constitute a further example of this phenomenon. What needs to be pointed out is that it is in the nature of the antithetical dynamics of such passages to bring about linguistic innovation. Thus in Hesiod’s little “hymn to Zeus” (Op. 3-6)

Through him mortal men are famed or unfamed, sung or unsung alike, as great Zeus will. (5) For easily he makes strong, and easily he brings the strong man low; easily he humbles the proud and raises the obscure.

Trans. Evelyn-White (Loeb)

in one and the same line (5) the active of βριάω is first transitive, and then intransitive; the first is the norm, the second an innovation, generated by the accumulated momentum of the preceding antithetical lines. So also in Glaucus’ εἰκάζειν, the antithetical logic of the whole, and the η μέν/η δε-structure of line 149 in particular, make possible the innovative intransitive

54. The two verbs at the successive line-ends, φέρβει and φλέγει, have been chosen for their phonetic similarity, which adds further to the symmetry of the passage.

55. Cf. Aesch. Septim 758-60, κακών δ ὄσπερ ἡλάσσα κὼν ἄγει, / τὸ μὲν πίτυν, ἄλλο δ’ ἀείρει / τρικαλοῦν. It should be pointed out that in Aegisthus’ εἰκάζειν in Aesch. Ag. 1628-30 (quoted and discussed earlier in the text) what Fraenkel condemned as “the forced ἐμμολογία of ἀγεί and δεῖ” is simply another instance of this same kind of shift in verbal voice. On the whole phenomenon, and on its manifestation in Hesiod Op. 5 in particular, see Watkins (1995) 99f.

56. LSJ’s way of handling this innovation is amusing: founding their entry on four instances, they first give the transitive use, and cite Hes. Th. 447. Then, under “II. intr.”, they cite Oppian, Halieutica 5.96. Finally comes “in both senses,” with quotation of Op. 5—as if listing Oppian before Op. 5 somehow disinfected the latter of irregularity.

57. This line exhibits another kind of artistry, again of a recognizable type: it is as “epimerism,” whereby a stated category is named, and then broken down into its constituent parts (usually with μέν . . . δε); examples are Hes., Op.11-13 οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἐπὶ Ἐριδών γένος, ἄλλ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἕκαστον διὸ τίν μέν . . . ή δ’ . . .; Pindar, Nem. 8.2f. παιδῶν . . . τὸν μὲν . . . ἐτερον δ’ . . .; Mimnermus 2.5-7 Κήρες . . . ή μέν . . . ή δ’ ἄτερ. The grammarian Alexios in the bi scholium ad loc. complained πῶς ἐνικόν ὅν τὸ γενέεπεριζησθαι δύναται; to which comes the reply: κακώς δυνάται γάρ καὶ ήδ’ ἐνικοῦ ἐπεμερισμός γενέθηαι (it should be said in Alexios’ defense that he may have meant “how can γενέθηαι in the
use of φύω, the novelty of which must be accepted as a further manifestation of the speaker’s artistic panache.

So it would seem that Glauclus opens his speech with an εἰκάζειν. We are left with the question why. Presumably Glaucus is doing something similar to what Eurýalus does with his more overtly skeptic (second-person) εἰκάζειν in Od. 8: he is identifying himself as a member of symposiastic society, and indeed as an adept of the art of conversational “warfare.” But what motivates his decision to present himself thus here? Clearly, it is something in the preceding speech of Diomedes. A clue may lie in the way Diomedes presents his own question: Are you a mortal or a god? Odysseus, in the passage already quoted (Od. 6.149-52), had charmingly put the same question to Nausicaa, with something like an εἰκάζειν: θέος νῦ τις ἢ βροτός ἔσσι; / εἰ μὲν τις θεός ἔσσι . . . Ἀρτέμιδι σε ἐγώ γε . . . / εἴδος τε μέγεθος τε φυήν τ’ ἄγχιστα ἐδόκοι. The sequence of θέος νῦ τις ἢ βροτός ἔσσι; followed by . . . ἐδόκοι, recalls the ludic interrogative type of εἰκάζειν exemplified in Sappho 115.1 Voigt: τίω σε . . . εἰκάζοι; (cf. Ar., Birds 804, οἶδ’ ὁ μάλιστ’ ἐοίκας ἐπτερωμένος;). It doesn’t seem impossible that Glauclus is imagined as having caught a whiff of this in Diomedes’ speech, the similarity of which to Odysseus’ is plain: τίς δὲ σὺ ἔσσι, φέριστε (123) . . . εἰ δὲ τις ἀθανάτων γε κατ’ οὐρανοῦ εἰλήπουσας (128) . . . εἰ δὲ τις ἔσσι βροτῶν, οἶ ἀρουρῆς καρπὸν ἔδουσιν, κτλ. (142).

At any rate, the mere fact of having been asked to identify himself poses a subtle challenge for the addressee. Diomedes’ question carries demeaning insinuations: (1) you are too insignificant to have come to my notice, or perhaps (2), you are a malingerer and thus have been invisible hitherto (124 f., οὐ μὲν γάρ ποτ ὄποτα μάχη ἐνι κυδιανεῖρη / τὸ πρῖν). A blustering reply will be self-condemnatory, confirming the suspicion already floated that we have to deal with a talker rather than a fighter. With his elegantly composed εἰκάζειν, however, Glauclus succeeds in hitting the perfect note of detached urbanity, “both witty and clever,” as Kirk observed. By removing the discussion into the realm of the symposium, Glauclus’ use of the device suggests that he doesn’t take Diomedes’ aggression too seriously. It proves him a member of the sympotically cultivated class, and a

meanings it has had in the comparison hitherto [i.e., “lineage,” and then “generating principle”] be subdivided?”). A parallel for the epimerism of a singular collective noun is furnished by Od. 8.117-19 quoted above in the text, where καρπός in 117 reappears in 119 as τὰ μὲν . . . ἄλλα δὲ. Alexion seems to have supported the alternative reading γενεὴ ἤμεν φύει ἦδ’ ἀπολήγει, a device to which Crates also had recourse in “solving” the “problem” of the two separate tribes of Αἰθηπιόν at Od. 1.23f. See Bekker (1863) 58, discussing both passages.

58. The first suggestion of the exegetical scholiast to the line in effect endorses (2): δευτέραν γάρ ἔχων τάξιν Σαρπιδέωνος οὐ προσείχει.
skilled practitioner of the verbal jousting in which the Homeric hero reveled.\textsuperscript{59} Aegisthus, too, we may recall, countered an enemy’s questioning with an εικάζειν, though his use of the second-person form was overtly skeptic, and, as Fraenkel sensed, infinitely less dignified than Glaucus’. Similarly aggressive was Euryalus’ use of the εικάζειν–form with Odysseus in \textit{Od}. 8. Glaucus is a much more polished performer, but producing an εικάζειν remains, even in his hands, a competitive act.

4. Rhetorical detachment

I think there is some strong if unrecognized evidence that Glaucus’ comparison was indeed understood in antiquity to be an εικάζειν. Earlier we looked at a passage from the comic poet Alexis (fr. 46 \textit{PCG}); another fragment from the same author compares life to dice (35 \textit{PCG}):

\[
\text{τοιοῦτο τὸ ξῆν ἔστιν ὡσπερ οἱ κύβοι}
\]
\[
\text{oὐ ταῦτ’ ἀεὶ πιπτοῦσιν, οὐδὲ τῷ βίῳ}
\]
\[
\text{ταῦτόν διαμένει σχῆμα, ἦμαθολοῦσδ᾽ ἔχει.}
\]

That’s the nature of life: as dice don’t give the same roll every time, neither does the shape of a man’s life stay the same to the end, but it goes through changes.

Arnott ad loc. points out that, though dice-analogies are quite common, the “direct comparison between life and the hazards of dice-play” does not occur in extant authors earlier than Alexis and an anonymous Hellenistic hexameter poet (\textit{CA Epica Adespota} 4.9-15):

\[
\text{ἄλλοτε γὰρ ἄλλος ἄληθεν λάχος ἀνθρώποισιν:}
\]
\[
\text{οἷς τοις πεσσοσί δίκη, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἄληθεν:}
\]
\[
\text{πεσός ἰμαδόμενος ποτε μὲν τοῖς, ἄλλοτε τοῖς}
\]
\[
\text{εἰς γάθανω πίπτει καὶ ἀφεθὲν αἷμα τίθησι:}
\]
\[
\text{πρόσθεν ἀνοθείσιν, ἐνήμενοντα δ᾽ ἀνολθον:}
\]

59. In Pelliccia (1995) 150-78 I have argued that many of the taunting speeches found in both epics exhibit a remarkable, almost Hellenistic, stylization (see especially 169 n.106). Glaucus’ comparison belongs with them. —Fraenkel, in the same note quoted earlier condemning Aegisthus’ εικάζειν (1950) n. on 1629ff., invoked Soph., \textit{Aj}. 1142ff. in support of his view that by putting an εικάζειν into Aegisthus’ mouth Aeschylus meant to show him up as a lou. “Sophocles uses an exactly corresponding means to characterize his Menelaus in the dispute scene of the \textit{Ajax}. There Menelaus, when driven into a corner, insults his opponent under the transparent cover of an αἰτίος or ἀτάξιος, and in so doing he keeps in every detail the primitive form of a coarse popular custom, whereupon Teucer pays him back in the same coin.” But consistency in that case should require that Teucer be tarred with the same brush. And surely if diminishment of Menelaus was Sophocles’ aim, he would have had Teucer rise above the provocation. Fraenkel, if anyone, knew perfectly well that not all αἰτίον are “coarse.” The exchange of αἰτίον between Menelaus and Teucer is valuable precisely because it shows how two Greek antagonists can in moments of excitement switch into these tidy formal, stylized mini-genres of abuse. The sequence is very similar to that of \textit{Od}. 17.238-54, discussed in these terms at Pelliccia (1995) 270f.
I find it hard to believe that line 10 here was not deliberately patterned after II. 6.146, a line famous in antiquity, and yet one whose configuration (verse-initial οὗς with correlative τοῖς after the line’s main break at the fourth foot caesura) is all but unique. The thematic similarities between the two passages are obvious. Fraenkel, had he considered the passage in this context, would not have hesitated to class it as an εἰκάζειν (especially since the speaker, an impoverished old woman, conforms to his erroneous view of the device’s social affiliations).

We had already known, or thought we had known, that II. 6.146 had proved a useful resource for later poets, from the opening of Simonides 8 West¹ (=19.2 West²):

50. Neither Powell, CA ad loc., nor Arnott, 1996, loc. cit., notes the resemblance; but Hollis (1990) 29f., in a detailed discussion of the fragment (arguing against Callimachean authorship), remarks (30 n.15) that the “style of the anonymous piece is . . . in places strongly reminiscent of Homer”: “compare l. 10 with the structure of II. 6. 146.” In Pandora searches for forms of οὗς in poems labelled “Epic” and “Eleg.” On the TLG E disk, and in the Homeric Hymns, the Orphica, and other hexametric corpora that came to mind, I have found no example of such a line-configuration besides II. 6.146, Simonides’ quotation of II. 6.146 in 8.2 West¹ (=19.2 West²), and CA loc. cit. (But I have become very skeptical about the reliability of Pandora searches.) Cf. also Empedocles 17.3 D-K, a passage that is closely dependent for both theme and style upon II. 6.146-49 (the debt is noted by Sider [2001] 287). The formulation of a given comparison as an assertion, at its beginning, is one of the features that we remarked in section 1 as distinguishing II. 6.146-49 from the normal Homeric narrative simile, and in section 2 as being characteristic of the εἰκάζειν. We can note now that οὗς/τοῖς are used only rarely with “real” similes (II. 5.554-59, 864-66, 7.63-65, 208-11, 13.298-304, 17.53-59—otherwise only singly, in correlation with, e.g., οἷς), and then the pair are not configured as a “head” for the comparison but, in the normal manner of similes, as the coordinators of its two members—e.g., at II. 5. 864-67: οὐ δὲ έκ νεφέων ἐρμηνεύνει αἶρη / καύματος έξ, ἀνέμων δυσσαέος δρυμένου, / τοίος Τυδείδη Διημήβη κέλλεισ τερετίον “Αρπή / φαίνεθ’ κτλ., . . . (and that is all there is to it, i.e., there is no subsequent working out of the points of the comparison as in II. 6.147-49). On another instance of οὗς/τοῖς in an εἰκάζειν-like passage, see n.49 above on Od. 21.172f.

61. The assessment of such matters of social nuance, difficult for the archaic and classical periods, as noted earlier, becomes even more complicated for Hellenistic poetry, especially because poets like Callimachus and Theocritus delight in incongruities such as having herdsmen and peasants produce, e.g., hexameters of exquisite refinement. An excellent, grossly coarse, and quite funny example of a bucolic εἰκάζειν (noted by Dover [1971] ad loc., but not mentioned by Monac or Fraenkel) is spoken skopically by Priapus to Daphnis in Theocritus 1 (82-91): “βούτας μὲν ἔλεγεν, τοιάδ’ ἀπετίθη άνδρα έιδάκα, / ωτόπολα δέκε έσορός τῆς μυκάδας οἷα διατείνω, / τάκεται ορθαλιώς ὤτε οὖ τρόφος αὐτός έγέντο / καὶ τ’ έτι εἴπε κ’ έσορός τῆς παρθένος οἷα γελάνη / τάκεται ορθαλιώς ὤτε οὖ μετὰ ταῦτα χορεύειν.” The general import is that goatherds are specially prey to illegitimate sexual wants and consequently to irregular anxieties (see Gow ad loc.), and that Daphnis is exhibiting symptoms of these. It seems likely that Priapus’ charge is not that Daphnis wants to have intercourse with the laughing maidens and cannot (as per Dover, 83-85), but rather that he wants to become one of them (as the goatherd desires a change in species); such a desire would explain Daphnis’ lack of interest in the girl and his fatal enmity in general, and would be of a piece with the other impossibilitas sought by him in 132-36.
The one best thing the Chian man said was this:

"As is the generation of leaves, so is that of humanity."

But few men taking this into their ears
take it also into their hearts; for hope is present in each,
sown into their breasts when young.

Now a recently published papyrus has appeared preserving much of the rest of the poem as previously known, in a context that all but guarantees Simonides' authorship, which had been uncertain. The problem is that the new version differs from the old in a crucial respect: it doesn't include the line from Glaucus' speech, or indeed anything else from the five lines quoted above. It gives us instead lines 6-13 prefaced by 4 lines too fragmentary to reconstruct, but preserved well enough to be identifiably other than the old 1-5.

One explanation that has been suggested is that Stobaeus silently excerpted: the lines he gives as 1-5 actually came from earlier in the same poem; the papyrus preserves lines from the intervening passage Stobaeus omitted.

Another possibility would obviously be that we have to do with two different compositions, both of which included the same passage (6-13 in the Stobaean version, 5-12 in the papyrus).

These observations form the prelude to the speculations with which I wish to conclude the present article. I continue with a few further points. The first has to do with the detachability of the eiKol;elv. Among the examples to have come down to us are two identical pairs, Thgn. 457-61 and Theophilus 4 PCG, and Alexis 284 PCG and Eubulus 122 PCG. We do not have any surrounding context for any of them, which is a perfectly normal state of affairs for both the Theognidea and the fragments of comedy. We may have a suspicion, however, that comparisons like these would be prey to detachment to an exceptional degree because they are so eminently detachable—because they are discrete units usually well able to survive on their own. This suspicion would be correct. So detachable are they, in fact, that we know

62. See n.4 above for the references, and for an excellent statement of the facts and discussion of the issues see Sider (2001).
64. See nn.29 and 30 above.
they were stolen: Aristophanes tells us so himself, at Clouds 559, where he indignantly characterizes other comic poets as τὰς ἐικόνας τῶν ἐγχέλων τὰς ἔμας μιμούμενοι. (The stolen εἰκάζειν is to be found at Knights 864ff.). Which is to say that a given εἰκάζειν might appear in different contexts in different places: in the presumed originator or author, e.g., Aristophanes, or “Theognis,” or Eubulus, or Alexis, etc., and then in the works of his alleged imitators.

This mobility, as we can call it, surely mirrors the realities of symposiac practice. Not everybody who went to symposia will have been gifted with the kind of poetic skill and creativity prized there. It is the suggestion of B. Rust that anthologies such as we have in the surviving Theognidea functioned as prep-books for symposiasts: memorize a few—the collection features poems for every occasion—and fit them into the evening’s conversation as opportunity allows.65 We happen to have preserved for us on papyrus an εἰκάζειν-collection of just this type—an εἰκάζειν for every occasion, that is, for every physical type—ready-made for the uninspired symposiast hoping to make a splash.66

The trick, or perhaps τέχνη, of symposiac conversation was to have at your command a repertoire of set pieces. Obviously, the higher the quality and originality of your set pieces, and the more of them you had mastered, the better. Imagination and creativity and wit will be manifested not so much, in your ability to improvise new material on the spot (since this would not be within the capability of many),67 but in your deployment of the pieces at your command—your startling ability to adapt set piece X to new context Y.68 (We may be seeing an example of this when Protagoras produces his “myth” in the Platonic dialogue that bears his name.)

The feature of this procedure that may be hard for us to accept is that it is perfectly acceptable for the seams to show. In fact, within limits, it may be

65. Rust, in progress, developing upon Reitzenstein (1893) 45-86, esp. 76ff. Cf. Barns (1950-51) i-19, West (1974) 57, and Bremmer (1997) 14-18. The idea that people might memorize set texts for performance at symposia is confirmed by Theophrastus, Char. 27.2: ὁ δὲ ὑμισθίας τιμῶντος τις, ὁδὸς ἡδίσεις μανθάνειν ἔξηκοντα ἐπὶ γεγονός καὶ ταῦτα λέγον παρὰ πότον ἐπιλανθάνειν. Chapter 5 of Cole (1991) 80ff. is given over to arguing that the earliest rhetorical handbooks were collections of model speeches (such as we have in the surviving works of Gorgias and the Tetralogies of Antiphon) to be memorized by the student, and then adapted to suit such occasions as presented themselves. I note here that while many examples of the εἰκάζειν at the working out of the comparison to its opening statement with γαρ, some have recourse to the explanatory asyndeton that we noted earlier Kühner-Gerth II p.344 characterized as “equivalent to γαρ.” Besides II. 6.146-49 itself, other examples are Carm. Pop. 22 (PMG 905), quoted in n.31, and Powell (1925) CA Epica Aesopota 4.10-13 and Alexis 35, both quoted in the text immediately above. It seems clear that the asyndetic types will have been those most adaptable for transference to other contexts.


67. West (1974) 17: “a victim [of elegiac skoptic abuse] might want to answer back. If he was to do it in song, he would need some facility at improvisation, but that is attested for Simonides at least (eleg. 6-7).” West goes on to discuss various interactive poetic games.

68. See Barns 3f., who shows that Aristophanes both uses and ridicules the technique.
desirable: the more artificial the transitions, the more brazen the thematic, logical, and linguistic leaps, then the more loudly is proclaimed your originality and dash—provided, of course, that, e.g., your lack of taste and style doesn’t make the whole thing fall flat.69

This suggestion implies an aesthetic at odds with our own and later antiquity’s preference for an *ars adeo latet arte sua* approach. If the claimed taste seems incredible, I ask the reader to consider that some of the most memorable gnomic and parainetic passages of early Greek and classical Greek literature exhibit precisely this quality, and have often been called into question for it:

1: The fable of the Hawk and the Nightingale in Hesiod, *Op.* 202-12. Hesiod “does not succeed in making effective use of [the traditional pattern in which fables are deployed]. The hawk’s hybris matches the king’s without putting it in a ridiculous light or showing it to be ill-advised. They might more aptly have told the tale to Hesiod . . . . As it is, Hesiod can only proceed by saying ‘Well, don’t you behave like that’ (213). . . . This is to negate the parallelism of animal and man which is fundamental to the genus fable. He may well be adapting an existing fable.” (West on 202-12.)

2. Phoenix introduces the Meleager exemplum at *Il.* 9.599 in support of his claim (524-26) that heroes of old allowed themselves to be persuaded by gifts and prayers; but Meleager turns out to be a negative exemplar: he had to give in *even without recompense:* “When the story was introduced, we were led to expect encouragement rather than warning; Meleagros cannot be called δωρητός. This is only one more of the awkwardnesses in this curious narrative” (Leaf on 599).70

3. The Niobe-exemplum held out to Priam by Achilles at *Il.* 24.601-19: “Niobe’s situation as described is clearly very like Priam’s, only more so. Priam has lost one son: Niobe lost all twelve; and yet Niobe ate food. *A fortiori* Priam should eat. . . . [It is more than improbable that there was any legend at all that Niobe had eaten food after her children had been killed. The detail is irrelevant to the universal story that she was turned into stone. . . . The situation is not that Homer has chosen a suitable mythological example as an encouragement to Priam—rather he has invented it.”71

69. Opinions then as now could differ: the exchange of comparisons between Lysistratus and Philocleon in *Ar., Wazps* 1308-14, quoted in section 2 above, concludes, as I quoted it, with a round of applause accorded to the old man. But the passage goes on to record dissent, duly noted and rebuked by Philocleon (1314-18): *οί δὲ ἀνεκράτησαν, πλὴν γε Θεουφράστου μόνου / ὀψίς δὲ διεκόλλησαν, ὡς δὴ δεξίος, / οἱ γὰρ ὡς τῶν Θεουφράστου ἤρτα· "εἰπὲ μοι, / ἐπὶ τῷ κομῆ καὶ κομῆς εἴηι προσποιέι, / κομμαδολοχόχον περὶ τῶν εὗ πρᾶττον ἄτις;" The key phrase is ὡς δὴ δεξίος: Θεουφράστου is a connoisseur of apparently fastidious standards, and is ridiculed for these pretentions. It might be thought that the Hesiodic fable of the Hawk and the Nightingale, discussed below, is an example of an attempt that has failed to be brought off.

70. Cf. Hainsworth on 524-605: “It [the Meleager parable] is not the happiest of choices . . . .” on 599: “It is not . . . very felicitous that the climax of the parable should be ‘yielding to his δυνόμας’ when the point of Phoenix’ discourse is ‘overcome your δυνόμας’ (496).”

71. Willcock (1964) 141, following Kakridis (1949) 96-105.
4. In Herodotus 5.92 Sosicles, the Corinthian ambassador present when the Spartans propose restoring the Peisistratids in Athens, relates, as a negative exemplum about tyranny, the history of the Cypselid dynasty, and at length (5 full pages in the OCT): the “speech is incredibly inapt to the occasion. . . . Of the stories told, that of Cypselus’ childhood is not in point, since it does not illustrate the evils of tyranny, nor is there any attempt to show that a tyranny at Athens would injure Sparta and her allies” (How and Wells on 5.92.1). “[T]his is an exemplum, as is clear from the moral drawn afterward . . . . But the fact to be exemplified is not, as one might expect, contained in the [ending], which [is itself] quite irrelevant to the point being made” (Slater [1983] 123f.).

Each of the passages poses a different kind of problem, and I will not enter into discussion of them here. The element common to all is that the speaker takes the audience somewhere it cannot have expected to go: the train of thought goes in one hole and comes out another. M.L. West noted the apparent illogicality of certain Hesiodic transitions, and observed that “this kind of inconsequence, a series of thoughts ABC, where A and B and B and C make a coherent sequence, but ABC taken as a whole seem to lack all cohesion, is characteristic of archaic Greek literature” (note on Th. 94-97).

One of the passages he mentions is Op. 359-63, which forms part of a discussion of gift-giving versus theft:

\[
\text{oS } \delta \text{ } \text{ke } \alpha \text{ut } \delta \text{e } \lambda \text{e } \tau \text{i } \alpha \text{nai } \delta \text{e } \iota \pi \text{b } \iota \text{s } \iota \sigma \sigma, \\
\text{kai } \tau \text{e } \sigma \text{i } \mu \text{kr } \sigma \text{on } \epsilon \text{o } \upsilon, \text{ } \tau \text{o } \gamma' \text{ } \epsilon \text{p } \alpha \text{ } \chi \text{w } \omega \text{se } \phi \text{i } \lambda \text{o } \eta \text{ } \tau \text{o } \rho \\
\text{e } \iota \text{ } \gamma \text{ } \alpha \text{p } \text{e } \text{ } \iota \text{ } \text{ke } \iota \text{ } \mu \text{i } \kappa \text{r } \sigma \text{on } \epsilon \text{p } \iota \text{ } \sigma \text{i } \mu \text{kr } \sigma \text{on } \kappa \text{a } \tau \text{a } \delta \text{e } \iota \pi \text{a } \mu \text{e } \gamma \text{a } \text{kai } \tau \text{o } \gamma \text{ } \nu \text{ } \nu \text{o } \iota \text{o } \tau \text{o } \\
\text{e } \iota \text{ } \delta' \text{ } \epsilon \text{p } \text{ } \epsilon \text{ } \omega \text{ } \nu \text{ } \phi \text{e } \iota \text{ } \epsilon, \text{ } \delta' \text{ } \alpha \text{l } \xi \text{e } \zeta \text{e } \tau \text{i } \alpha \text{i } \theta \text{o } \sigma \text{a } \lambda \text{i } \mu \text{o } \nu. \\
\]

Whoever gives way to shamelessness and takes something himself, even though it be a small thing, it freezes his heart.

For if you add a little to a little, and do this often, soon that little will become great.

But he who adds to what he has, he will keep off bright-eyed hunger.

Trans. Evelyn-White (1964) modified

West remarks that “361-62 cohere with 359-60 only if taken in one way, and with 363 only if taken in another,” i.e., 361-62 function as the “pivot” on which a thematic transition is made from theft to thrift.

We can briefly note some further examples. After his spectacular discusthrow Odysseus issues challenges in other events, and boasts of particular skill with the bow; of all archers at Troy, he was better than all but Philoctetes:

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72. It should be noted that Slater (1983) does not regard the irrelevance of the ending as a defect.
73. All but the Hesiod are analyzed in Slater (1983), chiefly as examples of ring composition.
Eurytus is introduced as setting a standard of bowmanship Odysseus cannot be. Similarly, in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, Aphrodite substantiates her assertion that previous members of Anchises’ family have also been close to the gods in beauty: first there was Ganymede, whom Zeus carried off, and then there was Tithonus, whom Eos loved and obtained immortality for; but she forgot to ask for agelessness in addition, and so he wastes away forever. This unpleasant fate provides a moral for Aphrodite to admonish Anchises with: “I wouldn’t want you to end up like that”—a conclusion which apparently is meant to explain why she will not be seeking immortality for him. So ends what began as a parade of Trojan beauties.

Trick transitions have an obvious appeal: they surprise the audience, and at best delight them in doing so. When towards the beginning of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, the poet circles around the topic of the god’s birth on Delos, he proposes the theme (25-29) with a brief account of it as a past event (τάκε, ἐξεί); he then returns to the present by way of a relative adverb in 29: ἐνθεν ἀπορφύμενος πάσι βηντοίς ἀνάσσεις. The next line begins ὅσσος Κήτη τ’ ἑντὸς ἔχει and introduces a geographical catalogue that continues until 45f., where we read τόσσον ἐπ’ ὦδίνουσα Ἐκήβολον ἱκέτο Λητώ, / εἰ τίς οἱ γαῖεσων ὑπέ θελοι οἰκία θέσθαι. Allen insisted that a full stop must be placed at the end of line 29 (he saw this as the only alternative to positing a lacuna there)—otherwise there will be an intolerable inconcinnity.

74. Of course this is the climax of Odysseus’ disagreeable but crucial encounter with Euryalus examined above as beginning with an exchange of εἰκόζειν and ἀντεικόζειν.
between the catalogue’s beginning and its end. But obviously that will have been the whole point: the pleasure comes from going into a list of the places Apollo now timelessly rules over and coming out of it to discover yourself in the past of that one occasion when Leto visited them.

Any doubts about an archaic poet’s willingness to do such a thing should be quelled by noting that Hesiod does it too, though in reverse, with his catalogue of the Muses at Th. 75-80: this catalogue begins as part of the past-tense birth narrative, but at its end delivers us into a timeless characterization of the goddesses’ spheres of influence. (A similar and closely succeeding passage, 94-97, was the occasion for West’s note on archaic transitions, quoted directly above.) It seems entirely reasonable that catalogues, which tend not to have verbs, be employed to segue from one temporality to another in this way. Indeed, the same “trick” is played within the hom. h. Ap. itself: immediately after his birth, Apollo is described as visiting various places, first with an aorist, ἔβήσασθαι (141), and then with an iterative imperfect, ἠλάσκαζες (142). These two lines are succeeded by three listing the kind of places dear to Apollo, without any verb at all. We emerge from them in line 146 into what is unambiguously the timeless present: ἀλλὰ οὐ Δῆλῳ Φοῖβε μάλιστ’ ἐπιτέρπεσαι ἦτορ.

The editors who have been tempted to tamper with these passages on account of their “irregularities” should not be judged too harshly. If interpolation is the working into one passage of another that was not originally composed for it, then it seems quite likely that many of the exempla and αίνοι which we have been examining fill the bill. The editors’ intuition is, in short, right. What needs to be adjusted is our understanding of what constituted “success” in working a ready-to-hand exemplum or fabula in: Achilles’ manipulation of the Niobe story pleases because it renews the traditional tale in an unpredictable yet opportune way. Slater perceptively...
remarks that the surprise negative twist Phoenix gives the Meleager exemplum at its end serves a purpose: Phoenix "implies that all he is concerned to illustrate is the need to take gifts before the ships are burned and not afterwards; but his negative example discreetly conceals his assumption that Achilles will fight only when the ships are in danger and Patroclus asks him." It follows from all this that Achilles and Phoenix are being depicted by Homer as skilled adepts of sympotic conversation.

So also Glaucus. That his comparison shares with these other passages their "detached/detachable" look is made clear by the suspicions cast upon it by modern scholars, and by its having in fact been "detached" in the subsequent tradition preserved for us: the incorporation of its opening line into the Stobaean version of Simonides' elegy. It follows that we should not insist one of the two versions that we now have of this poem to be a defective variant of the other, since both could be Simonidean: if the poet could detach it once from Glaucus' speech, he could re-detach it from his own poem. Cobbling together new versions on the spot is just the kind of trick you would expect from Simonides when you invited him to dinner.

It is at a dinner-party, of course, that Simonides is said to have had the insight that led to his developing what became the ancient rhetorical art of memory. As the story is told in Cicero (de oratore 2.352-54), Simonides was called out of the banquet hall by two young men (i.e., the benevolent Dioscuri); when he went outside to answer the summons, he found nobody; the building thereupon collapsed behind him, utterly destroying everyone aristocratic neoi who were the characteristic symposiasts in Ionian cities. More individuals may have been involved than in symposia elsewhere, but the context is clearly related to a symposium. See more fully Bowie (1990). Cf. Murray (1991) who emphasizes the differences between the institution of Homeric "commensality" and that of the symposium as part of his thesis associating the latter with the adoption of hoplite tactics.

77. Slater (1983) 126.
78. Fränkel (1921) 40, claims that the linguistic irregularities of the lines (the variations in the meaning of γείας, the intransitive use of ρήχο) indicate that it was inorganically attached to the passage (hineinzuschmelzen). Cf. Cribiore (1994) 8: "It is undeniable that the simile is slightly out of place in the Homeric text. . . The connective texture of the poem here seems less smooth and homogeneous and lets come to the fore the point of juncture of different motifs."
79. G. Nagy proposed the "mouvanace" exhibited in the variant versions of the poems of Jaufré Rudel as a model for the alleged re-composition of Greek epic (Nagy [1996] ch. 1). The model is far more appropriate to Greek sympotic versifying like Simonides' here. Cribiore (1994) presents a fascinating papyrus in which Il. 6.147-49 appear to have served for a writing exercise: she discusses the identifiable ancient habits in excerpting the passage, and what I have called its "detachability" in general; see esp. 8: "The man-leaves simile had freed itself, and probably very early, from its multiple connections with the narrative context. All the instances of quotations of this comparison exhibit direct knowledge of the Homeric text, but suggest a desire to disembody the image from its context and record it for preservation in memory or in writing. . . It is not improbable that the man-leaves simile was already a topos in funereal, consolatory, threnodic poetry before the poet of the Iliad adopted it to the battle narrative." Martin (1997), argues that the supposedly late linguistic features of Homeric narrative similes may in fact reflect genre differences: the similes, Martin suggests, have been incorporated into epic from lyric and elegiac poetry. Rutherford (1997) 14ff. discusses the third triad of Pindar, Pae. 6, in terms of "detachment," "supplement," and "split performance."
80. See Molyneux (1971) for an examination of the historical evidence for this event.
still within; the poet, however, was able to identify the remains for the bereft relations by reconstructing the order in which the dead had reclined—that is, by recollecting their placement in the sympotic order: *hac tum re admonitus invenisse fertur ordinem esse maxume qui memoriae lumen adferret.*

The attribution to Simonides of the invention of this visual and above all architectural mnemonic technique, upon which classical rhetoric was founded, has an intuitive appeal: Simonides was also supposedly the founder of epinician, the ancient poetic genre that has proved most happily susceptible to "rhetorical" analysis. But Cicero's account of the poet's primal act of *Toposforschung* must make us wonder what he was doing memorizing the order of dinner-guest placement in the first place? The answer would of course be that he did it to prepare for the conversational battle that was going to begin after the meal was done. It is well known from Plato's *Symposium* what common sense alone might have suggested: the place to which your host assigns you will determine your turn at speaking, and placement will therefore be critical in determining outcomes. "We who have to speak last are at a great disadvantage," Socrates says (Plato, *Symp.* 177e3-4): all the obvious good points and approaches will have already been exhausted.

So in studying the competition, and memorizing their sequence (*ordo*), Simonides is simply behaving like the consummate symposiastic professional we know him to be. He is in effect surveying the disposition of the enemy forces. And he is also no doubt preparing for his own performances in the battle to come—constructing what he is going to say on the basis of the spatial model we know was used in the memory art of the ancient orators.

Some such calculations may have lain behind the recently revealed variants of the famous elegy: for one dinner group a version that included the quotation from Glaucus' speech was somehow deemed apropos, for another, not. We obviously cannot know the basis for these discriminations, if they in fact were Simonidean. At any rate, we have now seen that in detaching Glaucus' comparison from the "Chian man's" poem and incorporating it into an elegy of his own, Simonides in effect simply returned it to the sympotic context in which it was bred.