



2022

Is France Having a Populist Moment?

Emma Gilmore
Colby College

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses>



Part of the [Communication Technology and New Media Commons](#), [European Languages and Societies Commons](#), [French Linguistics Commons](#), [Political Theory Commons](#), [Reading and Language Commons](#), [Social Influence and Political Communication Commons](#), and the [Speech and Rhetorical Studies Commons](#)

Colby College theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed or downloaded from this site for the purposes of research and scholarship. Reproduction or distribution for commercial purposes is prohibited without written permission of the author.

Recommended Citation

Gilmore, Emma, "Is France Having a Populist Moment?" (2022). *Honors Theses*. Paper 1349.
<https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses/1349>

This Honors Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at Digital Commons @ Colby. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Colby.

Is France Having a Populist Moment?

Emma Gilmore

Honors Thesis

Department of Government, Colby College

Advisor, First Reader: Professor Joseph Reisert

Second Reader: Professor Valérie M. Dionne

April 15, 2022

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank several people for their unwavering support this semester, as annoying as I may have been. First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Reisert. His guidance throughout the year is probably the main reason that I got to this point. Next, my second reader, Professor Dionne, was so supportive when I was in her class in the Fall and was struggling to juggle all my deadlines. Her patience and insight made the process significantly smoother. Another vital person to my project, Yoselin Ramirez, helped me do *so much* scanning. Without her, I likely would have had no data to analyze. Finally, I would like to thank my roommate Lylah. She put up with a lot of my complaining and helped me think through many a jumbled thought (including this acknowledgments page). I did not realize at the beginning of this process that it would be such a group effort. But a huge thanks to all those who were involved.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2: DEFINING POPULISM	4
COMPETING DEFINITIONS	4
POPULISM AS A CORRECTIVE	13
REGIONAL EXAMPLES	16
AMERICA	16
RUSSIA	20
LATIN AMERICA	24
CHAPTER 3: POPULISM IN FRANCE	27
OVERVIEW	27
GAULLISM	29
RISE IN POPULISM	35
CHAPTER 4: LITERATURE REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF POPULISM	38
CHAPTER 5: HYPOTHESES, METHODS, AND RESULTS	41
HYPOTHESIS	41
METHOD	43
RESULTS	47
NEW QUESTIONS	58
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION	63
BACKMATTER	65
APPENDIX	65
BIBLIOGRAPHY	70

Chapter 1: Introduction

It is 2017. You are in a high school French class in your junior year of high school. Your French teacher, from the lovely city of Toulouse, looks downright shocked. Of course, to put off going over the grammar homework that you definitely did wrong, you ask “Madame Kas, qu’est-ce qui s’est passé?” *What is going on?* She pulls up Google on the projector and types in “French elections”; every single article title looks the same: MARINE LE PEN, FAR-RIGHT MAKES IT TO SECOND ROUND; FRANCE’S MAIN PARTIES FAIL TO PLEASE VOTERS. Now, even if French politics aren’t at the forefront of your mind, it was easy to understand that something major had happened. Fast forward a year, Brexit has passed, Donald Trump is elected to the White House, and it feels impossible to escape the word populism. Except now it seems that everyone, according to the media, is a populist. Emmanuel Macron, Marine le Pen’s competition and the victor in 2017, receives the title a few times. But how is that possible if he and le Pen actively disagreed on so many different policies?

Return to today. If you type “French elections” into Google, you will likely find the same, if not increased, fervor over the state of French politics. At the time of writing, Marine le Pen is steadily closing the polling gap between herself and the incumbent President Macron (Kar-Gupta 2022). Other notable figures are also gaining ground, Luc Mélenchon, a leader of the far left, is holding steady at 17%, compared to Macron’s 27% and le Pen’s 22%. (Le parisien ; April 6, 2022). The 2022 elections share another similarity with 2017, the idea of populism remains ambiguous in the news media. All three of the leading candidates, despite having wildly different campaign platforms, have been accused of being populist. More than that, France’s “turn to the far right” (Zerofsky 2022) has led scholars and news media alike to claim that France is having a populist moment. But with the lack of clarity surrounding populism in general, it

seems difficult to accept this as fact. Is France having a populist moment, or is the news media using the term because it garners more clicks on their sites?

My thesis looks to answer this question by conducting a study of the rhetoric of the top French politicians since 1981. First though, it was vital that I understand what populism is. Chapter 2 discusses these numerous definitions, but I found the most support for populism being a thin ideology that essentially divides society into two parts, the pure people versus the corrupt elite and that demands that the will of the people be the main goal of government. This ideology is expressed through rhetoric. A populist leader will consistently frame their messaging around the people and against the elite.

After discussing the definitions of populism, I move to a brief study of three different regions where populism has manifested, America, Russia, and Latin America. While each region's populism has looked distinct, they all share the core tenets of my understanding of populism, demonstrating that while populism is a broad concept, there are identifiable, and trackable, components.

Using this understanding of populism provided by the definitions that are confirmed by the regions where the phenomenon has been observed, I then turn to French populism in Chapter 3. The conception of populism in France is complicated by two factors which I discuss in detail in this section: the existence of a left *and* right populism in the country, and the conflation of populism with another political ideology specific to the region, Gaullism. Once I distinguish these concepts, I discuss populism in France today, reiterating my guiding question, "is France having a populist moment" and in Chapter 4 discuss how other scholars have gone about empirically measuring populism. Chapter 5 presents my hypotheses and method and tests my

hypotheses. I then discuss my results and ponder the questions that they may pose. Finally, in Chapter 6 I conclude my thesis and discussion of populism.

Chapter 2: Defining Populism

To begin my project determining whether France is having a populist moment, I had to have a working definition of populism that I could implement. This goal, however, became complicated by the fact that there is widespread disagreement over the meaning of populism. Ruth Collier (2001) indicates that the main problem with defining populism lies in the fact that “the populist label has been attached to such a wide variety of political movements (right and left, from above and from below) that it is hard to stabilize any core meaning that can work rigorously as an analytical concept” (Collier 2001, 11814). Indeed, populist scholars have not come to a consensus regarding what populism actually is. Karen Remmer, writing about Latin American electoral changes and populist actors’ influence, defines populism as an anti-status quo appeal for extended rights of social citizenship (Remmer 2012). Michael Kazin, in his *Foreign Affairs* article discussing President Trump and Bernie Sanders’s populist natures, stresses the importance of language in populism, with populist actors placing the people at the center of their political agendas. Paul Ricoeur, a French philosopher specializing in hermeneutics, maintains that populism is almost always “le discours de l’autre” *the discourse of others*, that aims to “describe [a group] and disqualify [them]” (Godin 2012). Paul Taggart (2017) extends the framework of Ricoeur’s discourse, and defines populism as political parties, who are antagonistic to elites, that fetishize the purity of the people. Kirk A. Hawkins defines populism simply as “discourse” (Hawkins 2009, 1041).

The notion of populism as political discourse, or rhetoric, has a decent amount of support amongst scholars. Yet another definition along these lines is provided by Hans-Georg Betz (2002), who understands populism as political mobilization through political rhetoric. Carlos de la Torre seconds the importance of political rhetoric, describing populism as a “Manichaeian

discourse that divides politics and society as the struggle between two irreconcilable and antagonistic camps: the people and the oligarchy or the power block” (de la Torre 2017, 2).

Taggart (2017) also shows an interest in rhetoric defining a part of populism, writing that “issues are framed in populist terms. The issues themselves are not inherently populist” (Taggart 2017, 2). French scholar Christian Godin expands on the rhetoric that qualifies and defines populism, stating it is the “condamnations sans appel des élites, la défense d’une identité nationale menacée, et le rejet des forces étrangères menaçant cette identité” *unprompted condemnation of elites, the defense of a threatened national identity, and the rejection of foreign forces threatening this identity* (Godin 2012, 16).

The perception of a threat is likewise seen in a more ideological approach to populism that “pits a virtuous and homogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 3). In a paper discussing the populist impacts on foreign economies, Martin Rode and Julia Revuelta describe populism as a “conglomeration of ideology, tactics, and strategy” that seeks to form “large gross-class coalitions to implement a reformist set of policies” (Devinney and Hartwell 2017, 35; Rode and Revuelta 2015, 75).

In one of the most extensive works on populism, simply titled *Populism*, Margaret Canovan, rather than restrict populism to a single, simple definition, creates a typology. Her typology has two major types of populism which are further broken down into seven subsets. The first type, agrarian populism, describes populism as movements with a “particular kind of socioeconomic base, liable to arise in particular socioeconomic circumstances, and sharing a particular socioeconomic program” (Canovan 1981, 8). Her subtypes of agrarian populism

include Farmers' Radicalism, Peasant Movements, and Intellectual Agrarian Socialism. Her second type, political populism, refers to "devices of direct democracy, revolting against elite" (Canovan 1981, 8). Her four subtypes for this category are Populist Dictatorship, Populist Democracy, Reactionary Populism, and Politician's Populism. Her book provides extensive examples for each type and subtype, though she indicates that while no populist phenomena she describes can belong in every group, most, if not all of them, belong in multiple groups and are not restricted to a single categorization. Canovan does not provide an explicit definition of populism to her readers, allowing for some individual reflection on the subject, yet she does point out that "two elements do seem to be universally present. All forms of populism without exception involve some kind of exaltation or an appeal to 'the people' and all are in one sense or another anti-elitist" (Canovan 1981, 294). Canovan does not believe that these commonalities are enough to define populism, however, as she claims that they are too vague and ambiguous. She points out that "the people" can be a completely different construction depending on the populist movement being discussed.

Cas Mudde, another predominant populist scholar, disagrees with Canovan's assessment of these common features found in her populist subtypes. In his pivotal 2004 work on the subject, *The Populist Zeitgeist*, Mudde provides a concrete definition of populism. He considers populism to be "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2004, 543). Mudde breaks down his definition into four core elements: ideology, the people, the elite, and the general will. For anything to be called populist, it should include all of these features.

For his first element, ideology, Mudde adapts Michael Freeden's (1996) concept of a "thin ideology." Instead of providing specific views on political, institutional, or socioeconomic issues, thin ideologies have "a restricted core attached to a narrow range of political concepts" (Freeden 1998, 750). "Thick" ideologies, like Marxism or capitalism, provide an intensive understanding on how, exactly, a government and society should be run. Populism and other thin ideologies like socialism, merely describe the problems of a society and "offer general advice for the best way to conduct its policies" (Mudde 2017, 4). By classifying populism in this way, Mudde is following the framework of Giovanni Sartori's Ladder of Abstractions (1970). Essentially, Mudde is stripping populist movements down to their cores, which he provides in his definition. By not getting too specific, but offering criteria, Mudde is able to conceptualize a non-populism.

There are two clear opposites of Mudde's populism: elitism and pluralism. Elitism is a mirror of populism, by maintaining that the moral elites should oversee the amoral people. Pluralism is populism's direct opposite as it "rejects the homogeneity of both populism and elitism, seeing society as a heterogeneous collection of groups and individuals with often fundamentally different views and wishes" (Mudde 2004, 544). For Sartori's Ladder, this creation of a contradiction is sufficient for populism to be considered a full theory that can be studied further. In this vein, Teun Pauwels (2014, 2017) argues that populism should be categorized "according to the type of ideology to which it is adjacent (neo-liberal, social, or national)" (Taggart 2017, 3). The understanding of populism as a thin-centered ideology settles Canovan's problem with classifying populist movements. Now, instead of agrarian and political populism established as similar but ultimately distinguished varieties of populism, they can fall under the same, expanded umbrella of populism.

Mudde's second core element in his definition of populism is "the people." The fundamental populist belief regarding the people is that they are authentic (Mudde 2004). This authenticity is understood in moral terms; their goals, political or otherwise, are consistently aimed at doing "the right thing" (Mudde 2017, 4). Mudde acknowledges that the construction of the people depends on who is framing the populist vision but insists that it does not make "the people" any less important. He cites Benedict Anderson's 1983 book, *Imagined Communities*, to explain his reasoning, "history has taught us that the fact that core concepts of main ideologies are based on 'imagined communities' has not made them less relevant in actual politics and societies" (Mudde 2017, 6). Even if the idea of "the people," continuously cited in populism, is a construction, should the followers of the populist leader, party, or regime believe in it, it becomes a relevant and key concept in the ideology. Christian Godin clarifies who "the people" are, as constructed by populists, "le peuple du populisme n'a ni un sens ethnique, ni un sens politique, ni un sens social. Il ne se définit pas pour, mais contre : contre les élites et les étrangers" *the people of populism do not have an ethnic, political, nor social sense. They are not defined by for, but against: against the elites and foreigners* (Godin 2012, 23).

Godin's understanding of the people attached to populism lends itself well to the third core element of Mudde's populism ideology, the elites. In the purest form of populism, the elites are distinguished from the people based solely on their morality (Mudde 2017). The "pure" people are set against a "corrupt" elite. Godin puts the comparison simply, "pour les populistes, le monde se divise en deux camps: ceux qui mentent, ceux qui disent la vérité" *for populists, the world divides itself into two camps, those who lie, and those who tell the truth* (Godin 2012, 17). However, the understanding of elites is often combined with other ideologies. For example, for a

populism that has been combined with the ideology of nationalism, the elite may be those who defend more open immigration and institutions that subvert domestic control over a region.

The fourth and final element of Mudde's populism provides the solution to the problem of elites being in control of a country's institutions, the general will of the people. With the corrupt elites in charge, the political system is inherently opposed to the will of people. Essentially, populists want government policies to be dictated by the people's desire (Mudde 2004). However, Mudde explicitly states that "populists are reformist rather than revolutionary, they do not oppose political parties per se. Rather, they oppose the established parties" (Mudde 2004, 546). Put simply, the political parties that exist at the outset of a populist party's creation are corrupt, but, by listening to the general will of the people, the system in which they operate can be fixed instead of supplanted entirely.

In William Barr's (2009) essay on defining populism, the anti-political establishment nature of populism plays a much larger role in classifying a political phenomenon as populist. Barr provides three key factors that make populism an identifiable phenomenon: "the appeals designed to build support, the location of political actors with respect to the party system, and the linkages between citizens and politicians" (Barr 2009, 30).

Barr points out that a common tool for some political actors during a period of high public discontent is the appeal to an anti-establishment discourse, which he defines as "the rhetorical appeal used in opposition to those wielding power" (Barr 2009, 31). This interpretation allows the understanding of anti-establishment to push past the political sphere and include any institution that wields power. While populism can be interpreted as a meaningful threat to the status quo, Barr notes that anti-establishment appeals do not go as far as anti-politics in challenging an entire political system. Anti-political and anti-system actors, two categorizations

he offers as related forms of oppositional politics, fall under the categorization of disloyal opposition, meaning they do not follow normal democratic rules of engagement. On the other hand, Barr (2009) says that anti-establishment politics fall under Andreas Schedler's (1996) categorization of semi-loyal opposition. They vie for votes by attacking not just the incumbents, but "instead the entire entrenched power elite" (Barr 2009, 32), but they do not aim to replace democracy, even if they suggest improvements to it.

While the anti-establishment appeal is important to Barr's definition of populism, he maintains that he puts less weight on the concept than other scholars. His focus on anti-establishment appeal is the construction of a "view of society where 'the people' (commoners) are pitted against the power elite" that "invokes criteria for assessing the performance of a political system and, thus, advocates prescriptions for change" (Barr 2009, 32). Barr acknowledges that his first factor of populism can be used by any politician to distinguish themselves from their competition, prompting him to add his second key factor, the location of a political actor within the party system. For an actor to be considered populist, he must be an outsider. The term, in Barr's words, indicates someone "who gains political prominence not through or in association with an established, competitive party, but as a political independent or in association with new or newly competitive parties" (Barr 2009, 33). He clarifies that novelty is not the sole characteristic that creates an outsider, smallness and marginality "may serve as functional equivalents" (Barr 2009, 33). An outsider does not necessarily have to be irrelevant to be considered an outsider. An electorally uncompetitive party can have a certain degree of influence over the campaigns of establishment parties. Insider and outsider status, then, depends solely on their placement within the party structure. There exists a political figure, however, whose position in the system can complicate the clear-cut insider and outsider categories — what

Barr deems “a maverick,” or “a politician who rises to prominence within an established, competitive party but then either abandons his affiliation to compete as an independent or in association with an outsider party, or radically reshapes his own party” (Barr 2009, 34). A populist leader can be a maverick if they alter the status quo. If not, they are still considered insiders.

The final factor that makes a populist according to Barr is what he calls “linkages” or “the means by which political actors and constituents exchange support and influence” (Barr 2009, 34). For populism, which describes the relationship between government and the people, how the two interact is of vital importance. Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl (1980, 1988) identified four distinct forms of linkages: clientelistic, directive, participatory, and electoral. A party can use multiple forms of linkages at any time. Clientelism is the exchange of material benefits for support, “if you vote for me, I will do this for you.” Directive linkages “coerce constituents in order to control them” (Barr 2009, 35). Participatory linkages give citizens some sort of role in the government, like choosing party leaders from party support groups. The fourth linkage, and most important for populism, is electoral linkages. Less frequent than the other three, only occurring during elections, electoral linkages serve to hold elected officials accountable to the general public. Barr emphasizes that “accountability is the crucial point of distinction here: rather than offering citizens the chance to make their own decisions, this form of linkage allows citizens to judge whether the rulers are doing a good job for them” (Barr 2009, 35). Barr then adds his own linkage to the four, an extreme form of electoral power, plebiscitarianism. Essentially, instead of offering a vote on something during the drafting process, policymakers following this linkage offer the voters a simple choice, yes or no. In general, plebiscites serve “to provide passive political support for a leader, to confirm the popular legitimacy of his authority”

(Hayward 1996, 15-16; Barr 2009). Rather than democracy that truly takes the people's opinion into account, plebiscitarianism primarily focuses electoral power in a single leader claiming to represent 'the people.'

While appeals, location, and linkages are clearly distinct concepts, how they interact accounts for Barr's understanding of populism. As previously discussed, any political actor can make an anti-establishment appeal, but it stands to reason that only outsiders and mavericks can make reasonable, believable appeals of this kind. The critique that is inherently tied to anti-establishment politics is that "the political class has failed to tend the needs and interests of ordinary citizens and, as a result, changes are necessary" (Barr 2009, 37). Barr sees three solutions to this critique that are a part of the anti-establishment appeal: "a change of personnel; a change in personnel plus improved accountability and government effectiveness; or a change in personnel plus citizen participation" (Barr 2009, 37). Obviously, a change of personnel, or the replacement of the elites in charge, is a part of all three options as it is the absolute minimum solution to anti-establishment appeals. The option to improve accountability emphasizes the electoral or plebiscitary linkages and "holds representatives accountable for effectively looking after the needs and interests of 'the people'" (Barr 2009, 37), and is therefore the most populist choice. Instead of seeking guidance from citizens, this option assumes that the new leadership has the people's best interest in mind and will effectively implement it when in government. Barr concludes his discussion of how his factors relate with this definition of populism:

Populism reflects the specific combination of appeals, location and linkages that suggests a correction based on enhanced accountability rather than increased participation. More specifically, it is a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages. (38)

Populism as a Corrective

Barr's definition of populism touches on a complication in populist literature, namely whether or not populism is a threat to democracy. Due to the adversarial nature of populism, many scholars are willing to commit to the idea that populist movements represent a threat to liberal democracies. Others see populist leaders' ability to garner mass support as an indicator that liberal democracies and established parties had failed to entice significant chunks of their citizenry, so populism serves as a corrective to that problem. According to Panizza (2005), "populism is always the result of a crisis of representation in the existing political order" (Panizza 2005, 180). It only becomes a threat when the system handles it incorrectly.

The populist phenomenon that I am studying in France operates under the order of a constitutional democracy which is a two-strand institutional model with a democratic pillar and a liberal/constitutional pillar. The democratic pillar relates to participation and popular sovereignty. Populism can operate effectively within this pillar, as it advocates for the supreme authority to lie with the people (Abts and Rummens 2007). The liberal constitutional pillar accounts for the individual rights and the rule of law in a constitutional democracy. Checks and balances are a vital part of this pillar, and populism does not fit here because it advocates, essentially, for the tyranny of the majority, without any check for the minority (Abts and Rummens 2007). Populist resentment under the two-pillar understanding of democracy arises when the liberal/constitutional pillar becomes too powerful. Checks and balances are important, but if a majority of the people feel ignored, they will begin to push back against the system.

According to Cas Mudde and Cristobál Rovira Kaltwasser, there are four possible reactions to a rise in populist resentment. The first is a *cordon sanitaire*, blocking every part of a populist agenda. This reaction will likely increase resentment. The second reaction,

confrontation, involving attacks on populist entities and denying their legitimacy, will have a similar result as the *cordon sanitaire*. A third possible reaction is adaptation. Major parties can accept a certain degree of legitimacy in populist claims, understanding that the resentment must be coming from somewhere, and therefore should be addressed. Finally, socialization, complementary to adaptation, aims to pacify populist actors by accepting that liberal democracy should have “public contestation,” thereby not excluding populists from public discourse, but not necessarily giving them sway over any agendas (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012, 213).

These four strategies hint at the key to ensuring that populism is a corrective rather than a threat to democracy. The solution does not lie with individual leaders. Ultimately, “the path towards populism can be found in a country’s institutional system and, in particular, the way in which a country’s existing political institutions mediate the rise of populist leaders (or create a propensity to populism)” (Devinney and Hartwell 2017, 36). Kitschelt and McGann (1995) account for the rise of new, and sometimes populist, parties in established democracies by observing new social cleavages that build upon the traditional, industrial revolution left-right divide. They note that “radical right authoritarian parties tend to emerge when moderate parties converge toward the median voter” (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, vii). Parties, as political institutions, have tended to converge in the middle, leaving the extreme left and right open for new parties. For Rummens, the rise in populist parties filling those gaps constitutes a big threat to democracies as “populists do not share these core values [of liberal democracy] and they do not recognize other politicians as legitimate adversaries. For them the political struggle becomes once again an all or nothing affair in which their opponents appear as enemies who should, ideally, be cleared from the political stage” (Rummens 2017, 9). While it is fair to assume that populist parties are unlikely to be pluralistic and welcoming to collaboration with established

parties, it seems rash to dismiss them as a threat to democracy without considering what their electoral success might mean for a country's political dynamics.

If “populism is a symptom or reflection of growing dissatisfaction with democracy,” (Berman 2019, 657) then it should interest the political community of any country with growing support for populist parties. If citizens believe that their votes do not matter, or cannot inspire change in a system, then they will vote against the establishment. Berman (2019) uses the Great Depression as an example of how the response of a government can change the outcome of an extreme anti-establishment push back. The United States, while severely set back by the Depression, did better at responding to it politically than the Germans, who shortly fell to the Nazis. While it seems extreme to compare the recent rise in populist parties to Naziism, Berman justifies his parallel by suggesting that fascism was a more dramatic response to a more dramatic political problem.

The rise of new social cleavages, and the failure of establishment parties to adjust to the new voter dynamic, creates the space for anti-partyism, or anti-establishment politics, to rise (Viviani 2019). To rephrase Barr's distinction between the two, “whereas the notion of ‘anti-systemness’ refers to a principled opposition to the political system as a whole, ‘anti-establishment’ expresses an opposition to the governing political class in particular” (Bickerton and Accetti 2018, 135). The established parties not adjusting quickly enough gives credence to populist parties' anti-party messaging. However, the threat of populism's anti-pluralism taking over a liberal democracy does not stem exclusively from their influence over parties. Devinney and Hartwell (2017) detail how weak institutions can lead to a populist takeover:

The weaker the checks and balances on the execution of the power of the executive, the more likely that those pursuing a populist agenda will be able to capture all levers of government once in a position of power. The goal of such capture would allow leadership that might not generate broad support for its

populist policies to reduce the likelihood that the policies would be thwarted or negotiated by either other populists, mainstream politicians, or the administrative bureaucracy of the state... Similarly, control of state institutions allows for increasing the likelihood that the coalition of internal powers — political social and military — that lead to the leadership currently in place continue to be satisfied... a change of political institutions can engender the largest amount of uncertainty and, at the same point, effectively change the rules of the game going forward. (43)

Ultimately, populism can be both a corrective and a threat to democracy. It is inherently in tension with the system as “populists forces promote the re-politicization of certain topics that are not mentioned by the establishment (whether on purpose or not)” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 205). This re-politicization can seek to include groups that have been left behind in a modern democracy, but it can also be a negative force, with populist actors looking to break the rules of political competition and seize the levers of democracy to fit exclusively their vision of democracy.

Regional Examples

It can be difficult to grasp the core concepts of populism without concrete examples. Turning to movements that have been consistently labeled populist can help clarify these ideas. While some insist that populism has been a phenomenon since as early as the Roman Republic, with the people-favoring *Populares* pitted against the aristocrat-loving *Optimates* (Stockemer 2019), most academic work places the origin of modern populism in the late 19th century with the arrival of the United States People’s Party. (Stockemer 2019, Godin 2012, Canovan 1981).

America

The US People’s Party, founded in 1892, was an agrarian party at heart. Before reaching the national stage, the party found their voice and early platform amongst rural farmers across the nation around 1880. Three regional Farmers’ Alliances formed to combat the problems facing their community, eventually realizing that if they worked together, they would have more

political power, and thus joined under the banner of the People's Party (Canovan 1981). The new party increased their electoral appeal by claiming far and wide that the Republican and Democratic parties were too similar and too worried about "special interests" (Kaltwasser et al. 2017, 3; Stockemer 2019). They believed that farmers had been abandoned in the wake of industrialization, and that politicians in D.C. were too focused on pleasing railroad and industrial leaders. The same railroad companies had a monopoly over cross-country travel and were charging exorbitant prices to ship agricultural goods across state lines. Paired with a severe drought and falling land prices making mortgages unpayable, the People's Party found a receptive audience for their platform, when they claimed that "executive power and patronage have been used to corrupt our legislatures and defeat the will of the people, and plutocracy has thereby been enthroned upon the ruins of democracy" (Party Platform 1896).

The People's Party framed the farmers in the Midwest as "the patriotic people" and the public servants as corrupt and indebted to the wealthy. More specifically, they pitted the southern and western farmers against the "few millionaires" in Wall Street that controlled the markets on which they relied (Canovan 1981, 51). Despite their initial wave of support, including a joint nomination with the Democratic party for the Presidential ticket in 1892, the People's Party began dying off once the candidate, William Jennings Bryan, lost heavily to his Republican opponent. Subsequently, major Democrats adopted the Populists' most well-received policies rather than pursue electoral partnerships. The Republicans took care of whatever remaining support that was left by dramatically outspending the Populists in the next wave of elections (Canovan 1981).

As the People's Party was making inroads in the West, the next wave of US populism was being born, literally, in Louisiana. Huey Long, the future governor and senator of Louisiana

and a commonly cited populist figure, “got himself a name for redressing grievances and standing up to the corporations” (Canovan 1981, 152). He rose to infamy during the Great Depression, often claiming that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s policies were not radical enough to save “the common man,” and filibustered one of his policies for 15 hours and 30 minutes (Long 1935). As governor of Louisiana, he championed extensive public work projects, including a public highway system and the tallest capitol building in the nation. Instead of targeting farmers in the Midwest, Senator Long broadened his audience, praising the “common people,” a group consisting of “god-fearing” and “hard-working” Americans, while lambasting the wealthy, saying in his famous *Every Man a King* (1943) speech,

It is not the difficulty of the problem which we have; it is the fact that the rich people of this country — and by rich people I mean the super-rich — will not allow us to solve the problems, or rather the one little problem that is afflicting this country, because in order to cure all of our woes it is necessary to scale down the big fortunes, that we may scatter the wealth to be shared by all of the people. (Long 1943, 587)

While enjoying broad public support, Long was impeached in 1929 by the Louisiana State Legislature after claiming that any lawmaker who did not support his proposed 5% per barrel tax to fund his public works projects had been bought by the oil companies. He responded to his impeachment in a newspaper article, writing,

I had rather go down to a thousand impeachments than admit that I am the governor of the State that does not dare to call the Standard Oil Company to account so that we can educate our children and care for the destitute, sick and afflicted. If this State is still to be ruled by the power of the money of this corporation, I am too weak for its governor. (Long 1943, 152)

Even during an impeachment investigation, Long maintained a strong populist rhetoric.

In a campaign speech for the election of Senator Hattie Caraway in Alabama, Long took aim at the Democrats and Republicans, despite being himself a Democrat, saying, “they’ve got a set of Republican waiters on one side and a set of Democratic waiters on the other side, but no

matter which set of waiters brings you the dish, the legislative grub is all prepared in the same Wall Street kitchen” (Long 1932).

While claiming to be a champion for the people, Long received a lot of criticism for his open manipulation of the Louisiana state legislature, earning him the nickname “the Kingfish.” Upon his assumption of the Louisiana gubernatorial position, he fired any perceived “enemies” in the state bureaucracy. He filled every position available to him with allies and punished those who went against him swiftly and definitively (Canovan 1981). As governor, Long was essentially untouchable, escaping his impeachment by appealing to the people and threatening his allies in the State Senate, forcing them to commit their unwavering support and ensure that he was not convicted. Long was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1930, but only served 3 years before he was assassinated, cutting his populist run short.

After World War II, populism in the United States became more frequently associated with the right. In 1968, Alabama Governor George Wallace ran for the presidency on a third-party ticket, after leaving the Democrats, attacking “pointy-headed bureaucrats” and protesting school integration and civil rights protests, infamously demanding “segregation today, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever” (Lowndes 2017, 2; Wallace 1963, 2). Then-Republican-candidate Richard Nixon, seeing Wallace’s populist rhetoric gain momentum, adopted language like “Silent Majority, Forgotten Americans, and Middle America” in his own campaign speeches (Lowndes 2017, 3). Populism waned on the right with the arrival of George Bush and his goal of incorporating the elite into the Republican Party’s base (Lowndes 2017), but in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008 and the arrival of the Tea Party’s anti-government doctrine and the left-leaning Occupy Wall Street movement, populism was back in full force.

Recently, populism in America has been associated with political figures like former-President Donald Trump and Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders (Pfau 2021; Gusterson 2017). Trump centered his 2016 campaign on blue collar Americans, pitting them against illegal immigrants, whom he infamously dubbed “rapists” in his Presidential bid kick-off speech, while promising to “drain the Washington swamp” (Smith 2018). Sanders, for his part, centered his populist rhetoric around the people, the working class, and against the elite, the billionaires in America. While there was overlap between Trump and Sanders voters in 2016 — 12% of Sanders voters in the Democratic primary voted for Trump in the presidential election — it is hard to imagine two people farther apart on the political spectrum (Kurtzleben 2017).

Russia

Another commonly cited example of early populism began at a similar moment as the US People’s Party, although in extremely different circumstances. In Russia, oddly, the populist movement, or the *narodniki*, stemmed not from a response to explicit unhappiness amongst the public but, instead, “grew directly out of the favorite institutions of the radical intelligentsia: the student circle and the thick journal” (Billington 1958, 58). The oppressive Tsarist regime had banned any and all political newspapers and parties, preventing any political movements from truly thriving. In the late 19th century, however, Tsar Peter I, “who understood the grandiose importance of public education for Russia” (Matveenko et al. 2018, 1) was attempting to improve the Russian education system. His reforms, albeit fairly conservative, opened the universities to political and revolutionary thinkers in Russia (Matveenko et al. 2018). In 1870, the student intelligentsia were meeting in “circles,” or small groups of like-minded individuals who rejected Marxism and worried over European influence in Russia (Billington 1958). These concerns created a need for a new set of ideals for which to strive, inspiring the Russian populist

movement. The movement grew quickly as the “first of the all-pervasive myths of the period, the idea of the *narod* (the people)” was beginning to take hold (Billington 1958, 86). While today most Russian words including *naro* are associated with this particular group that was active in the 1870s, the term came from Slavophiles (Canovan 1981). An intellectual movement from earlier in the same century, they wanted the future of the country to be based on the country’s early history and believed that “Russia’s distinctive path of historical development, outside the classical legacy of the West, was a blessing” (Poole 2020, 135). The term *narod* in the Slavophile movement came to mean “the authentic representative of national identity” (Hughes 2013, 89).

Slavophilism had lost its relevance after the Crimean war, but “the concept of *narodnoski* commended itself to two new groups of Russian social thinkers” (Billington 1958, 87). On the right side of the political spectrum, thinkers took *narodnost* to mean “nation” and used it to promote their belief in the supremacy of Russia. On the left, *narodnost* came to mean the spirit of the people, and ultimately the “mystical faith in the superior wisdom and sanctity of the people” (Billington 1958, 86). The intelligentsia of the 1870s capitalized on this understanding of the *narod*, and applied it to the peasantry, which “at the turn of the century, still made up more than 80% of the population of an empire which covered 16% of the earth’s land surface” (Eklof 2017, 6). Ultimately, for the populists:

The villagers embodied quintessential Russia on account of their number and, especially, their authenticity. Since the people had not been contaminated with the false values that had come from the West and perverted the cities, as well as the entire Tsarist state, they would provide the recipe for the true social salvation of the country from The Mirage of Europeanisation and the hypocritical liberalism of the power holders. (Hermet 2013, 87)

Scholars of populism have struggled with classifying this movement as populist because it began with the intelligentsia and not the people: nevertheless, it clearly had the populist Manichean divide of the *narod*, or the people, against the morally corrupt elite.

Despite populist concern over the future of Russia, political parties were still banned by the Tsar, thus the movement used other strategies to push their agenda. The first program, and perhaps the most ill-advised, was known as the *khozheni v narod* or the “movement to the people” (Billington 1958, 78). Within the walls of their universities, no matter how much the intelligentsia discussed and idealized the purity of the Russian peasantry, they were physically and spiritually separated from them. They decided the solution to this problem would be to go out and join the peasantry themselves. So, groups of university students traveled out of the corrupted cities to join the farming populace. Quickly, the divide between the two groups became obvious. The students, unused to hard physical labor, hindered rather than helped the farmers they went to serve. The peasantry, concerned with feeding themselves and their families, did not take to the moralistic philosophy that the students were trying to promote (Hermet 2013).

After this failed experiment, the intelligentsia turned to a more comfortable realm, and ultimately “the populist movement coalesced into an organized revolutionary movement (Land and Liberty) seeking to create a broad basis of support among the population and using the press and the court system to publicize its goals” (Eklof 2017, 39). The Tsar was not happy with the public push for reform, and so several of the populist’s prominent leaders were arrested or exiled from the cities. The rapid repression of any anti-Tsarist sentiment caused the Russians to turn to more drastic measures — a terror campaign. The *Narodnaya Volya* were the armed branch of the populist movement and their “political aims were the overthrow of the Tsarist government and the establishment of a popularly elected constitutional government” (Billington 1958, 108).

Interestingly, despite beginning under an authoritarian regime and rejecting Western values as amoral, Russian populists made similar calls for democracy as their American counterparts.

Persecution by the Russian ruling class caused the *narodniki* to slowly fade out of relevance in the larger political arena, but their influence did not disappear entirely. Lenin, the infamous leader of the Bolshevik's and founder of Soviet Russia, held the political radicals of his youth in high regard. Author Neil Faulkner, in his book *A People's History of the Russian Revolution* (2017), wrote that "the young radicals of *Narodnya Volya* were the heroes of Lenin's youth" (Faulkner 2017, 53). Lenin, however, was inspired not by their politics, preferring Marx's values to populist ones, but by their terrorist actions against the state.

More recently, the question of Russian Populism has been tied to Russia's president since 2000, Vladimir Putin. His rhetoric, pitting Russians against the "evil" United States seems entirely populist. Yet, while in power he has restricted the democratic capacity of the Russian people and, after throwing a number of disloyal oligarchs into jail, rather than cleaning up corruption, promptly replaced them with people more devoted to him, a decidedly un-populist act (Medvedev 2004, 1). As a result, some scholars have clarified that "Vladimir Putin conforms most closely to discursive descriptions of populism" (Burrett 2020, 197), meaning that he used populist rhetoric when talking to the Russian people, but is not populist in the ideological sense. To use Barr's terminology, Putin was a political maverick in his early years, but as he rose to power and did not change the status quo of the elites, he is not a true populist. Additionally, Putin's public rhetoric in recent years has transitioned to be more nationalist rather than populist (Burrett 2020). Putin's chokehold on Russian politics means that he has effectively put an end to any competing rhetoric, thus populism remains a feature of 19th and 20th century Russia but has struggled to take hold in this era.

Latin America

Though the term populism might have emerged in the late 19th century following the American and Russian movements, it would be impossible to discuss the concept without examining Latin America, where there has been a higher concentration of populist leaders than anywhere else. Carlos de la Torre (2017) provides a good summary of the phenomenon in Latin America, identifying three distinct waves of populism in the region: classical, neoliberal, and radical populism.

De la Torre, using his understanding of populism as a discursive, ideological strategy, identifies the 1930s and 40s as the arrival period of populism in the region. His first wave, classical populism, was a result of a crisis in societies with an oligarchical social order that attempted to combine “liberal inspired constitutions (division of powers, and elections) with patrimonial practices and values in predominantly rural societies” (de la Torre 2017, 2). The organization of the civic community meant that the elites retained political power and excluded the citizens who had no one to defend them. The onset of urbanization and rapid industrialization and the general dislike of paternal authority in these countries provided the space for populist leaders to gain support (de la Torre 2017, 2). In general, classical populists maintained highly clientelistic relationships with their voting bloc, and thus received significant support from workers and repressed labor groups. Typically positioning themselves against “foreign-oriented elites,” the leaders fought against electoral fraud and looked to expand the franchise (de la Torre 2017, 2).

One of the most well-known populists, Argentina’s Juan Domingo Peron, emphasized the distinction of the people from the elite in a 1955 speech,

Comrades, I want to remind all of you and all the Argentine people that the dilemma is quite clear: either we fight and conquer to consolidate the conquests

already achieved, or the oligarchy will overthrow them. They look for any pretext, judicial liberty, religious freedom, or any other cause they can carry as a shield to reach the objectives they pursue. (Peron 1955, 2)

Peron threatens the return of the oligarchy, maintaining that he is the only shield for the people and their expanded rights under his regime.

In more industrialized countries, populist leaders focused on nationalist and redistributive social policies (de la Torre 2017). While classical populists used mass rallies, rather than increasing popular participation, to demonstrate their dedication to the people, they did massively expand the franchise in their respective countries (de la Torre 2017). Past that, however, their fervent support of democracy appears to be mostly empty promises to their citizens, as they focused more on solidifying the executive power bloc than providing support to their people.

By the 1990s, most Latin American citizens had the right to vote and were relatively organized into political parties, weakening the strengths of the classical populists' messaging and leaving space for the arrival of the neoliberal populists. Interestingly, this new wave of populists blamed the rise of economic strife in the region on "traditional politicians," or the classical populists. The elites, instead of the foreign-oriented construction of the classical populists, became the white leaders who were enemies to the non-white citizenry (de la Torre 2017). Neo-populism, an excellent example of how the construction of the people and elites can change, also highlights that populism is not tied to a certain side of the political spectrum; where classical populists expanded social programs and government spending, neoliberal populists reduced the size of the state dramatically while opening their economies to foreign investment.

Just as De la Torre's second wave of populism responds to problems generated by the first, so does the third wave, radical populism, respond to the problems generated by the second.

It returns the populist phenomenon back to the left of the political spectrum. Responding to the broad unpopularity of neoliberalist populism that had resulted in a large hike in gas prices, the privatization of water, increased taxation, and included brutal crackdowns of popular protests, leaders of radical populism framed the established political parties as tools of the elites, both local and foreign. According to the new populists, these elites had “surrendered national sovereignty to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US government” (de la Torre 2017, 7). They promised to return the power to the people, and through input from social movements and the common citizen would draft a new constitution to “‘refound’ the nation” (de la Torre 2017, 7).

While the populist waves of Latin America have varied slightly in their construction of the people and the elites who endangered them, it helps to look at the similarities to grasp how populism can manifest in *real life*. David Doyle writes (2011),

Despite their apparent ideological differences, all of these [Latin American] politicians and political movements display many of the central traits of populism — such as highly personalized political movements focused around relative political outsiders espousing a stridently anti-elitist discourse. (1448)

Ultimately, while populist scholars may disagree on how to classify Latin American populists, they share enough similarities to improve our understanding of populism more generally. Under each of de la Torre’s waves, populist leaders consistently positioned the good, moral people against the corrupt, ruinous elite and they did so after the previous regime or political movement found themselves unable to respond to the problems that faced the people.

Chapter 3: Populism in France

With a better understanding of populism, we can return to the discussion of France. New social cleavages in a rapidly modernizing Europe in the late-60s laid the groundwork for a rich populist history in France (Surel 2002; Kitschett and McGann 1995). While the typical left-right axis of political parties was covered by strong establishment parties, like the Parti Socialiste Français and the Parti Communiste Français on the left and the Gaullist parties on the right, the new social cleavage of libertarian-authoritarian left room for populist parties on both sides of the political spectrum.

Right-wing populist parties in France began with the Poujadism movement in the mid 50's. This anti-tax party focused on the threat of economic modernization and rapid industrialization, targeting small town business owners and farmers. By the 90s, the right-wing populist parties became increasingly concerned with European integration (Ivaldi 2019). Sovereignist, Eurosceptic groups like Phillipe de Villers' *Mouvement Pour la France* and *Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions* began to capitalize on nativist and culturally exclusionist ideals. They stressed that European ideals, pushed by EU integration, were hurting France's culture and people (Ivaldi 2019).

Left-wing populist parties in France are more socially inclusive than their counterparts (Ivaldi 2019). Their construction of the "elite" focuses more on the economic elite in the country (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013; Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2016; Ivaldi 2019). Historically, left-wing populism has been embodied by the *Parti Communiste Français* (PCF). Active since WWII, the communists have extolled a Manichean divide between the ruling caste and the hardworking people of France (Ivaldi 2019, Birnbaume 2012). Their dominance of the populist left waned in the 80s, however, with the arrival of challenger parties like the *Confédération*

Paysanne and Bernard Tapie's 1994 populist campaign for the European elections in which he won 12% of the vote (Ivaldi 2019). Jacques Chirac, a major player of the French left establishment, adopted some populist ideas in his presidential campaign in 1995, but quickly returned to business as usual once elected (Surel 2002).

Populism in France today is exemplified by two outsider parties, Marine Le Pen's *Rassemblement National* (RN), formerly the *Front National*, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon's *La France Insoumise* (LFI). The RN is a typical example of radical right-wing populism (Mudde 2011, Ivaldi 2019). Begun in 1972, they brought together a group of small nationalist organizations and became the predominant populist right-wing party in France. A people-centered party, they claim to protect the *majorité silencieuse* from the French elite, which to them includes everyone from the news media, journalists, intellectuals, political elites (including the so called "UMPS caste"), and the financial powers of the state (144 Engagements Présidentiels, *Rassemblement National*, 2017). The UMPS caste is a conglomeration of the acronyms for the two major parties in France, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), formed in 2002 as a merger of several center-right parties, and the Socialist Party (PS), which has historically been the largest party on the French left. The RN frame them as the ultimate enemies of the French people. More broadly, the RN embodies the nativist and authoritarian focus typical of right-wing populist parties (Ivaldi 2019). For example, Marine le Pen stated in the official platform that she wanted a tax on foreign workers' salaries to "assurer effectivement la priorité nationale à l'emploi des Français" *assure, effectively, national priority in employment to the French people* (RN).

As for the left, LFI has emerged as the preeminent left-wing populist party for the French. They emerged in 2016 after a split in the *Partie de Gauche* (PG) coalition (Ivaldi 2019).

The coalition had been based on anti-globalization social movements during the Lisbon negotiations, which strengthened integration and expanded the EU (Ivaldi 2019). By the 2017 elections, however, Jean-Luc Mélenchon had left the group and created his own party, LFI, to vie for the presidency. His party operates primarily along socio-economic divisions, promising economic redistribution, increased public spending, and state intervention to the people of France (Ivaldi 2019).

For both RN and LFI, the EU has come to embody the neoliberal elite that they lambast in their public speeches. For the RN, the EU is an elite-driven institution that threatens France's national sovereignty over their laws, borders, and currency (Ivaldi 2019). The LFI views the EU economy as too market liberal and overly focused on austerity politics.

Evidently, populism in France has been a consistent fact on both sides of the political spectrum (Ivaldi 2019, Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, Surel 2002). The left has been focused on the "losers of globalization," focusing their policies and rhetoric on the economy, taxes, and French workers (Ivaldi 2019). The right centers their goals around identity politics, underscoring the importance of French ideals on the political and global stage.

Gaullism

In France, in addition to the concept of populism being muddled by both sides of the political spectrum having parties designated as populist, another political ideology represented in the 5th Republic's constitution, the aptly named Gaullism, also complicates the concept in the region. Gaullism is the political movement and/or doctrine of the most famous French president in history, General Charles de Gaulle. It has three waves that essentially track de Gaulle's influence in French politics and impacts our discussion of French populism.

The supporters of the first phase of Gaullism, spanning the 1940s, include the French who rejected the armistice with Nazi Germany during World War 2, and the Vichy government led by Philippe Pétain. Gaullism in this period refers to General de Gaulle's campaign to realign France with the Allied Forces. This first wave of Gaullism helps explain the future political gravitas of the General. His bravery, strategic expertise, and direct line of communication with the French people during World War II helped solidify his political standing and instilled a deep sense of trust in his policy-making decisions in subsequent years. This trust became instrumental to the second and third waves of Gaullism, which are the forms of the ideology that often get confused with populism.

In the second phase, occurring in 1950s France, De Gaulle was a vocal critic of the party system of the Fourth Republic. Since its beginning, following the collapse of the Vichy Government, it had been marred by "government instabilities and inefficiencies" (Surel 2002, 140). The parliament had been consistently stuck in political stalemates, caused, in part, by the ease in which small parties could be elected to the body and control legislation. De Gaulle, observing this political deadlock, lambasted the party system, saying "Le régime des partis, c'est la pagaille" *the regime of parties is a mess* (Le Monde 1965). He believed that "it was the task of statesmanship to articulate and kindle [shared noble purposes] by reaching for the summits, for the dazzling, stellar light of national unity and ambition that he called grandeur" (Mahoney 1996, pr. 1). Looking to realize that goal and mitigate the power of political parties and the parliament, De Gaulle, tasked with writing the new 5th Republic's constitution, created a semi-presidential system. Should the parliament reach a stalemate, the president of France could now dismiss the entire National Assembly and call for new elections (Conseil Constitutionnel).

De Gaulle's staunch disapproval of political parties, and the Fourth Republic more generally, lead some scholars to associate the second wave of Gaullism, his constitution and political beliefs, with populism. Especially since the second and third articles of de Gaulle's constitution state that the government would be “du peuple, par le peuple et pour le peuple” *of the people, by the people, and for the people* (Article 2) and that “La souveraineté nationale appartient au peuple qui l'exerce par ses représentants et par la voie du référendum” *National sovereignty belongs to the people who will exercise it through their representatives and by the avenue of referendum* (Article 3). Populist values are therefore enshrined in the country's constitution (Surel 2002, Hartley 1971). However, consistent with William Barr's understanding of populism, de Gaulle's ideology during this period is anti-system rather than anti-establishment. While both Populism and Gaullism can be considered correctives — populism addressing a subset of the voting bloc left behind by the political parties and Gaullism addressing constant governmental deadlocks — populism operates within the existing system, and the second wave of Gaullism was a restructuring of the system entirely. Put more simply,

Populism... rests on two related dynamics. Classically, populism is a constant recall of the determining nature of the people in the logic of politics — that is, that the sovereign people are the sole bearer of legitimacy in a political community based on democratic principles that the populous organizations claim to represent. Secondly — *and this is what distinguishes populous from anti-system parties* — the stress on the people is accompanied by a critique of the implementation of popular political supremacy by the elites, who were accused of having betrayed the ideals and modes of legitimation and organization of the political community. (Surel 2002, 151-152) *Emphasis added.*

Put differently, in populism, the blame for political problems lies squarely on the shoulders of political elites. The system itself works; the political elites are ruining it. Gaullism, on the other hand, faults the system for the problems facing France's political community.

That is not to say that de Gaulle does not have some populist tendencies. Notably, when campaigning for constitutionalized reform (and beginning his party, *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*) in June 1946 — “de Gaulle presented himself as the true friend of democracy, one who understands the ways in which weak state can alienate citizens from the government, engender anarchy and moral confusion — and strengthen the temptation of dictatorship” (Mahoney 1996, 9). While this seems like a construction of a morally remiss elite, the parties of the 4th republic, it was “France’s propensity towards profound partisan and ideological strife, the waste of political and intellectual talents in “political confusion” and “national disunity” which particularly pained de Gaulle” (Mahoney 1996, 19). De Gaulle did not inherently hate the political parties involved in the 4th Republic’s parliament, just that the organization of the government wasted the potential of strong political minds. Additionally, according to the *Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World*, “populist movements claim to represent the people as a whole: sometimes the entire nation, sometimes the majority of the people. They often begin this movement with protest against parties which they see as entrenched defenders of the existing social order” (Krieger et al., 678). De Gaulle on the other hand, “knew that in this century, ‘no man can be the people’s substitute’” (Mahoney 1996, 22).

De Gaulle’s flirtation with populism continued throughout his tenure as the preeminent French politician. He was a large proponent of direct electoral influence of the French populace, believed in a strong electorate, did not like the parties under the 4th republic, was fairly protectionist in his foreign affairs policy, and in 1968 following violent protests by French students, called on support from the “silent majority” (Hartley 1971, 285; Mahoney 1996, Dreyfus 1982; Krieger et al. 2001). He lacked, however, the moral dichotomy, the Manichean divide, between the people and the elite. His political movement was more focused on bringing

France into the 20th century and rebuilding after World War 2. He did not use a call to the people's power to garner support for the reconstruction of a new France, instead he touted the long history of France, and demanded that it be restored to its former glory. He often worked with elites in the country, relying on his ministers to do the economic work, and he created a system of negotiation between companies to revitalize the French economy. In fact, "it has often been remarked that de Gaulle's opinion of the French was as poor as his opinion of France was high" (Hartley 1971: 17).

In short, de Gaulle was nationalist more than populist. He believed in the supremacy of France but did not connect any problems with a certain construction of an elite. Certainly, he had populist traits, he did refer to the "French" as a united people, but he did not pit them against any specific group. He was wary of America, and decried an "American hegemony," (Hartley 1971, Mahoney 1996) but did not try and position the French people against them or say that he was the only Frenchman that could stop them, more that the French should be wary of their international politics and policies.

Making matters more complicated, however, is the 3rd wave of Gaullism, which occurred after the death of the General in 1970. In France, de Gaulle is seen as:

the most important French political leader since Napoleon... due to his extraordinary dramatic sense — demonstrated in his press conferences, TV speeches, journeys at home and abroad, and many public ceremonies — his mastery of the French language, and his success in establishing a regime that was strong without being dictatorial — a novelty in French history — earned him the admiration even of many of his opponents. (Krieger et al. 2001: 306)

The 3rd wave of Gaullism is the attempted appropriation of de Gaulle's popularity by modern-day parties and politicians. For example, Emmanuel Macron, the current president of the country, consistently calls on de Gaulle's memory to inspire unity, most recently using him to try and amass support for a second, wildly unpopular, Covid lockdown (Flandrin 2021). More

broadly, according to an article from France TV Info: “Être l'héritier du général de Gaulle : tous les présidents... en ont rêvé” *to be the next General de Gaulle: all the presidents have that dream* (FranceInfo 2020). Marine le Pen, looking to distance herself from her father’s more radical, anti-Semitic statements, chose to rename the party he founded that she now leads from *Front National* to *Rassemblement National*, a clear nod to de Gaulle’s first party, *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*. In an interview with *Le Monde Moderne*, Jean Luc Mélenchon, founder and leader of the party *La France Insoumise*, responding to the question, “de Gaulle peut-il être vu comme un insoumis ?” responded with, “on peut dire que le De Gaulle de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale s’est comporté comme un insoumis. Il nous fournit même un exemple vertigineux” *one can say that the de Gaulle of the Second World War carried himself like a member of my party. He provided us with an amazing example* (Mélenchon 2020).

De Gaulle’s status as a French national hero, and his staunch nationalism and belief in France’s superiority, means that most of the top politicians in the country often try to emulate him. Because of his political principle of Gaullism, this can obscure the understanding of their populism. While both Gaullism and populism cite an understanding of the French people as a unified group, Gaullism lacks the moral dichotomy that populism imposes on French society. De Gaulle and his principles might suggest unhappiness and/or frustration with the stagnation caused by the political parties, but de Gaulle recognized the importance of political elites overseeing the country, for example “his repeated flouting of established authority had as much to do with his profound appreciation of the decadent character of the French military and political elite and state as it did with his supreme pride and recognition of himself as a ‘man of character’” (Mahoney 1996, 4-5). Conversely, populists place the blame of political and societal problems squarely on the shoulders of their constructed notion of elites and Gaullism blames the

system. Put succinctly, in the words of Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the same interview where he said the de Gaulle of World War 2 would have been an *insoumis*, “Il est le père de cette monarchie républicaine” *he is the father of this republican monarchy* (Mélenchon 2020). Therefore, de Gaulle and Gaullism cannot be connected to populism because the status quo that modern-day French populists are challenging was created by Gaullist principles.

Rise in Populism

Now that we understand the distinction between Gaullism and populism, we can study populism in France’s politicians more accurately. The purported rise in populism in France follows the trend in Europe. In *Le Monde*, one of the most widely read French language news publications, there has been marked increase in the use of the word (Mazot-Oudin 2017). The phenomenon is not exclusive to the French language, however, and the Web of Science database shows that the number of publications containing *populis** in the title, abstract, or keyword has had a sharp rise in the 3 years (Brown and Mondon 2020). Italy, Ukraine, Spain, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Austria, and the Netherlands all have parties that receive the title populist that sprung up in the last twenty or so years. While scholars have not reached consensus over the cause of populism, some consistent reference points have cropped up in recent European populism scholarship.

Multiple scholars point to the 2008 global financial crisis as a turning point in liberal democracies (Ivaldi 2019, Berman 2019, Héro 2018, Mudde 2017). There had been economic insecurity and inequality in democracies across Europe, and the Great Recession confirmed many voters’ fears that their governments were not looking out for their best interests. Alexis Héro (2018) adds that the rise in populism, caused by the economic crisis, was aggravated by “forte immigration et l’accroissement du nombre de réfugiés” *intense immigration and the increase of the number of refugees* (Héro 2018, 46). Additionally, an increase in terror attacks,

notably the November 2015 Paris Attacks and the December 2016 Berlin Attack, strengthen nativist-populist claims of domestic insecurity (Berman 2019).

Berman (2019) remarks that “populism is a symptom or reflection of growing dissatisfaction with democracy,” and suggests that if citizens believe their votes do not matter, or cannot affect change, then they will vote against the establishment (Berman 2019, 657). The sense of political impotence in Europe is exacerbated by the European Union’s perceived mismanagement of the crises facing the region. Their bungling of the problems facing the continent, paired with economic integration rapidly outpacing political integration and the European Monetary Union restricting the level of financial support that governments could provide their citizens during the crash, created the sense that national governments had lost control over their countries’ economic fates (Berman 2019). With traditional center-left parties adopting policies more receptive to open markets, converging with center-right parties, populists had a rich voting bloc they could capitalize on in the region.

In France, even as Marine le Pen’s electoral success shocked most media outlets around the globe, the major parties’ failures could have been predicted. In the university *SciencesPo*’s annual “Baromètre de la confiance politique” *barometer of political confidence*, a survey sent out each year to French voters, political parties ranked the lowest in “trust afforded to political institutions” in the country, at only 12%, compared to the hospital system which ranked at 81% (SciencesPo 2019). More specifically,

Looking across both Sarkozy and Hollande’s presidencies, an average 60% of voters said they “trust neither the left nor the right to govern the country,” while an overwhelming 85% would agree that “politicians do not really care about what people think.” Voters showed high levels of pessimism about the future for both themselves and the country. Dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in France remained exceptionally high at about 60% on average throughout both Sarkozy and Hollande’s presidencies, culminating at 70% on the eve of the 2017 elections. (Ivaldi 2019, 11).

Clearly, French voters were unhappy with how the major parties were handling governance while in control. However, the problems France faces today are not necessarily new problems. And even as populism is being used more frequently to describe the political response to these problems in publications, there seems to be a discrepancy in understanding the ideology it describes. For example, the news site *Europe 1* published an article entitled “Le populisme chic d’Emmanuel Macron,” but it is difficult to find an academic source that would classify Macron as populist (Andre 2016). The question for this project becomes, is there an actual marked rise of Populism in France (therefore a potential threat to its democracy), or is it just a new buzzword that garners more advertising revenue for news media?

Chapter 4: Literature Review of Empirical Studies of Populism

To answer this question, I needed to create a way to empirically measure populism over time. There has been a severe lack of empirical studies of populism conducted in the French language. During my research, I found a single French study that conducted an empirical analysis of populism. While helpful, the lack of empirical studies, both in French and English, demonstrates a rather large hole in the academic work in the study of populism, which tends to be much more theoretical.

In one study, Pippa Norris chose to measure populism by conducting a series of expert surveys. She used a list of populist leaders in 33 countries compiled by Kyle and Gultchin (2018). The list identified populist leaders through “searches in the academic literature,” meaning that a leader could be added to the list of populists if they were called populist in at least one academic piece. Norris sent this list to more academics and asked them to fill out a survey that would lead to a yes or no answer to whether the leader was populist. While this form of measurement might be helpful in “weeding out” the excessive use of “populist” as an adjective for leaders who might just be charismatic, I chose to not use this method for France politicians because by basing it on expert opinion, Norris introduces a sort of bias. Also, Norris found that the response rate colored responses. She had a lot of experts weigh in on politicians from Latin America, where populism is more clearly in play, but for the more nuanced forms of populism, she received fewer responses.

For my thesis, I prefer a computer-based analysis, as it can reduce bias. For the one study I found in French, Chloé Thomas used a program to analyze the rise of Euroscepticism and populism in political parties, adapting studies done by Jagers and Walgrave as well as Rooduijn and Pauwels. Jagers and Walgrave used content analysis of news media specific to Belgium to

identify types of populism. They created indices to calculate the importance of three factors they saw as representative of populism, the people index, the anti-elite index, and the exclusivity index. For the people and elite indices, they created a word bank for a computer to scan for in speeches. Then they calculated the proportion and intensity of these words. The proportion was the number of characters the word had in a speech in its entirety, and the intensity was how often it was used in a citation. For the exclusivity index, they calculated sections that mentioned societal groups as positive, negative, or neutral (0). Then they added all three together. If a party's result was negative, meaning that they frequently spoke about groups in an exclusionary manner, that was, to them, a mark of populism.

Rooduijn and Pauwels compared classical analysis with computer-based analysis. For the classical analysis (when a person is responsible for the analysis), they had a reader look for people-centrism and anti-elitism. They also created a codebook that included an extensive list of words that could refer to the people or elites. They had readers look for every reference in a speech and then interpret the context and decide on whether the speech/politician was populist. They also ran computer-based analysis. They created a dictionary of words they found relevant to populism and had a program count the proportion of words that were in the dictionary.

For the French study, Chloé Thomas (2017) used two out of three forms of measurement developed by Jagers and Walgrave, the people index and the anti-elite index, and developed her own, a claims-for-democracy index. Thomas created a bank of words that politicians and parties used to discuss the people, the elite, and a claim for democracy. Using those word banks, she ran speeches and campaign media through the application *Logiciel TXM*, which gave the frequency of the words, similar to Rooduijn and Pauwels. To calculate the importance of the indices, instead of using just words, like Jagers and Walgrave, Thomas calculated the proportion of lines

that contained the words to the rest of the speech. In her words, “un mot n’a, en effet, de sens que dans un réseau de mots” *effectively, a word only has sense in a the context of other words* and “nous pensons être mieux à même de rendre compte de la présence d’une rhétorique populiste, qui ne se limite pas à des termes mais à des phrases complètes” *we thought it would be more accurate to measure the presence of a populist rhetoric which does not limit itself at terms but in complete sentences* (18-19). She further analyzed the uses of the words by conducting a forward and backward reading each time a word came up, allowing her to place the words in context. For the French language this is very helpful because words like “nous” or “eux” need more context than the English equivalent of “us” and “them” might. Thomas’s study, while helpful, focuses on analyzing the increase in Euroscepticism in populist parties, choosing to analyze only a handful of French politicians over a very short period. I have adapted her technique so that it can be used to study populism more generally and expanded the scope of analysis over a much larger stretch of time. That way I can study if populism is rising in France.

Throughout all the different definitions of the concept and the numerous examples found throughout history, a consistent pattern arises. The populism that I will look for in the French presidential candidates’ books adapts the understandings articulated by Cas Mudde (2004), William Barr (2009), and Jagers and Walgrave (2007). Populism is a thin ideology that separates society into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics and political actors should operate within the system of liberal democracy to best express the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people. It is expressed in political rhetoric and can be measured by three indices, the people index, the anti-elite index, and the call for democracy index.

Chapter 5: Hypotheses, Methods, and Results

Based on my understanding of populism and the marked rise of the use of the word populism as a descriptor in news media, I formulated five hypotheses that I will test using multiple methods.

Hypotheses
<i>Hypothesis 1.</i> Populism in France will increase over time.
<i>Hypothesis 2.</i> Populism will grow following the European debt crisis of 2009.
<i>Hypothesis 3.</i> Populism will grow following the Syrian refugee crisis of 2016.
<i>Hypothesis 4.</i> In the most recent elections, France's left populism will start adopting exclusionary, right-populist ideals.
<i>Hypothesis 5.</i> Marine le Pen and Jean Luc Mélenchon will be significantly more populist than Emmanuel Macron.

Hypothesis 1. We know that populist parties appear when the mainstream, established parties fail to meet the needs of the electorate. They can serve as a corrective to party blending, ensuring that the voices of the voters who feel ignored are heard. Considering the French public's dissatisfaction with the state of established parties as seen in the annual *barometer of political confidence*, I expect political actors to capitalize on this unhappiness, and as a result populism will be increase.

Hypothesis 2. The European debt crisis of 2009 and the subsequent global recession caused trust in the European Union to fall dramatically. According to the European Union's *Eurobarometer*, in 2008, at the onset of the financial troubles to follow, "46% (+20) of EU respondents believe that the situation of their national economy will be worse in the next twelve months, only 16% (-8) that it will be better and 33% (-11) the same" (Eurobarometer SP 2008).

In 2010, “confidence in the EU fell at the height of the crisis (42%)” (Eurobarometer 2010). For French populist parties, who often frame the European Union as the elite of their country and tend to appear where political parties fail to satisfy voter needs (Berman 2019), I would expect this failure and lack of confidence to cause a spike in populist rhetoric criticizing the EU.

Hypothesis 3. Similarly to the 2009 financial crisis, the European Union’s management of the 2016 Syrian refugee crisis caused general unhappiness with the institution. A year after the crisis, “Immigration is the main challenge currently facing the EU (39%), followed by terrorism (38%). At the national level, the main concerns are still unemployment (25%) and immigration (22%)” (Eurobarometer Autumn 2017). I expect populist actors to capitalize on this unhappiness and adopt rhetoric that emphasizes the EU’s failures.

Hypothesis 4. In 2012, Marine le Pen outperformed Jean Luc Mélenchon in the first round of the presidential elections by 6 percentage points, winning 17.9% of the first-round votes. Le Pen had outperformed her father’s best election result in 2002, shocking the French news media. Her platform was focused mainly on criticizing the euro, with her stating, “L'euro n'a tenu aucune de ses promesses” *The Euro has kept none of its promises* (Baralon 2017). It follows that the other oft-cited populist candidate, Mélenchon, would adopt some of the language that propelled le Pen forward in the previous campaign.

Hypothesis 5. Emmanuel Macron was a definite newcomer when he announced his candidacy in 2016. He had no party and refused to identify with any side of the political spectrum. As a result, several news media sources chose to describe his campaign as populist. His campaign rhetoric, however, varied dramatically from the two recognized populists in the 2017 election, le Pen and Mélenchon. I believe that Macron’s early classification as populist was

a reaction to his newcomer status, rather than a true reflection of his ideology, and thus will identify him as a non-populist.

Method

To find whether there has been a rise in populism in France, and to test my other hypotheses, I needed to access a consistent source of political rhetoric over time. While the ideal example of pure political rhetoric would be campaign speeches, a consistent dataset was not publicly available. During a French presidential campaign, the candidates publish videos and transcripts of all their campaign speeches on a campaign website. The victors keep those websites up for posterity, but the losers simply delete their websites, taking their wealth of campaign speech transcripts with them. I did, however, find a workaround to this problem. In France, it is a common practice for potential candidates to publish a book, a year or so before the election, that details their vision for the future of the country. Generally around 200 to 300 pages, these books effectively set up the candidates' future platforms and therefore contain plenty of political rhetoric to analyze.

Because I was looking to analyze the rise of populism over time, but did not have unlimited resources, I could hardly hope to study every presidential election in the history of the Fifth French Republic. I had to choose a starting point that would be realistic as well as marking an interesting point in French politics. I chose the Presidential Election of 1981 as the start year because it marks an important transition in French politics and the relevance of populism. In 1972, 3/5 of the French populace approved by referendum the enlargement of the European Economic Community (CEE) to include as new members the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway. And 1981 marked the first time a non-right-wing party was elected to the presidency of the 5th republic. Politics became more open, and candidates' rhetoric started

varying more from the “party line.” The subsequent election of 1988 marked the first time Jean-Marie Le Pen made it to the first round of the presidential elections, the beginning of the rise of his populist party, Front National. I thought that this transitional period, which saw the rise in success of non-Gaullist parties, would engender more interesting political rhetoric, as major politicians would be less likely to follow the party line that had thus far been dominant.

Beginning in 1981 and working towards 2017 means that I had to contend with candidates from seven different elections. Choosing to analyze the rhetoric of just the winning candidate would not have provided me with enough political rhetoric to get the lay of the land, especially since the rise in populism in France is often associated with outlier candidates, and not the eventual victor. However, in contrast to the United States’ rigid, two-party-dominated system, France’s electoral and party system is more fluid. Any candidate who meets the nominating qualifications can stand for the first round of elections. If no candidate gets 50 + 1% of the vote, then the top two candidates from the first round automatically advance to a runoff that takes place two weeks after the first round. Often, the first round of elections can include anywhere from 10 to 15 candidates. To qualify for the first round, a candidate must collect 500 signatures from elected officials; these may be mayors, general councilors, regional councilors, deputies, senators, or members of the European Parliament elected in France. While daunting, this threshold does automatically exclude candidates with only a niche appeal. Also, in the interest of keeping the data set manageable, I chose to have the threshold of qualification for my study as winning at least 10% of the vote in the first round of the election. The only exception I have to this rule is François Bayrou in 2012 who only won 9.13% of the vote as other candidates that did not reach the threshold did not come close to it.

With that threshold in place, I had a total of 28 books to acquire and analyze, which, accounting for candidates who ran multiple times, amounted to 16 individuals. In total, I have 28 candidates and access to 24 books, which totals about 5600 pages of data. I ran into a few problems regarding accessing these books. For example, the book by Ségolène Royal, the runner up against Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, *Maintenant 200 mots pour changer la France*, is not owned by any library that Colby has access to, and if ordered, would have arrived in June 2022. Not entirely helpful for my thesis due in April. Additionally, Jean-Marie le Pen, one of the most oft-cited populists in France, only published one election book in 1994, despite running five separate times, and meeting my threshold four times. With Le Pen being a large political figure in France politics, however, I was able to access more of his political rhetoric and thus created a near-equivalent length source to the corresponding years' candidates but was unable to locate a satisfactory equivalent for the 1988 election. For the 2002 election, I used le Pen's *Programme du Front National*, a 187-page document that details his platform for the campaign. Similarly, I used the 2007 election platform, but this document was only 69 pages, so significantly shorter than the 2007 document.

Apart from Le Pen and Royal, though, I was able to locate and obtain the remaining election books. To generate machine-readable text files from the hard copy book volumes, I had to use a KIC Bookeye 4 high-resolution, large-format book scanner, which allowed me to create searchable PDFs of each book. I then converted each of the PDFs to simple text files, so that my chosen text analysis software could read them. Following this step, I had to go into each file and clean up the data. The French accents on many of the pages confused the computer, and so I had pages and pages of gibberish, which would have made searching for specific language nearly impossible. I went into the files and for each section of gibberish, found the corresponding page

and, if it had language relevant to populism, corrected the gibberish. The program I used recorded all characters, gibberish or not, so by correcting only populist language, I did not skew the data to be more populist because it would still be a fraction of the same whole.

After cleaning up the data, I plugged the files into the corpus analysis system, AntConc. This system allowed me to search for words, or lists of words, and produced graphics that showed how often they appeared in my text files. Using Tomas (2017) and adding relevant language I found in Taguieff (1984) and Jamin (2017), I compiled lists of words that corresponded to my three populist indices, the people index (Appendix A), the anti-elite index (Appendix B), and the calls-for-democracy index (Appendix C). I added additional indicator words if I thought that they were accurate indicators of populism and would add to my understanding of the concept. While a race/immigrant index would have been informative on the exclusionary tendencies of populists, I ran into some problems developing a list of words that could indicate themes of race and Christian culture. The French are extremely proud of their secular, *laïque* tradition, meaning that, for the most part, when religion is mentioned in these electoral books, the candidate is talking about protecting and/or expanding secularism. While laws that enforce the strict separation of church and state has been accused of actively targeting non-Christian French citizens (Alouane 2017), it is difficult to adapt a list of words that account for these nuances. However, considering a lot of anti-immigrant rhetoric is expressed through concerns over border control, and, additionally, accepting Chloe Thomas's reasoning that populist parties "s'approprient les arguments eurosceptiques pour renforcer leur discours anti-élite" *appropriate eurosceptic arguments to reinforce their anti-elite discourse* (20), I tested a list of words that she had used to indicate an anti-EU rhetoric (Appendix D). This anti-EU rhetoric serves as a substitute for the exclusionary measure of populist rhetoric.

Using the data captured by AntConc, including the number of “hits” my word lists got in my text files, I created graphs in excel. To guarantee that the lengths of books did not skew my data to be more or less populist, I calculated the percentage of populist language and populist indices rather than simply count the number of hits. Each hit indicates an entire word, so I calculated the percentage as the number of hits against the total word count of the book. Totalling the populist language by election year will give a sort of timeline, though it will jump by 5 to 7 years, and indicate whether populism is on the rise in France.

Obviously, this is not an ideal form of measurement as the data skips years, but as an initial indicator of growth, it is stronger than what scholars have measured in the past for French populism. With that being said, I believe that this form of measurement will indicate a growth in populism following certain shocks in the French political sphere.

Results

For each candidate, I calculated the aggregate populist level of their political rhetoric by combining the lists for the people index, the anti-elite index, and the democracy index into one master list and running it through each book. I then calculated the percentage of language that fell under the label populist. However, as my understanding of populism is the conglomeration of the people, the anti-elite, and the calls for democracy, I tested each candidate specifically for each index in addition to the aggregate levels of populism.




Figure 1 Aggregate Populist Level for each candidate, organized by election year




Figure 2 Break down of aggregate populist level by index




Figure 3 Anti elite index




Figure 4 People Index




Figure 5 Democracy index




Figure 6 EU references

Hypothesis 1. This method and data set produced some surprising results. The first, the aggregate of all three of my populist indices, while confirming my first hypotheses that there has been a rise in populism in France, does not demonstrate a *dramatic* rise. In fact, the slope of the trend line is only 0.00006x. It is worth noting, however, that the average populist level of the 2017 candidates is about 1/3 higher than the average level in 1981. The least populist election is 1988, though that could be due, in part, to the fact that Jean-Marie le Pen did not publish a book for that cycle. In fact, le Pen's populist results provide several questions regarding the understanding of populism in France. Bearing in mind that he founded the FN, the almost universally accepted representative of right-wing French populism, it is surprising that he scores amongst the lowest populists for two of the three sources that I found for him. Le Pen's data only includes one election book, published in 1994 for the '95 elections. Notably, this book scores highly on the populism scale. The other two sources from 2002 and 2007 were my filler data that included his campaign platforms. His low score in these two elections could suggest that while he often receives the title populist, that might be a result of his unpopularity rather than a sign of his true populism. However, it only takes a quick skim reading to identify another explanation for his low populist score. Take this quotation from his 2007 campaign platform "Cette immigration est poussée par le grand patronat pour qui elle est une délocalisation à domicile qui lui permet de compresser les coûts salariaux, et par la classe politique qui y voit une clientèle électorale facile" *this immigration is pushed by big business for which it is a domestic outsourcing that allows them to cut down on salary costs, and by the political class that sees in [immigrants] an easy voter base* (FN Programme 2007). Clearly, this language is entirely populist, but, like a lot of le Pen speeches, it is also stylized. He uses the word "patronat" one time and "classe" four times in all 69 pages of the document.

Additionally, the shorter page count of this document presents a problem. Unlike the election books that present themes and then elaborate more deeply, thus using repeated language and phrasing, a campaign platform looks to present a candidate's goals succinctly, avoiding unnecessary fluff. The difference between the platforms and the election books can be seen by examining le Pen's data. The one election for which he published a book, 1995, accounts for his highest populist level, and is one of the most populist books in the data set, suggesting that my filler data, while interesting to look at, were not the best substitutes for the missing election books.

Another interesting piece of data shown in Figure 1 is Jacques Chirac's apparent rise in populism after losing to François Mitterrand in 1988. Chirac was a two-term president and a member of the well-established, center-right, neo-Gaullist party, *Rassemblement pour la République* (Rally for the Republic, RPR) which under his leadership renamed itself *l'Union pour un Mouvement Populaire* (Union for a Popular Movement, UMP). The UMP has been typically recognized as the establishment center-right party in France politics. It is interesting, then, that he, especially in 1995 and 2002, records some of the highest rates of populist rhetoric in his books. Though perplexing, this observation is not necessarily surprising, especially when considering the strategy of any political campaign. Surel (2002) acknowledges this phenomenon when distinguishing populist ideology from "purely strategic discourse and demands," stating "in some cases adopting populist discourse allows repositioning to take place within the party system and the creation of distancing from competing parties and leaders" (Surel 2002, 149). Considering that Chirac's party had been in power since 1993, therefore receiving a good chunk of the blame for a 10% unemployment rate, it was vital that he created some of that distance between his campaign and their governance. He adopted several populist elements, including the

“belief that a gap had gradually opened up between the people and their political representatives,” a gap that only he could fill (Surel 2002, 150). This adoption of populist rhetoric is seen clearly in my data. Chirac had campaigned for the presidency in 1988 and had obviously not employed this strategy. The following two elections, both of which he won, shows how he changed his campaign strategy and ramped up his populist language. Following Barr’s (2009) understanding of populism, Chirac could be classified as a maverick within the UMP, but as he did not radically alter the status quo, cannot be a true populist.

In fact, there are a few examples of election results correlating with changes in the use of populist rhetoric. In 1981, François Mitterrand’s election book was about .67% populist, below the .79% median score. As the incumbent running in 1988, however, his populist rhetoric dropped even lower to .41%. Nicolas Sarkozy has a similar pattern. A newcomer in 2007, his rhetoric was .82% populist. The next election, it had dropped to .56%. While I cannot confidently say exactly what caused this decrease in populist rhetoric, with all that is known about populism, it makes sense that an incumbent would have less anti-elitist language than someone campaigning from outside of the administration. Sarkozy shows the drop off, decreasing in the anti-elite index, Figure 3, from .29% to .12%. Mitterrand shares this drop-off in anti-elite language. In 1981, it accounted for .3% of his populist rhetoric and it dropped to .19% in the subsequent election. Given that the only other incumbent accounted for in my data is Chirac, who we have established used populist rhetoric in his campaigns as a strategy, I cannot say that this pattern is a consistent fact of populism, but it certainly warrants attention given that some populist scholars are trying to assert that populism is more than just rhetoric and instead represents a sort of ideology.

A vital feature of the ideology of populism is the importance of the people. When I calculated the people index, Figure 4, however, I found a negative slope on the trendline, meaning that references to the people in the election books have decreased over time. This oddity can be explained, however, with more context on the candidates themselves. For example, the primary source of the negative trendline of the people index is Georges Marchais. He has the highest percentage of references to “the people” in his book, *l’Espoir au Présent*, yet in all my research on French populism, he was not named explicitly as a populist. This abnormality can be easily explained, Georges Marchais was the leader of *le Parti Communiste Français* (The French Communist Party, PCF). While not always populist, communist parties share a similar tendency to idealize the nature of the hardworking “people,” explaining Marchais’s high score in this index (Ivaldi 2019). Take this quotation from *l’Espoir au Présent*,

Ce qui est, sera et sera toujours déterminant pour faire vraiment bouger la société, c’est le mouvement populaire, c’est l’action et l’union des travailleurs eux-mêmes, des gens sur des objectifs qu’ils définissent, soutiennent, contrôlent eux-mêmes. Ouvriers, employés, techniciens, paysans, intellectuels doivent bâtir l’union (123)

What is, will be, and will always be decisive to really make society move, is the popular movement, it is the action and the union of the workers themselves, the people, on objectives that they define, support, control themselves. Workers, employees, technicians, peasants, intellectuals must build the union

The “people” that Marchais constructs in this extract consist of the working class. They alone, in tandem with the party, can build the ideal society for a better France.

As the PCF’s electoral base was absorbed by other left-wing parties following the 1981 election and they slowly became less relevant in Presidential races, it makes sense that the communist emphasis on the people has faded somewhat. Additionally, when Marchais is removed from the data set, the trendline returns to a positive, though extremely small, value.

Suggesting that aside from his highly charged rhetoric which spiked the data early on, references to the people in political rhetoric has been increasing, even if only slightly.

While populism overall has been increasing only slightly according to my data, there is a better way to examine the data that emphasizes the importance to all three indices to populist ideology. Figure 2 graphs the distribution of the indices in each candidate's aggregate populist score. The most populist candidate would score high on the aggregate populism test and this graph would be equal parts people, anti-elite, and calls for democracy. The 2017 candidates have the best distribution of the three indices, save for a few outliers in the early years. Notice that the communist George Marchais, while having a high score for the people index, has some of the lowest in the other two indices. François Fillon, a member of the establishment party *Les Républicains*, interestingly, has the most even distribution of all three sections, though he has a relatively low aggregate score when compared to his two, clearly populist, opponents, Marine Le Pen and Jean Luc Mélenchon.

While the distribution of the three indices has become more even in the rhetoric of the French candidates, one index, the calls-for-democracy index, consistently scored the lowest in the aggregate (Figure 5). The highest score, Chirac in 1995, only accounts for .24% of his language. Marine le Pen, though ranking relatively high in the aggregate, scores only .07% in the democracy index, just barely beating Macron, a low-scoring populist, at .06% for this index. Jean Luc Mélenchon had a relatively high score for both the 2012 and 2017 elections, but was beat out by a non-populist, a member of the establishment *Républicains*, who was low scoring in the aggregate. While the trend line for the democracy index is positive, suggesting that there has been an increase in calls for democracy over time, because they are only a small fraction of the

overall populist rhetoric, I would pose that the importance of this feature to populist rhetoric may have been overblown in some academic works.

Hypothesis 2. With the oddities being handled, we can now discuss my second hypothesis, that populism will grow following the 2009 European debt crisis. Using my anti-EU index, I found that the number of references to the European Union has been on a steady incline. Interestingly, though he confounded my populist data, Jean-Marie le Pen scored one of the highest anti-EU scores, at .48% in 2007. Nicolas Sarkozy scoring the highest in this index does not automatically mean that he is a populist. According to Tomas's (2017) research on how Euroscepticism and populism relate, populists did not come up with anti-EU rhetoric by themselves, rather they appropriated it to bolster their anti-elite sentiment. As Sarkozy scores below the median populist score in the aggregate, scoring only .56% populist in 2012, he is not in danger of receiving the title.

As for my hypothesis, I did not find a consistent enough jump in the data to confidently say that populism increased after the 2009 crisis. Sarkozy, a low scoring populist, had the biggest jump in EU references between his two books. This suggests that the European Union might have been a relevant topic of discussion during the elections but does not confirm that populism rose as a result.

Hypothesis 3. While I did not find sufficient data to confirm that there was a jump in populism following the 2009 financial crisis, I found some indication that following the 2016 Refugee Crisis, populist rhetoric increased. More specifically, Marine le Pen's populist language ramped up. According to Figure 6, le Pen's EU references jumped from .15% in 2012 to .53% in 2017. Alone, this fact could simply indicate that le Pen was responding to the political climate in which concerns over immigration and terrorism, were at an all-time high of 39% and 38%,

respectively. However, le Pen's anti-elite rhetoric also increased between the two elections, from .15% in 2012 to .49% in 2017 (Figure 3). While her people-index score dropped (Figure 4), her aggregate populism score increased by about a third, from .65% to .97%, indicating that following the 2016 crisis, her populism, especially her anti-elite and anti-EU rhetoric, ramped up. While there is not enough data to indicate that her populism increase was due to the crisis, the correlation should be noted.

Interestingly, le Pen's .65% aggregate score is relatively low for someone that receives the title of populist so frequently. However, her 2012 election book reads more as an autobiography, a way to distinguish herself from her better-known father, rather than strictly electoral. The fact that she ranks as high as she does on the populist score despite this fact may say more about her populism than the actual score.

Hypothesis 4. While references to the European Union have increased over time, and Marine le Pen's rhetoric suggests that populist actors have appropriated anti-EU sentiment to bolster their anti-elite rhetoric, as proposed by Chloé Tomas (2017), there is not sufficient data to support my hypothesis that Jean Luc Mélenchon, a left populist, adopted protectionist, exclusionary rhetoric typical of right populism. Though Mélenchon scored the highest on the aggregate scale at 1.27% populist (Figure 1), his EU references only increased very slightly from .19% in 2012 to .24% in 2017 (Figure 5). Unlike Marine le Pen's 33% increase from 2012 to 2017, Mélenchon's EU reference only saw a 5% increase. This change is not significant enough to indicate that he adopted exclusionary rhetoric, especially as the increase in EU references are not explicitly connected to his populism.

Hypothesis 5. Confirming my fifth hypothesis, Emmanuel Macron's rhetoric scored the third lowest on the aggregate populism scale, significantly lower than both Marine le Pen and


Jean Luc Mélenchon. In fact, when looking at the three indices of populism, Macron consistently had one of the lowest scores in the dataset, and he never scored above the trendline. During the campaign, Macron's status as a newcomer who did not conform to the typical party lines, often declaring himself the candidate "ni de gauche, ni de droite" *not of the left, nor the right* (Wolfrom 2017), led many media outlets to declare him populist.

While he shares the anti-partyism that many scholars associate with populist actors, he lacked the anti-elite and pro-people rhetoric that would help solidify his populism. Macron can be described using William Barr's vocabulary of "maverick," in that he did not conform to the French party system, but the appeals he used to garner support for his campaign did not utilize populist strategies, disqualifying him from Barr's definition of populism.

New Questions

When looking at my dataset, I was struck with how specific it was. Indeed, Chloé Thomas found a similar problem, stating "ces termes ne représentaient qu'une part infime des discours" *the [populist] terms only represented a tiny part of the total discourse* (Thomas 2017, 19). She chose to recalculate the data so that rather than count the number of times the word occurred compared to the total number of words, it counted the proportion of lines each index had to total lines of the document. She justified this correction by explaining that a word only has meaning in the context of other words. The discussion of "the people," for example, is only relevant to populism with the other words surrounding it. After correcting her dataset, she found significantly higher results of populist language. While I would love to have done that with my data, I was using a pared-down program which only provided a "hit" count and, unfortunately, does not include a line count feature.

I do believe that my data would be more significant with this feature, however. Especially based on the simple graphic that is produced by the application after running the data. Take this screengrab that runs the aggregate list of populist indicator terms through eleven of the candidates, for example:



The black lines indicate each page of text that included populist language. While each of these candidates' populist language barely made up 1% or less of their total language, this graphic shows that populist rhetoric still occurred frequently on several different pages. I chose not to analyze the data using these graphics, however, because they were too unspecific. Additionally, the way the PDFs converted to text files meant that while the language transferred, the

formatting was not completely accurate. For example, the line breaks copied over exactly, so a sentence that might ordinarily span one line of text, could be broken up into three sections because the book page was narrow. These graphics provide a general sense, rather than accurate analysis, of the level of populism in a candidate's rhetoric. I have attached the raw data in appendix (E through K), however, so that the concentration of populist indicators can be better visualized.

Additionally, I think my understanding of France's populist trends over time might be different if I had time to adapt Kirk A. Hawkins's (2009) study on holistic grading of populist rhetoric. Just from skimming unexpected results, like Jean Marie le Pen's low aggregate populism scores in 1998 and 2002, I could tell that his highly populist, but stylized, language would not have been picked up by my indicator words. Moreover, I know, from the many papers I have written as a French major, that the French hate repetition in writing. For my indices to be effective, repetition is an absolute must.


Hawkins (2009) method that looked to standardize human interpretation and perhaps prevent the holes that my computer-based method demonstrates, might have aided my project. He created a rubric for a group of readers on what to look for in terms of populist ideals in a speech. He then trained graders on the rubric using a set of example/anchor texts. He had 2-3 readers look at a single text in 4 different categories of speeches, a campaign speech, a ribbon-cutting speech, an international speech, and a "famous" speech. By varying the type of speech, Hawkins aimed to prevent a specific type of rhetoric from clouding the analysis (a politician might be more populist in a campaign speech in front of his supporters than on an international stage, for example). While the election books I used worked as a consistent resource across candidates and time, they certainly had limitations that Hawkins's method would have helped cut

through. Take the dilemma of Jacques Chirac as another example. Hawkins's method might have helped clarify that while he might have used populist rhetoric on the campaign trail as indicated in his election books, his actual governance, which may have been identified in an international speech, made him an establishment member rather than a true populist.

Another frustration that I faced conducting this research was the knowledge that campaign speeches would have been more conducive to the research I was conducting. For anyone undergoing a project like this, and who had more time than I did, transcribing recorded campaign speeches, or accessing transcriptions provided by candidates during the elections rather than years later, to create a larger database of accessible speeches would be helpful.

An important finding for the general understanding of populism as an ideology, the calls-for-democracy index was the weakest indicator of populism in my data. While Jean-Luc Mélenchon scored the highest in this index, suggesting that perhaps it could be a well-founded indicator of populism, it was easily the smallest part of his aggregate populism score. Outside of Mélenchon, the spread of this index is much closer together, with the notable exception of Jacques Chirac. This deviation poses an interesting question. Did Chirac score high in this index in 1995 because he was actively trying to emulate populist rhetoric and therefore doubled his calls for democracy? Obviously, this question cannot be answered with my data, but it bears asking.

Ultimately, while my data shows that populist rhetoric has not spiked in the way the news media would suggest, it is worth noting that the first-round elections have started to look different in recent years, which could be influencing how populism is being reported.



From 1981 to 2012, two patterns emerge. Either there are two clear winners of the first-round votes (as in 1981 and 2012), or the vote is split among a few establishment parties (1995, 2002). 2017 marks the first time since de Gaulle's creation of the 5th Republic that two non-establishment parties made it to the second round. Indeed, François Fillon represented the only member of the "normal" power bloc, as in a member of a major establishment party, *Les Républicains*, that met my threshold that year, the other three candidates were operating outside of the major center-right and center-left parties. Considering populism is feared, justified or not, to be an indicator of the failure of a liberal democracy, it follows that news media would stress the importance of the major parties failing to make it to the second round of elections.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Though my data shows that populist language only accounts for a small fraction of the political rhetoric of the top French presidential candidates, I am not prepared to throw out the concept entirely. For one, without the capacity to change how I tally the populist indicators, like Thomas (2017) changing from word count to line count, it is hard to say how populist my dataset is. If nothing else, my dataset shows that there has been a rise in populist rhetoric amongst the top French politicians.

Additionally, the fact that the first round of the elections of 2017, and now 2022, had political outsiders beating the biggest parties of the establishment says more about the state of French politics than populist rhetoric might. Clearly, the French people were unhappy with the status quo, and they expressed their displeasure in the voting booth. Accepting that populism is a corrective in a liberal democracy, this disapproval of the major parties alone should cause populist scholars to take note.

Indeed, my data poses several interesting questions that would enrich populist scholarship if addressed. The first pertains to the drop off in François Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy's aggregate populist scores after they were elected to office. It makes perfect sense that an incumbent candidate would have less populist rhetoric than a newcomer; it is a lot harder to condemn the elites of a country when you are in a position of power. However, Jacques Chirac shows that this observed drop-off does not guarantee an incumbent will have less populist language. But Chirac is an exceptional case, as his campaign strategy included a conscious effort to increase populist rhetoric to distinguish himself from other candidates. This leaves lingering questions for populist scholars. For those arguing that populism is an ideology, such as Mudde

(2004) and Barr (2009), populism should have more longevity than the typical electoral strategy. Hollande and Sarkozy threaten this understanding.

The state of French politics, unsettled in 2017, has unravelled further in 2022. Marine le Pen made it again to the second round, comfortably, winning 23.1%, compared to Emmanuel Macron's 27.8%. Jean Luc Mélenchon was the only other candidate who made it close, winning 22% of the first-round vote. The socialist party (PS), historically one of the most popular parties in France, had a record low of 1.75% of the vote. It would serve scholars well to look closely at Le Pen's rhetoric and ponder why it seems to resonate more with the French people than her father's. Are Marine's values more tenable than her father's? Or is it because the people are more unhappy with the establishment, thus her populism is more palatable than her father's was? I think studying the difference in their rhetoric, both through computer-based analysis and holistic grading would aid in understanding populism more broadly.

While it continues to escape definition, it is clear to me after doing this thesis that populism is a political phenomenon worth studying. As it appears most frequently when establishment parties fail to please their voters, populism can be a constructive tool in analyzing the effectiveness of liberal democracies. In an ideal world, no citizen would feel ignored by their elected officials. But populism can serve to correct this wrong, as imprecise as the observation of it may be.

Appendix

A. People-Index World List

Peuple	Thomas 2017
Population	
Communauté	
Français	
Populaire	
Citoyen	
Société	
Nation	
Classes	
Electeurs	
Electorat	
Travailleurs	
Patrie	Tatguieff 1984
Nation	
Occident	
Victime	
Ouvriers	Jamin 2017

B. Anti-Elite Word List

Elite	Thomas 2017
Bruxelles	
Commission	
Union Européenne	
Merkel	
Hollande	
Valls	
Gouvernement	
Système	
Pouvoir	
Capitalisme	
Banques	
Euro	
Intérêt	
Étranger	Tatguieff 1984
Gros	
Bureaucratie	
Fraudeurs	
Menteurs	
Banquiers	
Oligarchie	

Aristocratie	
PS	
UMP	

C. Calls-for-democracy World List

Référendums	Thomas 2017
Souverainetés populaires	
Démocratie	
Vote	
Souveraineté	
Souverain	
Élections	
Référendum	
Démocratisation	
Voter	
Parlement	
Consultation	Gilmore 2022
Participation	

D. EU World List

commission	Thomas 2017
immigration	
2005	
austerite	
euro	
bruxelles	
crise	
contre	
liberalisme	
capitalisme	

E. Populism aggregate scan, 1981 Election Books




F. Populism aggregate scan, 1988 Election Books



G. Populism aggregate scan, 1995 Election Books



K. Populism aggregate scan, 2017 Election Books



Bibliography

- Abts, Koen and Stefan Rummens. 2007. "Populism versus Democracy." *Political Studies* 55 (2): 405-424.
- Albertazzi, Daniele and Duncan McDonnell (eds.). 2008. *Twenty-First Century Populism*. London, EN: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Alouane, Rim-Sarah. 2017. "The Weaponization of Laïcité." In *Berkeley Forum*. Last accessed at <https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/the-weaponization-of-laicite>
- Andre, Antonin. 2016. "Le populisme chic d'Emmanuel Macron." In *Europe 1*. Last accessed at <https://www.europe1.fr/emissions/L-edito-politique2/le-populisme-chic-demmanuel-macron-2864752>
- Balladur, Edouard. 1992. *Dictionnaire de la réforme*. Paris, France : Fayard.
- Baralon, Margaux. 2017. "2012 vs 2017 : ce qui a changé dans le programme de Marine Le Pen." In *Europe 1*. Last accessed at <https://www.europe1.fr/societe/2012-vs-2017-ce-qui-a-change-dans-le-programme-de-marine-le-pen-2973953>
- Barr, Robert R. 2009. "Populists, Outsiders, and Anti-Establishment Politics." In *Party Politics* 15 (1): 22-48.
- Barre, Raymond. 1987. *Au tournant du siècle. Principes et objectifs de politique étrangère*. Paris, France : Plon.
- Bayrou, François. 2007. *Projet d'espoir*. Paris : France : Plon.
- Bayrou, François. 2012. *2012, État d'urgence*. Paris, France : Plon.
- Berman, Sheri. 2019. "Populism is a Symptom Rather than a Cause: Democratic Disconnect, the Decline of the Center-Left, and the Rise of Populism in Western Europe." In *Polity* (51) 4: 654-667.
- Betz, Hans-Georg. 2002. "Conditions Favouring the Success and Failure of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies." In *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, 197 – 213.
- Bickerton, Christopher and Carlo Invernizzi Accetti. 2018. "'Techno-populism' as a new party family: the case of the Five Star Movement and Podemos." In *Contemporary Italian Politics* 10 (2): 132 – 150.
- Billington, James H. 1958. *Mikhailovsky And Russian Populism*. London, EN: Oxford University Press.

- Brown, K., Mondon, A. 2021. "Populism, the media, and the mainstreaming of the far right: The Guardian's coverage of populism as a case study". In *Politics*. 41(3): 279–295.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395720955036>
- Burrett, T. 2020. "Charting Putin's Shifting Populism in the Russian Media from 2000 to 2020." In *Politics and Governance*, 8 (1): 193-205. doi:<https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i1.2565>
- Canovan, Margeret. 1981. *Populism*. San Diego, CA: Harcourt.
- Charaudeau, Patrick. 2011. "Réflexions pour l'analyse du discours populiste." *Mots, Les Langages du politique* 97 : 101-116.
- Chirac, Jacques. 1978. *Discours pour la France à l'heure du choix*. Paris, France : Stock.
- Chirac, Jacques. 1988. *Une Ambition pour la France*. Paris, France : A. Michel.
- Chirac, Jacques. 1994. *Une Nouvelle France*. Paris, France : NIL.
- Chirac, Jacques. 1994. *La France pour tous*. Paris, France : NIL.
- Collier, Ruth. 2001. "Populism." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. (11813 – 11816)
- De la Torre, Carlos. 2000. "Populist Seduction In Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience." In *Foreign Affairs*. (79) 4: 144. Last accessed at
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/20049820?origin=crossref&seq=1>
- De la Torre, Carlos. 2017. "Populism in Latin America." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ositguy. London, EN: Oxford University Press.
- D'Estaing, Valéry Giscard. 1976. *Démocratie française*. Paris, France : Fayard.
- D'Estaing, Valéry Giscard. 1981. *L'état de la France*. Paris, France : Fayard.
- Devinney, Timothy M. and Chirstopher A. Hartwell. 2017. "Varieties of Populism." In *Global Strategy Journal* (10) 32-66.
- Doyle, David. 2011. "The Legitimacy of Political Institutions: Explaining Contemporary Populism in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 44 (11): 1447-1473.
- Dreyfus, François-Georges. 1982. *De Gaulle et le gaullisme : essai d'Interprétation*. Paris, FR : Presses Universitaires de France.
- Eklof, Ben. 2017. *A Generation of revolutionaries : Nikolai Charushin and Russian Populism from the great forms to perestroika*. Bloomington, Indiana : Indiana University Press.

- Emerson, Caryl. Pattison, George. Poole, Randall A. 2020. "Slavophilism and the Origins of Russian Religious Philosophy." In *The Oxford Handbook of Russian Religious Thought*. London, EN: Oxford University Press.
- Faulkner, Neil. 2017. "Lenin and the Bolsheviks." In *A People's History of the Russian Revolution*. 52-87. London, EN: Pluto Press.
- Fillon, François. 2006. *La France peut supporter la vérité*. Paris, France : Albin Michel.
- FranceInfo. 2020. "Charles de Gaulle : Emmanuel Macron se rêve en héritier du général." Last accessed at https://www.francetvinfo.fr/culture/patrimoine/histoire/charles-de-gaulle-emmanuel-macron-se-reve-en-heritier-du-general_4175891.html
- Freeden, Michael. 1998. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. London, EN: Oxford University Press.
- Gilles, Ivaldi. 2019. "Populism in France." In *Populism Around the World. A Comparative Perspective*, ed. Daniel Stockemer. Switzerland: Springer.
- Godin, Christian. 2012. "Qu'est-ce que le populisme?" *Cités* 49 (1) : 11-25.
- Goldman, M. I. 2004. "Putin and the oligarchs." In *Foreign Affairs* (83) : 33-44. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20034135> Last accessed at <https://colby.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/magazines/putin-oligarchs/docview/214292606/se-2?accountid=10198>
- Gherghina, Sergiu. Mişcoiu, Sergiu. Soare, Sorina. 2013. "Contemporary Populism: A Controversial Concept and its Diverse Forms." London, EN: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Gusterson, Hugh. 2017. "From Brexit to Trump: Anthropology and the rise of nationalist populism." In *American Ethnologist: Journal of the American Ethnological Society* 44 (2): 209 – 214.
- Hartley, Anthony. 1971. *Gaullism: the Rise and Fall of a Political Movement*. London, EN: Routledge & Kegan Paul PLC
- Hawkins, Kirk A. 2009. "Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist discourse in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (8): 1040-1067.
- Hawyard, Jack. 1996. *Elitism, Populism, and European Politics*. London, EN: Oxford University Press.
- Hermet, Guy. 2013. "Constants and Mutations of Populism." In *Critique* 1: 62 – 74.

- Héro, Alexis. 2018. "Analyse Comparative de la Montée du Populisme aux Etats-Unis et en Europe." *Mapping Politics* 9 (1) : 46-62.
- Hollande, François. 2012. *Changer de destin*. Paris, France : Robert Laffont.
- Hughes, David J. 2013. "A reality check on the shale revolution." In *Nature* 494: 307 – 308.
- Ignazi, Piero. 1996. "The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties." In *Party Politics* 2 (4) : 549-566.
- Jagers, Jan and Stefaan Walgrave. 2007. "Populism as Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Political Parties' Discourse in Belgium." *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (3): 319-345.
- Jospin, Lionel. 1995. *1995-2000 Propositions pour la France*. Paris, France: Stock.
- Jospin, Lionel. 2002. *Le temps de répondre*. Paris, France : LGF.
- Kar-Gupta, Sudip. 2022. "French election poll: Macron to beat Le Pen but Le Pen gains ground." *Reuters*. Last accessed at <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-election-poll-macron-beat-le-pen-le-pen-gains-ground-2022-04-06/>
- Kitlt, Herbert. 1997. *The Radical Right in Western Europe, a Comparative Analysis*. The University of Michigan Press.
- Krieger, Joel (ed). 2001. *Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Kurtzleben, Daniele. 2017. *Here's How Many Bernie Sanders Supporters Ultimately Voted For Trump*. Last accessed at <https://www.npr.org/2017/08/24/545812242/1-in-10-sanders-primary-voters-ended-up-supporting-trump-survey-finds>.
- Lawson, Kay and Peter Merkl (eds). 1988. *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Legacy Library.
- Le Monde. 1965. "LE GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE: il s'agit d'éviter que l'État soit à la disposition des partis." Last accessed at https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1965/12/17/le-general-de-gaulle-il-s-agit-d-eviter-que-l-etat-soit-a-la-disposition-des-partis_2193497_1819218.html
- Le Parisien. 2022. "Sondage présidentielle 2022 : la participation en hausse, Marine Le Pen progresse encore." *Le Parisien*. Last accessed at <https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-2022-j-4-participation-en-hausse-et-zemmour-en-baisse-selon-notre-sondage-06-04-2022-5QNPCLOQYDBFCRPXTAH3AFG3YVQ.php>

- Le Pen, Jean-Marie. 1991. *Le Pen 90 : Analyses et propositions*. Paris, France : Maule.
- Le Pen, Jean-Marie. 2002. "Programme du Front National." Last accessed at <http://h16free.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/prg-fn-2002.pdf>
- Le Pen, Jean-Marie. 2007. "Programme électoral de Jean-Marie Le Pen, président du Front National et candidate à l'élection présidentielle 2007, mars 2007." Last accessed at <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/166209-programme-electoral-de-jean-marie-le-pen-president-du-front-national-et>
- Le Pen, Marine. 2006. *À contre flots*. Paris, France : Éditions Jacques Grancher.
- Le Pen, Marine. 2012. *Pour que vive la France*. Paris, France : Éditions Jacques Grancher.
- Long, Huey P. 1932. *Huey Long on the Political Parties*. Last accessed at <https://www.hueylong.com/perspectives/huey-long-quotes-in-his-own-words.php>
- Long, Huey P. 1935. "Huey Long Filibusters New Deal Legislation." At *United States Senate*. Last accessed at <https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/filibusters-cloture/huey-long-filibusters.htm>
- Lowndes, Joseph. 2017. "Populism in the United States." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ositguy. London, EN: Oxford University Press.
- Macron, Emmanuel. 2016. *Révolution*. Paris, France : XO Editions.
- Mahoney, Daniel J. 2000. *De Gaulle: Statesmanship, grandeur, and Modern Democracy*. London, EN: Routledge
- Marchais, Georges. 1980. *L'espoir au présent*. Paris, France : Messidor.
- Matveenko, Veronica E., Nazartseva, Ekaterina A, & Zharkova, Elena. 2018. "State Policy of Russia in the Field of Science and Education (The end of 17th-early 18th Centuries)." *Journal of History Culture and Art Research*, 7(1), 90-102. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7596/taksad.v7i1.1441>
- Mazot-Oudin, Antoine. 2017. "Au Nom du Peuple? Circulations du Populisme et Représentations du Populaire au Québec." *Politix* 120 (4) : 37-60.
- Medvedev, Sergei. 2004. *Rethinking the National Interest: Putin's Turn in Russian Foreign Policy*. Last accessed at <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/marshall-center-papers/rethinking-national-interest-putins-turn-russian-foreign-policy/rethinking-national-interest-putins-turn-russian>.

- Mélenchon, Jean-Luc. 2011. *Qu'ils s'en aillent tous ! Vite, la révolution citoyenne*. Paris, France : J'ai Lu.
- Mélenchon, Jean-Luc. 2014. *L'ère du peuple*. Paris, France : Fayard.
- Mélenchon, Jean-Luc. 2020. "« De Gaulle était-il un insoumis ? » – Grand entretien avec Jean-Luc Mélenchon." Last accessed at <https://melenchon.fr/2020/06/17/de-gaulle-etait-il-un-insoumis-grand-entretien-avec-jean-luc-melenchon/>
- Mitterrand, François. 1981. *Ici et maintenant*. Paris, France : Le Livre Poche.
- Mitterrand, François. 1988. *Lettre à tous les Français*. Paris, France : Chez l'auteur.
- Mudde, Cas. 2004. "The Populist Zeitgeist." *Government and Opposition* 39 (4): 541-563.
- Mudde, Cas. 2017. "Populism: An Ideational Approach." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ositguy. London, EN: Oxford University Press.
- Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2012. "Populism: corrective and threat to democracy." In *Populism in Europe and the Americas. Threat or Corrective for Democracy?*, ed. Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. Cambridge, EN: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2013. "Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America." *Government and Opposition* 48 (2): 147-174.
- Norris, Pippa. 2020. "Measuring Populism Worldwide." *Party Politics* 26 (6): 697-717.
- Panizza, Francisco. 2005. "Is Brazil Becoming a Boring Country?" In *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 19 (4): 501 – 525.
- Pauwels, Teun. 2014. *Populism in Western Europe. Comparing Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands*. London, EN: Routledge.
- Pauwels, Teun and Matthijs Rooduijn. 2011. "Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of Content Analysis." *West European Politics* 34 (6): 1272-1283.
- People's Party Platform. 1896. Last accessed at <https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/democrac/29.htm>.
- Remmer, Karen. 2012. "The Rise of Leftist– Populist Governance in Latin America: The Roots of Electoral Change." In *Comparative Political Studies* 45 (8): 947 – 972.
- Rioux, Jean-Pierre. 2012. "La Tentation Populiste." *Cités* 49 (1): 65-77.

- Rode, Martin and Revuelta Julia. 2015. "The Wild Bunch! An empirical note on populism and economic institutions." In *Economics of Governance* 16 (1): 73 – 96.
- Royal, Ségolène and Marie-Françoise Colombani. 2007. *Maintenant*. Paris, France : Hachette Littérature.
- Rummens, Stefan. 2017. "Populism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ositguy. London, EN: Oxford University Press.
- Sarkozy, Nicolas. 2006. *Témoignage*. Paris, France: XO Éditions.
- Sarkozy, Nicolas. 2012. "La France Forte." Presented at Marseille Campaign Rally February 19, 2012, Marseille, France.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics." In *The American Political Science Review* 64 (4): 1033 – 1054.
- Schedler, Andreas. 1996. "Anti-Political Establishment Parties." In *Party Politics* 2 (3): 291 – 312.
- SciencesPo. 2019. "Baromètre de la confiance politique." Last accessed at https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr/cevipof/files/CEVIPOF_confiance_10ans_CHEURFA_CHANVRIL_2019.pdf
- Smith, David. 2018. 'Democrats won the House but Trump won the election' – and 2020 is next. Last accessed at <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/10/donald-trump-midterm-elections-2020-democrats-republicans>.
- Stockemer, Daniel. 2019. "Defining Populism." In *Populism Around the World. A Comparative Perspective*, ed. Daniel Stockemer. Switzerland: Springer.
- Surel, Yves. 2002. "Populism in the French Party System." In *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, ed. Yves Mény and Yves Surel. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Taggart, Paul. 2017. "Populism in Western Europe." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ositguy. London, EN: Oxford University Press.
- Taguieff, Pierre-André. 1984. "La rhétorique du national-populisme. Les règles élémentaires de la propagande xénophobe" *Mots. Les langages du politique* 9 : 113-139.
- Thomas, Chloé. 2017. "L'Europe Contre les Peuples : euroscepticisme et populisme dans le discours des partis politiques." *Les Cahiers de Cevipol* 2 (2) : 3-30.

Viviani, Lorenzo. 2019. "Populist Anti-Party Parties." In *Multiple Populisms*. London, EN: Routledge.

Wallace, George. 1963. Last accessed at <http://media.al.com/spotnews/other/George%20Wallace%201963%20Inauguration%20Speech.pdf>.

Zerofsky, Elisabeth. 2022. "France's Far Right Turn." In the *New York Times*. Last accessed at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/31/magazine/new-french-right.html>