Palestinian? Israeli? Both?: Analyzing Citizenship Experience among Israel’s Palestinians

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Palestinian? Israeli? Both?: Analyzing Citizenship Experience among Israel’s Palestinians

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April 22, 2020
Table of Contents

Abstract: ........................................................................................................................................3

Chapter 1 — Introduction: ........................................................................................................4

Chapter 2 — Education: ...........................................................................................................45

Chapter 3 — Employment: .......................................................................................................65

Chapter 4 — Land: ....................................................................................................................95

Chapter 5 — Conclusion: .........................................................................................................118

Methodological Appendix: .....................................................................................................125

Works Cited: ............................................................................................................................126
Abstract

Palestinian citizens of Israel occupy a unique position amidst ongoing instability in the Middle East. As an ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority in the Jewish homeland, they experience the benefits of Israeli citizenship while shouldering the discrimination and hardships that come with them. This paper examines the citizenship experience of Palestinian citizens of Israel through three primary indicators of citizenship integration: education, employment, and land. Data gathered from 30 interviews with Palestinian-identifying citizens of Israel in the Galilee region finds Palestinian citizens of Israel experience diminished citizenship based on their experiences in these three realms. Understanding lived experience of Israel’s Palestinian citizens is critical to providing a contemporary classification of Israel’s political system and navigating prospects for peace in the region. Broad-based efforts to confront systemic inequities facing Palestinian citizens of Israel serve as a foundation for a just society and cultivate a path towards reconciliation as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict persists.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Palestinian citizens of Israel exist on the margins of Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab society. As a minority in the Jewish state, these Palestinians are distinct from the Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza, and they are an unrecognized ethnic minority within Israel’s internationally recognized borders (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). After Israel’s independence in 1948, Palestinians in the newly founded country gained automatic citizenship (Smooha 1990). Since becoming a part of Israel’s citizenry, Palestinians of Israel living within the Green Line 1 have lived a life beset with injustice and uncertainty. The borders between Palestinians within Israel and Palestinians beyond the Jewish state are unstable. Like lines in sand, they are constantly drawn and redrawn. Decades of war and conflict blur the overlapping borders among people, cultures, and ideologies. Shared histories exist alongside divergent narratives, and Palestinian citizens of Israel occupy the space of in-between. With more than 5.9 million Palestinian refugees in the Palestinian diaspora, Palestinians in Israel are among the few with citizenship (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2019). Palestinians receive distinct privileges and challenges as a result of their Israeli citizenship, yet they remain intimately connected with the plight of Palestinians worldwide and demonstrate vested interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict. More often than not, Palestinian citizens of Israel embody contradicting identities within and among themselves.

For Palestinians of Israel, navigating identity and citizenship is a voyage with no clear destination. Palestinians with Israeli citizenship grapple with uncertainty in their identity, often vacillating among gratitude, resentment, and confusion. Often referred to as Arab-Israeli or

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1 The Green Line is the 1949 armistice line that served as the de facto border between Israel and what remained of historic Palestine up until the 1967 Six Day War. In 1967 Israel captured additional territory including the occupied Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Ghanem 2001).
Arabs of Israel, Palestinian citizens of Israel debate over the terms used to describe them. A Palestinian journalist born in the Galilee and working in Haifa notes the importance of language in negotiating identity: “I do not use the term Arab-Israeli. We are Palestinians with Israeli citizenship. It’s very important for us, the terms and the language we use” (Rabea Eid, as cited in Berger 2019). Palestinian American lawyer and Israeli citizen Huwaida Arraf expands: “I do not negate my Arabness. But I identify as a Palestinian citizen of Israel because it’s an assertion of my national identity, a national identity that Israel has been trying to eradicate systemically” (Arraf 2015). Outwardly embracing the Palestinian identity is a relatively new phenomenon — the particularly hostile environment for Arab-Palestinians in the decades following Israel’s independence instilled fear, stifling openly discussions on matters of identity (Farrell 2019).

Now, identifying as Palestinian is increasingly popular among non-Jewish Israeli citizens. For Palestinian-Arab Knesset member Ahmad Tibi, it is a way to speak truth to power and change the national discourse: “We are part of the Palestinian people. We are struggling in order to be equal citizens, and we want that to be known” (Ahmad Tibi as cited in Farrell 2019). Tibi utilizes the privilege that comes with his citizenship to highlight its inequalities, using the word Palestinian as a form of reclamation. Layla, an articulate, well-respected Palestinian woman and human rights advocate, notes the difficulty in describing her situation:

When people ask me what Israel is like, I tell them I do not know. Even now, at 30 years old, I know only what it is like as a Palestinian citizen. I have an Israeli passport, but I am not Israeli. I am a Palestinian living in Israel. My citizenship is not the same. Would I still rather live here than any other Arab country? Of course. I am lucky in this way. But I will never know this other Israel, for my citizenship is inseparable from my Palestinian identity. (Interview with Layla, 13 January 2020)

Palestinians living in Israel are a hybrid by default of their seemingly antithetical ethnicity and citizenship. As non-Jewish citizens in the Jewish homeland, they live in a state with two discourses of citizenship. In one, Israel is a democratic state that accords equal rights to its
citizens. In the other, Israel is a country that explicitly defines itself as Jewish, and thus
privileges its Jewish citizens (Peled 1992; Peled 2007). The dichotomy among Israel as a Jewish
state and a democratic one profoundly impacts the country’s Palestinian citizens.

Palestinian citizens experience the benefits of Israeli citizenship while shouldering the
discrimination and hardships that come with it. Their experiences occupy a distinguished realm
riddled with nuance and complexity, and their experiences deviate from one extreme to another
as the socio-political arena revolves around them. While substantial research exists on the
broader Arab-Israeli conflict and the more specified Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is a deficit
of scholarly concern regarding Israel’s relationship with Palestinians living as Israeli citizens
within its borders. This thesis seeks to fill that gap. I first seek to understand the citizenship
experience of Palestinians living in Israel and analyze its implications. I argue that Palestinians
of Israel experience diminished citizenship sustained across multiple indicators of integration.

The consequences of this research are extensive. This research allows for further analysis of root
causes of stability and instability in the Middle East and a greater understanding of the ongoing
disputes driving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Examining the lived experience of Israel’s
Palestinian citizens provides critical insight into the plausibility of a two-state solution and the
validity of Israel’s identification as a Jewish and Democratic state.

This chapter first addresses motivations for research, then moves to provide historical
background and discuss relevant literature. The literature review provides foundational
knowledge via review of multidisciplinary works across political science, history, and
anthropology fields in order to address the citizenship experience of Palestinians in Israel. This
section focuses on four categories central to my argument: classifying Israel’s political system,
Israeli citizenship, approaches to development, and integration indicators. Pre-existing literature
served the basis for my research and helped establish my hypotheses and informed my fieldwork conducted in northern Israel during January 2020. To conclude this chapter, I state my hypotheses and explain my methodology for research and evaluation.

I. Research Motivations

I developed my honors thesis after completing substantial coursework related to Middle Eastern studies, conflict resolution, and minority representation. This topic is also of personal significance stemming from my own identity as an American Jewish woman. Growing up heavily involved in the Jewish community, I learned about Israel from an early age. I had a positive, although basic, impression of the country, its people, and its history. It was not until first visiting Israel in Summer 2014 that I formed a vested interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict. That summer, after Hamas launched over 100 rockets into Israel over a 24-hour period, Israel responded and launched a military operation into Gaza. Referred to as “Operation Protective Edge” by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the “2014 Gaza War” by Arabs in the region, the conflict lasted 50 days and killed 2,131 Palestinians and 73 Israelis (“Gaza Crisis: Toll of Operations in Gaza”). As a teenage traveler forced to relocate to Northern Israel, beyond the reach of bombs and rockets launched from Gaza, I rapidly developed a much more personal understanding of the depth and gravity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

I decided to study abroad in Jordan during my junior year at Colby because it was a place I could actively seek Arab perspectives on the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. This experience ultimately planted the seeds for my interest in Israel’s relationship with its Palestinian citizens. In learning the majority of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin, I sought to understand the nuance of Palestinian culture in Jordan. This led me to discover a host of
academic and cultural dilemmas among Palestinian-Jordanians and Palestinians living in East Jerusalem. What I did not find, however, was information about Palestinians living within Israel’s 1948 borders. Realizing how often Palestinian citizens of Israel are left out of mainstream discourse and further understanding my own positionality to the issue solidified my desire to study Palestinians living in Israel. What began as a study on Palestinian-Israeli political behavior evolved into a focus on Palestinian experiences related to their Israeli citizenship (hereafter referred to as “Palestinian citizenship”). It has been a privilege to research the Palestinian citizenship experience through the lens of political ethnography.

II. Historical Background

In 2020, Israel will celebrate its 72nd Independence Day. At the same time, Palestinians will commemorate the Nakba,2 a day many associate with the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their home following Israel’s independence (Louer 2007). From the Fall 1947 to Spring 1948, more than 700,000 Palestinians left Israel either by choice or by force (Ghanem 2001). Israel destroyed a number of villages and relocated thousands of Palestinians away from their home communities, transforming them into internally displaced persons (Ghanem 2001). During this time, the demographics of what is now Israel changed from a two-thirds majority Arab population to a Jewish majority (Landau 1993). Approximately 150,000 Palestinian Arabs remained in the newly established Israel, but some were expelled as late as 1949 (Kamen 1987). Palestinian Arabs who remained in the parts of historic Palestine that became Israel gained automatic Israeli citizenship (Boqa'i 2008). Still, Israel did not have well-developed policies regarding its Arab minority, and fear took hold among its Jewish citizens. For

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2 Arabic word for catastrophe. For more detailed information on the Nakba, see Masalha (2012) or Frisch (2002).
many, Palestinians living in Israel were seen as the “enemy” despite their citizenship (Ghanem 2001). The Israeli government treated them as dangerous and considered them a threat to Israel’s safety and security (Ghanem 2001).

Israel ruled its new Palestinian citizens under military rule from 1948 to 1966 (Boqa’i 2008; Frisch 2011). Three considerations guided Israel during the military occupation: security, Zionism, and democracy (Ghanem 2001). Security was, and still is, prioritized, but Israel cared about creating a Jewish homeland while presenting as a country recognizing equality for all (Lustic 1980; Smooha 1990). During this time, Israel viewed Arab political activism as radicalizing the population and in coordination with the Palestinian agenda of those in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Rekhess 1977). Consequently, Israel undertook techniques to remedy the perceived risks of its Arab population. Authorities controlled Arab political activity, prevented formation of political groups or parties, and thwarted Arab national organization attempts (Ghanem 2001). Israel further controlled its Palestinian citizens through regulations and land laws that prohibited them from traveling to many areas and limited expansion of housing and agricultural efforts within permitted lands (Marteu 2009). The final repressive tactic during this time was the Palestinian citizens’ forced economic dependence on both the government and Israel’s Jewish majority (Bauml 2017). Targeted economic policies existed to ensure Arab citizens could not amass economic capital; Jewish Israeli leaders feared this would enable revolt or endanger the Jewish character of the state. Though no longer currently in place, the military-enforced restrictions served the foundation for current policies and attitudes towards Israel’s Palestinian and Arab citizens. These restrictions created a culture of fear and uncertainty, 3

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3 Originally a movement for the establishment of a Jewish homeland and now an international movement dedicated to its support and protection. Several different camps exist within the Zionist movement, and what began as an easily-definable political movement is now a hotly contested term with no single definition.
centered on Israeli and Jewish security while presenting a facade of equality for the Palestinian citizenry.

Widely considered a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1967 War\(^4\) marked the end of military occupation of Palestinian areas and resulted in a sizable expansion of Israeli territory. Over the course of six days, Israel gained the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and a large portion of the Sinai Peninsula (Landau 1993). Israel eventually ceded the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt as part of the Camp David Accords\(^5\) in 1979, and in 2006 Israel withdrew from Gaza. Israel currently maintains control of the Golan Heights and parts of the West Bank, although Israel withdrew military control over some of the West Bank in 1982 (Frisch 2011). The West Bank remains in intense dispute due to the increasing presence of what many Palestinians deem illegal Israeli settlements.

The first twenty-five years of Israel’s existence were defined by the grave external security threats posed by neighboring Arab states which refused to acknowledge or accept Israel’s existence (Frisch 2011). While these threats have not disappeared, they have changed and evolved, and Israel’s approach to addressing them has as well. Following the Six Day War in 1967, Israel relaxed long-term centralization efforts and liberalized, opening it to global markets and providing greater political freedom to the inhabitants (Frisch 2011). Arab political organizations started to form in earnest during the 1970s and 80s, and Arab political activism started to be seen as a sign of politicization rather than radicalization (Smooha 1990). Many Arab citizens chose to work within the existing system instead of outside of it. Interactions with Palestinians in the Palestinian territories increased as a result of Israel’s expanded boundaries,

\(^4\) Commonly referred to as the Six Day War
\(^5\) Peace treaty between Israel and Egypt
and solidarity efforts served as the beginning of sustained efforts uniting around a shared Palestinian cause (Landau 1993).

In 1987, the first intifada erupted when local protests turned into a mass popular uprising. Distinct from an armed rebellion, this grassroots effort was a large and persistent civil resistance campaign — the first of its kind among Palestinian Arabs (Morris 1992). The causes of the intifada remain controversial. Many Zionists blame the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Others, including Israel’s then Prime Minister Rabin, cited external agitation from Iran and Syria (Berry and Philo 2015) as fomenting agents. Regardless, Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories hold the Israeli government responsible for its failure to meaningfully engage in efforts to resolve the situation of Palestinians in and around its borders (Marteu 2009). The goals of the intifada, however, were clear: end the Israeli occupation and establish a Palestinian state. Ultimately, Israeli forces used force against Palestinian demonstrators, killing 1,100 Palestinians between 1987-1991 (Sela 2012). The intifada lasted six years, ending only at the request of Palestinian leadership after Israel and the PLO made progress in negotiating the Oslo agreements in 1993 (Berry and Philo 2015).

The Oslo negotiations ushered in a time of hope for Israel’s Jewish and Palestinian citizens. During this time, Israel and the PLO signed a set of documents referred to as the Oslo Accords. The goal behind the agreements was to establish a transitional framework for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to begin the process of self-governing (Alkidwa 2019). The accords stipulated that negotiations for a permanent resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would occur within 3 years from 1993. With unclear language and political backlash from extremists on both sides, the provisions outlined in the accords ultimately fell short of realization (Alkidwa 2019). The assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin decimated
the vision outlined in the Oslo Accords, and the era came to a definitive end with the events of 2000 and the onset of the second intifada. Since 1994, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has claimed to be the legitimate governing authority for the Gaza Strip and West Bank, though its current ability to exercise authority is a reality only in the latter. The PA lost control over the Gaza Strip following Israel’s withdrawal in 2006 and the disputed election of Hamas. Since 2004, the PA and the PLO have overlapping leadership with Mahmoud Abbas, as the president of the PA and the chairman of the PLO. Ever since the failure of the Oslo Accords to render peace, both Palestinians and Israelis have lost substantial hope for a meaningful peace agreement with current leadership.

There is no single event that accounts for the building tensions underlying the second intifada; however, one moment served as the catalyst for these tensions to rise to the surface. Ariel Sharon, a provocative Israeli politician serving as the leader of the opposition coalition in September of 2000, triggered the second intifada by entering al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem (Hallward and Norman 2011). Considering al-Aqsa mosque is the 3rd most important site in Islam and non-Muslims are not allowed inside, Sharon’s intentions to provoke a strong response were received clearly. Within days, the intifada spread across Israel and the Palestinian territories, and Israel’s harsh response to mostly-peaceful protesters fueled rage and discontent over policies in the Occupied Territories that many viewed as colonial and illegal (Louer 2007).

The second intifada served as the most significant turning point in the last 20 years. Today, prospects for peace look bleak given the right-wing stances of the Netanyahu administration and the largely illegitimate rule of Palestinian Authority President Mahmood Abbas.6 Tensions within Israel’s borders continue to rise and fall in relation to Israel’s

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6 President Abbas is currently in his 16th year of a 4-year term as president of the Palestinian Authority based in the West Bank.
engagements in the Palestinian territories and neighboring Arab states. There are currently around 1.8 million Arab citizens of Israel making up 21% of the country’s population (“The Arab Population in Israel: Facts and Figures”).

III. Literature Review

Looking first to Israel’s political categorization and identification, this section provides an overview of the discussion on Israel as an ethnic democracy as a prerequisite for citizenship analysis. I then move to outline and contextualize existing scholarly research on integration of Palestinian citizens of Israel into Israeli society and its influence on citizenship experience. Finally, a discussion of gaps in the literature will serve as a reference for the goals of this research and its fit within the field of political science.

Categorizing Israel’s Political System

The debate over whether or not Israel is an ethnic democracy rests at the crux of the relationship between integration and experience of citizenship among Palestinians of Israel. Determining the extent to which integration influences citizenship experience requires an understanding of the existing state apparatus and, as an extension of that infrastructure, the rights, opportunities, and impediments Palestinian citizens of Israel have by law and by practice.

Israel’s existence as a Jewish state rests upon the idea that a Jewish state is necessary for the Jewish national survival. Israel was founded as a home for the Jewish people and is based on Zionism. The state’s official ideology of Zionism understands Jews as the intersection of a religion, an ethnicity, and a peoplehood (Smooha 1990). There is no controversy as to whether or not Israel is a Jewish state with Jewish Israelis serving as the dominant ethnic group. However, there is uncertainty in whether or not the state is a democracy. Jewish, Arab, and otherwise
identifying citizens of Israel can vote in all elections. Residents of East Jerusalem are not citizens and may only vote in local elections (Kook 2017). Israel identifies itself as a Jewish and democratic state, but scholars dispute the extent to which the country is democratic (Rekhess 1993, 2007; Ghanem et al. 1998; Ghanem 2011; Dowty 1999; Smooha 2002). Debates over whether or not Israel is a democracy depend on the definition of democracy that is used to qualify or disqualify the country. While democracy analysis is a nuanced discussion beyond the scope of this paper, a contour of the debate is outlined here so as to highlight the complexity of the term and Israel’s classification within it.

With no obvious or inherent definition, Israel is a country that blurs the lines of many definitions of democracy (Smooha 1990, 1997; Yiftachel 1992, Ghanem 2011). Robert Dahl’s (1956, 1971) seminal works equate democracy with representative government, including processes and institutions centering around free and fair elections. Dalton et. al (2007), however, calls attention to the shortcomings that come with definitions of democracy that focus primarily on scholarly conceptualizations. While scholarly definitions of democracy focus on political domains, public opinion surveys suggest that scholars may be conceptualizing democracy differently than the average citizen in many societies, particularly in developing countries (Dalton et. al 2007). Looking to individuals at the grassroots level, data shows that democracy can be defined as much by its outcomes or social benefits as it can by its political procedures and institutions (Dalton et. al 2007). Among Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa, democracy is widely defined by its freedoms and civil liberties (Dalton et. al 2007). Democracy is more than its electoral and constitutional elements, and individuals judge and understand democracy based on what it yields. Although Israel is not a developing country, it is a deeply divided society in which understandings and applications of democracy are not uniformly
understood or applied. Perceptions of democracy differ substantially at the ground and state level, and this gap widens among the Arab minority in the country (Smooha 2015).

Understanding Israel’s political categorization is necessary to assess the starting point for which integration of Palestinian citizens of Israel is possible. From there, one can evaluate integration’s relationships to citizenship experience within the subgroup of Palestinian citizens in Israel. Although the vast majority of comparative analysts have classified Israel as a democracy since its inception, the tensions between Jewish and democratic elements of the state have provoked ongoing debate and received a large amount of scholarly attention (Gavison 1999; Smooha 1990; Rekhess 1993; Yiftachel 2006). In a study comparing Israel to 24 other democratic states, Lijphart (1984) determined Israel to be in its own isolated category given that it scored very high on certain indicators of consociational democracy and very low on others. Israel is often presumed to be a liberal democracy that belongs to the Western democratic system, but it fails to meet several of the characteristics of liberal democracy, most notably treating all citizens and groups equally (Smooha 1990, 1997). Rather, Israel is a democracy that is distinct from liberal, consociational, and Herrenvolk democracies (Smooha 1997).

*Israel as an Ethnic Democracy*

Aiming to fill a gap in democratic categorization, Smooha (1990, 1997) presented the new model of democracy, called ethnic democracy. Smooha initially advanced two primary arguments, the first being that there is a viable model of multi-ethnic democracy which he calls ethnic democracy. Secondly, he holds that this model applies to and explains the case of Israel as both a democracy and an ethnic state (1990,1997). These foundational works identify the defining characteristics of an ethnic democracy as a combined political system with both viable democratic institutions and a state that separates citizenship from membership in the dominant
An ethnic democracy is not ethnically neutral, and minorities do not share in full autonomy or power-sharing. As such, non-dominant ethnic groups like Palestinian citizens of Israel have incomplete individual and collective rights. Still, these ethnic minorities are allowed to engage in the democratic process to fight for change and better their circumstances (Smooha 1997).

Israel meets the criteria for the procedural definition of a democracy as well as an ethnic state, thus allowing for its categorizing it as an ethnic democracy (Peled 2007). Building on Smooha, Gavison (1999) contends that the Jewish and democratic strands of Israel’s identity are not at odds but rather reinforce one another. The situation of ethnic minorities can improve greatly with direct participation in the democratic change-making process (Gavison 1999). Thus, it is critical for Palestinian citizens of Israel to engage rather than leaving pertinent issues as an internal debate among Jewish Israelis. In 2002, Smooha presented an updated model of ethnic democracy which expands beyond Israel’s specificity and clarifies and updates prior claims. This model maintains that an ethnic democracy is “propelled by a movement of ethnic nationalism that declares a certain population as sharing a common descent (blood ties), a common language, and common culture,” still classifying Israel as an ethnic democracy, but also expanding upon conditions for emergence and stability (Smooha 2002).

Since Smooha put forth ethnic democracy as a typology, critics have challenged Israel’s self-identification and the near universal acceptance of the country as a democracy in conjunction with an ethnic state (Peled 2007; Ghanem et al. 1998). By definition, ethnic states exclude ethno-national groups that are not part of the dominant ethnic group, thus calling into question whether or not any ethnic state can ever be a fully functioning democracy (Smooha 2002; Rouhana and Ghanem 1998; Rekhess 1993). In a critique of Smooha’s use of the Ethnic
Democracy model to explain Israel’s political structure, Ghanem et. al (1998) question the model’s viability, sustainability, and contents. The primary critique of the model is that its classification of Israel as a state with a democratic structure is inaccurately used to describe what is actually an ethnic state with democratic elements.

Moreover, the existence of a larger Arab-Israeli conflict complicates the situation of Palestinian citizens of Israel because of their relationship to hostile external threats, making it significantly more difficult to consider the case as either stable or an archetype (Ghanem et. al 1998; Dowty 1999). While Israel’s situation is neither unique nor particular, it serves as a compounding element linking the ethnic minority to issues of national security (Dowty 1999). Consequently, it is debatable as to whether or not this makes the case of the Palestinian minority unique and prevents the opportunity for a new model to apply in any sustainable manner.

Criticism of Israel’s categorization as an ethnic democracy also points to equality and consent as foundational elements of a democracy, both of which are missing in Israel. The existence of Basic Laws, which deal with issues of land, resources, and education, among others, that openly benefit Jewish citizens to the exclusion of non-Jewish citizens, raise substantial claims of inequality which serve as the basis of this critique (Ghanem et. al 1998). Smooha, however, also acknowledges these aspects, claiming that the democracy is: “diminished by the lack of equal rights,” (2002). This mutual acknowledgement thus calls into question whether or not critiques of Smooha’s model are actually more about varying opinions as to what constitutes a democracy.

Other scholars hold that while Israel may have been an ethnic democracy at one point, it has evolved in ways that no longer allow it to be categorized as such. Since the second intifada, the devolution of the peace process has led to an increase in the ethnic component of the Israeli state and decreased in the democratic element (Peled 2007). These events came with an erosion
of citizenship for Palestinian citizens and other minority groups in ways that have led some
scholars to see Israel increasingly as an ethnocracy rather than an ethnic state. Additionally, the
Citizenry and Entrance into Israel Law of 2003 and its approval by the court in 2006 serve as
indicators of Israel’s democratic decline towards an ethnocracy (Peled 2007). The 2003 law
prohibits the allowance of residency or citizenship status for any Palestinian in the 1967
occupied territories who is married to an Israeli citizen (“The Nationality and Entry into Israel
Law”). Of the scholars involved in this extensive debate, all of them acknowledge the difference
in treatment between Jewish Israelis and other citizens of the state (Ghanem et al. 1998, Smooha

Citizenship of Palestinian-Israelis

Officially, Palestinians citizens of Israel receive full citizenship, and the benefits that
come with it, just as Jewish-Israelis and other non-Jewish minority citizens. Israel also provides a
large number of civil services to its non-Jewish citizens, including Palestinian citizens of Israel
(Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). In practice, however, only Jewish Israelis can fully exercise their
civil rights, making the Palestinian minority effectively 2nd class citizens (Peled 2007). As an
ethnic state, belonging to the Jewish people, not citizenship, defines inclusion in Israeli state
identity (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). According to a UN publication, Palestinian citizens of
Israel meet the criteria of an indigenous minority, but the Israeli state recognizes them only as a
cultural, religious, and linguistic minority (‘The Concept of Indigenous Peoples.’ Department of
Economic and Social Affairs. The UN. Publication). Moreover, several of the Basic Laws — the
constitutional laws of the country which can only be changed by a supermajority vote in the
Knesset—are deemed discriminatory against Palestinian citizens of Israel (Smooha 2002;
Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). The difference with which laws and policies are applied to Arabs
versus Jewish in the state of Israel has been examined in great depth by a number of scholars over time (Khalidi 1997; Haidar 1991; Smooha 2002, 2010). Among them, issues of welfare, education, land, health, and economic development reveal systematic discrimination that favors Jewish citizens over Palestinian citizens and intensifies the potential for crisis. Ultimately, the instability and discretion that comes with Palestinian citizenship prevents any sense of normalcy from taking hold with regard to development (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998).

In Israel, nationality is the primary basis for citizenship in a number of social domains (Mizrachi and Herzog 2011). Thus, national identity is a key aspect of understanding citizenship among Israel’s Palestinians. The identity of Palestinian citizens of Israel includes religion, nationality, and citizenship, all of which complement and contradict each other in various ways. How individuals and groups define their identity sheds light on their understanding of opportunities and desire to engage within the state of Israel. In 2016, a plurality of Palestinian citizens identified religion as the most important aspect of their identity with their civic and national identities following as second and third respectively (Omar 2016). Comprehending the layered identities of Palestinian citizens of Israel allows for a more well-rounded analysis of citizenship experience, particularly given that Palestinian citizens of Israel only having the opportunity to formally participate within Israeli institutions and processes. According to studies on minority self-categorization, the domination of one group in multi-ethnic states increases the salience of ethnic identities (Suleiman 2002). As such, Palestinian citizens of Israel are more aware of their Palestinian identity because of the state’s explicitly Jewish character. Kelman (1999) identifies the interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian national identities as an insurmountable challenge to integration. So long as the assertion that an acknowledgement of one identity requires a negation of the other remains, peace and equality cannot develop in the
state of Israel or in the immediate region (Kelman 1999). Accordingly, Palestinian national identity in Israel remains in flux, thus influencing their citizenship.

A civic-Israeli identity has emerged among Palestinian citizens of Israel in addition to a national-Palestinian one; however, Palestinian individuals deem their Israeli identity as significantly less important (Suleiman and Beit-Hallahmi 1997). Between 2003 and 2009, the percentage of Arab citizens who identified as Israeli Arab decreased from 53% to 39% while those who identified as Palestinian, Palestinian Arab, or Palestinian in Israel rose from 42% to 59% (Smooha 2010). Ethnic groups that aim to integrate into the dominant society must balance this desire with the maintenance of their own distinct culture and values, creating a difficult and ever-changing process of evaluation (Smooha 2010). The same way Jewish Israelis wish to maintain their Judaism, so too do Palestinian citizens of Israel wish to maintain their own culture, language, and identity (Dowty 1999). The Arabic language and cultural heritage are key factors in the national identity of Palestinian citizens of Israel (Suleiman and Beit-Hallahmi 1997). As a non-assimilating minority, long-term stability for Israel as a democratic state requires recognition of Palestinian citizens of Israel as an ethnic minority rather than their current status as a religious, cultural, and linguistic minority.

Group identities in particular are central to citizenship experience (Huddy 2003). Foundational research has recognized the correlation between strong group identities and cohesive political behavior as well as ideology (Miller et. al 1981; Huddy 2013). Consequently, understanding the strength of group identities for Palestinian citizens of Israel lends insight their perceptions and behavior in relation to the Israeli state. In a democratic state system, national identities drive political engagement and increase support for civic norms (Theiss-Morse 2009). Social identities such as ethnicity, religion, and race can precipitate shared perspectives and
points of view that can then lead to political cohesion (Lewis-Beck et. al 2008). Issue-based identities also generate a compulsion towards political action, often resulting in a shared political cohesion based off of a given issue (Huddy 2013). In the case of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, the primary issue would be the development of a Palestinian State as part of an agreement between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority. The Oslo Accords of 1993 further exacerbated the national dilemma of Palestinian citizens of Israel, leading them to repeatedly work for alternative models of minority-majority relations that are preferable to that of the 1948 paradigm (Rekhess 2007). The collapse of the peace process and the outbreak of the second intifada has continued to challenge the civic and national identity of Palestinian citizens of Israel, yet despite this, just over half of Arab citizens of Israel noted they are proud to be Israeli (Omar 2016).

Both individual and collective identity influence citizenship experience (Abu-Saad 2006). Generally, it is Palestinian citizen’s civic identity that promotes engagement in the Israeli political system in order to achieve instrumental needs. This identity is limited and countered by a Palestinian national identity that promotes estrangement from an Israeli civic identity (Rouhana 1989; Suleiman 2002). Koren (2010) identifies intensified conflict with Palestinians and Arabs outside Israel as a motivating factor for Palestinian citizens of Israel to engage politically. An attitude survey conducted by the Abraham Fund Initiative supports this, reporting that worsening racism in Israel increased the desire of Arab citizens to vote (2015). Calls to boycott the 2015 election after Israeli military intervention in the occupied territories, however, led to a decrease in voter turnout, providing evidence which counters this notion (Wermenbol 2019). These boycotts, however, could also be a result of decreased satisfaction with the performance of Palestinian politicians, an actuality which diminishes the dominance of national identity over that
of civic identity when it comes to experiences of citizenship (Omar 2016). At the same time, the formation of the Joint List established itself as a coalition of Arab parties and has since reshaped Arab political engagement by embracing both an Israeli and an Arab identity simultaneously (Omar 2016). Additionally, 2018 is the first year where tension between the right and left outranked tension between Arabs and Jews (Hermann 2018). A public opinion poll reveals that the majority of sampled Israeli citizens viewed the country’s political divide as a more significant issue than the country’s Jewish-Arab divide, marking a change from prior years (Hermann 2018; Smooha 2010). Ultimately, existing dichotomies still act forcefully in preventing the creation of an overarching identity that transcends the barriers of being an ethnic minority in an ethnic state. Thus, an unstable civic identity persists, and the lack of a state-supported national identity obstructs integration via group or national identity.

**Approaches to Development**

While integration is distinct from development, unraveling the progression of Palestinians living in Israel serves as a foundation for analyzing the relationship between integration and citizenship experience. Existing research highlights two primary streams of thought regarding the development of Palestinian citizens of Israel: the Normal Development approach and the Crisis approach (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). Each model parallels and supports the idea that Israel is an ethnic democracy, or not, as they look to evaluate the evolution of Palestinian citizens in Israel. Under the Normal Development approach, Palestinian citizens of Israel have undergone and continue to progress down a typical path of development as an ethnic minority in an ethnic state (Ginat 1989; Smooha 1989, 1990; Landau 1993; Reiter 1995). On the contrary, the Crisis approach argues that the exclusive collective identity of Israel as an ethnic
state nurtures ongoing inequality which prevents expected progress and prohibits normalization with the state (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998; Yiftachel 1992).

The development of Palestinian citizens of Israel falls into 3 primary domains: development with regards to the Israeli state, the relationship with non-Israeli Palestinian people, and internally among themselves. While citizenship experience ties most directly to Palestinian citizen’s relationship to the Israeli state, it is also heavily influenced by the other two domains, as internal and external forces often leverage their weight to achieve certain political goals or actions. The Normal Development approach aligns with identifying Israel as an ethnic democracy and declares that Palestinian citizens are on a typical path of development for a minority in an ethnic state (Smooha 1997). Alternatively, the Crisis approach sees Israel as an ethnocracy where the problems Palestinian citizens face are not the same as those of minorities in Western liberal democracies (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). Rather, Israel has a thin democratic facade that veils a more intense ethnic structure (Yiftachel 2006). The ethnically based political and cultural structure of the state creates an existential quandary where Palestinian citizens cannot develop naturally (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998; Yiftachel 2006). Examining development in these three domains demonstrates the potential, or lack thereof, for Palestinian citizens of Israel to integrate and the results of this process over time.

*Israeli Domain*

Within the domain of Palestinian citizen’s relationship with the Israeli state, the primary notion of the Normal Development approach is that Palestinians recognize and accept their status as a minority and wish to remain within and as a part of the Israeli state (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). Politically, the Normal Development approach assumes Palestinian citizens of Israel aim to work within existing systems to make change and facilitate integration. Advocates of this
approach recognize the potential for Palestinian and other Arab citizens of Israel to advocate for themselves through support of leftist and Arab Israeli political parties along with coalition building (Reiter 1992; Smooha and Peretz 1993). Some scholars go so far as to credit Palestinian citizens of Israel with developing at an accelerated pace due to their proximity to the modernized state of Israel and its Jewish majority (Peres 1970; Landau 1971).

One of the most convincing arguments for the Normal Development approach emphasizes the Israelization of Palestinian citizens, a process which has led them to develop a strong Israeli identity on top of their existing Palestinian identity (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). The fact that such a process can even occur demonstrates an acceptance of Palestinian citizen’s status as an ethnic minority and the existence of the Israeli state as it is (Smooha 1992, 2005). The Normal Development approach holds that the Palestinian minority will seek greater integration into the Jewish state while focusing on democratic change-making efforts to diminish discrimination and improve quality of life (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998).

The Crisis approach counters these conclusions, arguing that Palestinian citizens of Israel face challenges that cannot be reconciled within the domain of the Israeli state. As a result of Israel’s state structure, the Palestinian community within its borders will not be able to achieve the goals for which they strive (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). Israel will continuously and strategically refuse the demands of an ethnic minority for equity and belonging, as meeting such needs would compromise the integrity of the state as a Jewish homeland (Ghanem 2011). One of the primary distinctions between this approach and the Normal Development approach is that ethnic minorities in an ethnic state can never adequately achieve their basic, non-negotiable needs in an ethnic state like Israel (Rouhana and Huneidi 2017; Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). Access to power and resources are restricted without respite in unacceptable and unsustainable
ways. There has only ever been one Arab Supreme Court justice, and there has never been an Arab minister aside from the Minister of Minorities, a cabinet-level position. The lack of access to positions of power is one of many results that come from Palestinian and Arab citizens being seen through a security lens (Frisch 2011). Because Israel’s security serves as the preeminent driver of policies and attitudes of the state, particularly towards the Arab population, the extent to which Palestinian citizens can fully embrace their rights depends on Jewish-Israeli perceptions of the security the situation at any given time. If Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, or outside of Israel-Palestine are seen as a threat, so too are Palestinian-Israelis.

Central to the Jewish aspect of Israel is an amendment to the Basic Laws in 1985 which stipulated that a party must recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people in order to register and participate in Knesset elections (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). This law represents a fundamental divide between those who believe that Israel should be a state of all its citizens versus those who wish to maintain the ethnically-based status quo. Eventually, the Basic Law reached the high court, which deemed it essential to maintaining the Jewish character of the state. In a court case about eligibility requirements for parties wishing to participate in elections, the Israeli Supreme Court deemed acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state as a prerequisite for political party recognition (Dowty 1999).

The decision that came from this case extends far beyond political parties, for the court outlined what it means by “acceptance.” The court determined that acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state requires: maintenance of a Jewish majority, allowance for Jews in the diaspora to immigrate to Israel, and preservation of connections with Jewish communities outside Israel (Ben Shalom v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee). None of these qualities are inherently at odds with democracy, nor are they unique to Israel, as most states in the
international system profess some sort of ethnic aspect in their national identity (Dowty 1999). They do, however, represent the culture of explicit preference towards Jewish Israelis, both in law and in practice. Rouhana and Ghanem (1998) maintain that this reality pushes Palestinian citizens of Israel further down a path of crisis and collision rather than development and integration.

**Palestinian Domain**

In the domain of Palestinian-Israeli citizen’s relationship with the broader Palestinian people and community, the Normal Development approach contents that Palestinian citizens of Israel have developed a relationship with the Palestinian national movement and its constituents in a way that is typical of ethnic minorities in liberal democracies (Smooha 1992; Peres 1970). This approach assumes that the identity of Palestinian citizens of Israel has been clarified and incorporated into a collective identity. Divergence occurs when considering whether or not this Palestinian identity exists in conjunction with an Israeli identity (Smooha 1989) or parallel to it (Gavison 2000), and scholars debate whether or not the two identities are compatible with one another or at odds.

Looking at the national goals of Palestinians within Israel and those outside, the goals have become increasingly similar since the Oslo Accords and the potential for a two-state solution (Smooha 2002). During the Oslo Accords, near universal support among Palestinian — and other Arab — citizens of Israel for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza led to a belief that a mutual agreement among Palestinians and Israelis would solve the challenge of national identity. According to this approach, a two-state solution is seen as the answer for reconciling the tumultuous relationship between Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the diaspora (Smooha 1997; Jurban 1995; Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). Cohen (1990) argued that a
Palestinian state would allow a Palestinian citizen of Israel’s to embrace their Palestinian identity through solidarity to Palestine as an Israeli citizen. Remedying the issue of national identity would then reinforce the Normal Development model with regard to Palestinian citizen’s relationship with the Israeli state.

The Crisis approach, however, pushes back against this rhetoric, seeing it as over simplistic, and idealistic. With the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the second intifada, and the failure of the Oslo Accords to yield any lasting or meaningful change, arguments put forth by proponents of Normal Development are increasingly baseless and outdated (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). The relationship between the Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians outside Israel has always been precarious yet strikingly relevant for matters of integration and citizenship experience. Although, the PLO was considered the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, they never openly claimed to represent Palestinians within Israel. Furthermore, the Israeli state considered the group a terrorist organization until 1991, making interaction between the PLO and any Israeli citizen illegal (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). This leads to the larger issue of that fact that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process consistently ignores Palestinian citizens within Israel’s 1967 borders. Palestinian citizens of Israel are not considered a priority for either Israel’s state or external Palestinian representatives and authorities, rendering them practically invisible given that their interests were never of primary importance to either side. This tumultuous relationship leaves the Palestinian citizens of Israel without anyone to advocate for them, thus creating substantial challenges regarding national identity and inhibiting their development into either Israeli or Palestinian society (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998).
The internal domain of Palestinian citizens of Israel centers on the social, political, and economic challenges that impact the community from within, although the internal is inextricably tied to the external, particularly the Israeli state. Proponents of the Normal Development approach point to the process of political organization among Palestinians as an indicator of significant development (Rekhess 1993; Ginat 1989; Smooha 2002). Political pluralism is identified as a primary indicator of integration, suggesting that the Palestinian citizens of Israel have incorporated themselves into the country’s democratic processes (Gavison 1999). The emergence of various political parties, movements, and organizations led by and for Arab members of Israeli society is seen as validation that Palestinian citizens are represented amidst their diverse preferences and ideologies. Similarly, committees and local municipal groups further represent the political and economic interests of Palestinian citizens of Israel and are seen as legitimate by the people they represent (Rekhess 1993; Rouhana 1989).

Literature from both streams of thought identify internal structures and values within Palestinian communities as factors that exacerbate the difficulties that come from external forces, whether it is the Israeli state or the broader Palestinian and Arab communities (Smooha 1997, 2010; Rouhana and Ghanem 1998, Ghanem 2011). Issues surrounding family structure, corruption, religion, gender dynamics and patriarchal norms are all identified as matters of concern by scholars writing on the issue; however, they are not dealt with appropriately by the standards of contemporary research. While critically evaluating challenges within Palestinian communities of Israel is essential to understanding the overarching situation and potential paths to remedying it, the vast majority of existing reasoning relies heavily on ethnically based stereotyping and sweeping generalizations. Furthermore, a substantial amount of literature fails
to account for the impact of colonization on indigenous communities and their values and practices, leaving a dire need for a more updated and informed analysis of internal factors which promote or inhibit development among Palestinian citizens of Israel. In pursuing research on integration and its relationship to citizenship experience of Israel’s Palestinians, this paper will highlight address the importance of challenges within Palestinian communities of Israel while ultimately relating to the broader Palestinian diaspora and the Middle East as a region engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

**Integration Indicators**

Expanding upon the basis of Israel’s sociopolitical structure, this section will provide an overview of the literature on four key integration indicators with regard to Palestinian citizens of Israel. Doing so provides a necessary basis of understanding for what scholars have researched thus far and what needs further exploration. Here, integration is defined as: the process through which individuals and groups become accepted into society. Integration is a bi-directional process in which the host culture and the minority culture enter into a process of adaptation and negotiation. The relationship between integration of Palestinian citizens of Israel and their political sentiments and actions must be taken in the context of the state apparatus discussed above, for they are not necessarily typical in nature. Beginning with education, and moving to group and national identity, socioeconomic status, and civic service, this paper provides an overview of each realm, reviews existing research, and discusses its connection to citizenship experience.

**Education**

Education is vastly recognized as an integral indicator of integration for minority groups in any given society. In Israel, education for Palestinian citizens of Israel is a cultural crossroad
caught between the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arab citizens of Israel make up more than 20% of Israel’s population, but there is still a palpable separation between them and Jewish citizens of the state, particularly when it comes to education (Shwed et. al 2014). The educational system of Israel is divided into a Jewish system and an Arab system, both of which are further subdivided — the former into religious and secular, the latter into Christian, Muslim, Druze, Bedouin, and mixed (Abu-Saad 2006). Israel’s Compulsory Education Law states that education is compulsory for children aged three to fifteen, and children ages three to seventeen have the right to free education (Law of Compulsory Education, 1953). 49% of its population received at least some higher education in 2018 (OECD 2018). In the past decade, Israel has experienced a number of reforms aimed at improving the quality and equity of education in Israel. The “Oz Le’Tmura” reforms of 2011 follow a series of reforms that failed in 2004 and 2007, demonstrating the controversy and difficulty that come with implementing policy changes surrounding education (Fuchs 2017). Ultimately, the 2011 reforms achieved greater success, leading to an increase in teacher salaries, updated curriculum, and improved standards for education (Taub Center Staff 2015). Overall, Israel boasts the highest number of university degrees per capita in the world, including high rates among Arab citizens.

Although the Ministry of Education in Israel aims to promote struggling students and lessen the educational and social gaps among social classes, a number of studies have demonstrated inequality between the Jewish and Arab school systems (Abu Baker 2003; Abu-Saad 2006). Three types of resources within the Arab school system remain inadequate: shortage of appropriate educational centers; shortage of funded positions; and a shortage of materials required for proper functioning (Abu Baker 2003). Resources and budgetary allocations involve both national and municipal governments, implicating both Jewish Israelis and Arab Israelis in
the current situation which inhibits integration of non-Jewish students in the public school system (Arar and Khaled 2013).

In education, there is a strong and positive correlation between the type and quality of welfare services provided to a particular group and their achievement levels (Abu Baker 2003). The Israeli government recognizes the socioeconomic gaps that stem from the underrepresentation of educated Arab citizens are viewed as a key priority (Hai and Shoham 2013). Still, Palestinian citizens of Israel are less likely to do as well as Jewish students in the Israeli educational system despite recent progress (Abu-Saad 2006; Rouhana 2017). This in turn limits potential for Palestinian citizens to enter higher education or receive employment in key job sectors (Arar and Mustafa 2011). Since 1992, the amount and quality of welfare services provided to Palestinian citizens of Israel has increased, but there are still a number of significant gaps between the outcomes of and resources available to Jewish and Palestinian students (Abu-Baker 2003; Arar and Abu-Asbah 2013). For example, in 2003, 50% of Arab four-year olds were not enrolled in pre-school of any kind whereas only 2% of Jewish children were not (Abu Baker 2003). The percentage gap continues to decrease over time with up to 85% of Arab-Israeli citizens participating in pre-school in 2015 (Taub Center Staff 2012). Still, Arab students are more than twice as likely as their Jewish peers to drop out of junior high or high school education (Kadari-Ovadia 2020).

Arab students also performed disproportionately poorly on the exam used for entrance into institutions of higher education (Abu-Saad 2006). In 2016, 54.6% of Jewish students received a high school matriculation while only 31.2% of Arab students achieved the same success (Hager and Jabareen 2016). With regard to university enrollment, there has been an increase in the percentage of Palestinian citizens of Israel who attend, but structural barriers
remain and are compounded by other marginalized identities such as gender and religion (Arar and Mustafa 2011). A 2017 report from the Taub Center found that there has been significant improvement in the achievement of Arab-Israeli students and that existing gaps have narrowed substantially in the past decade (Blass 2017). Other scholars supported this, identifying a slow but notable trend towards integration in recent years (Shwed et. al 2014). This data, however, is contradicted by data from other surveys that demonstrate a growing gap in educational outcomes between the two groups (Agbaria 2017).

Abu-Saad (2006) links education to identity formation, arguing that the state uses the educational system to repress Palestinian collective culture, history, and identity. By first separating Jews and Arabs, the state purposefully chooses not to integrate the ethnic majority with non-Jewish citizens of the state. In terms of the curriculum, the same law that establishes the right to education also states that the curriculum in all public schools will be based on the values of the Jewish culture. Moreover, students are taught to love and be loyal to the Israeli state and the Jewish people (Abu-Saad 2006). This law promotes Jewish and Zionist ideology while ignoring Palestinian values, culture, and history (Agbaria 2017). Both Arab and Jewish schools provide extremely limited acknowledgement of Palestinian Arab history, and Palestinians are not recognized as indigenous by the state-funded educational system (Lavie 2018). As such, Palestinian citizens of Israel develop a sense of alienation from both the state and their own ethnic background, creating internal tension and conflicting identities. While Jewish Israeli schools stress the development of a national identity, the system inhibits the development of a Palestinian or broader Arab identity. As discussed below, hindering the development of a national identity correlates to stalled integration.
With regard to Palestinian citizens of Israel, data is mixed as to whether or not education makes a substantial difference. Normally, higher rates of education are associated with increased political engagement; however, level of education did not correlate to a higher degree of interest in politics among Palestinian citizens of Israel, nor did it correlate to more positive opinions of Israeli processes and institutions (Smooha 2010). Education also had no effect on whether or not Arab citizens felt they had influence over government policy or not (Hermann 2018). When it came to integration, however, education was key in determining the likelihood that an Arab citizen of Israel would want to integrate into Israeli society and become a part of it: those with higher education were more likely to demonstrate a desire to integrate than those who had only finished elementary school or part of secondary school (Hermann 2018). Arab citizens of Israel with greater education are less likely to approve of politicians who circumvent laws in order to advance initiatives or issues deemed important (Hermann 2018). Perhaps most surprising, there was no correlation between education level and voter turnout among Arab citizens of Israel in the 2015 Knesset elections (Omar 2016). Evidence as to the relationship between education and political behavior is inconclusive, requiring additional study and a greater specificity in group categorization.

**Employment**

Palestinian citizens of Israel are largely underrepresented in key job sectors including high technology, higher education, and security (Keshet et. al 2015; Hager and Jabareen 2015; Weiss 2017). Employment rates among Palestinian citizens of Israel fall below those of Jewish citizens, and a disproportionate amount of Israel’s Palestinian population falls below the poverty line (Fuchs 2017). Despite this, there has been an explosion of Palestinian representation within the hi-tech industry in recent years, yet proportionally there is still a drastic gap between Arab
and Jewish citizens (Weiss 2017). This increase in Arab high-tech employees overlaps with an increase in women—both Jewish and Arab—employed in high-tech (Schneider and Shoham 2018). Though too often ignored by scholars, the intersectionality of gender and minority status compound one another in the realm of employment. In academia, Palestinian citizens have been underrepresented since the establishment of Israel in 1948, and change is slow — only 3% of lecturers are Arab while Arabs make up more than 20% of the national population (Hager and Jabareen 2015).

Contrary to academia, Israel’s public healthcare system is seen as a model for genuinely engaging Arab and Jewish citizens equally both in practice and under the law (Linder 2017). Historically, there is also an underrepresentation of Arab women physicians due to expectations and practices surrounding gender norms and the medical field (Keshet et. al 2015). In recent years, this trend is changing, and Arab citizens of Israel are increasingly represented in the healthcare sector (Halperin et. al 2014). Turning to security, Israel’s dominant sector is almost exclusively dominated by Jewish Israelis, a reality which is tied to military service and the security lens through which the state views Palestinian citizens of Israel (Weiss 2017; Kanaaneh 2008). Even for Palestinian citizens who are stably employed, there are substantial wage gaps between Arabs and Jews (Weiss 2017). In the health sciences and education, these wage gaps are actually positive for Arabs, whereas in economics and STEM fields, there is a substantially negative wage gap for Arab employees (Weiss 2017).

**Land**

Land serves as one of the primary sources of debate and conflict in contemporary Israel, and Palestinian citizens of Israel are no exception. Historically, the establishment of the state of Israel resulted in massive loss of land for native Palestinian communities (Yiftachel 2006). The
current housing shortage stems from the Absentee Property Law of 1950 which enabled state institutions to transfer and control land that once belonged to Palestinians who become either internally displaced persons or refugees (Lavie 2018). According to the law, Palestinian citizens could not come back to the land nor have any rights to it if it was not occupied physically in the time which the state took control (Yiftachel 2006). At the same time, the newly established Israeli state planned to develop the land, often referring to it as empty and seeking to populate it with newly arrived Jewish immigrants (Jabreen 2017).

The Galilee Development Plan of 1975 represents the Judaization of the region which continues to the present day (Lavie 2018). Judaization policies were seen as efforts to increase the Jewish population in areas with a high population or density of Arab citizens. These regional efforts took place primarily in the Galilee region where there remains an Arab majority (Ghanem 2001). The state of Israel has stopped large, aggressive efforts to acquire private Palestinian land, but indirect measures continue impacting land-owning Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Israel is unique in that 93% of the country’s lands are publically owned by either the government, the Israel Land Authority (Minhal), or Karen Kayemeth, also known as the Jewish National Fund (Holzman-Gazit 2007; Yiftachel 2006). As of 2018, Palestinian citizens control less than 4% of the land in Israel’s pre-1967 borders, and the state has not established any new Arab communities despite a growth in population (Lavie 2018). This process created and continues to support a housing crisis that demonstrates a physical, social, and economic impediment to integration. Economically, land is a resource that correlates to status. Socially, land represents independence from the Jewish majority and the ability to survive as a non-Jewish citizen in the Jewish homeland. In the political realm, land-owning families are more likely to hold positions of authority or power in municipal governments (Lavie 2018).
Gaps in the Literature

Existing literature on the development of Palestinian citizens of Israel provides an excellent framework for ongoing research and debate, but a large amount of it is outdated. Despite significant changes in the country and region after the second intifada, a few foundational works and researchers continue to be used as the cornerstones for understanding the situation of Palestinian citizens of Israel and the political apparatus under which they exist. Among more recent literature, understanding of Palestinian citizens in Israel and their situation differs greatly in terms of results and conclusions, exemplifying a need for additional research. Seeing as Israel is still a relatively young country and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still evolving, up to date information is crucial to the ever-changing state of affairs and the volatility of the region.

In addition to a need for more timely scholarly work on Palestinian citizens within Israel, existing literature tends to over-utilize terms and explanations for processes which are distinct. This is most prevalent with regard to development, integration, and assimilation —words that are used as catchalls to describe what is often seen as progress regarding ethnic or migrant minorities. There is an ongoing tendency to conflate integration with development when, in reality, the terms are interrelated yet independent. Development differs from integration in that it is more limited in that it is attached solely to numbers rather than qualitative feelings of belonging. Integration, on the other hand, is more closely related to social inclusion and social cohesion, both of which center around full and equal participation and belonging (Ager and Strang 2008). Even though development is a prerequisite for integration, integration is not necessary for development. The following research takes care to treat integration as a comprehensive variable. By going beyond statistics to examine integration’s impact on
citizenship experience, this analysis is thorough and credible as it contributes valuable knowledge to the academic community.

When it comes to incorporation, there is a clear difference between integration and assimilation. While the majority of Arab citizens of Israel wish for greater integration into Israeli society, an abundance of information has determined that Palestinian citizens of Israel do not wish adopt the culture of the Jewish majority (Smooha 2015; Rouhana 2017). In the past, literature on this topic has discussed assimilation as a process that occurs simultaneously with integration (Peres 1970). While assimilation can be an outcome of integration, it is dangerous to assume that integration implies assimilation or the desire to become more like the dominant ethnic group. Integration is one aspect of assimilation and cannot represent or indicate the process of assimilation in and of itself (Berry 1994). Unlike the definition of integration noted above, assimilation requires no process of negotiation on behalf of the host culture. Recent research more appropriately addresses these terms without associating them with together too closely, but this shift is relatively recent and requires further analysis to fully understand the realities and impacts of integration.

Related to the aforementioned discussion on terminology, a vast amount of existing literature fails to adequately distinguish words pertaining to identity categorization. Arab and Palestinian are often used interchangeably or without explanation to address non-Jewish citizens of Israel. While all Palestinians are part of the broader Arab community, not all Arab citizens of Israel are Palestinian. Some Arabic-speaking Druze and Bedouins choose not to identify as Palestinian, making it important to distinguish who is being referred to when using any given term. The majority of literature on this topic refers only to Arab citizens of Israel, making it unclear as to whether or not they mean to combine Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arab citizens.
of the state or they simply do not know or care to differentiate. Because official determinants of who is Palestinian vary, individual identities are malleable, and these categorizations are highly political, this is a difficult task. Nonetheless, it is imperative to obtain and convey accurate information.

Most significantly, there is a lack of literature that explicitly links integration indicators to citizenship experience specifically regarding Palestinian citizens of Israel. A small amount of literature relates individual indicators to citizenship experience; however, data is heterogeneous and diverse, as seen by the contradicting statistics regarding gaps in education between Arab and Jewish students. Looking at multiple integration indicators together in order to analyze their impact on citizenship experience provides an holistic and up-to-date analysis of the relationship between the two variables. An individual breakdown of specific aspects of integration will remain integral, but this approach allows for cross-comparison as well as a more informed understanding. This paper seeks to fill these gaps by assessing how the integration indicators of education, employment, and land influence Palestinian citizenship experience. By identifying these three primary indicators in the case of Palestinian citizens of Israel and using them to analyze the relationship between integration and citizenship experience, I aim to shed light on a critical aspect of Palestinian-Israeli lived experience. The information examined here will benefit the academic community in the process of understanding how these integration indicators influences citizenship experience among indigenous ethnic minorities beyond the case of Palestinian citizens of Israel and whether or not there are similarities between cases.

There is a lack of diversity in research addressing how integration influences citizenship experience of Palestinian citizens of Israel, and much of what does exist is contradictory. Moreover, there is a tendency to pursue research at the broader level of Arab-Israelis without
further investigation of Palestinian citizens in particular. A greater understanding of integration’s impact on citizenship experience among indigenous minorities in ethnic states will fill a substantial gap in the existing literature. By focusing on Palestinian citizens of Israel and analyzing their qualitative experiences and quantitative realities, this research provides nuance in a field where distinction is essential. Ultimately, the marginal status of Palestinian citizens of Israel requires an analysis of lived experience, particularly when it comes to examining citizenship experience. Assessing the relationship between these two variables will build upon existing research to clarify and expand scholarly understandings pertaining to Palestinian citizens of Israel and provide insight on prospects for peace in Israel and Palestine.

IV. Hypotheses

In analyzing literature on citizenship with a focus on the Middle East, the theme of integration as an indicator of citizenship emerged as a common theme. Given this, I use education, employment, and land as three key integration indicators as my independent variables. I focus on education, employment, and land because of their prominence in the discourse surrounding Palestinian citizens of Israel and their measurability based on a mixed methods approach, further explained in next section. Drawing on the aforementioned literature, I developed several hypotheses individually relating my independent variable of citizenship integration indicators to my dependent variable of citizenship experience.

Regarding the relationship between education and Palestinian experience of Israeli citizenship, my hypotheses are:

$H_1$: Attending an Arab school funded by the state of Israel will correlate to a negative citizenship experience for Palestinians living in Israel.
**H₂**: Receiving education based upon the national curriculum will correlate to a diminished citizenship experience among Palestinian citizens of Israel.

**H₃**: Higher levels of education among Palestinian citizens of Israel will correlate to a more positive experience of citizenship.

My second set of hypotheses build upon the prior set by focusing on the relationship between employment and Palestinian citizenship experience:

**H₄**: Discrimination faced by Palestinians in the workforce will correlate to a reduced experience of Israeli citizenship.

**H₅**: The limited opportunities for Palestinian employment stemming from a strong culture of defense will correlate to diminished citizenship experience among Palestinian citizens of Israel.

**H₆**: Taking ethical concerns into account when navigating the labor force will correlate to a decreased citizenship experience for Palestinians living in Israel.

**H₇**: Working in an integrated environment with both Palestinian and Jewish citizens will correlate to a fulfilling citizenship experience.

Finally, I expect land and space to influence citizenship experience in the following two ways:

**H₈**: Confiscation or attempted confiscation of land from Palestinians to the State of Israel will correlate to a reduced citizenship experience among Palestinians of Israel.

**H₉**: Living in one of Israel’s Arab communities will correlate to a negative citizenship experience for Palestinians.
V. Methodology

My research relies upon a mixed-methods approach including primary fieldwork and secondary data analysis. In January 2020, I conducted an in-depth examination of Palestinian citizenship experience in Israel’s northeastern Galilee region. The primary field site for this research was a Muslim Arab town with a population of about 30,000. I chose this location as my field site for a combination of logistical and methodological purposes. First, the size of the town and its demographic makeup of Muslim Arabs allowed for substantial diversity in my interview pool while still ensuring all informants identified as Palestinian citizens of Israel. Furthermore, by conducting research in the Galilee, I gathered data from the region most populous with Palestinian and Arab identifying citizens of Israel. In doing so, I aimed to draw from a sample representative of the Palestinian citizenship experience in Israel. I used a referral method to identify and recruit subjects. When meeting with informants, I conducted semi-structured interviews and administered a questionnaire aimed at understanding sentiments towards Israeli processes and institutions.

The data used for this thesis comes from ethnographic fieldwork conducted between January 1 and January 28, 2020. In that time, I interviewed 29 Palestinian-identifying citizens of Israel and employed political ethnography to qualitatively document my informant’s perceptions and engagement surrounding their citizenship experience. Based on the literature and the information my informants proved most eager to talk about, I focused on education, employment, and land among other interrelated areas. Before, during, and after my fieldwork, I utilized data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Inter-Agency Task Force on Israeli Arab Issues, the Israel and Palestine Center for Research and Information, the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the
Israel Democracy Index, the United Nations, Adalah, and newspaper archives. When possible, information was gathered specifically regarding Palestinian citizens of Israel; however, often times Palestinian citizens are combined into the category of Arab citizens.

When looking at the relationship between education, employment, and land respectively with Palestinian citizenship experience in Israel, in-person interview data and data from the aforementioned entities served as the primary source of information from which I deduce my argument. To evaluate my data, I used specific criteria to determine whether or not I can support my hypotheses. The criteria are as follows:

Education:

1. **Acknowledges difference in resources, budgets, or funding between Arab and Jewish schools.** This is measured qualitatively by analyzing written and/or spoken comments from my informants and quantitatively based on documentation of numerical inequality.

2. **Criticizes their curriculum for demonstrating bias towards Jewish and Zionist narratives and neglecting Palestinian representation.** This is measured qualitatively through written and/or spoken comments from my informants.

3. **Addresses disparities in educational opportunity and its impacts as a detriment.** This is measured qualitatively using informant interviews and quantitatively based on data reported by institutional and organizational reports.

Employment:

1. **Mentions discrimination in the workforce as a result of Palestinian identity.** This is measured qualitatively based on information conveyed during interviews. It is also measured quantitatively based on data reported by institutional and organizational reports citing discrimination in the Israeli workforce.
2. Refers to the IDF, Palestinian nationalism, or safety and security concerns as barriers to employment. This is measured qualitatively based on Israeli law, informant interviews, and institutional and organizational reports. I also measure this criterion quantitatively based on statistics surrounding military service and security.

3. Cites morals or ethics as a consideration in pursuing employment in the Israeli workforce. This is measured qualitatively based on informant interviews.

4. Reflects positively on working with Jewish citizens or in an integrated workplace. This is measured qualitatively based on informant interviews.

Land:

1. Demonstrates distress over loss or attempted loss of land at the hands of the Israeli government, the Israel Land Authority, or the Karen Kayemeth - Jewish National Fund (KKL-JNF). This is measured qualitatively and quantitatively based on informant interviews and supported by reports documenting the long-term ramifications of land loss.

2. Addresses challenges perceived to apply disproportionality to Arab municipality and their residences. This is measured qualitatively based on informant interviews. It is also be measured quantitatively by data stated in reports documenting the long-term ramifications of land loss.

IV. Overview

Chapter 2 analyzes education as the first of three integration indicators used to assess citizenship experience among Palestinian citizens of Israel. Here, I argue Palestinian citizens of Israel experience diminished citizenship due to insufficient educational resources, biased curriculum, and systemic disadvantages surrounding opportunities for higher education. Chapter
Chapter 3 analyzes the role of employment in Palestinian experiences of Israeli citizenship. This chapter emphasizes the centrality of the IDF and a culture of patriotism rooted in military service as variables restricting Palestinian citizenship both legally and in practice. I determine employment based discrimination forces Palestinian citizens to navigate the workforce with greater intention, taking into account both practicality and ethical concerns. I find employment has detrimental, far reaching effects on their citizenship experience by reinforcing notions that Palestinian citizens are less capable and valuable. This drives them to dissociate from Israeli national identity and, more broadly, Israeli society.

Chapter 4 evaluates the importance of land and space in determining Palestinian experiences of citizenship. Drawing upon the multifaceted engagements of one particularly representative Palestinian family, I demonstrate how the Israeli government uses land and space to consistently and systemically disadvantage its Palestinian citizens. The ongoing housing crisis reveals underlying intolerance and an absence of concern for Palestinian citizens and further diminishes their citizenship by sending the message that their history, belongings, and quality of living are insignificant. Finally, I conclude my thesis with an overarching summary of my analysis and argument. I then address the research implications and provide policy recommendations and propose areas for further research.
Chapter 2: Unequal Education and an Experience of Diminished Citizenship

Education is a primary pillar of Israeli society and the key engine for development. As an indicator of integration, education plays a critical role in shaping experiences of citizenship. Access to and experience of education impacts the overall social, cultural, and political well-being of the Israeli population. Education is essential for accruing economic and social capital, ultimately contributing substantially to civil society (Campbell 2006). Pursuing critical democratic education is exceptionally difficult, particularly in deeply divided societies like Israel. The Israeli public education system is well renowned, yet it serves as a source of tension for numerous identity groups within the country. Most notably, the divide between both religious and secular and Arab and Jewish schools serves as a demonstrable manifestation of social cleavages. Despite legitimate interest in maintenance of separate schools, one such consequence is little to no overlap among identity groups within the public education system (Arar and Haj-Yehia 2016). An Arab student can go through their entire education experience without meeting a Jew in an educational setting, and the reverse is true as well. As an ethnic minority, Palestinian citizens of Israel face numerous challenges in the realm of education.

Israel is well known for its progressive, well-developed education system (OECD 2019). Education is seen as a segue to multifaceted advancement, and the size of the Palestinian-Arab population requires state attention to achieve the desired progress. Most recently, the Israeli government adopted a resolution intended to improve and strengthen the Arab-Israeli sector via an emphasis on education (Fuchs 2017). Contextually, Israel spends one of the highest shares of its Gross Domestic Product on education among the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries: primary, secondary, and tertiary education account for 6% of Israel’s national GDP (OECD 2019). The share of Israel’s GDP spent on education grew at a
dramatic rate of 25 percent between 2010 and 2016, yet the amount Israel spends per student remained below average among peer OECD countries, coming in at 8,891 USD compared to the average of 10,502 USD (OECD 2019). Seeing as education greatly influences character and development, the atmosphere in which Palestinian citizens of Israel learn and grow impacts them significantly. The formal and informal education that takes place at school for Palestinian citizens of Israel cultivates their relationship amongst themselves, their community, and their country.

Israel boasts high levels of educational attainment among its population, yet significant differences remain between Jewish and Arab sectors (Hemmings 2010). These differences are measurable, but, more importantly, they are felt and internalized by Israel’s Palestinian citizens. This chapter focuses on the experience of Palestinian citizens in the following three educational realms: resources, curriculum, and opportunity for the future, particularly with regard to higher education. I use interviews from students, faculty, and staff at a secondary school and a university in northern Israel to look at how education influences experiences of citizenship with regard to resources, curriculum, and opportunity. I expected to find a negative correlation between attending a public school funded by the Israeli state and Palestinian citizenship experience. I also expected to find a negative correlation between learning via the Israeli national curriculum and Palestinian citizenship experience. Finally, I anticipated a positive correlation between higher levels of education and experience of citizenship among Palestinians. Ultimately, my data supports my first two hypotheses while failing to support my final hypothesis. As a result, I argue that structural discrimination and perceived prioritization of Jewish citizens over Palestinian citizens in the realms of resources, curriculum, and higher education contribute to their experience of diminished citizenship. I further content that Palestinian citizens are more
likely to grow up conflicted about themselves and their country and the contradictory nature between Palestinian culture and Israeli national identity. Education plants the seed for a lifetime of diminished citizenship by showing Palestinian citizens they matter less than Jewish citizens, leaving them disillusioned with the state of Israel and its society.

**Resources**

Palestinian citizens perceive an absence of necessary material resources in their educational environment, inhibiting their opportunities for learning and creating resentment towards Jewish schools presumed or said to be well funded. Despite largely impressive educational offerings and statistics, many Palestinian citizens of Israel feel neglected by the education system. They do not see the budgetary advancements touted by the government and the OECD, and their perceptions emphasize what is lacking compared to Jewish schools. The deficit of physical materials necessary for proper education lead Palestinians in Israeli public schools to experience education as second-class citizens who are overlooked and disregarded.

While information on whether or not Arab schools actually receive less funding varies, it is relatively unimportant compared to the lived experience conveyed by my informants.

Fatinah, a high school student in a mid-sized town, speaks candidly about her educational experience. She immediately says that, while she likes her school, “It is nothing compared to the Jewish schools. The curriculum is the same, but the quality here is poor” (Fatimah, student, 20 January 2020). School is very important to Fatinah, and she is close with a number of teachers and administrators. She often works with them on improvement projects such as beautifying the school, organizing trash pick-ups, or making Kanaffeh (a traditional Palestinian dessert) for the janitorial staff. Last fall, she and an English teacher got a group of
students together to paint a mural on a bare wall between the 11th and 12th grade buildings. She tells me about the process, explaining that “Originally, we had one plan, but we had to change it after we realized we did not have paint for all the colors we wanted to use. We had an amazing artist draw the design, but she had to make a different one that was more simple and used fewer colors” (Fatimah, 20 January 2020). Her expression is somber yet strong as she describes the situation, as if she is disappointed but used to things like this taking place. Although this is a small example, it has stuck with Fatimah enough for her to recall it quickly without prompting. Still, she does not dwell on her disappointment, and she pads the story with praise for her education, as if playing by the rules of a game to which I am not yet privy.

In the teacher’s lounge, a high school biology teacher builds upon Fatimah’s thoughts, noting that resources are very different in Arab schools than Jewish ones. He believes the quality of teachers is better in Jewish areas in addition to the facilities. At his school, many of the teachers are young, and he feels they do not have enough experience to be teaching high school students during such a formative time in their lives. As a 63-year-old man, he has taught for almost 40 years. Ironically, he too started at a very young age; however, he believes times have changed since he began his teaching career. He believes that now many young people go into teaching because it is accessible, though he does not mean that in a positive sense. His experience has led him to believe that the government does not care about who teaches Palestinian students, so anyone — including young, unqualified people — is able to get a teaching job. Over the past 40 years, he explains how he has seen further neglect of Arab schools as the area where he lives and teaches becomes more and more Jewish (Interview with Biology teacher, 9 January 2020). By this, he is referring to the Judaization of the Galilee. The process was a government project that encouraged Jews to populate the primarily Arab part of the
country known as the Galilee in the 1970s. Driven by state policy intended to prevent a Palestinian-Arab core from becoming stronger within the country’s official borders, the government implemented a multi-stage effort to increase the Jewish population in the mountainous Galilee region (Falah 1989). Though ultimately only minimally successful, the strategy did increase the Jewish population in areas where it was previously almost non-existent.

The biology teacher continues by emphasizing that he is too rarely valued for his work and experience, a statement made with seemingly equal regard to his co-workers and the broader system of which he is a part. He loves teaching and refers to it as his calling, yet he wonders how much longer he can stay on in this capacity. To demonstrate why he often has such thoughts, he refers to a conversation he recently had with the principal about receiving more materials for his labs:

Right now, I am planning for a chapter on cell biology. I do this every year, as it is required for students to learn about, and I always teach it the same way. Lots of things have changed in science, but cell biology is not one of them. At least not for anything at the high school level. So to teach, I always use a certain few demonstrations. It is difficult to explain, but the materials are rather basic. It engages students in a unique way and helps them learn by exploring the cell themselves. This year, I was told no. For the first time! I could not believe it. When I asked why, he said he did not have the money for my department. I checked with the other teachers, and they said they also had limited funds for laboratories and demonstrations. It is very sad for the students. And this is for a mandatory subject! I feel bad for the students interested in art or cooking or horses. We have no courses for them. I am not sure if Jewish schools do or not, but I think they do. They always have more than us because there are more of them and they are a priority. (Interview with Biology teacher, 9 January 2020).

An English teacher further addressed the lack of resources for students, especially those with learning differences. One of her students has trouble with reading — he mixes up the letters and words, making it difficult for him to keep up in reading, writing, and literary studies. She does her best to help him, but she is not sure how to fix his problems, as she has never experienced a student from whom this is so difficult even in high school (Interview with English teacher, 12
January 2020). A few days later, she tells me that the student heard about my research and would like to share his experiences. The student explains that he cannot receive accommodations because he has never been able to receive a diagnosis from a doctor. Based on hours of Google searches, he believes he has dyslexia. Few people in his community have ever heard of it. His grades are okay, but he spends much longer completing work than his friends. Although university is a dream for the student, he worries about the amount of reading and writing he will have to do. He said that he thinks the school is supposed to have someone who can help him with this, but he has never heard of any person like that.

Another student focuses on the issue of overpopulation. They explain how, in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, there is severe overcrowding in Arab schools. Here, “we are a bit more lucky, but it is still an issue. Class sizes are large, and all the teachers teach all day” (Interview with Mahmood, 16 January 2020). Several teachers confirmed this, noting how key it is for them to show up and not get sick or have family obligations that interfere with school. One math teacher explains that when a teacher is sick, it is very difficult to find a replacement for the day. Instead, everyone must cover for them. Teachers end up combining classes and abandoning lesson plans to accommodate the extra students. During exam season, it makes it difficult for students and teachers to prepare. The lack of human capital resonates with most of the high school teachers I speak with during my fieldwork with 83% mentioning challenges related to the number of classes they teach per day, the difficulty of finding a substitute, or the number of kids per class.

**Budgets**

In all three accounts, a lack of adequate resources ties directly to money. Budgets are essential to the public education experience. Since government provides public education, public

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7 The average class sized I experienced at this high school is 25-30 students.
schools serve as the backbone for most Palestinian families’ daily interaction with the state of Israel. Budgets are the foundation for resource allocation, and, like most other things, they are highly politicized. There is a great deal of controversy surrounding public education budgets in Israel due to varying perceptions and clashing or contradicting data as cited in the prior chapter’s literature review. Even the process of understanding how budgets are allocated is complex with few people feeling confident enough to provide insight. One history professor passionately explained:

The way money is allocated, funds are distributed from the top down by the national government to local governments. Local governments then have a certain amount of discretion as to where money goes and how it is spent, but there are a number of rules and guidelines. For education, our officials get almost no say. It is merely a formality that they even get to look at the budgets. And sometimes, depending on the town, the budget for education is combined with budgets for other things. I don’t know how each town works exactly. But there is a lot of corruption. Of course there is corruption among the Jewish officials at the top, but it is also here, in our communities. No one wants to talk about that. Either way, it is people like me and my students who suffer. And the free health clinics and food programs and homes for the town elders. (Interview with History Teacher, 14 January 2020)

Layla, a graduate school student involved in human rights work, echoes similar sentiments, building upon the history teacher’s comments with a specific example. She speaks to me in a bustling Aromas between classes, and her voice gets quieter as she talks about a case regarding the Ministry of Education where judges found the government guilty of giving more money to Jewish areas than Arab ones. She does not specify which case she is referring to, but she says it is one of the only cases surrounding discrimination in education budgets that made it to a high court. There are an endless number of justifications as to why the schools and the budgets are the way they are. Layla has heard many of them from friends, professors, and colleagues, but she does not care for these justifications because the end result is the same: Palestinian citizens like

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8 Coffee shop similar to Starbucks.
her get less over and over. Layla sees money as power, and considering this, she clarifies that the reality she describes makes perfect sense to her — the government does not want Arabs gaining any more power than they already have (Interview with Layla, 13 January 2020). Following our conversation, I found dozens of reports supporting her claims. Scholars and organizations document examples of discrimination in the budget via larger class sizes and fewer enrichment hours in Arab schools (Khan 2009; Arar and Mustafa 2011). Regardless, the marginalization Layla feels influences her attitude towards the state, leading her to vow never to take a job in the government. Her awareness of budgetary issues cultivates distrust within her as it adds another example to her list of why she perceives herself as a second-class citizen.

As a counterpoint to Layla, a former center-left Knesset member commented, “I have seen the budgets. They’re the same. There’s no difference. The only reason there would be a difference is if one area has funding for a specific project that’s been approved” (Interview with Israeli politician, 4 January 2020). From her perspective, not only are the budgets fair and equal based on population, but young people across the board are beginning to feel they have more of a voice. She sees more Jewish Israelis being openly critical of Netanyahu and right wing parties while Arab citizens identify with Israel more proudly than ever before.

The disconnect between her words and Layla’s is stark. As a formerly prominent public figure in Israel, the words of this politician likely reflect the perceptions of many Israelis. For Layla, this is part of the issue: “Even the well-intentioned Jewish Israelis don’t really get it. We, my people, we are so misunderstood” (Interview with Layla, 13 January 2020). Time after time, my informants demonstrate an attitude of defeat when talking about prominent Jewish politicians and public figures. Feelings of misunderstanding permeate across conversations and locations, serving as a common thread regarding both education and life more broadly.
**Representation in Curriculum**

In order to maintain a reasonable standard of education, the Ministry of Education implements a national curriculum for all public schools in the country. The vast majority of schools in the country are primarily government-funded, including the schools designated for Arab citizens (Hemmings 2010). The way Palestinian citizens of Israel are represented in instructional materials is a topic rife with controversy. Textbooks, exams, assignments, and officially recognized celebrations or memorials incite a response for what they do or don’t include, who they do or do not represent. For teachers, students, and principals in one town, the issue is often on their mind. Issues of representation seem to be a particularly present issue for students and educators in secondary school. Here, students are able to start thinking for themselves and recognizing what is missing or how it diverges from what they already know outside the classroom. Mr. Said is the principal at a high school in an all-Muslim town in the Galilee. After teaching at the school for more than 10 years, he is now in his first year as the principal. He finds the position “difficult but enlightening,” and he has “come to know more about the education system in the last 6 months” than in the decade prior (Interview with Principal Said, 13 January 2020). With regard to the curriculum, he finds:

Local Palestinian input is purely a formality. All the big decisions are made at the national government, and they are made almost exclusively by Jews, even though there is a process for our direct local representatives to provide feedback in theory. History and textbooks are very biased. The knowledge is not practiced the way it is written because it is not our knowledge. The style is not suitable to the culture of the people. They learn things that are irrelevant, and this keeps a lot of students from achieving to the best of their abilities. Teachers come, give the lesson, and then go home. I believe we need to treat students more holistically. There needs to be an approach that validates their identity while teaching them math and having them read classic stories. Education in Arab schools is not the way it should be. It has to do with what is written in the books, but it is also about behavior, family problems, violence in the community...etc. The fact that our people and our story is [sic] not represented causes problems for the students and the teachers. Some of the teachers don’t want to teach and some of the students don’t want to learn if this is what they must learn. When people are busy with these problems, they
cannot focus on obtaining knowledge. I try to work with teachers and students on this, but we need a system that makes this in the program from the start. (Interview with Principal Said, 13 January 2020)

Fatimah makes the important distinction that curriculum is the same for both Jewish and Arab schools. However, just because the curriculum is the same does not mean it is fair. On speaking about this, Fatimah describes her perception of the curriculum:

I see that the subject of history is the only unfair topic, but for me it is also the most important one because it is the basic right for us to learn about our history, not just the history of others like the Jews. There are a lot of mistakes in the books that are not in line with our principles and ideas, but they [the government] want them to be in our books. It feels like we do not have a chance to learn from many sides, only the one side that is approved by those who make the textbooks. (Interview with Fatimah, 20 January 2020)

Yousef, another student at the school, provides a different take on the issue. He does not feel like he is at a disadvantage culturally, and he believes the schools do a fair job of presenting information, but there is always room for improvement in the curriculum (Interview with Yousef, 11 January 2020). Though strong in his beliefs, Yousef is in the minority among students I spoke to on the topic.

One of the most significant issues for Fatimah is the way the national curriculum addresses Israel's day of independence on May 14. For Zionists and supporters of the country around the world, the day marks an unlikely miracle of Jewish statehood and calls for celebration. For Palestinians across the world, the day is referred to as the Nakba. The day that is a celebration for some is a tragedy for the Palestinians whose lives changed forever with the declaration of Israel’s independence. For the majority of Palestinian living in the pre-1948 borders of Israel, Israel’s independence led them to flee the country or become internally displaced persons. Generations later, the impact and consequences for Palestinian citizens and their families and friends are still felt deeply. To celebrate a day associated with such immense pain for a large portion of Israel’s current population makes students like Fatimah incredibly
uneasy. Mourning for what is lost amidst a day of national celebration pits Palestinian citizens of Israel against the state in which they reside (Interview with Fatimah, 20 January 2020).

Fatimah adds that there are rules around what Palestinians can and cannot do on this day. In 2011, Israel passed a law stating that any institution receiving public funds can be financially penalized if they publicly mourn the Nakba on Israel’s Independence Day (“Nakba Law”). For proud Palestinian citizens, this law serves as a form of erasure, reminding them that their community and its history is secondary to that of Jewish Israeli patriots. Ayman Odeh, the current leader of the Joint List,9 contends that this law proves the Nakba is a continuing phenomenon rather than a single historical event (2018). Institutionalizing the celebration of Israel’s independence while penalizing commemoration of a day that changed the lives of over 700,000 Palestinians provides a yearly opportunity for Palestinian citizens in the public education system to see first-hand how their histories are quashed in the name of patriotism. Mentions of Israeli Independence Day in textbooks and in national celebrations make Palestinian citizens in mourning experience cognitive dissonance as they see one thing yet feel another.

The lack of Palestinian and broader Arab representation in Israeli public education materials fuels a disconnect among groups in Israeli society, leading to many Palestinian citizens of Israel feeling unjustly cheated of a formal education that represents them. Palestinian and Arab citizens grow up knowing all about history, language, and culture from the Israeli perspective, but that perspective leans Zionist and Jewish-Israeli. Thus, the Palestinian citizens with whom I spoke experienced their public education as inherently biased toward a favorable view of the country’s existence and a set of historical facts which support that view. While

9 A political alliance of Arab political parties in Israel. Formed in 2015, the Joint List aims to strengthen the number of Arab members of Knesset by overcoming an increase in the minimum election threshold for a political party to gain seats in the legislature.
Palestinian students are therefore aware of a history that may not align with their community’s narrative, Jewish students do not have the same experience or opportunity to learn about narratives which do not align with those set forth by the state, at least not formally. Consequently, Palestinian students experience a rift in their identity as a result of Israeli public education. Students are forced to choose at a young age as to who and what they believe when presented with conflicting facts. This process of choosing often involves making choices between the education that is so strongly valued in their community and the culture and histories of their people. The difficulty of these choices pressures young Palestinian citizens to negotiate their identities at an early age, sending the message that they must choose between their Israeli and Palestinian selves.

**Education as Opportunity**

Education is often seen as the key to a successful future. The same way Israel as a whole takes education seriously, non-Jewish communities view it as essential to a life of success in the country. For Palestinian citizens of Israel, education serves as an opportunity for a successful career and life in an otherwise tumultuous environment. The importance of education is commonly acknowledged in the Galilee region among Palestinian-identifying citizens of Israel with 93% of those I interviewed rating it as important or highly important. One such interviewee worked as another principal at a secondary school in the lower Galilee region of Israel between Haifa and Akko. He addressed his experiences as a student as well as a professional in the field of education. As he progressed through various institutions, his journey in the education system highlights his relationship to identity and citizenship:

Growing up, I went to Arab schools just like everyone else in my town. I don’t really remember much about them. It was not until high school that I realized what it meant to be an Arab Muslim man living in Israel. I started to learn about the history of this country.
while experiencing its present in my everyday life. I walked around the city and started to think about how the police looked at me. One time, some young soldiers intimidated me. It did not line up with what the textbooks said about Palestinians being the aggressors. In 1991, I went to Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Most of my friends were Jewish and they lived together and ate together and worked together. It was almost as if we lived the same lives in different bodies. Things were totally different, and I did not think about my identity so much during that time. It was the period with Rabin, and there was much more hope and good relations between Arabs and Jews. My education here gave me so much. I visited lots of towns and learned about so much, even if it was not directly related to my studies — things like Jewish and Christian holidays. I got to pursue my PhD in this country, and I am very thankful for that. It gave me lots of opportunity. But I have realized that it gave me less opportunity than I thought it would at the time. The situation changed after the second intifada. We were the children of Oslo, and then suddenly people are getting killed for simply opening their mouths and demonstrating in 2000. It was the same situation as Land Day in March of 1976. By then, I was teaching, and I watched the world change before my eyes. Having a PhD did not mean anything unless you were for the state or against the state. It was like I had to take a stand on certain issues in order for my degree to be considered relevant. I did not want to be so political, I just wanted to teach children. But these events forced me to form opinions and take sides if I wanted to continue in my profession. I stopped talking and working so much with my Jewish friends and colleagues. Now, the situation is very bad under Netanyahu. He is a very dangerous person because he knows how to divide people very well. While he has improved the education and economic system for Arabs, he has increased the gaps among Arabs and Jews and encouraged hatred. He has been successful and because of this, I cannot say I am confused about my identity, though my thoughts of it have changed lots over time. My schooling made me feel a part of this country, but for the children today at my school, Netanyahu has made it very clear to them what they are. They are Arabs first and Israeli citizens second. I don’t think any amount of education can change that anymore. (Interview with Principal Ajmal, 19 January 2020)

The ever-changing political situation in Israel makes it difficult to know how long any given perception or reality will be true. Principal Ajmal talks about his education in reference to what is going on in the broader socio-political scene because the two cannot be separated from one another. For Principal Ajmal, education has been both an equalizer and a system of distinction. Past experiences gave him hope for the role of education as a unifier among Jewish and Palestinian citizens. Now, however, the thought of unity feels naively aspirational. Still, he maintains hope that higher education is a space with increasing potential as more Palestinian citizens gain admittance to colleges and universities in Israel.
Higher Education

Rates of higher education among Arab citizens of Israel continue to increase, yet many of the structural roadblocks that influence citizenship remain, particularly in the realm of identity formation through education (Arar and Haj-Yehia 2016). Ahmad, is a star student in his final year of school, and he is well known in the community. When I spoke with him, he was in the process of studying for exams that will help decide his future: “I take my studies very seriously, and I am grateful to be able to learn here. Right now I am studying for the Bagrut and Psychometric exams. They are very important. I want to be a surgeon or go into high tech, but I also love music. First, though, I must focus on getting good scores on these exams” (Interview with Ahmad, 11 January 2020). The Bagrut is a set of national matriculation exams used to evaluate whether or not a student has successfully completed high school in Israel. Students spend years studying for the Bagrut exams, which assess their understanding of mandatory high school subjects necessary for the certificate of matriculation from secondary school. With regard to the Arab population in Israel, education metrics have increased substantially, particularly for women (Fuchs 2017). While the share of Arab men in Israel who qualify for a Bagrut certificate has increased, it has not increased as much as the share of Jewish men in Israel, therefore widening the educational gap and the benefits that come with it (Fuchs 2017).

The Psychometric Entrance Test, a standardized test comparable to the SAT or the ACT in the United States, is used for admittance to institutions of higher education. The Psychometric, as it is colloquially called, is heavily weighted for university and college admittance, along with the Bagrut. The exam has eight sections, but only six are included in the final score: two quantitative reasoning, two verbal reasoning, and two English evaluations. The test can be taken in one of five languages, including Arabic. However, many Palestinian citizens of Israel still feel
they are at a disadvantage for the exam. It is argued that the psychometric exam discriminates against students from minority or underprivileged sociocultural backgrounds (Abu-Saad 2006; Ayalon et al. 2008). A study by the National Institute for Testing and Evaluation affirms this in its finding that the reading speed of students reading in Arabic was slower than that of students reading in Hebrew (Eviatar et al. 2016). The study states that, “Hebrew speakers read texts, on average, more quickly and precisely than Arabic speakers (Eviatar et al. 2016). In large part, this is due to the existence of both formal and informal dialects in Arabic. As a result, Arabic readers must distinguish amidst a larger vocabulary and forms of spelling for the same number of words. Moreover, passages become 16% longer when they are translated from Hebrew to Arabic, making it so that there is more physical content to digest in the same period of time (Eviatar et al. 2016). There are now three fewer questions on the verbal reasoning part of the Psychometric test in the Arabic version (Eviatar et al. 2016). Still, the existence of the English sections poses further questions regarding fairness. All schools in Israel learn English and Hebrew; however, English is a second language for Jewish Israelis and a second or third language for Palestinian citizens of Israel. Arabic is not mandated in public schools, though it is offered in some Jewish secular schools as an elective option (Interview with Joe, Tour Guide, 23 January 2019). As a result, students in Arab schools must learn an additional language in an academic manner upon which they will then be tested, whereas Jewish students can focus solely on Hebrew and English.

While Ahmad’s English is near perfect, many of his peers struggle to speak well in Hebrew and English in addition to their native Arabic. Even for those who do know Hebrew fluently, everyone I spoke with felt more comfortable reading, writing, and speaking in their mother tongue of Arabic. Ahmad was one of the few students who did not express worry over
the language aspect of the exams. He and his peers have spent years taking exams in Hebrew, and he feels even more confident in his grammar and understanding abilities in English. Contrary to Ahmad, Fatimah feels that language, culture, and other structural barriers will continue to impact her educational experience.

My sister has really shaped my perspective. She decided to study psychology, but part of her acceptance was an interview. She had very good scores and everything else that she needed, but she was turned down. They will never say it is because she is Palestinian, but it is known that the people doing the interviews judge Arabic accents. Also, there are no Arabic universities. I mean, there are no universities where you can take all your classes in Arabic. I would like to see one in her lifetime, but I do not think it will happen. Maybe there is a college that has this, but colleges are less favorable than universities. They are much easier to get into. I have many friends who want to go to university but will not because they do not feel confident enough to learn entirely in English or Hebrew. (Interview with Fatimah, 20 January 2020)

Here, the question of educational opportunity as it pertains to citizenship relates to a controversial new law in Israel. The Nation State Law serves as a link to thinking about how what is true on paper regarding education impacts Palestinian’s experience of citizenship in Israel. Enacted by the Knesset in July of 2018, the Jewish Nation-State Law is the most recent Basic Law added to the Constitution, and it does three major things. First, the law states that the right to exercise self-determination in Israel is unique to the Jewish people. Second, it establishes Hebrew as the country’s sole official language. Finally, the Nation-State Law proclaims Jewish settlement as a national value, vowing that the state will work to establish and develop these settlements. The implications of the Nation-State law are multifaceted; however, they do impact students’ perceptions of their identity and relationship to the state within the context of formal education. Among other dimensions, the Nation-State law demoted Arabic from an official language to a “special status” that is beneath Hebrew (Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People 2018-5778). Moreover, it is a law that must be taught in school along with reading, writing, and government.
The law codifies Jewish supremacy within the state of Israel, and teachers are expected to teach it such that students know the Jewish people have a historical and sovereign right to the land of Israel (Waxman 2018). The Nation-State Law embodies larger feelings of cultural exclusion described to me by many secondary school students. Fatimah stresses that laws like this further strengthen her identity as a citizen of Israel by making her and other Arabs who speak Arabic better than Hebrew feel like outcasts (Fatimah, student, 20 January 2020). Several students expressed that this law made them feel “less than” Jewish students with the same citizenship designation. Alia, an 11th grade student in Tamra, felt that “This law makes it feel like the government doesn’t care about my people. I wanted to think that things had changed since my parents went to school and felt this way, but it seems they have not” (Interview with Alia, 11 January 2020). The temporality brought up by Alia echoes larger concerns about change, and whether or not education gives or takes away hope for the future of Palestinian citizenship. Based on the Nation State law and its integration into the public education system, the outlook is bleak for students like Alia. When students learn government policy like this in the classroom, many are reminded that years have passed but nothing has changed for their community. Education as a form of awareness thus relates to hopelessness and a sense of loss. Learning about the Nation State law does not facilitate acceptance or promote inclusion of the Palestinian citizens residing within Israel. Rather, it nurtures exclusion and ingrains feelings of “otherness” into Palestinians with Israeli passports. Despite having the same passports, these citizens learn both formally and informally that they are not the same as Jewish citizens of the state.

According to one member of Knesset, the Nation-State Law is “unnecessary” because it doesn’t say anything new (Interviewed on 26 January 2020). For many Palestinian citizens of
Israel, however, that is not the case. One Palestinian-identifying politics professor believes it is disingenuous to suggest that the Nation-State Law does not usher in change (Interview with University Professor, 16 January 2020). The 2018 law sends a clear message to Israel’s Arab citizens — this state is not for you, and this land is not yours. In reality, large portions of the law are already normalized in practice; however, documenting them in codified law increases the stakes. Now, courts must abide by them as well, and challenges to that which was already practiced are no longer acceptable. Of my 30 informants, all expressed concern over the law. The percentage was split approximately half and half between those who believed it would change how people like themselves are treated in practice. Among those who expressed particularly grave concern, 80% had some level of higher education and 59% held a career in political science, law, or human rights. The tendency for those with higher education showing greater concern about the law shed light on the relationship among education and citizenship experience via trust and respect for the government and its institutions. Among my informants, closer proximity to the legal system correlated to heightened distrust for and concern of the state.

**Conclusion**

Fatimah, the biology teacher, and the English teacher all convey an overall belief that things are getting worse for schools like theirs. Trends in recent research directly counter this, as do a number of leading academics in the field of integration of Palestinian citizens of Israel, yet this is their experience nonetheless. Whether or not what my informants told me is true or not matters less than the fact that, to them, it is real. Overarching trends and statistical analysis pale in comparison to lived experience. The experiences mentioned here reveal a dismal view on the availability of both human and material capital in the education system. For Fatimah, education
is a privilege she does not take lightly, but that does not mean she cannot and should not be able
to ask for what she believes her Jewish peers receive. In theory, education allows young women
like Fatimah to define themselves and develop an identity of which they are proud. In practice,
however, Fatimah’s educational experience is often at odds with her culture, family, and desired
experience as a Palestinian citizen. Such dichotomies create a rupture in what may otherwise be a
cohesive relationship with public services provided by the Israeli state.

In talking about aspects of worth, the biology teacher reflects a larger attitude that
Palestinian citizens are not valued. Thus, feelings of exhaustion are understandable. To him, a
considerable amount of extra effort is required to achieve even basic desires such as materials for
a demonstration. Whether it is with his own teaching experience or the ability of his students to
learn in creative, meaningful ways, the teacher’s comments indicate a sense of defeat. Such
sensations correlate to a common narrative of the Palestinian people, one that emphasizes
destruction of a homeland, a people, and a sense of opportunity. Sentiments surrounding
resources centered on feelings of secondary consideration — secondary compared to other
professions, to other schools, to the Jewish majority. The lack of resources for special education
builds upon the notion of secondary citizenship realized through academic experience. Students
like the one who self-diagnosed themselves with dyslexia know that there should be someone
who can help them; however, that does not mean that there is.

In regard to higher education, there is a sense that one can use schooling and degrees
to make up for what they experience as a sub-par identity. While none of the students or teachers
I spoke with suggested giving up their culture as a means of achieving more positive educational
experiences, many talked about education as a way of overcoming cultural or ideological
deficits. There was a pervasive sense among high school students that more education will
correlate to fairer, more equal treatment in Israeli society. Unfortunately, the very education that they must go through in order to achieve this expected goal alienates them from their culture and identity as Palestinian citizens of Israel. The existing education system accentuates disparities and inequities by erasing Palestinian representation, narratives, and histories while highlighting Jewish ones. As such, students develop a distaste towards the state and learn that, in order to preserve crucial pieces of their own identity, they must be at odds with official notions of what is real and correct.

Even amidst appreciation for the opportunity to receive an education and aspirations for higher education, delegitimization served as a recurring theme from students and teachers identifying as Palestinian citizens. Amidst a perceived — and often actual — lack of resources, controversial curriculum that erases Palestinian narratives and histories, and structural roadblocks within institutions of higher learning, education can lead Palestinian citizens to internalize their position as second-class citizens. Despite this serving as the most common experience conveyed to me during my fieldwork, it is not universal. As shown by students like Ahmad and Yousef, some Palestinian citizens of Israel do not find education to negatively impact their citizenship experience. Furthermore, higher levels of education among my informants did not result in a more positive relationship with or perception of the Israeli state. On the contrary, the majority of those with a higher education associated their discontent with their treatment in Israeli society with the knowledge and experience gained from graduate school. Ultimately, education remains as a key segue to another integration indicator related to citizenship experience: employment.
Chapter 3: Navigating Employment and the Israeli Workforce as a Palestinian Citizen

Amidst Israel’s strong and developed economy, distinct gaps exist in unemployment rates, fields of employment, and treatment in the workforce between Palestinian and Jewish citizens. Palestinians are an integral part of Israel’s labor market, yet the contemporary employment arena presents systemic challenges for Palestinian citizens as they navigate the national economy in relation to their personal identity. Institutional and individual barriers originate from historical decisions riddled with fear of the other and a desire to maintain Israel as a Jewish homeland. Biased laws and unjust practices alter the realm of employment for Palestinian citizens, facilitating socio-economic gaps and feelings of inferiority.

Palestinians are not the only minority group to experience discriminatory employment practices; however, the reasoning and implementation of employment-based inequality stems from concerns unique to Israel as a young Jewish state in the Middle East. Security concerns are paramount for Israel, as the country has repeatedly needed to resort to armed conflict to maintain and defend its existence. Although security remains a significant and valid concern for Israel, the matter has come to serve as an overarching justification for inequality. Over time, narratives surrounding safety and security gave rise to preferential treatment towards, and opportunity for, Jewish citizens. This reality is most evident for Palestinian-identifying citizens living and working within the Green Line, as seen by the rift in socio-economic status and employment statistics. Despite ongoing difficulties, Israel has initiated attempts to address concerns and develop a path forward.

Over the past decade, the Israeli government significantly increased efforts to close socio-economic gaps between Jewish and Arab citizens, including Palestinian-Arabs. Strengthening both the ratio and standard of Arab employment is viewed as essential to closing
existing gaps and progressing Israel’s economy overall. According to the Israeli Democracy Institute, the under-employment of Arab-Israelis translates into a loss of 31 billion NIS\(^{10}\) per year (“Employment Among Israeli Arabs”). A number of national efforts aimed to challenge disparities in Arab-Israeli employment with varying levels of success. One such effort is the Collective Impact Initiative by the Inter Agency Task Force on Arab Israeli Issues in partnership with the government. This initiative focuses on improving opportunities and services for Arabs in the business sector by working with companies to promote internal change (“Collective Impact Partnership for Arab Employment”). Still, the vast majority of these efforts align through their focus on incorporating the Palestinian-Arab minority without truly integrating them (Sa’adi 1995). Full integration would look like systemic change meant to decrease bias and discrimination while providing increased opportunities for Palestinian citizens without demanding or expecting assimilation to Israel’s Jewish or Zionist character.

Despite progress in employing Arab-Israelis, Palestinian citizens still lag behind the national average in key measures. The discrepancy is particularly marked among Arab women — only 32% of Arab women were employed in 2016 compared to 81% of Jewish women (“The Arab Population in Israel: Facts and Figures 2018”). Arab women are most likely to be employed in either education or healthcare, with 58% falling into one of the two categories (Israeli Democracy Institute Arab-Jewish Policy Forum 2011). The gap among Jewish and Arab men is substantially smaller with 83% and 77% respectively (“The Arab Population in Israel: Facts and Figures 2018”). While cultural differences between Jews and Arabs may in part account for the size of the gap in women’s employment, the number of ultra-orthodox Jewish women serves as a balancing counterpart. The same way the employment rate is higher for Jews than Arabs, the

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\(^{10}\) Abbreviation for the Israeli currency called the Shekel
unemployment rate is an average of 1.6% higher among Arab citizens (Israeli Democracy Institute Arab-Jewish Policy Forum 2011). Furthermore, Arabs hold only .3% of middle and senior level management positions at Israel’s leading companies (Schifrin 2016). The number of Palestinian women in leadership positions remains small in Israel at .06% (Schifrin 2016). Compared to Palestinian women in other Arab countries where 5% of women hold mid-high level positions, Israel’s percentage is disproportionately low, yet again demonstrating how factors other than culture are at play in employment statistics (Hai and Shoham 2013).

When comparing data in key job sectors, employment of Arab citizens is growing but still far from proportionally representative. High technology is the fastest growing sector in the Israeli economy, averaging 8% annual growth (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). In 1965, the hi-tech industry accounted for 37% of Israel’s industrial product — in 2012 the industry accounted for nearly 80% (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). The number of Palestinian citizens employed in the hi-tech sector has grown substantially in recent years, but they still only comprise 4.5% of the field (Ziv 2019). Further, the majority of Israel’s employment opportunities reside in urban areas, disconnected from Arab communities. While the impact of city planning will be addressed in the following chapter, the fact that Palestinian citizens are concentrated in the periphery of industrial and urban centers makes it harder for them to physically and socially access the country’s economic core. The physical location of Arabs also leads to fewer employment opportunities because of unequal access to public transportation and thus ability to access employment beyond one’s community (Haj-Yahya 2017). One of the many results of this is that Arab-Palestinians are overrepresented in low-wage and labor-intensive industries such as construction and agriculture (Heider et al. 2009). More than 80% of Israel’s
Arab citizens work in jobs with difficult physical conditions, often jobs which take place in rural or developing parts of the country (Haj-Yahya 2017).

This chapter demonstrates the ways Palestinian citizens of Israel face discrimination in employment preparation and options in addition to addressing what underlies their lack of career choices. Going into my fieldwork, I expected to find a positive correlation between stable employment among Palestinian citizens of Israel and their citizenship experience. I anticipated that participation in the Israeli workforce would positively correlate to Palestinians embracing their Israeli citizenship status, and I expected this to be particularly true for Palestinians working in an environment with both Jewish and Arab Israelis. I also expected employment-based discrimination to negatively influence the citizenship experience of Palestinian citizens living and working in Israel. As a linguistic, religious, national, and ethnic minority, I predicted that Palestinian citizens navigate the workplace and the labor force differently from Israel’s Jewish population due to their intersecting and often conflicting identities.

The reality I found is significantly more complicated. Here, I argue that Israel’s strong culture of defense disadvantages Palestinian citizens in the realm of employment due to the role of the IDF. Palestinian citizens’ situation is compounded by discrimination, limited opportunity, and ethical qualms surrounding the labor market. Together, the fusion of these elements reduces the quality of citizenship experienced by Palestinians in Israel. Military service and the culture it creates serve as the largest institutional block to equal employment opportunities for Palestinian and Jewish citizens of Israel. The benefits and connections that come from serving in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), combined with the fact that both the labor market and institutions of higher education adapt to accommodate mandatory service, demonstrate the value placed on military service and the subsequent accompanying employment rewards. Since Palestinian
citizens are not required to, and mostly do not, participate in military service, they lose access to moral, social, and monetary capital intricately tied to employment opportunity. The values created, reflected, and perpetuated by Israel’s military reflect larger societal attitudes which crush Palestinian potential and contribute to workforce experiences that diminish Palestinian citizenship. Israel’s defense sector further combines with discrimination in higher education and hiring practices to force many Palestinians into unskilled jobs of convenience and easy availability. Those who choose to pursue employment based on personal interests are susceptible to economic hardship and further alienation from Israeli society. Finally, the discrepancy in prospects and realities for employment of Palestinian citizens between academics and Palestinian citizens themselves reveals the strong disconnect between elites and common citizens. This disconnect fuels the reality that the citizenship experience of Palestinian citizens is lessened by the very fact that it is so often misunderstood.

**The IDF as a Foundation for Discriminatory Employment**

Military service serves as a form of explicit as well as covert discrimination impacting employment among Palestinian citizens of Israel. To analyze the relationship between the IDF and employment and how it impacts citizenship experience, one must first understand the foundations of the IDF. Founded in 1948, the IDF began as a people’s army. Today, it is a professional military that serves as the backbone of Israel’s existence as a Jewish state in a hostile neighborhood. With 6 major wars in 72 years, the IDF is one of the world’s most tested armies. The IDF contains three branches — ground, air, and navy — all of which function under unified command. Israel’s government website outlines the security objectives of the IDF as “defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State of Israel, deterring all enemies, and curbing all forms of terrorism that threaten daily life” (“Who we Are: Mission and History”).
The IDF also aims to reinforce peace agreements, coordinate with the Palestinian Authority to ensure security in the West bank, and lead the war against terrorism within Israel and across the country’s borders. Overall, Israel’s defense forces look to maintain safety and proactively prevent hostility.

Israel’s Defense Service Law (1959-5719) determines military service in the country. The law states that military service is compulsory for all citizens of Israel, even those with dual citizenship or those living abroad either temporarily or permanently. Exemptions discussed below are crucial to understand the lack of Palestinian Israeli participation and their impacts.

Military service applies to citizens and permanent residents with no distinction between men and women aside from the amount of service required time-wise — women serve a minimum of two years and men a minimum of three years. Upon reaching the age of 16, the law orders citizens and permanent residents to register with the Israel Defense Services (IDF) and undergo a medical examination at age 17. In 2008, the Knesset passed the Reserve Service Law and Bill (2008-5768). Doing so redefined the IDF’s reserve force by outlining its goals and capabilities in addition to readjusting the ages in which soldiers are considered of military age. Per the bill, women are in reserve until age 38 and men remain until age 54.

The IDF is deeply trusted and respected by the majority of Israeli citizens. As of 2019, 90% of Jewish-Israelis trust the IDF, making it the most trusted Israeli institution in the country (Hermann et al. 2020). A much smaller percentage, 20%, of Arabs trusts the military, down 21% from 2017 reports (Hermann et al. 2020; Hermann et al. 2019). The large gap among Jewish and Arab citizens is intuitive; however, the severe decrease over the course of two years calls for further analysis considering that no large-scale conflict took place during this time. Surprisingly, Arab respondents had equally low levels of trust in their municipal and local authority. Given
that the majority of Arab citizens live in mixed or Arab-only cities and towns, low levels of trust are demonstrated across the board, not just with military or predominantly Jewish institutions (Hermann et al. 2020). Trust among Arab citizens of Israel is decreasing overall, going from 20.8% in 2017 and 18.1% in 2018 (Hermann et al. 2019). This wider level of distrust speaks to Arab and Palestinian citizens’ overarching experience with the state and its structures, something discussed in the following chapters.

Part of what makes the IDF particularly trusted is its historical involvement with a variety of national-civilian missions (Guy 2010). These missions receive multi-partisan support by prioritizing and directly addressing Israeli citizens themselves, thus reinforcing pre-existing high levels of trust in the military. Moreover, there is a strong association between levels of trust and perceptions of corruption among both Jewish and Arab citizens (Smooha et al. 2010). At 82%, a large majority of Jewish Israelis finds that the IDF upholds high levels of moral and ethical conduct in its work (Hermann et al. 2020). Meanwhile, 57% of Arab respondents to the 2018 Israeli Democracy Index find the IDF to be very corrupt in both financial and moral terms (Hermann et al. 2019).

Amended in 1986, Articles 39 and 40 of the Defense Service Law are of particular relevance as they announce exemptions from military service (1986-5748). Only two primary groups are exempted from military service: Arab-Israeli citizens and ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students. The 1986 law also exempted married women, pregnant women, women with children, and women who could adequately prove that, for reasons of conscience or religion, they could not serve without being severely aggrieved. A number of amendments to the law have changed valid exemptions, including the addition of a small number of people who are categorized as delinquents. Under Article 46a, those who avoid military service without proper exemption are
subject to 5 years in prison and additional punishment (Defense Service Law 1986-5746). In practice, the government and its security forces demonstrates inconsistence in how and when it follows through on the punishments provided in Article 46a (Grinberg 2007). For that reason, the number of people avoiding conscription has increased in recent years (Grinberg 2007).

Given the rules outlined by the Defense Service Law, most non-Jews are not required to serve in the army (Kaplan 2015). Despite this, some non-Jews do volunteer. Druze men are conscripted in the same fashion as Jewish men due to the Druze tradition ofpledging loyalty to whatever country in which they currently reside. Some Christian Arabs and sects of the Bedouin community also choose to voluntarily enroll in the IDF (TOI Staff 2016). In her work, Kanaaneh cites a prominent Israeli academic who addresses the situation of Arabs in the military and makes a critical distinction:

Except [for] about a dozen...volunteers no Palestinians serv[e] in the Israeli military. Druze and Circassians are drafted and several hundreds of Bedouins (and perhaps some Arab Christian) serv[e] as volunteers. However, to the best of my knowledge, none of them perceive themselves as ‘Palestinian.’ Understanding Arabs in the military is a different matter from Palestinians. (Israeli academic cited in Kanaaneh 2008)

Typically, Palestinian citizens of Israel consider the army as an oppressive tool directed towards Palestinians in Gaza and the West bank. As such, Muslim Arabs almost always refrain from choosing to join the military — in 2013, the number of Muslim Palestinians serving in the IDF sat at 10. That number rose to over five dozen in 2017, yet it is still only a miniscule fraction of a percent of those within the identity group (Goldman 2017). One Arab politician notes the importance of looking at the demographics of Palestinians who join the IDF, as 52-54% come from households living under the poverty line (Corbin 2016). In congruence with the BBC documentary *Israel’s Arab Warriors*, research suggests that Palestinian citizens may join the army because they see no other option and are looking for a source of upward mobility through
national integration. Among the roughly 1.8 million Arabs in Israel overall, the percentage of those who serve is tiny, usually around 1%, and the vast majority are Druze and Bedouin men (Corbin 2016).

Israel also has the National Service (Sherut Leumi), an alternative form of voluntary labor for those who cannot serve or are otherwise exempt from the IDF. The National Service program originated in 1971 as a substitute for military service for religious young women (Sherer 2004). Originally, it came into existence as the result of an intense debate between secular and religious Jews. Religious Jews did not want girls in their community participating in the military and aimed for full exemption, yet secular Zionists thought it was unfair for them to completely abstain from supporting the country and its goals (Rappaport et al. as cited in Sherer 2004). National Service was the result of compromise. Volunteers who choose to engage in the National Service are assigned various placements where they work intensively in a professional environment. Presently, the National Service attracts those who do not serve in the IDF for religious, moral, or medical reasons, among others. Similar to the IDF, there is a relationship between participation in the National Service and societal benefits (Chinman and Wandersman 1999), including employment.

When I asked my informants about the prospect of IDF service, their answers were largely similar in that they were brief and negative. Most hardly said anything about the IDF beyond condemning it and stating that they would never join. As one high school student told me, the idea was laughable (Interview with Jamal, 11 January 2020). I found it surprisingly difficult to obtain further, more in-depth information, a challenge that speaks volumes itself. The IDF is generally something Palestinian citizens do not speak about with regard to themselves and their involvement. Instead, it is spoken about in the context of violence and low moral standards.
Furthermore, it is generally not a topic for debate. It is expected that Palestinians view the IDF unfavorably because its targets are primarily Arab, and Palestinian in particular. Hakim, a Palestinian-Israeli high school student, describes the IDF as an army that dehumanizes and brutalizes those it considers as ‘other.’ He sees the Israeli military as humiliating to Palestinians like himself who are often and unfairly punished, hurt, or accused. Hakim believes the IDF is a great danger to peace among Arabs and Israelis and that the conflict will not end until the Israeli military changes its old ways. Overall, Hakim’s sentiments are blatant and in strong opposition to the Israeli Defense Forces. Many share his views, but others do not see the IDF in terms that are as black and white. One young Palestinian woman straddles the divide, providing a nuanced perspective on Israel’s military:

Personally, I do not see the IDF as a good thing. But I should also say that I do not like armies anywhere, that is not who I am. The way I see things, armies are bad. But the IDF is special because I live here and am a Palestinian. As a lawyer I am very interested in wars and conflict and justice. Being involved in human rights makes me aware of what is going on here and I only see the bad that the IDF does. There are lots of violations against people, and many of those people are other Palestinians. So that makes it much more difficult for me. But not everyone feels like me. And just because I do not like the IDF does not mean I do not like all of the soldiers. One of my best friends is a Russian Jew and he served in one of the elite groups in the IDF. We disagree a lot about this, but he is still my friend, and I still respect the guy. For others in my community, they see it [the IDF] as an occupation army, and I do understand why because they are in the West Bank and around Gaza and they should not be there. Our people have so little and now Israel wants that too. They should not have anything to do with that. And international law says that too. But many [Palestinian citizens of Israel] cannot say this because they will be seen as bad Israelis and they would be maybe being called by the police or punished somehow. This makes it very difficult to be a patriot here. Our situation is very complicated. We are Palestinian, there is no denying that, and we do care what do[es] happen to other Palestinians across the world, that is part of that. As for Israeli, I don’t know. I seriously don’t know. I cannot tell you if I am Israeli or not. The IDF makes it very hard to feel Israeli. (Interview with Palestinian Human Rights Lawyer, 21 January 2020)

This lawyer’s comments provide insight into the immense difficulty that comes with navigating Palestinian identity as an Israeli citizen. Regarding the military, there is an unspoken expectation
that the IDF is detrimental, if not outright evil, and many feel they cannot speak out against it even if they disagree. The IDF is a huge part of the national consciousness and an immensely formative time for those who serve in it. Consequently, Israel’s military is ground zero for Palestinian citizens feeling they do not belong. The mission of the IDF is perceived as contrary to freedom for Palestinian citizens yearning for liberation from an oppressive state. The role of the military in securing post-service opportunities like higher education and employment, providing long-lasting benefits to soldiers, and reinforcing rhetoric that promotes discrimination and bias against Palestinians exacerbates the impact on a deteriorating Palestinian citizenship experience.

**IDF as a Link to Employment**

There are three primary manners where the IDF links to employment: benefits, age restrictions, and connections. The advantages that come from serving in the Israeli military tend to come at the expense of Palestinian citizens both directly and indirectly. More and more, military service is used as a tool for excluding Palestinians citizens, including when it comes to preparation and consideration for employment. Overall, IDF service yields benefits for Jews that Palestinian citizens cannot access.

**Benefits**

Those who serve in the IDF are entitled to benefits during and after completion of service. Formal benefits include special grants for education and subsidies for tuition, housing, and business expenses (Kretzmer 2019). During their time in the military, undereducated soldiers are encouraged to upgrade their level of education at no cost. Furthermore, language instruction is provided to anyone who does not feel comfortably fluent in their Hebrew skills (“Who we Are: Mission and History.”). Upon completion of one’s military service, veterans become eligible for
an additional set of benefits, each of which is meant to ease the transition back into society as a civilian. The Discharged Soldiers Law of 1988 provides that soldiers who have served for at least three years are entitled to 900 NIS per year for 3 years following their service (Kretzmer 2019). Referred to as a readjustment grant, the money is seen as compensation for time served, somewhat compared to what soldiers otherwise would be working and earning out of service. The public, including those who do not serve in the IDF, pays for this compensation.

Furthermore, soldiers and their families are eligible for subsidized university fees. Several of my Palestinian informants expressed particular resentment toward this benefit. Nura, a current university student, told a story about comparing how much she paid for tuition compared to one of her Jewish friends who served in the army. By all accounts, Nura and her Jewish friend came from the same socioeconomic background and received many of the same scholarships. Eventually Nura realized she was still paying a substantially larger amount than her friend. When she confronted her about it, the friend said it was because she received additional money from her time in the army. Nura had no idea the army helped with educational pursuits until then. She said she knew that soldiers received many “unspoken” benefits and an exit stipend, but not help with their subsequent educational pursuits until then. She said she knew that soldiers received many “unspoken” benefits and an exit stipend, but not help with their subsequent educational pursuits until then (Interview with Nura, 16 January 2020). Kanaaneh (2008) confirms that student loans and scholarships are inferior for students who have not served in the military. Considering the ties between higher levels of education and better employment opportunities and placement, monetary-related educational benefits disadvantage Palestinian citizens who do not serve (Haider et al. 2010).

Veterans also benefit from government housing assistance, an issue that demonstrates how meaningful military service benefits are and how they stretch beyond service. While housing is further elaborated on in the next chapter, the role of IDF service in providing
economic benefits relates to where Palestinian citizens live and, thus, what jobs are most easily physically and intellectually accessible to them. For example, a policy established by the Ministry of Construction and Housing requires banks to determine the size of a mortgage loan in part based on proof of military service via a military identification number (Kretzmer 2019). The policy is supposed to be limited to three years following completion of military service, but banks generally disregard this. Together, these monetary benefits both overtly and indirectly disadvantage Palestinian citizens in finding and keeping suitable employment. For Palestinians struggling economically, they may choose to pursue a career that is more immediately helpful rather than one which requires further education or is focused on the long-term. On the contrary, soldiers who receive readjustment benefits may be more secure in their financial situation and able to pursue preferable employment opportunities with long term preparatory requirements.

Age Restrictions

The way Israeli society more widely accommodates military service further impedes the educational prospects and employment opportunities for Palestinian citizens. One such example is the implementation of minimum age requirements for university programs or acceptance into certain academic fields and clinical professions (“Universities Continue to Place Barriers on Entry for Arab Youth” as cited in Hai and Shoham 2012). Age restrictions may require that job applicants be a minimum age, usually anywhere from age 19 to 21 depending on the job. The intent behind the restrictions is that most all Israelis will be available at these ages because they will be done with their mandatory military service. However, because Palestinian citizens do not serve in the IDF, they generally enter higher education at age 18 or 19. Building on her example in the prior chapter, Fatimah explains how the age restrictions impacted her intention to become a doctor:
For a long time I wanted to study medicine, but then I learned about the age that you need to be. For certain majors you need students to be 21. Medicine is one of these. It is 21 because that is when Jewish men get out of the army. They do not even make it fair to Jewish women, but it is most unfair to Arabs and Palestinians who do not go to the army at all. Even though a disease doctor is what I want to study to become, I cannot wait so many years. I need to get a job and support my family more quickly. I do not know what I would do for some many years without school. You need a university degree to get a good job here, but many of the good options are not available to us because of rules like this. (Interview with Fatimah, 20 January 2020)

Medicine, social work schools, nursing programs, and physical, occupational, and speech therapy are among fields that commonly employ age restrictions, although rules vary from school to school (Hai and Shoham 2012).

Degree programs and entry-level positions will often cite maturity level as another justification for minimum age requirements (“The Council for Higher Education’s Plans to Enhance Arab Citizens Access to Higher Education: Progress and New Priorities”). Although rarely stated explicitly, such justifications are in line with the underlying assumption that military service provides a unique opportunity for development and discipline training, allowing young adults to be properly ready for advanced educational studies only once they have completed their patriotic service. The message this sends to young women like Fatimah is that, regardless of age, she will never be truly ready or competitive for the job she dreamt of for years. Hurdles like this one lead many elite Arab-Palestinians to leave Israel and go abroad to places like Jordan for higher education because, assuming they meet merit requirements and have the funds to travel, they can start in any field immediately following high school (“Higher Education for Arab Citizens of Israel: Realities, Challenges and New Opportunities”). This sends the message that, as a Palestinian, one must leave Israel in order to most easily and fully fulfill their aspirations even if they are an Israeli citizen.
Overall, age restrictions create a substantial barrier for Palestinian citizens of Israel. These restrictions ultimately impact Palestinians’ ability to receive a degree first of all, which in turn negatively impacts their ability to garner employment in a number of competitive fields. For a democratic country where freedom and possibility are supposedly defining characteristics among its citizens, structural impediments like this one reveal how the citizenship of Palestinians in Israel falls short of full citizenship.

Connections from the IDF

While the IDF is first and foremost a military enterprise, it also provides vital social and professional networking opportunities that serve long-lasting purposes. The Israeli army sees it as an obligation to foster cultural ties and unity among its various units, brigades, and chosen communities (“Who We Are: Mission and History”). Furthermore, soldiers become very close with one another as they share living and working spaces, creating friendships that form the basis of their social network as young-adults. The psychology of shared experience boosts connection even further, especially considering the intense expectations and duties associated with the military (Siebold 2007). While Jews and other minority groups who serve in the military have the chance to take part in building these valuable networks, Palestinian citizens do not.

Jaber and Salim are two Palestinian men in their mid 20s. Both young men are employed and, unlike the majority of my informants, they work in predominantly Jewish sectors. As a civil engineer, Jaber works in Haifa for a large company. He is the only Arab member of his team, and he is also the youngest. Working here is a privilege, but it has not been easy. It took Jaber three years to move up to a position that takes most people only a few months to attain. Based on his self-evaluation, there is no reason it should have taken so long to receive the expected promotion. The amount of time it took hurt even more because some Jewish members of his
team joined after him and yet earned promotions in less time. Jaber knew it was risky to confront his supervisor about the situation, so he decided to approach an older Jewish man in a mid-level position.

Jaber recounts his conversation with the older man, explaining how the man told him that he should not be surprised — this just is the way it is and Jaber must get used to it. By this, the man meant that Jaber would likely continue to face struggles as a result of his Palestinian identity. As a man who is visibly brown with a Levantine Arabic accent, it is not difficult to tell that Jaber is Palestinian. Eventually, Jaber befriended one of the men who leapfrogged him originally, and he discovered information that filled in the missing gap. One of the people appointed to the board of this company served in the military with this man’s brother. When the board member was told about his friend’s brother sending in an application to work for the company, he promised to keep an eye on him (Interview with Jaber, 15 January 2020). Without realizing it, the man who told Jaber this revealed his role in a much larger cultural phenomenon. Preference by and for those with military connections goes a long way in Israel, making it difficult for people like Jaber to succeed on merit alone.

Salim shared a similar experience in his job as a technology assistant working in the mixed city of Acco. Contrary to Jaber, Salim worked with a number of other Arabs, including some who also identified as Palestinian like himself. Salim’s issue came in the form of client assignments. Oftentimes, when someone on his team was dispatched to help at an event, program, or home, someone at the company had a personal connection to someone on the customer end. When this occurred, the person with the closest and strongest connection was given the assignment. The average number of monthly assignments someone received then played into their paycheck each quarter. Over time, Salim noticed a trend. Not only did he and
the other Arab members of his team consistently receive fewer assignments, but those who did get the assignments most often knew the client through an either familial or military context. Given Salim’s upbringing in Acco, theoretically he should not have been at a disadvantage in the familial arena. The military arena, however, showed Salim the difficulty of competing in a small, primarily Jewish country where a surprising number of people are either related or somehow connected through the IDF. Whether it was an old commander, a fellow soldier, or the friend of a friend someone served with, Salim found himself and his Arab co-workers losing out on assignments to equally or lesser qualified Jewish employees who had substantial military connections. The impact on Salim’s paycheck led him to actively consider whether or not he could afford to stay at a company who assigned work on this basis (Interview with Salim, 23 January 2020).

Jaber and Salim are just two examples of Palestinian individuals who came to understand the power and relevance of connections made in, by, and through the IDF. The use of connections is hardly distinct to Israelis who served in the IDF; however, what makes connections stemming from IDF service distinctive is the fact that so few Palestinian citizens serve in the military, preventing them from having the training and networks gained through this experience. Even when Palestinian citizens gain employment, they are seen as lesser qualified simply because they have not served in the military. The influence of connections stemming from networks built in the IDF is not something that can be easily proven by data or written rules. Rather, it is an informal consequence Palestinians face as a result of their not serving in the army. Although the consequence is implicit, its impact on Palestinian citizenship experience is still demonstrably real. It makes it significantly harder for Palestinian citizens to succeed in jobs where, in terms of training and preparedness, they may be equally qualified as their military-
serving peers. The often inadvertent bias against Palestinians and towards well-connected Jews or others who served in the IDF generates a culture where Palestinian citizens feel consistently inferior. The equality so fundamental to Israel’s identity as a democracy does not manifest for Palestinian citizens who experience covert discrimination in the workplace. Ultimately, the role of the IDF and the culture it breeds yields the formation of a national consciousness which elevates soldiers to a higher status while normalizing stigmatization and discrimination against Palestinian citizens who do not serve.

**Passion vs. Practicality in Israeli Workforce**

Currently, structural discrimination requires the majority of Palestinian citizens to choose between passion (personal interests) and practicality when it comes to employment. Palestinian citizens are forced to fill gaps in the labor market that are otherwise deemed unpopular or are particular to their own majority minority communities, thus preventing further integration into Israeli society. Omar’s education and career trajectory reflects these decision-making processes as he describes his process of navigating higher education and the job search. Omar was one of the first Palestinians from his town to receive a university education. Barriers to employment build closely upon issues regarding education outlined in Chapter 2, especially given the ever-increasing number of jobs in Israel’s economy that require skilled labor. In this sense, Omar was lucky to have the opportunity to study at a university instead of a regional college. He went on to study as a pharmacist in graduate school, eventually becoming one of the first Palestinians in the Galilee region to achieve such an accomplishment.

Even as a young adult, Omar knew a degree in pharmaceutical studies would serve him well because his community lacked any pharmacists. Part good citizen and part financially astute member of a minority, Omar chose to pursue a degree because of its potential, not because of his
interest in the field or passion for the topic. He went on to open the first pharmacy in his town, and he still runs it today as part of a family business. When asked how he likes his job, Omar focuses on its practicality, commenting that “it pays for the food and the electricity, and I am able to help other members of my family when they need it, so I cannot ask for more” (Interview with Omar, 9 January 2020). Observing Omar in his pharmacy made it clear that he cared about his work, but throughout the afternoon he never expresses a passion for his job. Rather, he sees it as a duty and an obligation that he is happy to fulfill. In 2017, Omar was among the 51% of Arab men working in their field of study (“The Council for Higher Education’s Plans to Enhance Arab Citizens Access to Higher Education: Progress and New Priorities”). Omar is privileged, yet his story still reflects the difficulties that come with choosing an occupation based on what is needed in an already under-served community. Through his work, Omar takes on the responsibility of providing for his community in ways that go beyond his occupation. His career as a pharmacist carries the weight of his education and dedication to his community. By all accounts, Omar could have used his graduate degree to do something more lucrative or to strive for upward mobility by leaving his primarily working-class town. Instead, he filled a gap in his town’s economy by providing a service for other Arab-Palestinian citizens like himself, even if he sacrificed his passion.

Unlike Omar, Zara has 3 different jobs, and she also takes classes at the local college. Zara is a young Palestinian woman working as a teacher, a tour guide, and a shop clerk at a local department store. She talks about each of her jobs and how she came to have them, starting with her position as shop clerk. She got the job as a teenager in order to help support her family. The money isn’t good, but she could walk there from her old house before she had a car, and some money was better than no money. Now, she hardly works there because she is so busy, but
sometimes she will pick up a shift when she needs some extra cash. Teaching is Zara’s primary job. She talks about how she came to be a teacher and how it defied her expectations for what she would end up doing as a career:

I studied in university for something completely different, but there were no jobs for that when I graduated. It just so happened a high school in my town needed teachers, and I had very good English. So they hired me as an English teacher and helped me get my certificate to teach. It was not very difficult, but I think I also adjusted easily to the work. This is never what I thought I would end up doing. I don’t mind it, but I can’t imagine doing it for my whole life. No way. This is just a stepping-stone to bigger and better things. I want to do way more with my life, but it hard as a Palestinian living in Israel. There are not so many opportunities. Most people work in the same place they live. I am lucky our town is large so there are more options, but it is still nothing compared to a large city. If I go there, though, I will be competing against people who are not Arab, and my chances of being hired will be lower. No one will say this to you when you interview, but everyone knows it. I am not sure I will ever be able to do what I want to do, but I am on my way there. During school breaks, I work for an Israeli tour company. At first I wanted to lead trips inside the country, but they told me no. No one will come to Israel and want to be shown around by a Palestinian Arab. So instead, I lead trips for Israelis to Eastern Europe. I love to travel and talk to people, so it’s great, but it is sad that I cannot lead my preferred trips. This is why I want to start my own tour company. The thing is, this is not so realistic. My boss is right, even if I do not want to admit it. No one will want to sign up for my tours unless I completely hide that I am Palestinian and just pretend to be Israeli! (Interview with Zara, 17 January 2020)

Zara’s situation demonstrates the suffocating and ever-changing nature of employment for Palestinian citizens of Israel. In order to succeed, she must embody a number of different skills and personalities, some of which highlight her Palestinian roots while others purposefully hide them. Although more than 70% of Arab-Israel citizens who qualify for a matriculation certificate study subjects associated with a potential for high future wages in high school, a large percentage of Arab Israeli women pursue academic degrees in the field of education — 42% of Palestinian Muslim women end up in education compared to 16% of Jews who study the same subjects (Fuchs 2017).

By all accounts, Zara is good at what she does. Her students love her, her boss at the department store says she is one of the best employees, and one of her fellow tour guides says
Zara is a natural. Despite this, Zara knows her chances of realizing her career goals are slim because of her two aspects of her identity are assumed to conflict. Regardless of whether Zara originally saw her Palestinian identity at odds with her Israeli identity, society has repeatedly sent her messages that they are inherently contradictory. As a result, Palestinian citizens like Zara cannot fully utilize their potential or meaningfully develop themselves and their communities, and Israel suffers overall due to this underutilization of its Palestinian citizenry. The process of pursuing employment based on availability and “appropriateness” reveals larger concerns of feeling trapped by a country that does not allow women like Zara to be fully themselves. Despite living in a country which labels itself as free, democratic, and developed, Palestinian citizens are shown through the employment process that the catchphrases of Israeli society do not apply to them equally. This leads to citizens like Zara feeling stuck and consistently unsatisfied regardless of their talents and abilities. The message this sends reinforces the message young Palestinian citizens like Fatimah receive — if you want to reach your full potential with support from the state, this is not the place for you.

*The Ethics of Choosing a Job*

Notwithstanding difficulties, some Palestinian citizens make career decisions based on an ethical duty to assist other Palestinians or the Palestinian cause, yet they do so at great risk. While availability and practicality influence how Palestinian citizens navigate Israel’s labor market, their positionality creates an added layer of ethical concern when considering a career path. Most of my informants chose their career path based on what seemed most sensible at the time. Financial reward served the primary concern. A few, however, prioritized ethical considerations over availability and practicality because of a drive to contribute to Palestinian
society within Israel in particular. Hiya and Maha are two such women. Hiya runs a theater
company in a mid-sized Muslim Arab town in the Galilee region of Israel. She talks about the
nature of her job, how she came to be involved in theater, and she sees it as meaningful to herself
and her larger Palestinian community.

I’ve worked for 20 years at the theater. I studied at Tel Aviv University, but I am
Palestinian. I am an actress, but I did not study theater at first. I did not always think this
was possible, to do this and have this space. I do this because arts and theater can change
the world. Now most people have hopped on board with this. It was not always like this.
Of course not when I started here. No one understood why I did this. I am an actress in
Arab Palestinian community running a theater and studying for more education. This is
not so common or accepted. At first I wanted to go into politics, but I realized that to
make a real difference you have to start with something more in the community. So I
thought about what I like and where I [can] make a difference. The daughter of my sister
said she wanted to sing but the school had no teacher. This made me think about the arts
and theater. It is so important, and a big part of culture. As Palestinians, our culture is
already stopped [squashed] all [the] time. So I thought why not do this. It will provide
opportunities and help empower children to be proud of their Palestinian culture. I want
young girls to look at me and say “I can do this too!” It is about making slow changes
every day. I would not be doing this if I was in politics. Here, I get to take away the fear
and stigma from acting. I get to use my own story to exceed people’s expectations and
prove them wrong that arts are not important. I get to make theater important again and
show Palestinian culture in a good way. I see theater as social activism, and that is why it
connected to politics for me. When you act, people pay attention and you can get people
to talk about certain issues. I will give you an example. One year ago, my neighbor was
killed under her bedroom window. It was another Palestinian who killed him, and the
police were right there. One police watched it happen without even standing up from his
sitting place. We do not even want the police here because they do not do anything [to
protect non-Jews]. And when they do things it is bad and violence for no reason! But they
cannot stop a killing? I couldn’t sleep for months after that. All I could think about is:
what happened to my community? The danger and violence everywhere and the
government does nothing. So, I decided to use theater to do and say something in
response. My team and I created a dance with criminals and police that demonstrates a
very provocative statement where the police give the criminals a present and it is a gun.
Then they dance together. It shows the belief that the police are working together with the
criminals. Why is the police doing this? It is like the police and government are happy
about bad things that happen within Arab communities because it keeps us from uniting
together. Some people protest by going to marches and holding signs. I do this too, but I
wanted to do more, so I made it my job. Someone needs to do this but no one was, so it
had to be me. Every day I get to do this and it is very needed in the community. The plays
are not always negative. Just recently I did one with little kids and high schoolers about
celebrating traditional Palestinian holidays. I also did one about women where the
message was to encourage them to think freely and be independent no matter what the
Hiya’s decision and motive to pursue a career in community theater speaks volumes about her dedication to her community in tangent with her dissatisfaction with the government and Israeli society more broadly. In the end, her goal is to create a generation of theater activists. She chose this job because she feels it is her duty to provide services and perspectives that are otherwise missing. This runs counter to the notion of citizenship as a status that implies a degree of protection and service from a larger authority. To Hiya, many of even the most basic services such as safety in the community are lacking. In choosing theater, she channels her discontent into action rooted in Palestinian justice and equality.

Hiya speaks passionately about her job, yet she also notes the difficulties that come with it. Both the title of her job and the fact that she presents things in a manner that is often provocative makes it so she does not fully belong in either Palestinian or Israeli society. Her feminism and focus on liberation is considered too progressive for many in her Palestinian community, yet her emphasis on Palestinian culture and indignation with Israeli services makes her an outcast among the majority of the country’s Jewish citizens. Moreover, economic struggles are a primary concern for Hiya. While she has no regrets in her career choice, she expresses anxiety over funding both the theater and her family. Hiya continues to try and walk the line between progressing her career and adequately supporting those who rely upon her. The ethical concerns underlying this concern reveal how her identity as a Palestinian woman influences her job and thus her experience as a citizen. Unlike many Israeli citizens, Hiya sees it as her job to provide crucial services which are otherwise neglected by the government (Interview with Hiya, 18 January 2020). Consequently, she actively de-identifies with the Israeli component of herself despite living and receiving citizenship there.
Maha provides another lens through which ethical concerns impact employment choice as a Palestinian citizen. Now a researcher for a human rights non-profit organization, Maha declined a prior job offer despite the rare privilege and honor that come with it. The offer came from a class Maha took in graduate school. It was her last semester, and she needed a job come summer. She explains how the job came about and why she respectfully rejected the offer.

I took class on Hasbara with a right-wing professor who said we are here to learn about the Israeli perspective and opinion and not any others. I chose to be quiet and not share my own opinions or experiences as a Muslim Palestinian. Everyone knows because, as you can see, I cover myself. I still found the class interesting, but it was not the same as it would have been if I felt I could fully participate. Still, the professor was amazed at how much info I knew, even compared to the Jewish students. One time, he pulled me aside, and I thought I was in trouble, but he asked me if I would be interested in working with the Israeli foreign ministry. I told him I wasn’t interested in politics. Working with Jewish Israelis in the government is a redline that I would not cross. It’s not that Palestinians are perfect, but I am on their side and consider myself as part of them. Both sides have done bad things but the Israeli side has done much worse. When I say the Israeli side, I am talking about the government and its representatives, not civilians themselves. The governments on both sides are worse than the people. I told him no, and he said think about it, but I said she was sure. I was strong, but I felt like I needed to find an excuse because no one passes on a job like this. Connections are everything in this country, and Palestinians usually do not have them. So I think he really expected me to say yes. I mean, the Foreign Ministry does have Arabs working for them, but most of them are stupid and don’t really have strong intellect. Most of the intellectual Palestinians in Israel would not work for the government. Even if they don’t consider themselves Palestinian, they still would not take the Israeli side when it comes to politics. I know people who work in the Justice Ministry who are Arab but still wouldn’t side with Israeli side and have to censor themselves in order to keep their jobs. I mean, even people who work in the government who are Arabs would never be seen as a full citizen because they are not Jewish. Even if they are not Muslim or do not practice any religion. It’s very unfair, but this is just how it is. (Interview with Maha, 17 January 2020)

Maha’s choices reflect her sentiments towards the Israeli state and her own Palestinian identity. Evidently, her life thus far has led her to embraces her Palestinian identity over her Israeli one despite Israeli citizenship and the challenges that come with visible or vocal Palestinian

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11 Hasbara is a Hebrew word that defies direct translation to English. Literally, it means the act or profession of explaining, but the way it is used in Israeli society carries additional connotations. The word is commonly used to refer to advocacy and propaganda for the state of Israel and its Zionism tenets.
identification. Maha found it impossible to proudly embody her history, culture, and ideological preferences while working for the government that is supposed to represent her. Working for the government is generally considered a way to provide insight and create change in a democratic society. For Maha, however, working within an oppressive system feels morally and ethically compromising to the point that she cannot justify it. Her citizenship is limited by her perception of the government and the processes that underlie Israel’s political institutions.

Maha comments on how even the government cannot meet its own goals for employing Arab citizens. Further research supports Maha’s claim: the Israeli government has repeatedly stated its intention to increase Arab representation in the public sector, particularly in government corporations and initiatives, yet there remains little to no progress (Israeli Democracy Institute Arab-Jewish Policy Forum 2011). In 2007, Israel established the Authority for The Economic Development of the Arab, Druze and Circassian Sectors via Government Resolution No. 1204 (“Authority for the Economic Development of the Minority Sectors”). Still, in 2009 Arabs made up only 7.8% of the public sector and were practically non-existent in government positions (Haider et al. 2010). Maha goes so far as to argue that Israel encompasses two separate economies within the same country: a well-developed Jewish economy that is advanced and progressive and an underdeveloped, Arab economy (Interview with Maha, 17 January 2020). The poverty rate reflects this given that 51% of Arab-Israeli families live in poverty compared to 15% of Jewish families (“Authority for the Economic Development of the Minority Sectors”). To be a citizen in a state where the government does not adequately provide for Maha and her communities severely diminishes the power and experience of one’s citizenship. This makes it more difficult for Palestinian citizens to invest themselves as Israeli citizens, particularly when it comes to dedicating their daily life to the government via
employment. Employment options and opportunities which may otherwise be available and
beneficial to Palestinian citizens like Maha are often eliminated on an ethical basis, thus further
alienating Palestinian citizens from integration into Israeli society and providing an opportunity
for Israeli society to blame Palestinian citizens for their situation.

**The Disconnect Between Academic Elites and the Masses**

Maha’s experience points to a larger issue that is often ignored yet crucial to unraveling
the relationship between employment, among other integration indicators, and Palestinian
citizenship experience. Conducting ethnographic research in both an elite academic setting and a
mid to low-income community setting revealed marked contrasts between what academics
believe about Palestinian integration and citizenship experience versus what Palestinian citizens
themselves actually live, feel, and believe. Although this dichotomy emerged as a trend across
integration indicators, it was most pertinent regarding employment and the socioeconomic status
of Palestinian citizens within Israeli society. While there was a clear dichotomy between the
conversations I had with professors and those I had with Palestinian citizens themselves, it is
important to note that this is based on the limited data I collected during the month of January
2020 from Palestinian citizens residing in a mid-sized Arab town in the Galilee.

After speaking with eight professors who are working on topics related to this research at
a large Israeli university, I noticed a trend among seven of them. These seven academics
expressed overarching optimism when it came to the socioeconomic status of Palestinian
citizens, with each professor citing various studies and papers in which they currently play a role
in writing or researching. This optimism was surprising, as it is contrary to the messaging I
received from the majority of my informants. One prominent academic noted the increase in
Palestinian citizens in high tech and the medical field. He then went on to address public opinion and how a majority of Palestinian citizens believe the state is doing a good job addressing unemployment and poverty in Arab communities (Interview with Professor Hussein, 11 January 2020). As mentioned above, some statistics support the professor’s claims about larger numbers of Arabs and Palestinians finding employment in particular sectors including hi-tech. However, 87% of my informants expressed sentiments countering his comments on public opinion trends. All of these informants communicated either fear or substantial discontent surrounding their socioeconomic status. 76% of my informants said they believe things have become worse in the past 10 years.

Another professor addressed the pattern of increasing patriotism among Palestinians who are integrated into the Israeli workforce (Interview with Professor Abdullah, 12 January 2020). A postdoctoral student spoke about his research revealing that the growing economy is leading to increased affinity for Israeli institutions among Arab citizens (Interview with Professor Youri, 14 January 2020). Considering my conversations with informants surrounding the IDF and their current financial (in)stability, I found these academics to have data which nearly completely contradicted my own. A number of factors may account for this split, but for Palestinian citizens like my informants, the discrepancy between their lived experience and the data trending among elite academics has an impact on citizenship in and of itself. Given their education and specialized research, academic elites are generally perceived as knowledgeable in their area of study, and they play a key role in knowledge production. The fact that their production of knowledge can, and does in this case, position itself at odds with lived experience further invalidates Palestinian citizens whose opinions and realities do not align with research produced by elites. This is also a reflection of a broader trend in which Israeli academics believe the
situation of Palestinian citizens is improving. This chapter highlights how several Palestinian citizens, many of whom are representative of larger groups, do not feel this way. Rather, they feel their situation is increasingly deteriorating despite numbers and information that say otherwise. The existence of this chasm highlights the need for further research that will be addressed further in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

**Conclusion**

This chapter outlines the multifaceted ways Palestinian citizens engage with the workforce through employment preparation, options, and participation. The chapter further demonstrates the personal and structural barriers Palestinian citizens face in employment. I use the Israeli military as a foundation for understanding how Palestinian citizens are consistently disadvantaged and stigmatized in Israel’s workforce because they cannot serve in the IDF. The monetary, experiential, and social benefits that come from military service impedes Palestinian citizens of Israel from utilizing and obtaining the same opportunities as primarily Jewish citizens who serve. Historic security concerns continue to underlie discriminatory employment through their advancement of the ongoing stigma and fear surrounding Palestinians. These sentiments are then used to justify Palestinian citizens’ presence and desire to integrate socioeconomically as an inherent threat to Israel’s existence. The IDF is a mechanism of assimilation that counteracts Palestinian culture on the basis of defending Israel as a state that prioritizes its Jewish citizens over its Palestinians citizens. None of my informants wanted to fight for a country that actively oppresses them and their brethren, thus limiting their employment options and employers who would accept their positionality.
By linking employment to citizenship experience, I reach the following conclusions. I anticipated that employment-related discrimination would negatively influence citizenship experience among Palestinian citizens working in Israel. My data overwhelmingly supports and upholds this hypothesis, as demonstrated by the examples mentioned in this chapter. Overall, 91% of my informants said they experienced discrimination surrounding employment or the labor force and that this impacted how they saw themselves within Israeli society. This connects to my expectation that the multiple intersecting identities Palestinian citizens hold correspond to them navigating the workplace and the labor force with greater caution and intentionality than Israel’s Jewish population. The significance of the IDF and the practical as well as ethical concerns addressed by my informants ultimately support this hypothesis. Finding suitable work as a Palestinian citizen in a country built upon and sustained by the perceived oppression of Palestinian communities forces Palestinian citizens to traverse the workforce in ways which do not concern Jewish citizens.

Originally, I expected to find a positive correlation between stable employment and a positive citizenship experience. Based on my ethnographic research, the data does not support this hypothesis. As seen by Palestinian citizens like Jaber and Omar, steady employment does not necessarily correlate to a more positive citizenship experience. Rather, steady employment can exist simultaneously with discrimination and bias that disadvantage Palestinian citizens both directly and indirectly. Moreover, my expectation that working in an integrated Jewish and Arab work environment would correspond to a positive citizenship experience also cannot be supported. Salim and other informants who worked in an integrated work environment did not profess citizenship experience that was any more positive than that of their peers working in exclusively Arab environments. In fact, if anything they reported more negative experiences...
because their identity and difference was highlighted when surrounded by Jewish-Israeli coworkers. Meanwhile, Palestinian citizens like Omar received no discrimination within his work environment seeing as everyone shared his identity. The deficit of support for these hypotheses reveals how integration into one’s own community does not correlate to feeling integrated into the state of Israel overall. As a result, Palestinian citizens of Israel are less likely to feel connected to or valued by Israel.

Employment affects all areas of life, most notably one’s socioeconomic situation. Unjust perceptions stemming from the culture of the IDF bolster biased attitudes and unfair actions towards Palestinian citizens of Israel, thereby sending the recurrent message that they are second-class compared to Jewish citizens. Compounding levels of discrimination against Palestinian citizens diminishes their citizenship experience by hindering them from reaching the potential they should be able to reach in a democratic state. These realities disincentivize Palestinian citizens from investing their time, energy, or talents in a state, which, despite what is written on paper, treats them in a way that dulls and reduces their experience as Israeli citizens.
Chapter 4: Remembering History, Living Reality: A Case Study of Land, Space, and Dispossession

When people hear ‘land’ in the context of Israel and Palestine, settlements in the West Bank and the debate over Jerusalem are often the first issues that come to mind. While both hold deep significance and complexity, land also rests at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict inside the Green Line. Palestinian citizens of Israel navigate ongoing problems related to land, housing, and city planning as they go about daily life. Laws stipulating control of land in Israel remain painstakingly relevant and controversial as they cause recurring debates over equality and citizenship. Since Israel’s establishment in 1948, the government has produced a number of different comprehensive land-use plans to direct the country’s geographic and demographic make-up. The vast majority of land in Israel belongs to Israel has a centralized planning system for land use in which the central government is heavily involved. Historically, efforts represent a strong Zionist agenda at the expense of Palestinian citizens. Regardless of the government’s planning and territoriality intentions, Palestinian citizens, particularly in the Galilee region where the majority reside, profoundly experience the consequences of such plans. As an ethnic, linguistic, national, and religious minority, Palestinian citizens of Israel have long faced challenges surrounding inhabitation and ownership of land. Here, I convey those challenges through the lens of a Palestinian citizen and his family, ultimately demonstrating how the complexities and ongoing injustice surrounding land negatively influences Palestinian citizenship experience.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Israel is unique in that the vast majority of its land is in the public domain. Within the public domain, the land is owned by three major parties: the state, the Jewish National Fund, and the Development Authority. Over time, the state and its partner
organizations continue to come into conflict with Palestinian citizens surrounding land use and rights. This chapter traces the experience of one Palestinian family as they navigate Israel’s laws, regulations, and practices regarding land. While I interviewed over 30 people about their experience with, and relationship to, land in the state of Israel, this chapter focuses on a single multi-faceted narrative. By focusing on a singular narrative, I am better able to explore the depth of the relationship between land and citizenship experience from the perspective of a Palestinian family with direct and ongoing involvement with the issues at hand. I chose to focus on this narrative because it is indicative of the major themes and experiences highlighted by my informants.

This chapter views land through three interconnected sections: historical roots to the land, contemporary experiences with land, and the impact of discriminatory city planning. Given the historical importance of land, I expect that confiscation or attempted confiscation of land from a Palestinian citizen to the State of Israel will correlate to a reduced citizenship experience among Palestinians of Israel. I further anticipate that living in an Arab municipality will correlate to a negative citizenship experience for Palestinians. Ultimately, I find support for both of these hypotheses. I argue that land is heavily tied to culture and, thus, plays a critical role in determining citizenship experience throughout an individual’s life. Land also serves as a crucial connector to the Palestinian diaspora, particularly when viewed through the lens of an ongoing refugee crisis. Class, education, or historical legacy do not exempt Palestinian citizens of Israel from land struggles, and experience with land has a strong role in shaping perceptions of the Israeli court and the legislature. The difficulty Palestinian citizens have in obtaining and maintaining land correlates to experiences of diminished citizenship where they are seen as less-than compared to Jewish citizens.
Tracing Historical Roots to the Land

There is no one history of land in what is now Israel and the Palestinian territories. Rather, there are many histories, each centering on the stories and experiences of the individuals who lived them. Mohammad is a Palestinian citizen of Israel who can date his family’s presence here back to the days of the Turkish Empire. Mohammad and the majority of his extended family live in a mid-sized Muslim Palestinian town in the lower Galilee region of Israel. Over the course of several interviews and field trips, he tells me about his life through the lens of his and his family’s land. He begins with historical context, tracing his connection to the land in the region and explaining its significance to him.

My family has been here for as long as anyone can remember. My grandfather was born in the same house as his grandfather, and probably the father before him. All we have ever known is this land. In 1948, when they made Israel a state, so many fled. They dropped everything and left. It was not safe here for Palestinians anymore. My family, well, they left. Or...they tried. My father and mother and their parents and siblings and cousins...everyone ran away with one or two suitcases and the money they had. Most went to Lebanon but some to Syria. My grandparents actually never made it even though they tried. They had to turn back because in the rush of everything they forgot a child. That child was my mother. She was three years old, and they found her walking around when they got back. Because they had to come back, it took a lot of time. So when they went to go again, they could not. No longer. It was too dangerous. The borders were closed. They had to stay, and they were the only ones who did not get out. They cried so much. Everyone was afraid. No one knew what would happen. They did not want to be in Israel, but we have been here ever since. I do not know what came of those who left — we are not in touch anymore. In many ways, we are lucky to have come back. Everyone who left lost their land because they were not there physically. But my grandparents were able to show that they lived on their land, so they got to keep it. Everything else went to the government. Entire Palestinian towns became the property of Israel. Many were deserted, but some had people in them who were relocated. There is a village nearby like this. Many tried to fight for it back, but it was mostly abandoned and converted into a Jewish settlement eventually. Those who were left either were in other parts of the country when the government came to survey the land and divide it up, or they could not prove it was theirs enough to get it back. You had to be very convincing, and that was only if you were even here. (Interview with Mohammad, 6 January 2020)

The majority of Mohammad’s ancestors were part of the 700,000 Palestinians who fled in the mass exodus known as the Nakba (Ghanem 2001). Israel’s independence created both external
refugees and internally displaced persons as its 1948 borders became officially recognized by the United Nations. While most Palestinians who escaped or fled ended up in neighboring Arab states or the Palestinian territories, about 150,000 (estimates vary widely) Palestinians remained within Israel (Boqa’i 2008). Land and property policy made in the years following Israel’s establishment influenced both groups differently; however, dispossession served as an overarching theme among varying laws and policies surrounding recently displaced Palestinians.

One scholar uses the term “obsessive territoriality” to explain the state of Israel’s post-independence approach to space and development (Jabreen 2017). Defining obsessive territoriality as an ongoing process to establish territorial domination through the state apparatus, Jabreen (2017) outlines how various state policies have intentionally and systematically disadvantaged Arab Palestinians from land within Israel. Without ever using this language, Mohammad expresses feelings of subordination and intentional disadvantage when talking about his experience or the experience of his Palestinian peers with land in the Galilee.

Mohammad’s daughter, Alia, says that in the end she is grateful her great grandparents left her grandmother behind and had to return to historic Palestine. That does not mean that her life is easy or without strife and injustice, but rather that she would much rather be here than in Syria or Lebanon. Like many young adults I speak to, she often finds gratitude in playing games of comparison. Her life is riddled with identity crises, but she acknowledges her relative privilege in comparison to many. Similar to her father, she feels deeply connected to the land and the history that goes with it. Contrary to him, she expresses hope and optimism at the potential for change leading to increased recognition of Palestinian rights to the land (Interview with Alia, 25 January 2020). Although deeply complex and personal, Alia is not unique in expressing these
feelings. Such sentiments reveal the complexity of existing as a Palestinian with Israeli citizenship.

Absentee Property Law and the Right of Return

Palestinians who remained within Israel’s borders gained citizenship, but that did not necessarily mean they regained what they had lost amidst Israel’s independence/the Nakba. The Absentees’ Property Law, one of the first laws enacted by the State of Israel serves as the basis for ongoing controversy and dispute surrounding Palestinian Arab land ownership like that mentioned by Mohammad. Originally passed by the Knesset in 1950, the Absentee Property Law states that any property that falls under the definition of ‘absentee property’ belongs to the state and can be used for the state’s development. According to the law, anyone who had left, fled, or was expelled from Israel after November 29, 1947 was considered “absentee,” thus losing their right to all property (“Absentee Property Law”). The “property” referred to in the law included all land, homes/apartments, and bank accounts, among other immovable possessions. Mass repopulation of Arab dwellings by Jews began as early as spring of 1948, and a number of new Jewish immigrants were settled in former Arab towns (Golan 2003).

At the time, the state justified the Absentee Property Law as critically necessary to protect the safety of the newly established state while preserving the property of those who were absent at the time. For supporters of Israel’s early actions, the main reason for the expulsion of Arabs during and after the 1948 war is credited to their being considered a security risk (Golan 2003). Ultimately, their property was never returned, and the property was quickly vested in the Development Authority through the Development Authority Law of 1950 (Jiryis 1973). A 1994 ruling issued by the Israeli High Court of Justice further illuminated the purpose of the law, as seen by a member of the court, is to “actualize the State’s interest in this property as least as
much as it is designed to preserve the land for its absentee owners and protecting their rights herein” (Golan v. Special committee under Article 29 of the Absentee Property Law 5710-1950). Thus, it becomes evident that the Israeli legal system sees the land as usable for its own goals and purposes, essentially disregarding its original ownership and eliminating expectation for transfer back to Palestinian Arabs.

For Mohammad, the law is personal. While none of his immediate ancestors lost land through the Absentee Property Law, family members and relatives from nearby towns lost everything. Growing up with this knowledge, as a child Mohammad wondered why they could not just come back and get the land. The legacy of the Absentee Property Law leads Mohammad to address one of the most prominent issues surrounding land, space, and dispossession in relation to citizenship: the right of return. While the Nakba itself is an event of the past, its impacts continue to reverberate across decades. Both Jews and Palestinians claim forceful and unjust removal from their historic homeland; however, under current Israeli law, only Jews may return to the land of Israel. The 1950 Law of Return gave any Jew in the world the right to come to Israel and gain citizenship through the process of aliyah (The Law of Return, 5710-1950). On the contrary, Palestinians who left—either by choice or by force—during the war of 1948 have no privileges, rights, or abilities to come back and establish lawful residency, much less citizenship, in the state of Israel. Mohammad is realistic about the fact that this will likely never change, and he is hesitant to engage in fantastical hypotheticals surrounding the issue. He does, however, explain the impact of the debate on himself and his own identity.

I have had a good life here in Israel, even though I am Palestinian. But I think about the other Palestinians...many of them were not so lucky. They lost everything. Everyone thought they would be back soon. No one thought this would be permanent, that Israel would last more than wahid [one], ithnayn [two], mumkin thelatha [maybe three] years. Even people like my grandparents who stayed thought this. But then this country of Israel did not go away and people started to realize that maybe they are not coming back. The
government here had already started taking their things and using the land and houses to build the new Israel. Inside, maybe they knew they would not get their things back or come back, but I don’t think so. I did not lose hope until college, and this was so many years after 1948. With more rulings and the newer laws, I started to understand that this country does not care about my people. I am a citizen here and they are not, but [they] are from this land also. My people, we have a deep connection to the land. When I see how this country treats their land and thinks about them, it makes me wonder how they feel about me. I am not sure they see any difference, even if I am lawful here. Israel does not want to bring back the Palestinians because it will make it so this is not a majority Jewish country. If they bring more of us back, they will have to change the rules to give us more land. I understand they don’t want to do that, but where are they supposed to go? These people are my people even if we do not have the same passport. I cannot abandon them or turn away. My legal country might, but I will not. I wonder if my children’s children will be the next to go. I do not know how to be Palestinian and Israeli on this issue. You cannot be both because the one in power does not care about the others. It is as if the government does not understand that Palestinians here care about Palestinians there. This land is theirs as much as it is mine. I just got more lucky. (Interview with Mohammad, 6 January 2020)

According to groups like AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) and the ADL (Anti-Defamation League), it is a common inaccuracy that international law states Palestinians have the right of return under UN Resolutions 242 and 338 (“Response to Common Inaccuracy: Palestinians have Right of Return”). Rather, they claim these UN resolutions refer to a need and obligation to address and solve the Palestinian refugee problem with a longstanding solution. For those with this stance, many feel Israel has demonstrated ongoing commitment to participating in solving the issue of Palestinian refugees. One of the primary reasons for a lack of consistent process is the lack of a willing and reasonable partner or Palestinian representative with which they can negotiate. Zionists spanning a spectrum of political ideology refer to the crisis of Palestinian leadership as an insurmountable barrier to peace and meaningful progress (Elgindy 2016). Palestinian Authority President Mahmood Abbas is currently in his 14th year of a 4-year term, and a recent poll revealed that more than ⅔ of the West Bank population wants him to resign (Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No-57). In 2014, a spokesperson for Netanyahu said the
following with regard to the ongoing debate over the right of return: “The Palestinian leadership
does the Palestinian people no service when they cultivate impossible fantasies. It’s high time the
Palestinian leadership abandon these sort of maximalist positions which make reaching a peace
agreement more difficult” (Quoted by Staff 2014). Prime Minister Netanyahu and the majority of
the Israeli Knesset demonstrate similar sentiments through their active criticism for the potential
of Palestinian refugees returning to Israel (Keinon and Toameh 2014).

Meanwhile, groups like Amnesty International feel Israel is violating international law by
refusing to allow Palestinians the right of return, thus fueling the ongoing conflict (“The Right to
Return: The Case of the Palestinians”). Groups in favor of Palestinian right of return emphasize
UN Resolution 194 in addition to 242 and 338, drawing on the portion of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which asserts refugees have an unconditional right to return and
live in peace in their old homes or to otherwise receive compensation for their losses (United
Nations General Assembly). According to the Planning Law (1965-5725), however, the
legislature enables local planning commissions to take up to 40% of a plot without compensation
under certain circumstances (Holzman-Gazit 2016). Moreover, a number of my informants
emphasize what they see as an underlying political motive to deny Palestinians the right of return
(Interviews with Layla, Alia, and a University Professor, 6-24 January 2020). They describe how
the government still sees Palestinians as a threat whether they live inside or outside Israel, and
bringing in more would make it so they could not control the country as they wanted to by
pushing a Zionist agenda.

Under the areas set aside for the state of Israel by the U.N. Partition Plan, it would not
have been possible to establish a country with a distinct Jewish character and political culture
without manipulating a substantial portion of the Palestinian population (Jabreen 2017). Thus,
people on all sides of the issue understand that allowing the right of return could transform the Jewish state into a predominantly non-Jewish one. Mohammad mentions these issues without directly referring to any laws or resolutions, reiterating that he has no idea why his family and now him are more deserving of land and citizenship than those who fled. After all, his same grandparents tried to leave, and it is only by chance they ended up remaining and thus gaining access to a host of privileges not extended to his Palestinian brothers and sisters. It is clear from his tone and the look on his face that realities like this continue to haunt him as a Palestinian man within Israeli citizenship.

Contemporary Controversies over Land

As a foundation for a stable social, cultural, and economic life, land is crucial to everyday functions and lives of Palestinian citizens in Israel. Far from complete after the conclusion of the 1948 war, the struggle over land in the Galilee persists to the present day. Mohammad’s family is one of the few Palestinian families who managed to keep both their home and their agricultural land, yet he and his siblings continue to come up against the state, the Development Authority, and the Jewish National Fund as their ownership is challenged and illegitimated. Ongoing pressure on Palestinian citizens to abandon their legal rights to land impacts their sentiments towards integration and the Israeli state. Land remains a point of pride among the Palestinian community, but even more than that, it is tied to notions of resilience and survival.

Mohammad and his kids spoke often about their family land, but I did not have a chance to visit until Mohammad designated a specific Friday morning to show me the coveted 12 dunams (approximately 3 acres). When the set morning arrived however, rain poured incessantly, and my host mom said she did not think we would be able to go. I thought she said this for fear of me worsening my cold in the dreary weather, but her daughter explained it had
nothing to do with this. Rather, the roads to the property are unreliable and in poor condition, making it incredibly difficult to traverse them on a normal day, nonetheless in inclement weather. Mohammad decided that we would try anyways, promising to stop at an adjacent hill if we could not go all the way. After turning off the main road, I immediately understood my host mother’s comment. The road was nearly impassible with its narrow width and large rocks and potholes. Unlike most of the roads I had been on in town, it was dirt instead of asphalt. Mohammad notes that the road is technically official, but the government treats it as if it is unofficial and, thus, does not maintain it properly. He and others continuously ask for improvements, but nothing ever changes. Mohammad speculates that the road is not maintained because it connects two Arab towns, and the state sees no reason to increase mobility and access for people it deems as less important than Jewish citizens in the area.

After turning off this side street, we made it to the long driveway leading up to the family property. We pulled over upon realizing the car would get stuck if we pushed it any further and walked the rest of the way towards the only physical structure on the property. This road looked like a private road, but this is because Mohammad himself made it over the course of three decades. With a significant amount of time, money, and energy, he made access where there was not any due to state and local negligence. Only some of the road was paved because it was still a work in progress, but the difference was hugely visible. My comments on the road brought Mohammad to speak about it as a topic of immense concern:

Ever since my father passed away, it has been my responsibility to care for the land at the highest level. It belongs to my brothers and sisters also, but I am the one that deals with it. This road, there is the 1965 Law, and it says private roads like this may not be more than 3 meters wide. 3 meters is already very tight, but now they tell me this road must only be 2 meters wide. With only 2 meters, it will not be possible for a car to use the road. If I cannot get a car or truck on the road, I will never have full access to my property. But this is not the biggest concern. The biggest concern is that I cannot transport materials to or from the property. One of the reasons why we were able to keep
this land is because of the olive trees. It is considered agricultural land that can be kept only if it is active. So my family and I, we must make sure to keep tending to the olive trees and producing olives every year. Otherwise, they can say if no one lives on it that the authorities need it, and then they will take it. So it is very important that we are able to get the olives and everything they need to and from the land. This is why I need the road to be good and wide. I already told the government I will do all the work, and I have, see [gestures to the partially paved road before us]. It has taken so much work, but I am not letting them take this land. It is too important.

Over there is where I used to play with my cousins. See all these trees? Those are olive trees. I used to spend the falls picking them every day with my friends before and after school. We would get distracted and play na-na [similar to the game of tag] and drink coke in the shade. A lot of my childhood was spent here. I had very good times. Now, it is much more complicated. My grandfather’s home has been destroyed since no one was living in it after he went [passed] away. They would not let us keep it even though we tried. This building here is supposed to be my shop, but it has no water or electricity. I have tried many years to get approval, and I meet all the requirements to receive a permit, but the government and Karen Kayemeth prohibit me. Keren Kayemeth is really just an extension of the government. They are one and the same, two names on the same team. All agricultural land is allowed to have one building to use for supplies, watering, and doing all the other farm activities. But without it, I must have my own water tank to help with the olive trees, and it is very expensive. This permit is a very big issue. I have permission from the electrical and water companies, and they have agreed because they know it is not in violation of any law for them to help me. I have all the boundaries and the markings for my property, I have studied the rules so I make sure I do not get a penalty for anything. Yet my neighbors there, every time they see the trucks they report it, and I am threatened with a fine. If I move forward, they may destroy the road or the pipes anyways, so it is not worth it. I am playing a dangerous game because I know they want my land.

I told you about an offer they made me to try and make me sell? Well it was not the first offer. Over many years they come back and each time they offer more. You see, Karen Kayemeth is the real problem. They have all the land surrounding. It is land that used to be owned by Palestinians like me and my family, but it was either taken or they sold it for very little money. The government and its partners like Karen Kayemeth and Minhal can take land if it is not considered active or suitable for agriculture. Even if someone is currently planting there, if there are too many rocks or the government does not think it is good agricultural land, they can say no and take it as if it were empty land. This is why I must keep the land mumtaz [perfect or amazing]. They cannot take my land on these grounds because I maintain it very good, so they try and buy it from me. At first it was small amounts, but now it is very large. Most others, they sold for the small amounts because they did not know what their land was worth. For people without an education, they would not know their rights. I am very lucky to have an education and know that I can say no to these people. I tell them again and again that this land is not for sale. I do not care if they offer me all the shekels or dollars in the world, I will not sell.

(Interview with Mohammad, 24 January 2020)
As Mohammad speaks about the property, he speaks quickly and with a tone of simultaneous nostalgia and frustration. He takes great pride in showing me around, providing a stream of anecdotes with each new sight. It is clear Mohammad feels passionately about his family’s land and works hard to stay up-to-date on what feels like ever-changing information surrounding relevant rules and regulations. He tells me that much of what he is facing is not in accordance with the law. Rather, it is how he is treated in practice. I later reached similar conclusions upon doing my own research, as only some of what Mohammad faced reflected what is currently enshrined in law. The 1965 Planning and Building Law does outline scenarios in which land can be taken and explains the concept of compensation; however, the way in which land is considered agriculturally active is unclear and leaves substantial room for subjective interpretation. Furthermore, I can find no written laws or rules that would prevent Mohammad from installing electricity and water in his shed. With regard to penalties, the law states that “A person who carries out work without a permit, or in deviation of the conditions of the permit, is
liable to a fine and imprisonment for six months...The Court may demolish unauthorized buildings at the expense of the offender” (Planning and Building Law - 1965). Mohammad expresses fear over this law because he has known other Palestinians who have been wrongly accused of breaking the law when in reality they have not. He thus emphasizes how important it is to know the law and have an education because, as a minority, groups and individuals, including the state, often take advantage of Palestinians.

Mohammad further reveals his negative sentiments towards Karen Kayemeth (KKL-JNF) by addressing their manipulation of environmental campaigns and Jewish foreigners who contribute to them. Karen Kayemeth is known for planting trees in Israel. Many people, myself included, have planted trees during trips to Israel or had a tree planted in their honor for events like a wedding or a b’nai mitzvah. Tree donation techniques are used by JNF-KKL to increase connection to and funds from the Jewish diaspora (Jewish National Fund). Mohammad supports the idea of planting trees, but what he does not support is the fact that Karen Kayemeth is not honest about how it is using the trees to take land that is not for it. He says that “They do not need missiles or guns because they use trees as their weapon” (Interview with Mohammad, 24 January 2020).

Mohammad’s shed without water or electricity, as seen by black water tank in the background.
By this, Mohammad means that Karen Kayemeth works as a quasi-governmental organization to seize land by continuously pushing boundaries through tree planting. The JNF-KKL claims to promote multicultural coexistence and peace in Israel. According to its website, JNF-KKL initiates and implements projects to encourage interaction and mutual engagement in environmental education and shared public spaces with the goal of creating a bridge or dialogue among Israel's different ethnicities (“What We Do”).

JNF-KKL’s impact stretches far beyond the environmental realm to the geopolitical one. When land has a certain amount of density via trees, it is no longer deemed suitable for agriculture, and Karen Kayemeth or the Development Authority has the opportunity to buy or take the land if no one is living on it full-time (Braverman 2009). As a Jew in the diaspora, I can attest that there is no conversation surrounding the geopolitical motives underlying these environmental efforts. Meanwhile, all 21 of my informants who knew about Karen Kayemeth had an unfavorable view of them and the way in which they go about their work in systematically discriminatory ways. They were shocked to hear the JNF had such a positive reputation in the United States, even among many progressive and liberal Jews. Among my informants, JNF-KKL recurrently came up as a source of tension regarding land, infrastructure, and space with 76% seeing the organization as partisan and unjust. The fact that so many outsiders were not aware of Karen Kayemeth’s reputation among Palestinians in Israel served as yet another example of how they must fight against well-established entities to assert themselves and their realities as Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Seeing Mohammad’s family land and hearing him speak about the ongoing issues surrounding rights, ownership, and infrastructure shed light on the difficulties he goes through in
order to keep and use what has been in his family for generations. While it is difficult to prove many of his challenges are because he is a Palestinian citizen of Israel, the fact that many of his challenges have no basis in written law or are used very subjectively reflects the second class citizenship he expresses. Those that are written in law are practiced strongly within his Palestinian Muslim community, almost always benefitting Jews rather than Palestinians. Mohammad is someone who takes the law seriously, as demonstrated by his diligence in knowing and practicing it with regard to this property, yet he knows it because he must, not because it is something of inherent interest to him. In his case, being a land-owning Palestinian citizen requires extra work and knowledge that takes time away from family, a career, and other aspects of life. The frustrations Mohammad faces regarding land reflect the broader challenges of systematic discrimination, and his experiences demonstrate the exhausting nature of continuously needing to fight for what is his.

After my time in Israel ended, Mohammad followed up with me to provide an update. He said: “There is a problem. The Minhal [Israel Land Authority] made a new plan. They close the way to my land and my store” (WhatsApp conversation with Mohammad, 20 February 2020). He sent the following picture with the above message text, noting that he was working with a lawyer to fight back against the Minhal.

Mohammad’s Land with the road leading to his shed (labeled as “my stor”) highlighted in yellow.
Overpopulation and the Housing Crisis

Throughout the country, overcrowding and overpopulation in Palestinian Arab municipalities serves as a foundation for socio-political problems that plague Palestinian-Israeli society. Towns like the one where Mohammad lives are quite literally bursting at the seams, disrupting daily life and putting a strain on residents as well as industrial providers. Everyone is aware of the land and housing crisis, yet few express hope for a solution. The frustrations that come with this reality impact day to day life, affecting everything from adequate sleeping arrangements to hosting family and friends for holidays or choosing to grow your family. The lack of adequate housing and the growing Palestinian population in Israel perpetuate existing inequalities, as the amount and number of needs expand while services remain constant or lessen. The housing and land crisis reflect systemic discrimination stemming from the era of independence, causing Palestinian citizens of Israel to feel an overarching sense of powerlessness as they measure their worth by what they do not have.

Mohammad admits that access to housing is a huge problem for everyone, including Jewish people. However, being Jewish gives you more privileges and advantages. He uses the neighboring Jewish community overseeing his property land as an example, saying that the mitzpeh [town on a hill] is only for Jewish people. While there is no rule or law saying that Palestinians like himself cannot live there, in practice it is a well-known presumption. Mohammad’s daughter Alia and I went to the mitzpeh one afternoon so that I could compare it to their town. The community that makes up the mitzpeh is one of several created in the last quarter of the 20th century as part of plans to Judaize the Galilee. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Judaization efforts were only mildly successful, yet they still had real impacts on existing Palestinian communities, particularly surrounding issues of land. Many Jewish communities in
primarily Arab areas established themselves on top of hills for security purposes. In the case of an uprising or conflict, the Jewish communities will have a strategic advantage. Both Alia and Mohammad express sadness and disappointment upon stating that there is still a clear sense of viewing Palestinians and Arabs as threatening despite living in peace with their Jewish neighbors for many years.

The *mitzpeh* served as a stark contrast in almost every way to the town where Mohammad and his family live. The most obvious difference was the size of the plots in the *mitzpeh* — they were substantially larger and more spread out, and most were single story homes rather than double or triple. The streets and sidewalks were much cleaner, and trash cans at the end of driveways indicated that residents enjoyed trash collection as either a public or private service. In Mohammad’s town, everyone dealt with their trash individually by composting, dumping it in their own backyards, or taking it to a communal dumpster. Occasionally, people would burn their trash in piles on the side of the road, but this was primarily done in areas of lower socioeconomic status and even then it was rare. Alia explained that the *mitzpeh* consisted only of single family homes whereas most people in her town live with multiple families in the same building. Even if the apartments were separate, things like walls, doors, and driveways are often shared.

Perhaps the most stunning thing Alia pointed out were the empty lots and homes sitting in the middle of the neighborhood next to the school and the large, green park. Alia scoffed at how much unused land existed here, just mere kilos from the most crowded parts of her town. Unfortunately, she knows people like her will never be able to live there. When I ask why, she compares the situation to de facto segregation in the United States, saying that even though there is no law saying Arabs cannot live here, no one will sell them the house. If they do somehow get
a bid on the house or the plot, it will cause an uproar in the rest of the community and the Palestinians will be forced out for fear or stigma. She notes that this would not be a problem if there were other places and communities for her people to live, but that the options are actually shrinking as the government grants more and more land for Jewish settlements at the expense of existing Arab ones. Jabreen (2017) depicts this as part of the national geopolitical agenda meant to systemically dispossess Palestinians from usable land while prioritizing Jewish communities.

Adalah’s “Inequality Report: The case of Palestinian Arabs in Israel” dissects various forms of inequality in Israeli society, including land and housing (2011). Admissions committees operate in around 700 agricultural and community towns throughout Israel. Jewish admissions committees are known for filtering out Arab applicants on the basis of their “social unsuitability,” thereby eliminating their future residency in a given Jewish town (Adalah 2011). The operation of admissions committees contributes to the institutionalization of racially segregated towns and villages throughout the state and perpetuates unequal access to the land. Currently, Arab municipalities have jurisdiction over 2.5% of the state in total despite the fact that they represent more than 20% overall population (Rouhana 2017). While not all of the Arabs accounted for in these sources fall into the category of self-identifying Palestinians in which I am interested, they provide a comprehensive analysis of the broader category into which all my informants fall. Few, if any, scholarly reports focus on inequality solely among Palestinians in a way that distinguishes them from Arabs.

One of Mohammad’s relatives is a university professor. Upon request, he eagerly provided background on the historical roots of overcrowding in Arab villages, towns, and cities. Going back to the mass movement and expulsion of Palestinians during the 1948 war, Professor Manal focused on those who were ultimately internally displaced within Israel’s borders. His
grandparents were among the internally displaced persons who could not return to their homes or land because their village was converted into a Jewish settlement. During the first few years of Israel’s formal existence, many Palestinian villages were depopulated and either destroyed and used to plant forests or converted into Jewish villages. For internally displaced persons like Professor Manal’s parents, this meant forced transfer to other locations where they were to start a new life. Israeli authorities built a number of housing units to address the needs of internally displaced persons; however, the amount of units paled in comparison to the need for housing (Boqa’i 2008). Moreover, Professor Manal explained how internal refugees needed to follow particular rules in order to acquire access to one of these housing units (Interview with Professor Manal, 11 January 2020). Scholars support narratives such as this, noting that internally displaced Palestinians needed to cede their original housing and property rights to qualify for limited governmental assistance (Al-Haj 1988; Boqa’i 2008; Humphries 2008).

As a result, overcrowding was inevitable as these makeshift shelter communities expanded over time, yielding more and more people with nowhere to go. The Inequality Report put out by Adalah highlights that the government has not allowed the establishment of any new Arab village, town, or city since 1948. Meanwhile, more than 600 Jewish municipalities have gained approval and recognition since the state of Israel came into existence (Jabreen 2017). Since 1948, the Arab population in Israel has grown from 158,000 to 1,858,300 in 2018 (Statistical Abstract of Israel Table 2.1). Furthermore, a 2016 report reveals that 43% of the Arab population in Israel is aged 18 or below (“The Arab Population in Israel: Facts and Figures 2018”). With such a young population, existing problems will only become worse as these citizens enter schools, the workforce, and look to start families of their own. No new land has been granted to Arab communities, and numerous restrictions exist as to adding upon existing
structures or buildings. Although originally small, the jurisdictional boundaries of Arab municipalities are shrinking, and these same municipalities are systematically excluded from distribution of state land for development (Adalah 2017). As a result, many Palestinians and Arabs more widely choose to build illegally because they see no other options.

I argue that decisions like this severely limit national pride among Palestinian citizens, seeing as they are forced to decide whether or not to support either their family and well-being or the state. The choices Palestinian citizens must make puts them at odds either with their own traditions and culture or with the law, forcing them to choose which they prioritize at any given moment. Mohammad’s brother Khalil uses his own situation as an example. He is employed with a steady job, a wife, and three sons. The oldest of his sons is married and living nearby with a steady job, and the youngest is studying medicine at a prestigious university. The middle son, however, is whom he speaks about the most:

My son is an adult, and has a serious, long-term partner. He and his partner Ana are eager to get married and start their own life and family. However, both of them still live at home, and the timeline for their future hope of living together is not clear. We do not know when or if it will happen. The reason for this is that my family and I have nowhere for my son and Ana to go. Here, it is traditional for the woman to move in with the man on a plot of land which the family owns. There are normally many houses per plot, and brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, parents, and other relatives live more or less next door to each other. The number of extended family members varies depending on how much land there is, but usually it will be 5-10 families living eye-to-eye [within eyesight of one another]. We thought about building in the area [that is] not allowed, but the fear of destruction is too much. Last year they killed [knocked down] the buildings on the ridgeline because you are not supposed to build there. The houses were very nice, but now they are just [a pile of] rocks. We do not want to do that and have this happen, but we cannot keep the kids here forever. We keep trying to find places for them, but it is very expensive and there are so few. It makes it very hard for me to believe in this country when we are living like this. In some other towns it is not as bad, and in some it is worse. The Bedouins in the South have it very bad. But it still goes against our tradition to have the boy’s family far away. Some do not care about this anymore, things are changing because they have to, but if I can I want them close to me. (Interview with Mohammad’s brother, 21 January 2020)
Mohammad’s brother is not alone in debating whether or not to break the law and build illegally or continue on in an unsustainably condensed manner. The economic situation of many of my informants prohibits them from considering any real action aside from building without a permit despite the potential for demolition that comes with that choice. In 2011, the average income of Arab citizens of Israel is 32% lower than the average income among Jewish citizens in Israel, calling attention to how economic inequality underlies and intertwines with issues of land and housing (“The Inequality Report: The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel”). The rising prices of land throughout Israel add another layer to the struggle Palestinian citizens must deal with surrounding housing. According to the mayor of Mohammad’s town, poverty rates in Palestinian towns like this one are on the rise, and there are not enough municipal resources to address the growing issue (Interview with Mayor of an Arab municipality, 25 January 2020).

While the housing crisis is only one factor among many contributing to this unfortunate reality, it reflects larger feelings of powerlessness among Palestinian citizens of Israel. Throughout this process, several informants conveyed an attitude of mere acceptance, as if cognizant of the fact that, in the words of a PhD student: “Like it or not, this just is the way it is” (Interview with Hannan, 8 January 2020). Bureaucratic hoops and red tape create a culture of either submission or rebellion, casting a number of Palestinian citizens against the laws of the country where they otherwise desire to live calmly and peacefully with access to basic necessities. The housing crisis, among larger issues resulting from discriminatory city planning, send an ongoing signal to Palestinian citizens that they have not historically, and are not currently, a legitimate concern of the state and government that is supposed to represent and protect them. Consequently, their citizenship is reduced by their experiences with housing in present-day Israel.


**Conclusion**

For Palestinian communities in Israel, land is intimately connected to political, economic, and social spheres. The relationships between land and culture plays a critical role in determining citizenship throughout an individual’s life, and my informants demonstrate how this relationship becomes demeaning and dishonorable through their experiences with land, space, and dispossession. I ultimately argue that land and space perpetuates feelings of diminished citizenship among Palestinian citizens of Israel by forcing them to accept both de facto and de jure discrimination. As a result of historical planning and unjust policies, Palestinian citizens of Israel end up in positions where they are asked to make decisions that that no citizen should be asked to make, nonetheless judged upon. These citizens face decisions such as whether or not to build a house and potentially have it knocked down, provide electricity to a legal structure and face fines or prison, or stand with the Palestinian diaspora in demanding the right of return and being labeled as an enemy of the state. Jewish citizens are not asked to make these choices and are not held to the same standards when they do. Injustice surrounding land requires Palestinian citizens to tirelessly advocate for themselves and their communities, leading to a sense of overwhelming defeat and disappointment in the state for many.

The housing crisis and the numerous issues with which it intersects casts Palestinian citizens in negative light by portraying them as deviants from the law or threatening. This occurs despite the fact that the vast majority with whom I spoke expressed efforts to actively contradict the stereotypes that are too often associated with their ethnicity and identity. Class, education, or historical legacy do not exempt Palestinian citizens of Israel from land struggles, and it does not ensure better or proper treatment from people or groups in positions of power. Restrictions on land exacerbate existing disparities, particularly in the economic realm. The resulting conditions
are poor for a growing number of Palestinian citizens, creating discontent with the state and a lack of connection to Israel as their home country. Experience with land has a strong role in shaping perceptions of the Israeli court and the legislature, as seen by the narratives shared by Mohammad, Alia, and Professor Manal. Subjectivity of the law and the difference between what is written and what is practiced reveals the reduced citizenship Palestinians come to expect, contributing to feelings of disillusionment and defeat.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

This thesis began with insight to the complexity of identity and citizenship for Israel’s Palestinian citizens. Through an in-depth analysis of three specific integration indicators, I aim to make sense of Palestinian lived experience as it pertains to citizenship. In this section, I review the argument that Palestinian citizens experience diminished citizenship as a result of their perceptions of and engagements in education, employment, and land. Thus, Israel's Palestinian citizens become disillusioned with the government and skeptical of the potential for meaningful change. I end by addressing the implications of this research and providing policy recommendations.

Palestinian citizens are an essential part of the Israeli population, yet they are largely removed from the cultural, economic, geographical, and political mainstream. Systemic and institutional discrimination disproportionately impacts Israel’s Palestinian citizens as a result of dominant narratives presenting Palestinians as threatening and distinct from the Israeli demographic. As seen throughout this paper, educational, socioeconomic, and demographic factors build upon one another to create fewer opportunities and exacerbate the ramifications of discrimination among Palestinian citizens of Israel. The strategic limiting of opportunity prevents Palestinian citizens from reaching their potential, ultimately harming both the individual and their community in addition to the country as a whole. Israel subsequently experiences the equivalent of a brain drain without physical movement. By restricting Palestinian citizens and indirectly proclaiming their insignificance, Israel fails to utilize their minds, talents, and capabilities, diminishing its own citizenry as a result of inhibiting collective advancement.

Ultimately, my data supports the seven hypotheses which anticipated a correlation between each independent variable and diminished citizenship experience. I find that I cannot
support my two hypotheses ($H_3$ and $H_7$) where I anticipated my independent variables would correlate to a positive citizenship experience. Palestinian citizens of Israel are treated as an afterthought when it comes to everything besides safety and security. Hence, they are left with conflicting attitudes towards Israel and forced into a false dichotomy of choosing between their Israeli and Palestinian identities. On the one hand, many are grateful to live in Israel compared to their likely alternatives. The situation for Palestinians in the Palestinian territories and neighboring Arab countries is often far worse than that of Palestinian citizens in Israel. Moreover, Israeli citizenship does come with certain benefits and freedoms denied to many people throughout the world, including the right to vote and run for office. Despite the benefits, Palestinian citizens of Israel are subject to injustice regardless of their citizenship, leaving them discriminated against in manners both *de jure* and *de facto*.

Moreover, the benefits of Israeli citizenship do not take away from physical, social, and emotional ties Palestinians in Israel have to Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and the diaspora. The relationship among Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians outside the country further influences their citizenship experience across the indicators of education, employment, and land. High levels of solidarity with the broader Palestinian cause alienate Palestinians from Israel’s Jewish and Zionist national identity. Additionally, solidarity efforts instill fear among those who believe Palestinian self-determination is at odds with the existence of Israel as they prefer it, resulting in increased stigmatization of Palestinians of Israel. The shame internalized by Palestinian citizens who express care for and connection to the wider Palestinian community sends the message that they are not welcome in Israel with their beliefs. This in turn disincentivizes Palestinian citizens from positively engaging with the Israeli state. Ultimately,
Palestinian citizens of Israel are a minority population constantly battling the Israeli government for better recognition, treatment, and validation for themselves and their brethren.

As a result, Palestinian citizens of Israel consider the state as an entity largely unwilling to respect their rights and acknowledge their collective identity. Rather, they experience Israel as a country aimed at stifling their potential, limiting their influence, and controlling their demographic presence in the Jewish homeland. The realities of Palestinian citizenship leave Palestinians in a place where they cannot win. If they proudly embrace their Israeli citizenship, they are seen as an outcast in their own community. If they renounce their Israeli identity, they are seen a danger to the state and further ostracized on the basis of their Palestinian distinctiveness. The resulting negotiation required of Palestinian citizens impedes their economic, social, and political progress.

*Implications of Diminished Citizenship among Israel’s Palestinians*

Since its founding, Israel has identified as both a Jewish and Democratic state. While a number of formal equalities between Jewish and Palestinian citizens exist on paper, the realities of Palestinian citizenship experience calls into question Israel’s democratic label. In theory, Israel is a state that treats all its citizens equally. Yet as a Jewish state, Israel is the homeland and a place of refuge for the Jewish people. The country sees it as an obligation to preserve and cultivate Jewish culture, and it acts accordingly. Israeli citizenship is tiered, rather than equal, and Jewish citizens occupy the top of the pyramid. The distinct citizenship experiences resulting from Israel’s legal and societal ranking of citizenship requires an analysis of motive and discourse among Jewish citizens. Amidst scholarly debates over how to categorize Israel’s political system, Smooha (1990, 1997) famously designates Israel as an archetype of Ethnic
Democracy. Though meaningful and revolutionary at the time, this thesis exposes the need for a contemporary re-examination of Israel’s political classification.

Furthermore, looking at the impact of indicators other than education, employment, and land on citizenship experience is necessary to more fully understand the ramifications of tiered citizenship. Expanding citizenship literature within the context of Israel and Palestinian in the 21st century is essential to comprehending the underlying goals of Israel as it battles to maintain its existence by suppressing Palestinian self-determination. While variations of this research exist, they are primarily outdated and contradictory. The ever-changing nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the evolving sociopolitical culture dominant within Israeli society requires timely analysis. There is a particularly strong need for greater research on the relationship between citizenship experience and political behavior in Israel. If Palestinian citizens cannot find trust or support in the Israeli government, they may look for sources of authority that will adequately prioritize them. This process can incentivize Palestinian citizens to depart from the current norm of working within Israeli structures in order to change them. Future research on citizenship experience and political behavior can shed light on potential changes likely to occur, thus providing insight on issues of stability, conflict, and prospects for peace in Israel and Palestine.

Finally, contrasting trends between elite academics and the lived experience of my informants presents an area ripe for further analysis. Given the limited scope of my study in terms of length and number of informants, a more extensive study of the integration indicators I used will serve as a foundation for seeing if disparities between academics and everyday citizens still exist. If so, research investigating why these differences and contradictions persist can
generate recommendations for an improved, well-rounded approach to gathering data in political science.

Policy Recommendations

Israel must strike a better balance between its Jewish and democratic character. Without in-depth, broad-based efforts to confront systemic inequities facing Palestinian citizens of Israel, instability endures while prospects for a just society remain low.

1. *Enshrine equality in Israeli law.* Currently, the right to equality and freedom from discrimination is not explicitly enshrined in Israeli law. It is neither a constitutional law nor a right protected by statute (“The Inequality Report”). The Supreme Court interpreted Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty as including the notion of equality; however, judicial interpretation alone is not enough. Israel needs legislation to provide unequivocal clarification protecting equality as a fundamental right. With this improvement, Palestinian citizens will have a strong legal basis for counteracting discrimination on the basis of their ethnicity, religion, political ideology, or other coexisting identities.

2. *Increase social interaction at the primary and secondary school level.* This will help cultivate social solidarity and awareness among Jewish, Palestinian, and other Israeli citizens engaged in the public school system. Ensuring Israeli citizens know and understand people across ethnic, religious, and other divides will help reduce stigmatization and discrimination, both of which contribute to diminished experiences of citizenship. What's more, creating opportunities for relationship building among diverse citizens will aid Israel’s ability to generate a national consciousness inclusive of all its
citizens. The emergence of a more reflective national consciousness opens up dialogue and potential for paths to peace in the country and the region.

3. Implement an equitable workplace-integration policy including bias training for public sector employers. Creating a policy centered on equity in the workplace is necessary to provide Palestinian citizens and the larger Arab population with an increased number of employment opportunities appropriate for their educational level and skillset. Similar to the prior recommendation, this policy will further increase social solidarity and foster coexistence between Israel’s Jewish and Palestinian citizens. It will also establish economic interdependence and advance Israel economically to the benefit of all. Mandating bias training for public sector employers will facilitate greater representation among Palestinian citizens and open doors for a more diverse set of candidates to influence state processes and institutions.

4. Reassess prospects for land utilization and urban planning by allocating land for new Arab towns and expanding current Arab jurisdictions. Israel’s Palestinian population is economically disadvantaged and physically condensed to a point of crisis. Allocating land for new Arab towns will decrease the pressure on existing communities to accommodate an unreasonably large population. Additionally, in tangent with expanding current Arab jurisdictions, this policy will alleviate the housing crisis and relieve the need for Palestinian citizens to build illegally without a permit. Eliminating the long and difficult bureaucratic process of obtaining a permit necessary for legal construction will increase the quality of living in Arab municipalities and allow Palestinian citizens to dedicate their time and energy to more valuable pursuits.
Palestinians of Israel demonstrate the hierarchy of Israeli citizenship through their lived experience. Their citizenship experience is intricate and ever-changing, demonstrating the need for ongoing analysis, an understanding of implications for the broader region, and a call to implement policy intended to remedy discrimination. Palestinians are constantly reminded of the fragility of their citizenship. The second-class nature of Palestinian citizenship experience highlights inequalities in Israel, and Palestinians continue to navigate their intersecting identities as an ethnic minority in the Jewish state.
Methodological Appendix

Informants*


*Pseudonyms are used for all informants. All informants self-identify as Palestinian and are legal citizens of Israel. I removed all information that could be used to potentially identify my informants.
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133


134


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