2018

Welcome To Europe? Consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal for Refugees Contained on Lesvos

Julia Endicott
Colby College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses

Part of the International Relations Commons, Near and Middle Eastern Studies Commons, and the Other International and Area Studies Commons

Colby College theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed or downloaded from this site for the purposes of research and scholarship. Reproduction or distribution for commercial purposes is prohibited without written permission of the author.

Recommended Citation
https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses/916

This Honors Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at Digital Commons @ Colby. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Colby. For more information, please contact mfkelly@colby.edu.
Welcome To Europe?
Consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal for Refugees Contained on Lesvos

By Julia Endicott
Senior Honors Thesis
Global Studies Program

Nadia El-Shaarawi, Global Studies Program
Maple Razsa, Global Studies Program

May 20, 2018
# Table of Contents

Abstract.............................................................................................................................................. 3  
Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................... 4  
Abbreviations..................................................................................................................................... 5  
Chapter 1: Introduction......................................................................................................................... 6  
Chapter 2: Background......................................................................................................................... 15  
Chapter 3: Literature Review............................................................................................................... 27  
Chapter 4: Methodology...................................................................................................................... 44  
Chapter 5: The EU-Turkey Deal Explained......................................................................................... 61  
Chapter 6: The EU-Turkey Deal: Lesvos’ shift from Transit Space to Permanent Settlement........................................................................................................................................................................ 72  
Chapter 7: “Moria: The Land of Anxiety, Stress, Pain, Depression, Anger”.............................. 84  
Chapter 8: Humanitarian and Solidarity Action in Response to Government Inaction.............................................................................................................................................................................. 103  
Chapter 9: Conclusion......................................................................................................................... 124  
Works Cited............................................................................................................................................. 129
Abstract

In 2015, the world experienced the greatest flow of migrations since World War II. During that year, more than one million people entered Europe, the majority of whom were fleeing civil war and political unrest in the countries of Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Eritrea, as well as many other places. The quantity of refugees was unprecedented and challenged the existing borders of Europe. Some countries on the continent were willing to accept newcomers, while others acted to keep them out. One tactic developed by European Union (EU) policy makers to manage the migration flows was the EU-Turkey Deal, which was implemented on March 20, 2016. Under the E.U-Turkey Deal, any person who arrived irregularly from Turkey to the Aegean Islands in Greece would be immediately deported back to Turkey and then be required to apply for asylum there, before entering a system for eventual relocation to EU member states. One of the Aegean Islands that has become central to conflict over the EU-Turkey Deal is Lesvos, an island a mere 4.1 miles from Turkey. In this thesis, I argue that the EU-Turkey Deal, rather than providing a solution to the surge in migration, is creating a system of layered containment that in turn results in consequences for the health and well-being of refugees stuck on Lesvos indefinitely because of this policy. Additionally, I argue that because of the relatively limited presence of the Greek state, a complicated system of humanitarian aid and solidarity initiatives has arisen to provide aid to refugees while they live within the system of containment. I base my argument on data collected through participant observation, social media analysis and a series of semi-structured interviews that took place on Lesvos in January 2018.
Acknowledgments

Thank you, first and foremost, to my interview subjects on Lesvos for sharing your stories with me and teaching me about strength, courage, and love. Thank you to the Hunt Grant for funding my research. Thank you to Nadia El-Shaarawi, my thesis advisor for helping me develop this project and pushing me along the way to the final product, even when I was skeptical of myself. Thank you to Maple Razsa, my second reader, and professor for providing valuable insight into my project and in our Insurgent Mobilities Lab all year. I am indebted to you both. I also want to thank Patrice Franko who encouraged me to pursue a thesis in the first place and who has been an invaluable academic advisor over the last four years. Next, I want to thank Shona McCarthy and Ava Baker, who traveled to Lesvos with me to conduct fieldwork for this project. Your friendship and support were essential to the completion of this thesis.

I could not have completed this project without the unrelenting support of my friends and family. To my roommates, Ami Hirano, Monique Legault, and Gillian Wei, thank you for tolerating my stress and baking incredible treats to help with writer’s block, and providing valuable edits to my final version, you are all incredible. Thank you to all my other friends, in particular, Anna Johnson, Kelsey Christopher, Nora Hanson, and Catherine Cimini for forcing me to take study breaks and reassuring me that I could write this paper. I also want to thank my parents, Tamsen and Dominic Endicott for pushing me to work hard from pre-K to my senior year of college. You rock. To my siblings Becca and Nick, for always being there and keeping in touch even when I’m too distracted and to Becca in particular for painstakingly copy-editing my thesis. Lastly, I want to thank my boyfriend Ryan Lolar for believing in me, asking me lots of tough questions, and loving me through the stress of this project.
Abbreviations

EU: European Union
HCG: Hellenic Coast Guard
IRC: International Rescue Committee
KEELPNO: Hellenic Center for Disease Control and Prevention
MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
TCG: Turkish Coast Guard
Chapter 1: Introduction

It is Monday morning. I walk through the narrow streets of Mytilene, Lesvos on my way to the Hope Project Warehouse, where I would be volunteering for the next month. An extensive trail of graffiti marks the buildings; some are tags while others present more like murals. Some of the graffiti is political; markings in support of Antifa come up on nearly every block of my walk to the taxi stand. Further, other graffiti calls for the end of borders or to stop deportation. I pass the local school and a massive church that sits at the center of the Mytilene skyline before reaching the bustling Ermou Street, where the smell of fresh-baked bread and pastries permeates the air. It could be any high street in any city in the Mediterranean, with its innumerable shops, cafes, and markets, but this is not just any city. It is a city on an island once known for tourism, which has recently become symbolic of refugee detention and the European bordering regime.

On Ermou, this reality is hard to see at first, but as I continue walking towards the taxi stand in Sappho Square, named after the legendary Greek poet, it starts to become more visible. There is graffiti on the wall that says “35,” a recent addition to the square linked to a hunger strike earlier last year because of the arrest of 35 refugees living in Moria.¹ Sappho Square has been a critical site of protests regarding the conditions and treatment of refugees in Moria, but it is relatively quiet come January.

The bus stand in the port is the most visible site of the presence of refugees in all of Mytilene. The front of one of the buses has a digital sign giving the destination of the route. The sign is written not only in Greek and English, but also in Arabic. Although not accessible to all of the residents of the island who speak other languages, the sign is a clear demonstration of an effort on behalf of the government of Lesvos to increase inclusivity in transportation. Throughout

¹ Moria is short for Moria Reception and Identification Center, the main registration and
the day, though more so in the late afternoon, there are always large groups of people waiting to take the bus back to the Kara Tepe\textsuperscript{2} or Moria refugee camps, especially if the weather is unforgiving. Each refugee receives €90 a month\textsuperscript{3}, which makes walking or the bus the only affordable way to leave the camp and still have enough money left for other monthly necessities. The walk is doable, but takes close to an hour and a half along a busy, dusty road; so instead, most refugees use the bus as their main source of mobility across the island.

I step into a cab and explain where I am going, simplifying it to Kara Tepe since all taxi drivers on the island are well versed in the refugee camps, but less so in smaller solidarity initiatives. Solidarians, like the group I am working with, aim to counter the violence of the borders, but also the norms of hierarchical humanitarian aid. The ride takes me past the far side of the port, where I pass the Valiant, an English Frontex\textsuperscript{4} boat, before turning left out of the city center. The drive takes us past MSF’s working clinic, the building for the Secretariat General for the Aegean and Island Policy, where I will later attend a UNHCR meeting, and then past the ancient Mytilene Castle, built during Ottoman rule in the 1300s. We continue along the coast where I can see the Turkish coastline clearly, even on a foggy day. The ride takes me outside Mytilene, past the ramshackle, yet operational Ouzo factory and an old Ottoman bath before I pass a cement wall, recently repainted to mask older graffiti. I then wind past gas stations and grocery stores and finally get dropped off outside of Kara Tepe. The ride costs me €5 for a 10-minute drive. I look back towards Kara Tepe, where the community is beginning to bustle with morning activity, before crossing the street and walking up the rugged dirt road to The

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item[2] Kara Tepe is an overflow site for Moria, run by the municipality of Lesvos. It houses vulnerable populations and is considered to be one of the best refugee camps in Europe. It is a site of refugee accommodation, but it is not the main focus of this thesis because it is not a site of containment in the same manner as Moria.
\item[4] Frontex is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.
\end{itemize}
Welcome to Europe. More specifically, welcome to Lesvos, a Greek island located in the Aegean Sea, just a few miles from the Turkish coast. Until the last few years, Lesvos was best known for its quaint villages, delicious foods, and ties to the ancient Greek poet Sappho. To me, those images evoke memories of other experiences from my childhood, where I spent a significant amount of time in Europe. Yet, my research over the past year has provided a vantage point of a changed and more violent Europe than I encountered growing up. Lesvos has also presented a very different reality for people coming to Europe for the first time as refugees. For them, the goal of coming to Lesvos was to reach Europe, which was supposed to provide a sense of safety and security unlike their situation in their home country. However, in this thesis, I argue that as a result of the EU-Turkey Deal, refugees who have arrived on Lesvos face a very insecure and frequently unsafe Europe that contains and immobilizes people, forcing them into conditions of protracted waiting in inhumane conditions.

First, I begin by defining what a refugee is under international law, as that contextualizes the population that has been moving to Europe by way of Lesvos over the last three years. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol legally define a refugee under international law as someone with a

---

5 Fortress Europe refers to the securitization of the external borders of the European Continent and efforts to fortify the entrances into Europe from non-European populations.

well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it ("1951 Convention," 2010).

This definition provides the international legal standard to determine whether or not a person applying for asylum can qualify and be considered a refugee in a foreign state. It applies to all 145 countries, including Greece, that are signatories to the 1951 Convention. One of the key obligations of a signatory state is that any person wishing to apply for asylum should be able to do so and have their case adjudicated in the state where they apply. However, on Lesvos this is a significant point of tension as the rights and obligations of asylum-seekers on the island are not being upheld, largely because of the policy implications of the EU-Turkey Deal.

The majority of people traveling along the Balkan Route7 by way of Lesvos are seeking to apply for asylum and gain refugee status because of well-founded fears in their own country of origin. Many people on Lesvos may apply, but are ultimately denied after months of waiting because their case does not fit the extremely narrow legal definition of a refugee. There are many people on Lesvos who were forced to flee for various other factors, but because of the legal definition may be forcibly deported to an insecure environment. The term refugee formally provides legal protection when granted, but it is frequently used interchangeably with the term “migrant”, which does not offer the same legal protection, or with the term “asylum-seeker”,

---

7 The Balkan Route is a shorthand term for the route of migration taken by refugees into central Europe by way of Turkey and the Aegean Islands. It takes different shapes but I will use it here to refer to the various routes taken by people on the move that result in their ultimate arrival on Lesvos.
which applies to a person who is still waiting for their case to be adjudicated. In the case of my participants on Lesvos, they all referred to themselves as refugees, even though they had yet to receive that legal status by the Greek state. Additionally, the other actors I engaged with in the field also used the term refugee to apply to the people stuck on Lesvos because of the EU-Turkey Deal, even though that legal protection had yet to be granted.

As a result of the 2015 “refugee crisis,” the EU intensified efforts to find a solution to limit the number of people trying to come to Europe and apply for asylum. The EU-Turkey Deal was developed as one of those solutions; it would create a legal and international policy to mitigate irregular migration and formalize refugee resettlement programs between Turkey and the EU. However, as I will later explain, this policy has many flaws and has ultimately put the Aegean Islands at the center of the asylum application process. In turn, I argue in this thesis that the EU-Turkey Deal creates extensive negative consequences for refugees stuck on Lesvos. These consequences manifest first through the establishment of an oppressive system of containment, which has led to a public health crisis where the policy itself serves as a determinant of ill-health. I further argue that this is exacerbated by government inaction and a complicated system of humanitarian aid that seeks to counter the effects of the policy, but can sometimes further worsen the consequences of the Deal for refugees.

It has been two years since the EU-Turkey Deal went into effect, altering migratory flows to Europe to an extent, while also dramatically changing Lesvos’ role within the broader European bordering regime. Here, the policy immobilizes and contains people while they are forced to wait indefinitely to receive a decision granting them refugee status. While they wait,

---

8 I use the term European bordering regime to refer to the ways in which the EU monitors borders that surround much of the European continent through strict policies and practices of enforcement.
the majority of refugees are housed within Moria, the government-run registration center/camp, which currently holds 7,000 people in a space with a maximum capacity of just over 2,000 (Smith, 2017a).

Lesvos has become central to bordering because of the details and implementation of the E.U-Turkey Deal. This policy established a system of exchange between the EU and Turkey wherein Turkey would receive €6 billion in aid for providing assistance and accommodation to asylum seekers currently in Turkish territory. Any people traveling irregularly, meaning those caught without formal travel papers attempting to cross the Aegean Sea, would be detained on the Greek islands, where asylum applications would be reviewed prior to moving either into the EU or back to Turkey (Gogou, 2017). The stated purpose of the deal, according to the European Commission was to “target the people smugglers' business model and remove the incentive to seek irregular routes to the EU, in full accordance with EU and international law,”9 (“EU-Turkey Statement: Questions,” 2018). Details of the formulation of the legal framework of the EU-Turkey Deal will be discussed further in Chapter 5, but it is necessary to provide a basic overview of the policy’s implications from the beginning of this thesis. Ultimately, the EU-Turkey Deal has caused much more harm than good. Despite its stated goal of alleviating dangerous smuggling efforts, the agreement has left in its wake a crisis of containment and inhumanity scattered across the Aegean Sea. Lesvos may be far from the center of Europe, but because of its geographic position at the periphery, the island has been forcibly tasked with the role of enforcing the European bordering regime.

---

9 The people smuggler’s model refers to the economic model used to facilitate irregular movement, in which people wishing to cross borders pay a smuggler a fee in order to cross (Chonghaile, 2015). It is both illegal and dangerous and carries the risk of death. The goal in targeting this model was to target criminal activity and decrease the opportunity for clandestine migration by limiting the supply of smugglers.
Motivations for Research

I developed my honors project following extensive coursework relating to public health, human rights, and refugee policy. I have long been interested in the intersection of public health and policy. After studying the EU-Turkey Deal in the fall of 2016, I began to think more critically about the relationship between migration policy specifically and public health. I was curious about access to resources and healthcare along the route, but then began reading articles about refugee detention centers on the borders of Hungary and in Greece and solidified my desire to focus my research specifically on how detention is related to public health. Since then, my project has changed frequently, moving from a study focused solely on public health to one focused on the broad implications of the EU-Turkey Deal specifically on the health and general well-being of refugees on Lesvos.

My work focuses specifically on one island within Europe, but there is a strong body of developing literature that focuses on several islands within the EU in terms of how they function within the broader European bordering regime (Albahari, 2015; Rozakou, 2017). I see my work as contributing to that body of literature. More specifically, I believe my thesis contributes to the scholarship on migration by framing the EU-Turkey Deal as a creator of layered containment that then acts as a determinant of consequences to health and well-being for refugees. I argue that the policy creates negative consequences first through establishing layers of containment, which create oppressive feelings of stuckness and insecurity. This problem is compounded by overcrowding within Moria, and a serious lack of resources to alleviate these sensations. There are many groups and individuals seeking to mitigate the troubling reality of Lesvos for refugees, but these actors face and even cause problems at times, and they are limited in their capacity to help.
I begin my argument by first providing background on Lesvos’ role within the 2015 European “refugee crisis” that preceded the implementation of the EU-Turkey Deal to further contextualize Lesvos within Europe’s borders. In Chapter 3, I discuss relevant literature from across several disciplines including anthropology, geography, and political science to situate my argument. My literature review focuses on four areas that are fundamental to my argument: immigration detention, detention as a public health issue, temporal uncertainty, and humanitarianism. This existing literature established the structure of my argument and, in turn, informed my fieldwork in January 2018 that provided the bulk of my data. In Chapter 4, I explain the methodology of my fieldwork. In Chapter 5, I provide additional context on the European border regime to situate the EU-Turkey Deal within the development of the supranational EU body. This chapter is imperative to understanding how the policy developed and what factors of the Deal are responsible for the situation unfolding on Lesvos.

The last three chapters of my thesis focus on the results of my research and fieldwork. In Chapter 6, I argue that the EU-Turkey Deal has created a system of layered containment, which is responsible for many of the issues occurring on Lesvos. Additionally, I argue that Moria specifically is starting to become a more permanent structure, as opposed to a temporary accommodation scheme constructed by the EU. In Chapter 7, I discuss the concrete health effects of the layers of containment on Lesvos that come as a result of the EU-Turkey Deal. Finally, in Chapter 8, I connect the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal for refugees to the groups and individuals working to counter the containment policy through action and aid. This a very complicated sphere of work as some groups further the consequences of the Deal by treating refugees poorly or exploiting their positions, while others are limited in their scope of action, and others walk a delicate line between challenging the policy and maintaining a working
relationship with both the EU and the Greek state. Finally, I end my thesis with a conclusion regarding my contributions to the existing literature and ultimate conclusions regarding the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal on Lesvos.
Chapter 2: Background

Lesvos, Greece, and the Balkan Route

To begin my argument, I first want to situate the events that preceded the implementation of the EU-Turkey Deal. Over the course of 2015, more than one million people crossed into Greece, first through the Aegean Islands and then to mainland Greece, as they moved along the Balkan Route, seeking safety in Europe during the so-called “refugee crisis.” As Nicholas De Genova (2016) stated, the problematically termed “crisis” began when 850 people drowned on April 19, 2015, while crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Europe.

The Balkan Route has existed as a space of clandestine migration since the EU eased visa restrictions on many Balkan countries in 2012, but it was formally opened in 2015 because of the quantity of people moving openly across borders. It opened politically when Angela Merkel announced the suspension of the Dublin Regulation for asylum applications to all Syrians in August 2015 (Dockery, 2017). The Dublin Regulation, which will be further discussed in Chapter 5, effectively requires any person wishing to gain asylum within the EU to file their claim in their country of first arrival (“Country Responsible,” 2017). Once registered, the person applying for asylum could not move further into the EU without the risk of deportation back to their initial country of registration. This regulation put the heaviest burden on the countries of first arrival at the periphery of Europe, most notably in Spain, Italy, and Greece. By suspending the Dublin Regulation, Angela Merkel allowed Syrians seeking asylum to register their claims in Germany, most Syrians’ destination country, rather than in their country of first arrival. This facilitated movement for people coming from Syria, and to a lesser extent, all other people traveling along the Balkan Route.
Over the last few years, the Balkan Route has become one of the most heavily traveled routes into Europe, replacing other common routes of migration from Africa and Asia through Spain. In 2015, the route was comprised of people coming from a variety of circumstances and countries. Hundreds of thousands of people were fleeing civil war in Syria, while many people were fleeing civil and political unrest in Iraq and Afghanistan. The countries of origin of people traveling the Balkan Route extend to many other states as well, including people fleeing political violence from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Eritrea in Africa (“Migrant Crisis,” 2016). The Balkan Route specifically manifested in various shapes and lengths for every person, but it is generally recognized as the route of migration from Turkey through Greece and then further north through the Balkan countries of Macedonia and Serbia.

From the Balkan states, most people initially moved back into the EU through Hungary, but the conservative and anti-immigrant Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, quickly shut the Hungarian borders, shifting migrant flows into Croatia and Slovenia. For most people traveling the Balkan Route, their ultimate destination was to reach wealthier EU countries, like Austria and Germany (Mandić, 2017). However, this became nearly impossible by early March 2016 when Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia also closed their borders (Dockery, 2017). These border closures left many thousands of people stuck in Greece, even before the EU-Turkey Deal came into effect on March 20, 2016. After the Deal, new arrivals became stuck specifically on the Aegean Islands within Greece.

The Balkan Route continues to exist, but it is once again a largely clandestine route because of border enforcement. Additionally, it is comprised of several countries within the EU and other countries of the European continent that are not part of the EU. As Nicholas De Genova (2017) argues, the Balkan Route “has been haunted by the awkward fact that several
European countries themselves have yet to be admitted to the self-anointed circle of genuine and proper ‘European’-ness” including Macedonia and Serbia, which makes their role in enforcing EU borders even more complicated.

Greece is a member of the EU, but it is far from a destination country for refugees. Greece has been in an economic crisis for the better part of a decade, and has required financial assistance from its fellow EU member states multiple times, most notably from Germany (Martinez, 2015). Greece’s economic position impacts the country’s ability to provide assistance to refugees and to enact EU border policies. Additionally, Greece has a poor record of handling asylum claims (Cabot, 2014:23). The most emblematic example of the problems associated with the Greek Asylum system is the case, *MSS v. Belgium and Greece*.

In this case, MSS, an Afghan national, presented the case with the claim that “his expulsion by the Belgian authorities violated Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention\(^\text{10}\) and that he had also been subjected in Greece to treatment prohibited by Article 3” (MSS vs. Belgium and Greece, 2011). Article 2 of the Convention formally states the right to life, while Article 3 states the prohibition of torture, defined legally as that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment” (Council of Europe, 1950). In the eventual ruling by the European Court of Human Rights, Greece was found to have violated Article 3 because of the inhumane conditions MSS encountered in detention and later in his general living conditions in Greece. Additionally, Greece was found to have violated Article 13 of the Convention because of deficiencies in its ability to appropriately process asylum claims (“ECtHR-MSS v Belgium and Greece,” 2011). As a result, Greece had to reform its own asylum

---

\(^{10}\) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, referred to in short here as the Convention.
system, while the EU was forced to reform the common standard for asylum cases under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).

Greece began to make reforms following this case, but even so, its reputation was not positive among refugees. As a result, refugees sought to reach farther north in Europe and use Greece as a transit space. Given its proximity to Turkey and its position as part of the EU, the island of Lesvos became a key transit zone for refugees within Greece.

Lesvos as a Space of Transit

Greece has a long history of serving as a space of transit for irregular migrants seeking to enter Europe. Greece’s role within the European bordering regime is the focus of Chapter 5, but it is critical to first situate how Lesvos came to serve as a space of transit along the Balkan Route during the summer of 2015 until the present. The first factor in this development was the transition to the sea-route to Greece instead of the land-route. Greece and Turkey share a substantial land border in addition to their sea boundaries. Given this land border and the high risks associated with sea travel, it would seem more logical for people to try to cross via land. And for many years, they did. The land border between Greece and Turkey used to be the main point of entrance into Europe for clandestine migration (Trilling, 2014). However, there were, and still are, substantial risks in crossing it. The border was militarized in 1974 because of the Turkish invasion of now-independent Cyprus (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006). Although many landmines have since been removed, they remain a risk for those attempting to cross along the land-route. In addition to the risks of landmines, the river Evros physically defines the border. The wide and fast-paced river winds along most of the 150km-shared border, posing a challenge not dissimilar to the watery depths of the Aegean Sea. But the true mark of change that shifted
movement through Greece came in 2011 after reports came of nearly 100,000 irregular arrivals. The Greek government decided to build a border fence along the short portion of the border that did not follow the Evros (“Greece Plans Turkey,” 2011). This decision was followed by a general uptick in border security, driving those trying to reach Europe to shift to the sea-route.

The sea-route to Greece crosses the Aegean Sea from Turkey to the Aegean Islands, and then on to mainland Greece. Lesvos, as one of the Aegean Islands, came to be a critical place along the sea-route. It has operated as a space of transit since 2003 and most people traveling through the island were fleeing situations of violence in the Middle East (Carstensen, 2015). Since then, the number of people moving through the island has ebbed and flowed, but the situation that arose in the summer of 2015 was unprecedented. Nearly 60% of refugees that came through Greece in 2015 passed through Lesvos, with the largest surge in arrivals coming from July to October, when the weather for travel was optimal (Hernandez, 2016). This coincided with Lesvos’ peak tourist season, which limited mobility for refugees to get off the island because the island and the ferries to the mainland were often crowded (“Mediterranean Situation,” 2017). For many, it created a strange dichotomy of European leisure time contrasted against life or death struggles to find a space of safety (Shuster, 2015).

The narrowest point between Turkey and Lesvos is along the northern coast of the island, home to the historic port community of Molyvos and the village of Skala Sikamineas. When boats carrying refugees started to arrive steadily, locals, tourists, and volunteers responded quickly to help (Hernandez, 2016). The response included a network of elderly people living on the coasts, who helped with arrivals, food distribution, and general refugee support. The distance between the Turkish and Greek coastlines is a mere 4.1 miles. To reach Greece,

---

refugees traveled this short distance in everything from rubber boats to speedboats, frequently overloaded with as many people who could fit in the boat without it sinking. The northern coast of Lesvos was the main source of arrivals, but boats also arrived throughout the eastern shore. Despite the risks and the uncertainty of the journey, more than 3,000 people a day embarked on this perilous journey across the Aegean Sea to the Eastern coast of the island in 2015 (Gaynor, 2015). At present, boats continue to arrive along the eastern shore. The numbers are significantly lower now, but as of March 2018, they crept back up to several hundred a day across the Aegean Islands, the highest levels since 2016 (“Aegean Boat Report,” 2018). It is likely that Lesvos will continue to see even higher numbers of arrivals as the weather improves into the summer.

From Lesvos’ northern coast, it is several hours by car to the island’s capital city of Mytilene and to Moria camp. Despite the distance, the weary refugees who arrived in 2015 had to make that trip by foot because of a law that prevented taxis and public buses from transporting irregular migrants. Article 88.2 of law 3386/2005 states that “Captains or pilots of ships, vessels or aircrafts and drivers of any means of transport shall not accept to carry persons who do not hold the required travel documents or have not undergone regular police control” (“Codification,” 2005). If they did transport said persons, the person conducting the transport was then subject to legal penalties including fines and imprisonment. These penalties can extend to life in prisons in situations where death has occurred (“Codification,” 2005). This law was implemented as a safeguard against human trafficking, but when applied in 2015, it forced new arrivals to walk 65 miles in the summer sun to arrive in Mytilene before they could then travel to mainland Greece (Hernandez, 2016). At the time, individuals boycotted the law to provide aid to refugees anyway, while others did so to exploit the refugee’s plight by providing rides at three
times the normal taxi fare (Cossé, 2015). As a result of these issues, the law was altered in July 2015 to allow for the legal transportation of refugees on public and private vehicles.

In 2015, the official center of Moria quickly surged past capacity and NGOs opened up additional spaces, such as the Pikpa Camp, to shelter, feed, and provide resources to people on the move. This was not nearly enough and thousands of refugees spent nights on the street. At this time, Lesvos was largely just a space of transit, a place people would spend several hours or days, before moving forward to mainland Greece, but this process often faced significant delays due to inefficient registration times and capacity limits on ferries (Neely, 2015). Even though the conditions on Lesvos were horrible in 2015, refugees were not experiencing stuckness and forced immobility then, in the same way they are at the present. The number of daily arrivals in 2017 and 2018 was a fraction of what it was at the peak of the crisis, but people are now living there in limbo as they wait for their cases to be processed in the inefficient Greek asylum system. There are many cases of people who have been on Lesvos for a year to 18 months and are contained by the island because of the EU-Turkey Deal as they are forced to wait before they can move forward.

With little assistance from the Greek government or the rest of Europe at the time, the non-governmental response in 2015 began with the residents of Lesvos and a handful of NGOs, which would proliferate extensively as the scale of arrivals grew over the course of 2015. Many of Lesvos’ residents also responded to the influx of refugees in 2015 with a fury, lending a hand where they could despite their own economic insecurity because of Greece’s statewide financial challenges (Cheslow and Estrin, 2016). These groups and individuals, particularly those working in solidarity with refugees, have continued to be the strongest voices in opposition to the EU-Turkey Deal’s establishment of a containment policy on the island. A collective of solidarians
issued a call beginning in October to #Opentheislands to end this policy because of the inhumanity it was creating (“Statement,” 2017). The response was mixed though, as some locals on Lesvos exploited desperate refugees to make a profit. This was particularly possible because people in transit on Lesvos felt comfortable spending their money freely because they felt they had made it.\footnote{Kostas, interviewed by Ava Baker, Julia Endicott, and Shona McCarthy, January 11, 2018.} Exploitation took place everywhere on the island, but it was particularly visible in the port area of Mytilene where people on the move waited for ferries to mainland Greece. Restaurants charged for bathroom use and even for glasses of water. Residents of other parts of Greece even migrated to Lesvos to take advantage of the economic opportunities present on the island.\footnote{Kostas, interviewed by Ava Baker, Julia Endicott, and Shona McCarthy, January 11, 2018.} For many locals though, the drive to help refugees was in part related to their ancestral ties to forced migration during the Asia Minor Population Transfer in 1923.

**Asia Minor Population Transfer**

The island’s strong ties to historic refugee experience were in part responsible for the reaction from the residents of Lesvos to the surge of new refugees coming to the island. The term refugee is one that has a legal definition defined in Chapter 1, but it also has a separate identity void of legalese. Even if an individual does not meet the legal definition, they are still entitled to self-identify in whichever way they see fit. Although very few, if any, of the local residents on Lesvos are refugees themselves, many have strong ancestral ties to refugees as a result of Lesvos’ long history of shifting between empires. It was part of the Ancient Greek Empire, only to be taken over by the Byzantine Empire and later conquered by the Ottomans, who would rule the island for the better part of five centuries (“History & Mythology of Lesvos,”). However, it
was the complicated politics and wars of the 20th century that would most heavily shape migration to Lesvos.

Turkey and Greece exist today as relatively young states. Their respective geographic boundaries and borders were only recently divided after years of conflict and struggle following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Greece became a state in 1830, while Turkey gained statehood in 1923. The Ottoman Empire was home to a multiethnic population that lived across a vast amount of territory. However, under the political shift to democracies and defined nation-states, acceptance of multi-ethnicity has been lost in favor of recreating states of ethnic homelands. These struggles were visible throughout the 20th century in the First Balkan War, the Greco-Turkish War, both World Wars, and the Balkan Wars that took place in the 1990s and into the early 2000s. Tensions still exist between the two nations (Clark, 2009).

The tensions that caused multiple wars in the 20th century were instigated in the 19th century, as the Ottoman Sultan was gradually pushed back from the Balkan area of Europe (Clark, 2009:6) and a new modern Christian Greek kingdom emerged, both of which directly contrasted with the aspirations of the Ottoman Empire. In 1912, the conflicting religious and ethnic ideals between Christian territories and Muslim territories would erupt into the First and Second Balkan Wars, during which the Ottomans were decisively pushed out of Europe (Clark, 2009:6). Although ultimately territory was really what was at stake in this conflict, religious difference was used as justification for the conflict.

The region would erupt into further conflict with the onset of the First World War, which would be the final straw to bring about the collapse of the once mighty Ottoman Empire. That would not be the end of war, however, for Greece and Turkey. Greece saw an opportunity for expansion given the outcome of World War I. Greece invaded the valuable port of Smyrna.
(present day Izmir) on the Aegean Sea and the region of Anatolia (Clark 2009:10). The aforementioned series of conflicts had already led to a significant number of refugees who were dispersed by incredible violence throughout the European continent. However, the result of the Greek invasion of Smyrna would impact the Christian Orthodox populations living in Turkish territory and the Muslim populations living in Greece, creating another population dispersion.

The government of Turkey responded decisively to the Greek invasion and would ultimately be victorious. The subsequent peace agreement not only ended the conflict, but also resulted in the exchange of nearly two million people between the two states following the Lausanne Conference of 1923 (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006). At this conference, it was decided that all Orthodox Christians in Turkish territory would be moved to Greece and all Muslims in Greece would be moved back to Turkey. Effectively, the Lausanne Treaty would create 1.3 million refugees from Turkey and 500,000 refugees from Greece (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006). However, this agreement left out several hundred thousand Greek people in the area of Constantinople, and Muslims living in the Western Thrace region of Greece, creating minorities who would be excluded from many social and economic facets of their states (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006).

The Lausanne Treaty and the Population Exchange of 1923 focused on religious identities, ignoring language traditions or family history of living in either place. Therefore, under this agreement people were forced to move to a new state to which they had little if any connection, other than their ethnic and religious history. Their new “home” was a foreign land, disconnected from many of their own family’s histories (Shields, 2013). Additionally, the population exchange did not create a homogeneous population of Christians or Muslims as the governments intended. It served to create additional divides between the locals who were already
living in Greece and the exchanged Greek Orthodox Christians as refugees, with similar divides in Turkey (Clark 2009: 229). Although some of the divides have since faded, the legacies of forced migration remain. Additionally, tensions between the Greek and Turkish governments and the Lausanne Treaty itself remain fraught to the present. This was recently evident by Turkish President Erdoğan’s December 7, 2017 visit to Athens to meet with Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, where Erdoğan sought to negotiate the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty as part of effort to rebuild Greek-Turkish relations, which was a surprise to the Greek government (Smith, 2017b).

The population exchange, now nearly 100 years ago, has left a lasting legacy on the island of Lesvos. Nearly 60% of the island’s current population is descended from refugees from the population exchange (Carstensen, 2015). Their ancestors were a marginalized population compared to the Greek nationals already living on Lesvos (Carstensen, 2015). That memory has transcended relations between new refugees and the descendants of refugees. However, even with assistance and kindness from the descendants of refugees, addressing migration is a task of government action, both from Greece and from the EU.

In this chapter, I sought to contextualize aspects of the 2015 “refugee crisis” that led to the EU-Turkey Deal, as well as Lesvos’ historical connection to refugees to provide background information of what was occurring on the island prior to the Deal. The Deal was implemented to stem flows of migration after 2015, but has ultimately created a situation of containment and inhumanity for refugees now stuck on Lesvos. The situation on Lesvos is unique because of its geographic position, as well as its history. It is also exceptional because of its role within the enforcement of the EU-Turkey Deal. However, its interesting position is first grounded in an
extensive body of literature regarding immigrant detention, island geography, temporal uncertainty, and humanitarianism, which are the focuses of my next chapter.
Chapter 3: Literature Review

In this chapter, I seek to situate my own research regarding the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal for refugees in the existing literature. The ultimate purpose of this research is to contribute to scholarship on migration. To do so, I first began by conducting an extensive literature review on four areas of work that were relevant to the issues apparent in my topic: immigration detention, health outcomes, temporal uncertainty, and humanitarianism. My purpose in writing this piece is then to provide a case study specific to the island of Lesvos after the implementation of the EU-Turkey Deal that explains how the policy creates containment through immobilizing refugees, and the consequences of that containment for health and well-being of refugees. This literature review seeks to situate the four bodies of literature mentioned as independent areas of study that come to intersect critically in the field of migration studies. The first section reviews research that documents the global rise in immigration detention structures and processes. The next section delves into the intersection of detention and health and seeks to frame immigration detention as a public health issue. The third section explores the role of uncertainty and (im) mobility as a determinant of migrant\textsuperscript{14} health. Finally, the fourth section discusses the role of global humanitarianism, as humanitarianism and bordering are frequently found to reinforce one another. The scholars cited use the troubled history of humanitarianism to shape contemporary critiques of the relationship between humanitarianism, politics, and the securitization of borders.

\textsuperscript{14} In this section, I use the term migrant, refugee, and asylum-seeker somewhat interchangeably to be more inclusive to the scope of the literature.
Immigration Detention and the Nation-State System

Since the 1980s, there has been a proliferation of policies and practices that use various forms of detention as a means for controlling migration. The EU-Turkey Deal is one of those practices, although it is not specifically designed to detain people. Immigration detention policies are designed to manage, immobilize, and isolate people who are present in a foreign state's territory through irregular means. Irregular migration refers to people traveling without state-sanctioned documentation, which in effect holds them in a place of exception (Sampson and Mitchell, 2013). There is a robust body of literature that analyzes the use and effects of immigration detention from a range of disciplinary backgrounds, most notably from political science and theory, anthropology, and social geography. Much of this literature draws on and critiques the work of Giorgio Agamben, specifically his writing on bare life and camp structure, (Walters, 2002; Hall, 2010, Mountz et al, 2012; Mainwaring, 2012) as well as the theory of biopolitics developed by Michel Foucault (Hall, 2010).

Silverman and Massa (2012:679) define immigration detention as “the holding of foreign nationals, or non-citizens, for the purposes of realizing an immigration-related goal.” Prior to the proliferation of these practices in the 1980s and 1990s (Flynn 2014; Sampson and Mitchell 2013; Bloch and Schuster 2005), immigration detention existed, however it was not codified in legal policies in the same manner that it is today. William Walters (2002:268-269) argues that the use of detention has its earliest roots in the use of exile, which dates back millennia. Walters (2002) identifies precedents for contemporary detention practices in the transportation and transfers of ethnic groups during periods of state building and shifting territorial boundaries during the colonial period, as well as throughout the 20th century (272-273). One of the transfers he discusses is the 1923 Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey, which has shaped much
of the current sentiments towards refugees on Lesvos. However, Walters (2002:275) notes that these earliest systems were largely used prior to or in the earliest periods of the state-system and, as a result, were entrenched in empire structures, rather than in states. Other scholars center the roots of modern immigration detention in the rise of codified immigration laws in the late 19th century, and the use of internment camps to contain ‘enemy aliens’ during World War I and World War II (Bashford and Strange, 2002; Bloch and Schuster, 2005). These camps existed throughout Europe, the United States, and Australia, all of which form the main geographic centers of immigration detention practices today.

Although immigration detention has its roots in historic methods of exclusion and containment, the expansion of designated detention centers is a notably modern trend. Michael Flynn (2014) argues that this trend can first be linked to Reagan-era policies in the United States that came as a response to a surge in migration from Haiti and Cuba (172). Scholars attribute the expansion of global immigration detention structures over the last 30 years to the rise of securitization of national borders, fear of acts of terror, and on the globalized ‘war on terror’ (Flynn, 2014; Mountz et al. 2013). The ‘war on terror’ effectively began after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in New York City, preceding the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The ‘war on terror’ is also visible through the increased levels of security at borders in the United States and in Europe. It is important to note that both Afghanistan and Iraq are two of the largest contributors of global refugees today. The core goals of immigration detention policies are securitization of borders and deterrence of migration; detention often comes as a byproduct when those goals are not achieved. Immigration detention centers then exist to hold the bodies of those who challenge border policies.
Immigration detention centers exist in both the core and the periphery of sovereign states. Increasingly, wealthy countries are externalizing their border controls to territorial island spaces closest to where migration surges are occurring or even going so far as creating political and economic agreements with other sovereign nations to delegate border control outside the nation-state (Flynn, 2014; Mountz, 2011; Mountz et al. 2013). The United States, European Union, and Australia have all used externalization policies as methods of migration control. In the United States, this trend toward externalization is evident in the use of US-operated detention centers in Guatemala and in Guantanamo Bay (Flynn, 2014). In Australia, externalization is seen in the ‘Pacific Solution,’ through which Australia established financial compensation regimes with the governments of the South Pacific islands of Nauru and Manus in order to build offshore detention centers outside Australian territory (Mountz, 2011). In Europe, externalization can be seen in the use of containment policies across Mediterranean territories, including the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, the Canary Islands, and the Italian and Greek islands, as well as in non-EU states that serve as transit zones (Mountz, 2011). The role of islands in immigration detention is particularly critical for the purposes of this research because of Lesvos’ island geography. Mountz (2011) argues that islands serve as a key factor in the design of immigration detention because they are not connected to the mainland, and therefore do not serve as direct of a link to state asylum proceedings.

Across disciplines, the literature demonstrates how immigration detention is rooted in a goal to increase social control and to systematically exclude or include migrants based on their identity. Migrants do not have just one identity, but rather their identity is shaped and governed by a series of multiplicities (Tazzioli, 2016). Tazzioli argues that these multiplicities are used to prevent the formation of a collective migrant identity against the state, and to divide migrants by
labeling their bodies. By the same token, she argues that migrants can exercise their own bodies and enable the formation of a mob collective that challenges state power. Additionally, state immigration detention policies are not the final step of managing migration, but rather a step designed to be temporary. However, people detained by foreign states are stuck for anywhere from a few days to several years at an increasing rate, depending on the nation that detains them and the conditions of their detention (Silverman and Massa, 2012). Detention also frequently leads to deportation, putting the detainee at high risk of persecution upon their return. However, detention also can result in extensive consequences for health, which will be discussed next.

**Detention as a Public Health Issue**

Frequently, immigration detention is analyzed from a political or human rights perspective, as much of the literature in the previous section demonstrates. However, given the negative health outcomes associated with experiences of detention, immigration detention can, and arguably should, also be framed as a public health issue. There is extensive scholarship on migrant health that indicates that detention has wide-ranging effects on health and well-being (Athwal, 2015; Crepet et al.; Mares and Jureidini, 2004; Mares and Zwi, 2015). In general, human health is a multidimensional subject that is determined by a range of factors. These factors are known as determinants and come from interactions between humans and their social, economic, and environmental worlds and influence health outcomes. Often, asylum-seekers have experienced risky journeys and may be fleeing experiences of trauma in their country of origin. Then they may be shocked when they arrive in a country thought to be safe, only to find themselves confined within a detention center. The determinants of health among detained populations range from the physical environment, to the stress of the situation, to the unknown
outcome of detention, all of which influence both the psychosocial sphere of health and the clinical understandings of health (Fiske, 2013; Mares and Zwi, 2015; El-Shaarawi, 2015). There are many other health determinants beyond these four discussed above, such as gender, age and socioeconomic status, but these four are the most salient in the structure of detention.

The first determinant is the experience of detention itself, which serves to dehumanize those who become entangled within the structural violence of immigration detention systems (Fiske, 2013). The second key determinant is the role of insecurity and violence as they contribute to health outcomes. The last two determinants are arguably two of the most critical beyond that of detention itself. These determinants are the physical conditions of the centers and the liminal nature of time in detention, both of which manifest in negative physical and psychological effects on the detainees (Kotsioni et al. 2013). Those effects also extend to refugees living in other immobilizing spaces, such as refugee camps, who suffer as a result of the liminal nature of their immobilization (El-Shaarawi, 2015).

Detention centers range from repurposed structures to prisonlike centers specifically designed to contain those who do not have legal status within a state. In many states, they are staffed and required to provide basic rights, such as shelter and food, but provide little beyond that (Fiske, 2013). The lack of dignity and recognition of basic rights within the structure of detention serves to deny the right of being human (Fiske, 2013). Fiske argues that grouping refugees into categories such as boatpeople or asylum seekers serves to reduce a person from human to a state of biology devoid of value or rights. Refugees are then only able to take back their humanity through protests evoking human agency (Fiske, 2013). Immigration detention also criminalizes those who are detained despite a lack of criminal charges and limited access to legal representation (Douglas and Sáenz, 2013). Although distinct, immigration detention centers
and prisons share many attributes and structural factors that contribute to their effects on health. A 2011 review in the Lancet by Fazel and Baillargeon outlines many of the health disparities between the imprisoned and the general public. In general, the two leading causes of disparities are related to mental health conditions and the spread of communicable diseases (Fazel and Baillargeon, 2011:956). There has been less research done on the role of imprisonment in the context of non-communicable diseases (Fazel and Baillargeon, 2011:959).

Next, detention centers are frequently tight, confined spaces, full of people who are overwhelmed by their circumstances. This overlap contributes to feelings of insecurity and outbreaks of violence, which serve as the second determinant of health within the context of detention that I discuss in this review. Certain populations are particularly vulnerable to situations of insecurity and violence, specifically women and children. A 2015 study of Australian immigration detention focused its research on the experiences of families and children at the Christmas Island detention facility (Mares and Zwi, 2015). Children were exposed to situations of violence and distress at higher rates than the general population and had notable reactions, including sadness, anxiety, and aggression (Mares and Zwi, 2015). Another study showed that women in detention were also at risk for gendered violence. In particular, women in immigration detention facilities were at risk for experiences of sexual harassment and assault both by fellow detainees and from staff (Steel et al., 2004). A 2004 study by Steel et al. analyzed a series of experiences among detained families in Australia in which they specifically looked at the role of violence among other experiences in shaping negative mental health outcomes.

Coupled with experiences of trauma, anxiety, and limited access to health services, many detention centers do not meet healthy housing standards, thus increasing the public health burden of detention. Substandard conditions include poor hygiene, minimal access to sanitation, poor air
ventilation, and inadequate sheltering in bad weather (Kotsioni et al. 2013). There is some literature on the relationship between crowding and health outcomes, but it is largely focused on the effect of slums on health (Evans et al. 1998; Sclar et al. 2005). Overcrowding is particularly linked to the spread of scabies and other communicable diseases because of limited means of isolating infected parties (Heukelbach and Feldmeier, 2006). Another body of literature investigates the relationship between substandard housing and health and includes several studies that look at Palestinian refugee camps outside of Beirut (Habib, Basma, and Yeretzian, 2006; Zabaneh, Watt, and O’Donnell, 2007). Habib, Basma, and Yeretzian’s 2006 study evaluated the presence of illness in relation to infrastructure and services, housing conditions, and crowding within Burj Barajneh camp in Beirut. They found a positive association between illness and poor housing conditions within the camp structure. Zabaneh, Watt, and O’Donnell focused their research on housing related health outcomes at an unofficial camp in Lebanon. They found that the conditions among Palestinian refugees living in the camp were akin to those of residents of British slums in the 19th century. This literature shows a clear trend between refugee camp housing and negative health outcomes. However, there is a gap in the research regarding how housing specifically in detention centers can have similar or different health outcomes when compared to refugee camps or slums.

Mental well-being and suffering among migrants is largely associated with the liminal nature of migration and the uncertain future posed for those stuck in limbo because of migration policies (El-Shaarawi, 2015). Many detainees worry about the future steps in the immigration procedure during and following an uncertain period of detention. For some, this means having an asylum application accepted, whereas for many, a decision may mean deportation. These experiences with uncertainty are directly linked to psychosocial effects on well-being (Athwal,
Not only are many asylum-seekers unsure about their future, but there are very few resources available for people to seek treatment for mental health or find techniques to cope with their anxieties. In a 2015 study conducted by Mares and Zwi, they found the risks for PTSD, major depressive disorder, anxiety, self-harm, and suicidal thoughts or actions in detention centers to be forty times greater than the same risks among the general Australian population. The risks for deteriorating mental health are not universal to all migrants, but were felt acutely for those populations of detained people, rather than resettled refugee communities (Kenny and Procter, 2016). In part because of Australia’s ‘Pacific Solution’ policy, there is a robust body of literature regarding health impacts among long-term detained populations in Australia. The literature on Australia, from Mares and Judienen, 2004, Mares and Zwi 2015, and Kenny and Procter, 2016, is particularly useful in this manner because of Australia’s mandatory detention policy. This is effectively what is transpiring on the Greek islands in response to the passing of the EU-Turkey Deal, although refugees on Lesvos are contained within a reception center, rather than a formal immigration detention center.

Beyond the determinants discussed above, there is an additional factor that contributes to the manifestation of illness — what Miriam Ticktin (2006) describes as the “trade in biological integrity for political recognition” (33). Ticktin’s (2006) analysis focuses on how asylum-seekers in France became sick, often by infecting themselves with HIV in order to gain legal status (33-34). The deliberate use of illness in France led to an increase in legal status for people who had diagnosable illnesses, but a decline in overall asylum admissions (Ticktin, 2006) Similarly, hunger strikes make use of the body to protest against the structural violence found in systems of immigration detention (Fiske, 2013). Additionally, Nicholas Fischer identifies self-harm as a last
resort to avoid deportation in France as a form of political protest, rather than as a manifestation of a clinical mental health condition due to the circumstances of detention (Fischer 2014).

The scholarly works across migration studies and public health closely analyze the links between health and detention. At the same time, there is a need to analyze the time frame during which these deteriorations occur. It is also necessary to better understand the overlaps between each determinant and the psychosocial and clinical manifestations of health and well-being among detained individuals, rather than framing them as separate experiences. Lastly, there is a research gap regarding the factors that make different refugee populations more vulnerable to the health consequences of detention.

**Temporal Uncertainty**

As mentioned above, one of the key determinants of health and well-being among detained populations is the uncertain nature of the period of detention. This uncertainty is described in the literature as limbo, stuckness, stillness, and waiting, in order to classify the idea of temporal uncertainty (Missbach 2013; El-Shaarawi, 2015; Griffiths 2014; Haas 2017; Turnbull 2016; Dimitriadi, 2017). However, temporal uncertainty is more than just a determinant of health. It is also at the center of a burgeoning body of scholarly work within migration studies. Uncertainty exists for everyone as a product of the human experience, but it takes on a special role within migration and situations of (im)mobility (Horst and Grabska, 2015). For many migrants, uncertainty is a protracted experience during which the near and long term futures are unknown and can exist beyond the agency of the individual. These situations of protracted displacement during which refugees may live in limbo for years, if not decades, are the subject of
much of the literature on temporal uncertainty (Conlon, 2011; Hyndman and Giles, 2011; Brun, 2015; Horst and Grabska, 2015).

The literature on temporal uncertainty within migration studies crosses a range of disciplines, with scholars exploring how temporal understandings impact people in many ways. Tim Cresswell (2012), a geographer, explains how mobility and stillness go hand in hand in instances of migrant movement. He illustrates this through the requirements of stillness in moments of clandestine migration, such as when migrants are trafficked in trucks and must remain motionless while still physically mobile (2012:648). Hyndman and Giles (2011) explore the gendering of mobility in the context of protracted situations, mainly focusing on refugee camps. They argue that waiting is feminized because of the power imbalances that exist when one is forced to wait due to geographic and legal constraints (Hyndman and Giles, 2011: 363). They further argue that movement is made masculine because it evokes feelings of fear (Hyndman and Giles, 2011: 369).

It is critical to note that the place where a person waits can also impact the experience of temporal uncertainty. Bridget Haas (2017) explores the suffering that occurs within the long asylum process in the United States. Many of her interview subjects were living in their own spaces, rather than in detention centers or camps, but still felt contained by the bounds of the asylum system on their rights to work and live. The structure of asylum proceedings forced many of Haas’ interlocutors to put their lives on hold, unable to plan for the future. This sense of waiting on life also manifested as the idea of wasting years of life, with no guarantee of an outcome in their favor. Nadia El-Shaarawi (2015) focuses on a similar vein of suffering among Iraqis in situations of protracted waiting, living as exiles in Egypt. Her work, like that of Haas, does not focus on detention centers specifically. She argues that for many refugees, suffering
relates back to instability and their lack of certainty regarding whether they could soon return to Iraq, or whether they were going to be resettled either in Egypt or through a third-country resettlement program.

Melanie Griffiths (2014) looks specifically at the role of temporal uncertainty within detention centers. She explains that temporal uncertainty, along with discord, mark “points of tension” within the experience of the immigration system, as they overlay with varying cultural understandings of the passing of time (2014:1992). Griffiths focuses her work specifically on detention centers within the U.K, which have been sites of substantial research on the relationship between health and detention. Sarah Turnbull (2016) later analyzed the same points of tension within the U.K. system, but with a focus on lived experiences of waiting and stuckness. Turnbull (2016) discusses stuckness, via detainee understandings of the experience, as “some sort of purgatory in which they were forced, against their will, to wait,” (69). Her analysis goes on to explore how these temporal conditions serve as a source of “mental torture” as defined by the detainees (Turnbull 2016: 69-70).

Uncertainty also creates idleness and boredom, leaving displaced people time to constantly wonder when their situation may change (Brun, 2015). Some people cope with their uncertainty through establishing routines, such as daily conversations with their neighbors or structured meals (Brun, 2015:27), while others use their faith as a means of coping (Turnbull, 2016). However, the inability to plan for even the short-term future is shown to take a significant toll on mental and emotional well-being, which contributes to suffering and exacerbates underlying or overt mental health conditions. Unlike a prison sentence, detention and migration come with no clear timeline (Silverman et al., 2012; El-Shaarawi, 2015). Asylum seekers and detainees alike are forced to wait in inefficient bureaucratic systems until their case number
merits the time of an immigration official. That official, though obligated to work within the bounds of existing migration policy, ultimately has the power to determine the asylum seeker’s future.

**Humanitarianism**

Immigration detention, border disputes and public health crises impact humans, and in turn frequently result in humanitarian interventions. Humanitarianism is a well-studied area of scholarship that impacts each of the aforementioned areas of scholarship, as well as this thesis in various ways. In this final section of my literature review, I discuss the various definitions of humanitarianism, its origins, and the formation, and subsequent critiques, of contemporary humanitarianism.

*What is Humanitarianism?*

This seems like a simple question, given how frequently it is used in public discourse. Google told me in 0.45 seconds that it is “the promotion of human welfare.” Scholars would not define it quite so quickly or easily. Rather, they have, and continue to, grapple with just what exactly is humanitarianism. Michael Barnett (2011) calls humanitarianism “a morally complicated creature, a flawed hero defined by the passion, politics, and power of its times even as it tries to rise above them” (7). This is evident in the framing of humanitarianism within the aid sector. Humanitarian organizations center their work on the core principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, but often struggle to adhere to those principles (Barnett and Weiss, 2008). The core principles come from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which is considered to be the “patriarch” of the humanitarian aid system (Barnett and Weiss, 2008). Jean Pictet (1979) defines the aforementioned terms for the ICRC as
follows: humanity: prevention and alleviation of human suffering and the protection of human life and health; impartiality: no discrimination towards people needing aid; neutrality: remain apolitical, and refrain from engaging in controversies; independence: autonomy from governments. However, this core definition frequently fails to hold up in practice.

Barnett and Weiss (2008) refrain from providing a clear definition of humanitarianism, as that would minimize its complexities and its fluidity over time. Rather, they define humanitarianism through the identities it takes within discourse, and in turn, how those various identities are shaped by the relationship between humanitarianism, power, politics, and ethics. Fassin (2007) takes a different approach in defining humanitarianism. He argues that humanitarianism is a “politics of life” based on the politics that ascribe a value to human life (Fassin 2007:499). This extends to how life and risk are taken and whose lives are fundamentally valued as worthy of being saved. Ticktin (2006) argues that humanitarianism is based on ideas of morality and compassion, but that without an effective system of governance, it can lead to contradictory results. Next, I explain how the understanding and role of humanitarianism has shifted and evolved over time.

*Humanitarianism Over Time*

The challenge in defining humanitarianism relates closely to its complex history. Barnett and Weiss (2008) argue that humanitarianism has evolved over three eras: the early 19th century to World War II; 1945 to the end of the Cold War in 1989; and from 1990 to the present (2). Barnett (2011) and Ticktin (2006) credit the start of humanitarianism with the idea of organized compassion that emerged in Europe and the rest of the imperial world in the 19th century. The rise of compassion was also deeply connected to Christian religious zeal during the same era (Barnett and Weiss, 2008). However, humanitarianism was not a new idea per say at that time,
and was preceded by colonial concepts regarding the civilizing mission ideology (Barnett and Weiss, 2008). Notions of humanitarianism are particularly true in the history of medical missions throughout the colonial world, in which biomedicine was practiced not by the state, but rather by Christian churches to protect health and life (Vaughan, 1991).

During the same era, popular culture encouraged humanitarian action. In Rudyard Kipling’s (1899) notorious poem “The White Man’s Burden,” he explicitly states in the third stanza, “Take up the White Man’s burden/ The savage wars of peace--/ Fill full the mouth of Famine/ And bid the sickness cease,” which suggests to the white men colonizing Africa that it was their burden to save those suffering from famine and illness and to provide aid to the suffering. Kipling’s ideas continue to play a central role of critiques of humanitarianism, as humanitarians shy away from acknowledging whiteness and the role race plays in humanitarian intervention (Jefferes, 2015; Danewid, 2017). This first era of humanitarianism however, saw little pushback against the structures that created the need for humanitarianism in the first place (Barnett, 2011:64).

Barnett and Weiss (2008) argue that this first phase lasted until World War II. After the War, there was a shift in westernized notions of peace, power, and suffering. Many of the major humanitarian actors present in the contemporary sphere were founded at this time, including the UNHCR (Barnett and Weiss, 2008). At the same time, former empires were decolonizing and pouring their humanitarian efforts into the suffering of the “third world,” in light of the shifting social consciousness (Barnett and Weiss, 2008). This era lasted until the Cold War, which Barnett (2011) argues began the present era of liberal humanitarianism.

Contemporary Humanitarianism and its Critiques
Scholars argue that contemporary humanitarianism has strayed from the core principles outlined by Pictet (Barnett and Weiss, 2008; Ticktin, 2006). Contemporary humanitarianism, as well as securitization and bordering are all closely connected. Ruben Andersson (2017) and Maurizio Albahari (2015) call it a nexus of militarism and humanitarianism that functions through ideas of state sovereignty and state-centric humanitarian action, framed as protecting human lives. This is particularly visible in European border zones (Andersson, 2017; Stierl, 2017). Walters (2011) calls this complex relationship a humanitarian border, which he defines as “an uneasy alliance…of politics of alienation with a politics of care,” pointing to the struggle between the humanitarian idea of care and the militaristic notion of exclusion that comes to a head in border zones. The Mediterranean Sea is a sight where this humanitarian border is frequently visible (Albahari, 2015; Stierl, 2017).

Critiques of contemporary humanitarianism also connect it back to its colonial roots. Teju Cole coined the phrase “The White-Savior Industrial Complex” in 2012 following the viral sensation of Kony 2012 (Cole, 2012) and argues in his article for The Atlantic that this complex is “a valve for releasing unbearable pressures that build in a system built on pillage.” The pillage he refers to is foreign policy and violence and the act of following Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden”, wherein white people can feel better about themselves by donating money or their time to save people, but do not actually challenge the structures in place beyond sharing a viral video. White innocence, as Ida Danewid (2017) argues, erases responsibility and structural reform stemming from colonialism in place of humanitarian hospitality and generosity. She, like Fassin (2007) and Albahari (2015), questions how humanitarianism puts a value on life and determines whose lives are worthy of humanitarian aid in the contemporary geopolitical structure, where hierarchical power structures continue to prevail.
Humanitarianism is a complicated field, as the literature suggests. The term is used frequently, but has no true definition. It is also often used in the context of state intervention and is actively partial to which lives are worthy of being saved, contradicting two of its founding principles. The term is used to manage political dissent, as well as military policies towards borders, both of which contradict the principle of neutrality (Walters, 2011; Albahari, 2015). Additionally, humanitarianism plays an integral role in my argument, as these same critiques and contradictions of humanitarianism are at play on Lesvos as a result of the EU-Turkey Deal.

By grounding my research in literature regarding immigration detention policies, public health consequences of detention, temporal uncertainty, and humanitarianism, I can better ground what is happening on Lesvos in other research, but also note the places where it clearly deviates from the existing literature. In the next chapter, I connect this scholarly base to the methodology I used in conducting my own research.
Chapter 4: Methodology

Last fall, I took my first course on refugee policy, which served as the catalyst for this research. There, I delved into stories of migration and the framework of international migration treaties, and began research into Greek refugee policy. As I began to think more critically about the subject of my thesis, I narrowed my research focus to refugee detention policies and from there, came to focus geographically on the island of Lesvos. Greece is at the edge of the EU and Lesvos is one of the furthest places from the center of Greece. Its distance and island geography give it a unique position at the far edge of the E.U (“The Hotspot Approach,” 2015). The policy that directly provoked my research was the EU-Turkey Deal, which has effectively turned the Aegean Islands (Lesvos being one of them) into agents of bordering and spaces of containment.

Given my knowledge of this policy and my interest in public health, I developed three central questions for my research. As with many research projects, these questions shifted over time, given the results of my fieldwork. Initially, my overarching question for this thesis was, how are uncertain periods of detention on Lesvos leading to a public health crisis? I asked this question with the aim of differentiating by variables including gender and country of origin as they impact the health consequences of detention. However, this ultimately came to serve a smaller role within my research and one of my other questions became more central to my ultimate discussion. By the end, the overarching question for my research asked, how do people on Lesvos see the shift in the situation for refugees since the EU-Turkey Deal was enacted on March 20, 2016. This ultimately created a broader central question and was more relevant to my three results sections that come later in this thesis. My secondary questions then focused on health and well-being, as well as what is being done to alleviate the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal. My initial first question became a secondary question, and shifted slightly to ask,
how are uncertain periods of detention as a result of the EU-Turkey Deal on Lesvos leading to a public health crisis? Lastly, my third question asked: how are solidarity initiatives seeking to mitigate or counteract the effects of detention on Lesvos.

In order to answer these questions, I spent my fall semester focused on an extensive literature review, which was discussed in the previous chapter. There, I focused on bodies of work relating to immigration detention policy, detention and public health, and temporal uncertainty across multiple disciplines. I later added a section regarding scholarship on humanitarianism because it emerged as a necessary component of my research following my time in the field. I also conducted extensive background research through journalistic reports of the situation on the ground. This initial research was critical to the development of my plan for fieldwork, which provided me the necessary data to effectively answer my research questions. I used a mixture of ethnographic methods, which included participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and social media analysis. However, given these methods, it was essential that I developed metrics to operationalize my research questions. To operationalize is “to reduce any complex variable to a set of measurable traits” (Bernard, 2011:35). As I will go into more detail later in my methods section of this chapter, I operationalized my research questions to measurable results I could find in the field in order to make sense of my three research questions.

In this chapter, I begin with an explanation of my field site, Lesvos, and the sites across the island that supported my research. I then explain my methods, fieldwork ethics, and sampling strategy before moving on to vignettes of my participants. I end this section with my analysis and the limitations I faced while conducting research.
Field Site

The field site for this research was the island of Lesvos, situated in the Aegean Sea near the Turkish coastline. Lesvos is one of several Greek islands that have become key sites of European bordering following the implementation of the EU-Turkey Deal. I chose to pursue my research on Lesvos, as opposed to one of the other islands, because it is the largest of the Aegean Islands and has the largest population of stuck refugees (“Aegean Islands,” 2017). The data used in this thesis comes from ethnographic fieldwork conducted between January 3\textsuperscript{rd} and February 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2018. My research on Lesvos was made possible due to the Hunt Grant at Colby College, which was designed to fund undergraduate honors thesis fieldwork for Global Studies students. My field site, though specific to my own thesis focus, was one of four sites of a collaborative undergraduate research team as part of the Global Studies course, Insurgent Mobilities Lab, instructed by Nadia El-Shaarawi and Maple Razsa. My research was bound by the ethical standards of this course and by an approved IRB through Colby College for our overarching project, titled “The Emergence and Evolution of Forced Migration Routes.” This course focused on the opening and closing of the Balkan Route of migration, from Turkey into central Europe. Our research team placed students in key sites along this route, which included Istanbul, Turkey; Belgrade, Serbia; Frankfurt, Germany; and my own site, Lesvos, Greece. Two students accompanied me to Lesvos as part of this research team: Ava Baker and Shona McCarthy. With the exception of two interviews, all fieldwork was conducted collaboratively.

On Lesvos, there were several places that were key sites for the fieldwork that informed this thesis. I used both photography and field notes as my means of documenting these spaces. The first site was the port of Mytilene, which was filled with Frontex border control ships. I walked along the port nearly every day and I typically saw anywhere from four to eight ships
docked. The port was also home to the ferry system, which transported goods, volunteers, and refugees to and from the island. Additionally, the port was surrounded by the bustle of Mytilene coffee shops and traffic in and out of the city center.

Coffee shops also served as key spaces for my research. They are a central element of the Greek social scene and spaces where groups of people gather for hours to share a coffee and a conversation. There are three cafes that were most important to my work, which were all well-regarded by refugees and volunteer groups. They were also within sight of the port and of Sappho Square, which has been the site of many protests regarding the state of Moria. Café π, was a well-known refugee and activist space. It had many reliable electrical outlets for charging cellphones and owners who I was told work in solidarity with refugee support efforts. Bobiras Café, the site of one of my interviews, was a place often used by NGO and humanitarian organization staff, as was Mousiko Kafeneio. These spaces were also recommended by my interview subjects and were later discussed as places that were supportive of volunteers.

Mytilene was my base and home to several key sites for my research but the true foundation of my fieldwork came through volunteering at The Hope Project Warehouse. It was located near the municipality-run Kara Tepe camp, a few kilometers from Mytilene. The Warehouse, operated by Eric and Philippa Kempson, provided basic hygiene supplies, such as shampoo, toothbrushes, menstrual napkins, diapers, and underwear, as well as clothing items to refugees living in Moria camp. The Kempsons, both originally from the U.K., have resided on Lesvos for the better part of the last 20 years. They have been actively engaged in efforts to support refugees on Lesvos since 2015. The Warehouse is their latest project; an effort to provide necessary support to thousands of refugees on the island. It opened in December 2017 and serves

---

15 Pafsanias (Professor), conversation with the author, January 23, 2018.
an average of 30 families a day. The Warehouse was one of several buildings housed on the same lot that were repurposed to serve various functions to mitigate the current situation for refugees on the island. At the time of my fieldwork, the only signage indicating that a nondescript door on a grey facade was the entrance to a resource warehouse was a sign saying “ticket” in several languages. Warehouse volunteers living in Moria distributed tickets each night that could be used the next day to receive goods from The Warehouse. Fig. 1 shows an image of The Warehouse at the end of my fieldwork with additional signs made by my research team. An empty warehouse on one side and a community center called Little Happy Family (LHF) on the other side directly neighbored The Warehouse while I was in the field. LHF provided shower spaces for families with children under 2, as well as tea, coffee, and a hot lunch. Many people would stay there for the afternoon after a visit to The Warehouse before later being shuttled back to Moria.

Inside The Warehouse were four long racks of clothing for men, women, and children, not to mention innumerable bins, some organized with shoes or baby clothes and others stacked to the ceiling waiting to be unpacked. The front of The Warehouse had a large wooden counter, built by several of the volunteers, where all hygiene supplies were kept, as well as warm weather conditions.

---

16 The Hope Project Facebook page, February 24, 2018.
gear, such as hats and gloves, so they could quickly be grabbed. The floor was always dusty and the only heater was a clear fire hazard but helped keep the January dampness of The Warehouse at bay.

The team of volunteers at The Warehouse was comprised largely of refugees between the ages of 17-26, with very few foreign volunteers. In part, this design came from a desire to create a sustainable workforce, without the challenges of weekly turnover from foreign volunteers. The Kempsons also believed strongly in creating a sense of purpose for the volunteers at The Warehouse. Volunteering at The Warehouse was a job and paid through eliminating boredom and giving responsibility to those working there. The Warehouse also created a positive social space by bringing together many different people into one space where they worked together and where all volunteers were at an equal position, regardless of their nationality, something not always found in other spaces on Lesvos.

The Warehouse was one of several spaces serving to counter the effects of long-term containment on the island since the EU-Turkey Deal went into effect. Other spaces I visited to conduct participant observation included community centers outside of the camps, such as One Happy Family Community Center, Little Happy Family, and the Mosaik Center. Additionally, I visited Lesvos Solidarity, a self-organized refugee camp that has existed since 2012 ("History," 2018). The final key space for my participant observation was outside Moria. I was unable to enter the official camp, but I was able to walk around the outside as well is in the Olive Grove section, an area of tents that has expanded outside the barbed wire walls of Moria due to a lack of space within Moria. I did not enter Moria because it was officially illegal to enter unless you were a resident or were otherwise authorized to enter. As I was unable to volunteer within the camp given my age, I could not get the proper paperwork to enter legally. However, Moria was a
topic of daily conversation. Moria was the unfortunate place of residence for many of the
volunteers and they shared their thoughts and views on the conditions every day. The inhumanity
present in Moria was felt viscerally in the tone with which my fellow volunteers spoke of it
daily.

Methods

Participant Observation

The data for this thesis was obtained through three different methods. At the center of my
fieldwork methods was the use of participant observation. H. Russell Bernard (2011) frames
participant observation as “going out and staying out…and experiencing the lives of the people
you are studying as much as you can” (276-277). Effectively, this requires the researcher to
immerse themselves in the environment of those who are the focus of the study. The focus of my
research was the lives of refugees affected by the EU-Turkey Deal, and the solidarians working
to counter those consequences. Although it was not possible for me to immerse myself fully in
the environment due to limits of legal access, I immersed myself in other critical spaces to
engage fully in participant observation.

The bulk of my participant observation took place at The Warehouse, where I
volunteered. I spent three days a week at The Warehouse, volunteering alongside the team of
roughly ten other volunteers. I arrived at The Warehouse at 10:00am and stayed until 3:30-4pm,
depending on how many families we were serving on a given day. Most days, the first hour of
the day was dedicated to unloading new donations from the Kempsons’ bright blue van and then
unpacking items to their dedicated area within The Warehouse. Around 11:00am, families would
start to arrive, showing their ticket marked with the day’s date. One team member checked the
police papers of the family before initiating the distribution process. The rest of the team then gathered to hear instructions from the translator of what size shoes the family members needed, what size pampers the toddlers needed, and so on. For the first few days, I followed the lead of my fellow volunteers to get a hang of the most efficient way of gathering items. By the second week, I checked police papers and began to pick up basic phrases of Arabic and Farsi to communicate size issues with the families coming through. Often, we served two families at once and the space could become quite chaotic with many languages spoken all at once. In between families, I spent extensive amounts of time chatting with my fellow volunteers or the Kempsons, talking about everything from refugee politics to Donald Trump. On average, we distributed items to roughly 30 families a day, the majority of whom were coming from Syria. However, we also served a large number of Afghan and Congolese people. In total, I spent 12 days volunteering at The Warehouse.

My role in The Warehouse and throughout Lesvos was as a participant observer, which is defined by Bernard (2011) as an “outsider who participates in some aspects of life around them and record what they can” (279). I participated the most at The Warehouse because I was simultaneously a researcher and a volunteer, and I spent full days at the site. In addition to my 12 days at The Warehouse, I visited the Mosaik Support Center once, One Happy Family Community Center Lesvos (OHF) once, Lesvos Solidarity Camp once, and Moria once. At these sites, I interviewed staff members and received tours of their respective facilities, with the exception of Moria. At Moria, I walked alongside the outside the barbed wire fence and within the Olive Grove section beyond the gates of Moria. I was able to drive past it three additional times on my way to the north of the Island. Lastly, I visited the General Secretariat of the Aegean and the Islands twice to attend UNHCR meetings, but I was only able to attend the meeting once.
Our team also visited the Office of Displaced Designers to attend an art exhibit from a 3-month design course. In addition to these sites, I actively engaged in participant observation in coffee shops two or three times per week, as sites of both interviews and work. My rationale for these sites was that they were all spaces of solidarity and active action to alleviate the effects of the EU-Turkey Deal among the refugees contained on Lesvos.

An essential part of participant observation is documentation. To do so, I kept a daily log of what I did each day, which was also where I wrote my daily field notes. I typically wrote my notes at the end of each day or the morning after. My field notes from The Warehouse and site visits were all written on my laptop directly into a Google Drive Folder shared amongst my research team. During interviews, I took hand-written notes on a legal pad. I then typed these interview notes into a separate folder that included audio recordings and notes of interviews. My field notes were predominantly descriptive field notes, where I described the observations and conversations I had each day.

In addition to my written field notes, I documented spaces through photography and video. I used a Canon EOS Rebel T6 and a GoPro to shoot these images. David MacDougall argues that “for all the ways in which photographic images oversimplify and aggressively impose their messages…they are intrinsically tentative, oscillating between meaning and the self-sufficiency of their subject” (2005: 7). I think that this is an important idea to base my own use of photography on as a form of participant observation because the meaning of a photo is shaped not just by the space it documents, but also by who took the photo, the framing of the subject matter, and the context for taking the photo. My photos are representative largely of key spaces from the field. However, my photographs also have a deeper meaning in the sense that they are all representative of some element of containment and the European bordering regime.
My rationale for photography was that it allowed me to capture images that I could not otherwise spend significant amounts of time observing without gaining unwanted attention. This was especially true in the case of photographing Frontex boats, as I walked by looking like a tourist and outside of Moria where I used my cellphone to take pictures of the outside of the camp. Photography was also useful because it helped me remember my sites once I left the field. I used a GoPro once when my team rented a car, which happened to be a sunny day and I was able to use this form of continuous direct observation to document the mobility of refugees between Mytilene and Moria. This was the only situation in which I engaged in unobtrusive observation, in which the people I was observing were unaware that they were being documented (Bernard, 2011).

Through participant observation, I gained valuable data into the day-to-day activities of refugees and solidarians on Lesvos, the various ways in which solidarians were working to mitigate the crisis, images of spaces, and a more well-informed understanding of the situation. My informal conversations took many shapes, from English conversations to charade style hand movements, image code, and gestures in cases where there was not a common language. These informal interactions in the field were recorded through field notes to the best of my memory and greatly informed my overarching knowledge.

**Semi-Structured Interviews**

Semi-structured interviews were another major component of my fieldwork. Semi-structured interviews are designed to be open-ended, but follow an interview guide in order to make sure that the interviewer covers the most critical information, particularly if the interviewer is only in the field for a short period of time (Bernard, 2011). Over the course of my time in Greece, I conducted nine interviews. Six of my interviews were with people who identified as
refugees and three were with people working within the aid sphere. I used two different interview guides for each group and often adapted questions during the interview to clarify my inquiries. Interviews were recorded after consent was given and otherwise were documented through detailed note-taking. Additionally, all interviews were conducted in English. Interpreters were used within The Warehouse. In one interview, held with two interviewees, the two participants interpreted for each other at various points.

Social Media Analysis

The third type of data I used came through social media analysis, largely in the form of a dedicated Twitter feed focused on NGOs, no-borders activists, and refugee activists who were actively posting regarding the situation on Lesvos. I used a snowball method of groups to follow, beginning with MSF, Human Rights Watch, and Arash Hampay, a known refugee-activist, and from there, I began to follow additional feeds that these groups were retweeting. I chose to limit my feed to 18 accounts because I knew I would be limited in how many tweets I could analyze given the pace of Twitter. The bulk of my analysis focused on the #OpentheIslands campaign, which began in October 2017. The campaign has its own website, but also attracted an extensive network of Twitter feeds and Facebook posts to garner attention from the EU and the Greek Prime Minister. Social media analysis provided an invaluable source of data for the situation on the ground leading up to my fieldwork. It was particularly useful because of the frequency of postings regarding Lesvos and the other Aegean Islands in the fall of 2017, but also because it provided first-hand accounts of protests, hunger strikes, and calls for action that were not otherwise reported. The campaign has quieted down significantly, but I continued to use social media as a means of monitoring containment on Lesvos through the time of writing, as well as to stay connected with my interviewees.
Fieldwork Ethics

I abided by the criteria established for human subject research CFR 46.111 to meet my ethical requirements. I conducted an oral consent procedure wherein I explained the project, and asked my interview if they were willing to participate, would allow me to record our conversation, whether or not they would allow their name to be used, and whether it was acceptable for me to take notes. All interviews were conducted after explaining the nature of our project and how information gathered was to be used in future projects. All interviewees were told that if at any time they wished to stop the interview or to skip any questions, that they could do so. During several site visits, I was asked not to conduct interviews due to the nature of certain spaces as safe spaces for refugees and I followed those wishes.

Sampling

During my fieldwork, I conducted nine formal interviews. I conducted nonprobability sampling given the sensitive nature of my project and my time constraints. Nonprobability sampling is appropriate when conducting studies of narratives of experiences (Bernard, 2011). It is also appropriate in situations where the study focuses on a small sample size. Additionally, given the focus of my study, it was important to find participants who could specifically speak about refugee issues, the changes on Lesvos, and health issues for refugees. My rationale for my interviews was to gain rapport with my interviewees and then focus the interviews on an in-depth conversation about their journeys to Lesvos and the effects of subsequently becoming stuck on the island. My main method for sampling was convenience sampling. I knew I had limits of access to the refugee population on Lesvos, so I ultimately conducted interviews with the people who I gained strong enough rapport with to feel comfortable asking highly personal questions.
about a challenging subject. However, I also used a purposive sampling method to find informants that fit my criteria for health actors, given the focus of my work. I was able to target one healthcare actor through a mutual connection and the second I targeted specifically because they worked at Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), one of the largest humanitarian healthcare actors globally. My third interview with someone in the humanitarian sphere came through convenience sampling. Convenience sampling allowed me to gain rapport and put in the time to get to know my informants before conducting formal interviews. Had I tried to conduct a larger study through a different means of sampling, I may have lost that personal connection. However, I did not obtain as wide a range of ages and genders as I could have, had I used another method. Through purposive sampling of humanitarian actors, I gained critical knowledge from individuals working directly in the field. At the same time, there is a loss in the fact that my sampling in both veins was not random and there is always a risk for bias given a lack of randomness. Additionally, my sample size was small and did not include interviews, but rather only conversations with solidarity actors.

**Interview Participants**

My interview participants came from eight different countries. All of the refugees that I interviewed were in the same age bracket of roughly 19-26, while the three humanitarian actors were older. Only two of my interviewees were women. They lived in different spaces, some in Moria, one in Kara Tepe, one in Mytilene, and one in hiding. I will further contextualize each participant below. All names have been changed for the protection of my informants and are put in quotes to demonstrate that they are pseudonyms.
“Noor”

Noor is a beautiful young woman from Idlib, Syria trying to get to Germany so she can marry her fiancée of four years who is already living there. She had been on Lesvos for 3 months at the time of our interview and had spent one month in Moria before being moved to Kara Tepe, where the conditions are considerably better. She was in university in Syria before she left, seeking a degree in pharmacy. She has incredible long hair that she wraps in an elegant hijab every day to match the elegance of her delicate makeup. She spends her days busy from 8:00am to midnight with various work positions and loves it, but still wants to get to Germany so she can finally get married. She is the only Arabic translator at the work and provides an invaluable resource to the team.

“Salar”

Salar is a loud-spoken, charming, and kind young man from a village in Ghazni, Afghanistan. He has been living in Moria for five months after fleeing Afghanistan because of the Taliban, but has been on the move for the better part of three years. He wants to find safety and a future; otherwise he would have stayed in his country, but at this point wants nothing more than to get out of Moria. He runs the show at The Warehouse, where he works efficiently to keep families moving and get work done.

“Mir”

Mir is Salar’s best friend and substitute brother who comes from Kabul, Afghanistan. The two of them met in Turkey and have been inseparable ever since. He is quieter and is always listening to music as he works in The Warehouse. He has been in Moria five months and like Salar, wants to be safe and have a future and connect with his biological brothers, who are also on the move.
“David”

David is a tall, soft-spoken Congolese who studied engineering in his home country before he was forced to flee over his involvement in political campaigns against the president. He is a leader in Moria and at The Warehouse, but is tired from living in the Olive Grove outside of Moria.

“James”

James is Nigerian but does not consider that country his home. James speaks like a poet and is full of questions, while also always ready to challenge an answer and push you to think more. He works to counter his past traumas through art and is impassioned with the idea of love. He has been on Lesvos for more than a year and a half and is still waiting for his case to be heard.

Arash

An activist and photographer from Tehran, Iran, Arash has a large social media presence documenting and calling out European authorities for the situation on Lesvos. He has engaged in multiple hunger strikes, most recently to contest the arrest of 35 residents of Moria, including his brother, who protested against the inhumane situation within Moria. A day after our interview, he was forced to leave Lesvos for Athens under pressure from authorities on Lesvos.

Additionally, I interviewed three humanitarian actors/volunteers. The first interview was with “Jan”, who works as the medical coordinator for the Dutch NGO, Boat Refugee Foundation. The next was with “Kostas” who worked at Mosaik Center. He defined himself as a humanitarian rather than an activist and is from Mytilene. He works at the reception and is in charge of any unplanned events that take place at the center, which includes giving tours and interviews. My final interview was with Monika, the Mental Health Activity Manager of the
Lesbos Project for Doctors Without Borders. Her name has not been changed as she told me it was fine to use her name in my research. In addition to formal interviews, I had additional conversations with solidarians working at my various sites, and many informal conversations with the Kempsons that also informed this research.

Analysis

To analyze my data, I used content analysis. This is one of the most common ways to analyze qualitative data, so it was the most natural method of analysis for me to use given my data. I wanted to understand the content of my fieldnotes and interviews to figure out what living on Lesvos is like for those affected by the EU-Turkey Deal. I looked particularly at what was being said about Lesvos and about Moria, rather than how my interviews were describing it, which would have evoked the need for linguistic analysis instead. The content of my fieldnotes and my interview transcripts were the body of my data. In order to analyze the content, I first developed themes that were relevant to my research question. These themes were health and well-being, detention, effects of the EU-Turkey Deal, and mitigation efforts. I then developed a set of codes for my data that I used to operationalize and ultimately answer my research questions. My codes included words and phrases that were important ideas within my themes. My codes for health and well-being included trauma, stress, coping, gender variability, and insecurity. My codes for detention included containment, mobility, and hopelessness. Next, my codes for the effects of the EU-Turkey Deal included permanency and uncertainty. Finally, my codes for mitigation efforts included solidarity and dignity. My final two themes also served as codes because they were specific effects that I could clearly code for, while the first two were broader themes. I then coded points in my data that fit the code to use as evidence in the body
sections of my paper. Coding allowed me to synthesize my data as clear evidence to answer my questions.

**Limitations**

Lastly, there were several limitations to my research. The first limitation came with my age. I could not enter Moria as a volunteer because I was too young to meet the requirements of actors working within the camps. This limited my access to a key planned site for participant observation. Additionally, I was limited given the short period of time I was actually on Lesvos. A month is a very short in the context of ethnographic fieldwork. Finally, one of the largest limitations was that of language. Although I had the funds for translation in my budget, the people I gained sufficient rapport with to interview happened to speak English. This was convenient in many ways, but also meant that we did not seek interviews with people who did not speak English because of limited time to conduct any more interviews than already planned. Additionally, my lack of language skills limited the amount of participant observation I could conduct because I could not understand conversations between people speaking Arabic, Farsi, French, etc. However, my gender, which I thought was going to be a major limitation, did not seem to pose a challenge to my research.
Chapter 5: The EU-Turkey Deal Explained

To begin the analysis of my data, I first seek to contextualize the policy at the center of my argument. In earlier chapters, I provided background on Lesvos and relevant literature, but in this next chapter, I provide an analysis of how the EU-Turkey Deal and the power structures that support it came to exist. This chapter provides the framework for understanding the effects of European migration policy on refugees and the development of EU policy over time, which are central in understanding why the EU-Turkey Deal is so critical in shaping the situation on Lesvos. In this chapter, I argue that the EU-Turkey Deal’s formation came as the result of the Europeanization of Greece, power dynamics that exist between the EU and Greece, and the Europeanization of migration.

Greece’s role in European migration comes in large part from its role within the EU. In this chapter; I begin by discussing the Europeanization of Greece following its break from the Ottoman Empire. I then focus on the formation of the EU supranational body and the Schengen Zone, which greatly influenced the development of the EU-Turkey Deal. Next, I focus on the Europeanization of Migration as it pertains to Greece’s role within the EU’s standardization of migration. Finally, I end with the construction of the EU-Turkey Deal and the impact Europeanization and continental power dynamics has had on Greek sovereignty when it comes to policies designed to protect central EU nations at other member states’ expense.

The Europeanization of Greece and the Power of the European Union

*Modern Greece*

Greece straddles the geographic line between the Asian and European continents. The modern nation of Greece was the cradle of a celebrated classical civilization, but it was also
subject to numerous periods of conquest, including an extended era of Ottoman rule. The modern Europeanization of Greece began with the Greek War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire (“Greece Profile,” 2018). In 1821, revolution broke out between Ottoman Turk masters and ethnic Christian Greek subjects (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2010). One of the key grievances used in the revolution was that “the Turks were foreign to the lands of Europe they lorded over and should be forced to abandon these European lands,” and that “the Greeks had the right to rejoin the European family of nations, which owed so much to the Greek classical legacy” (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2010:16). Greece was ultimately victorious and achieved independence in 1830 (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2010:5). Independence would not satisfy Greek nationals however, as not all territories claimed by Greece during the Hellenic period were returned. The state would continue to engage in territorial disputes into the early 20th century as discussed in Chapter 2. The battle for territory between Greece and what would become the Turkish Republic continues to play a role in tensions between Greece and Turkey that are in part played out through the EU-Turkey Deal.

The Modern Greek state has faced extensive turbulence for the majority of its history. The 20th century was full of wars and displacement, which began with the Balkan Wars and Asia Minor population transfer discussed in Chapter 2. Greece then underwent a Civil War following World War II, as well as a military junta. In 1967, the military conceived of a threat of communism to justify their takeover (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2010:141). George Papadopoulos led the Greek dictatorship until 1974 (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2010: 149). The subsequent return to democracy in 1974-75 following the fall of Papadopoulos spurred Greece’s application for membership within the European Economic Community, the precursor to the current European Union (Rankin, 2015). Greece’s acceptance to the community came somewhat
begrudgingly as a means to stabilize the country following the dictatorship, and to prevent the spread of communism any further. This membership would serve as the true mark of Greece’s welcome back to Europe.

*The European Union*

The EU now exists as a supranational regional governing body for most of the European continent, but it initially began as a source of economic cooperation and regional peace following World War II (“The History of the European Union,” 2017). Overtime, it expanded beyond trade integration, to include economic, environmental, and social integration. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the EU issued its next phase of cooperation in the 1990s through the gradual elimination of internal borders. In 1992, under the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the EU formally adopted its current name, as well as the objective to “promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the establishment of economic and monetary union” (*Treaty on European Union*, Article B, 1992). It also established four key areas of freedom: free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital between member states (*Treaty on European Union*, Title 2, Article 3, 1992). Finally, in Article K.1, the TEU established asylum policy, rules governing the crossing of external borders, and immigration policy regarding third countries as matters of public interest (*Treaty on European Union*, Article K.1, 1992). These three points were fundamental in establishing the current European bordering regime for Fortress Europe. Freedom of movement of people is at question in the development and implementation of the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal.
In 1995, internal frontiers within the EU were eliminated following the enactment of the Schengen Agreement. This agreement now extends to 26 countries, including four countries that are not part of the EU – Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland (European Commission, 2014). In effect, people passing through the Schengen Area, the geographic area outlined in the agreement, do not have to go through border control. Markers of the borders of sovereign nations remain, but theoretically, the internal borders are no longer guarded. However, what the Schengen area means to non-EU citizens, like refugees traveling the Balkan Route, is a walled barrier to an idealized image of Europe. In exchange for freedom of movement internally, the external borders of Europe, most notably the southern frontline member states, whose borders are heavily monitored. Under Schengen, there is a clause that allows for the temporary reintroduction of border control in the event of “a serious threat to public policy or internal security” (“Temporary Reintroduction,” 2016). Currently, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway all have reintroduced their border controls, largely in part because of significant secondary movements. Germany explicitly states their reasoning as pertaining to flight connections from Greece as the source of these movements (“Temporary Reintroduction,” 2016).

The final mark of European integration came with the introduction of a common currency in 1999. The Euro is now used in nineteen of the twenty-eight EU states, including Greece. This has proved to be a point of tension across the EU, as Greece is often seen as a problem for the rest of the EU, given the country’s long history of poor political and economic management. This perception increased with the onset of the Greek debt crisis in 2010, which decimated the Greek economy and required other EU member states’ cooperation to bail it out. The economic crash also put the status of the euro into question (Alderman et al., 2016). As a result of these debt bailouts, Greece is at the particular mercy and control of Germany, as Germany stands as its
largest creditor ("Why Greece," 2017). The unequal balance between Greece and Germany economically also serves as a facilitator for its refugee and migrant relocation relationship.

*Europeanization of Migration*

Although the TEU established migration and asylum as subjects of public interest, it only called for the need to establish a framework, rather than actually constructing a usable common framework for the EU (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2005). Rather it was the Dublin Convention, followed by the Dublin Regulation and the development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in 1999 that formulated the current framework for EU migration policy. The Dublin Convention was agreed to in 1990, but not ratified until 1997. The goals of the Dublin Convention were to develop a framework for which country within the EU would determine the results of an asylum seeker’s application, and how to establish which one state was responsible for making that decision (*The Dublin Convention on Asylum*, 2002). The Dublin Convention did ultimately establish the protocol for which country was responsible for processing asylum cases. Notably, it did not establish that the first state of arrival is the country where a claim must be established (European Union, 1990). Rather, it only established a hierarchy of criteria for decision-making and an opt-out metric for EU members. In 2000, the EU added the establishment of Eurodac, which introduced fingerprinting and biometric bordering to the Dublin Convention ("32000R2725," 2000). The Dublin Convention was later replaced in 2003 with the Dublin Regulation II, which is now in its second iteration.

The Dublin II regulation established additional criteria for which EU member state would be responsible for processing an asylum claim. The criteria were listed hierarchically, with family unity and residence permits or visas filling the top positions of which country was responsible for processing an asylum claim. Additionally the Dublin II regulation established
that if a person crossed into a country irregularly, then that country would become the country responsible for registering the individual’s asylum case (“Dublin II Regulation,” 2011). This was developed under the theory that all EU member states would process claims in the same manner, so any country within the EU would protect the rights of asylum-seekers and give them a legitimate opportunity to qualify for legal protection. The Common European Asylum System (CEAS), established in 2005 was designed to standardize the treatment of asylum seekers and protect the rights of asylum seekers across the EU (“The EU has a Solidarity Crisis, ” 2016). However, that standardization was frequently not adhered to, which ultimately led to reforms to EU migration policy.

In December 2008, the EU reviewed the Dublin Regulation and determined that it required reform largely because of the burden it put on first entry countries, which limited the required rights and protections for asylum-seekers in those countries (UNHCR and ECRE). The result of those reforms led to the adoption of the Dublin III regulation in 2013. The reforms increased the rights of asylum applicants, increased protections for children, and provided for the right to free legal aid. It also explicitly prohibited the use of detention for people who were seeking asylum (“Regulation EU,” 2013). This regulation, issued prior to the EU-Turkey Deal, effectively stated that closed reception centers violate the Dublin III Regulation as they do in fact detain people simply for seeking asylum. This is exactly what is currently happening on Lesvos within Moria under the EU-Turkey Deal.

Following the 2015 “crisis,” the European Parliament proposed a fourth iteration of the Dublin Regulation because of the volume of asylum applications at the time and visibility of the failures of the existing EU framework for managing migration. On October 19, 2017, the European Parliament adopted the reform and started negotiations for another version of the
policy, given the problems of the current system and the disproportionate burden of
determination felt by periphery member states (Veld et al., 2018). Greece is one of the states that faltered in adhering to the standard EU system of handling asylum applications. The country’s failures were discussed in Chapter 2 regarding the notable case of MSS v. Belgium and Greece. In part, this comes from Greece’s complicated history with migration. Until the 1970s, Greece was a country of emigration, rather than one of immigration. There were several notable exceptions in its history, including the arrival of refugees from the Balkan Wars and refugees from the Asia Minor population transfer, discussed in Chapter 2 (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2005). Migration trends to Greece in the 70s began to shift for several reasons. The first reason was that Greece began to see a surge in industrialization that required immigrant labor to fill its labor deficit. During the 70s, migrants came from Poland, Bangladesh, Egypt, and the Philippines to join the labor force (Mavrommatis, 2016). Additionally, when Greece became part of the EU in 1981, it became the origin of transit into other EU states for non-EU citizens (Papageorgiou, 2013). However, now Greece occupies a bizarre space as a migratory sending-and-receiving country because of its own economic crisis coupled with migration towards the EU, which is worsened by its inefficient and frequently inhumane internal migration system and the implications of the EU-Turkey Deal.

It is important to also note that EU law comes second to international law. The two main international laws that pertain to refugees are the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. When Greece signed on to the 1951 convention in 1960, it agreed to the statement of nonrefoulement. Under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (1951 Convention, ” 2010: 30). Yet, the EU-Turkey Deal encourages the return of refugees to Turkey, as well as their countries of origin, both places where many refugees’ lives would be threatened. The violation of nonrefoulement under this policy contradicts the obligations of Greece as a signatory to the 1951 Convention, as noted in Chapter 1.

My purpose in explaining the position of Greece within the EU and the development of European asylum laws is to provide context to some of the issues that the EU-Turkey Deal presents, as well as the power structures that exist that prevent Greece from directly opposing the policy even though it further burdens the country’s already strapped asylum office.

The EU-Turkey Deal

Next, I further explain the details of the EU-Turkey Deal. The EU-Turkey Deal would not exist without the supranational structure of the EU and its considerations in regards to migration and bordering. The EU-Turkey Deal was the end result of several months of negotiation under the E.U-Turkey Joint Action Plan, which came as a response to the “refugee crisis” discussed in Chapter 2. The Joint Action Plan, activated on November 29, 2015, sought to formulate a solution to stem the number of irregular arrivals between Turkey and Greece. By that point in 2015, over 800,000 people had traveled irregularly between the two states (Managing the Refugee Crisis, 2016). However, it was the EU, rather than Greece itself, that worked with Turkey on developing new policies, which took away some of the agency of Greece’s state in the development of a policy that would most directly impact its own territory, particularly on the Aegean Islands.
The stated purpose of the Joint Action Plan was to establish coordinated efforts between Turkey and the EU to manage the influx of irregular migrants and to prevent irregular crossing out of Turkey in the first place through financial and humanitarian assistance to Turkey (Managing the Refugee Crisis, 2016). It also explicitly called for support for Syrians in Turkey through cooperation and financial exchange between both sides (European Commission, 2015).

Then in March, the EU and Turkey replaced the plan with an effort to stem flows, by establishing the EU-Turkey Deal to end irregular migration between Greece and Turkey (“EU-Turkey Statement Questions,” 2016). The EU’s goal in the Deal was two-fold. First, it provided an act of policy to alleviate pressure against migration coming from the European public (Collett, 2016). It also served a humanitarian goal for the public worried about refugee deaths, as it targeted smugglers, aimed to prevent unnecessary deaths during crossing, and decrease the burden on Greece (Collett, 2016).

The EU-Turkey Deal established nine key points of agreement between the EU and Turkey. The first point of the Deal called for any irregular migrant who crossed from Turkey to any of the Greek islands after March 20, 2016, including Lesvos, to be returned to Turkey. The second point focused specifically on Syria and stated that for every Syrian refugee returned under the first condition, another refugee would be formally resettled in an EU member state. The third point focused on Turkey’s role and stated that Turkey will “take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for irregular migration” (Corrao, 2018), including the deployment of military and police forces to border areas. Fourth, the Deal detailed that as crossings end, “a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated” (Corrao, 2018). This point in particular ignored the violence causing flight, and the formation of different routes that still left many people vulnerable and without options for regular movement.
Several of the points of the EU-Turkey Deal also focused on increasing integration between the EU and Turkey, including visa liberalization for Turkish citizens, an upgraded Customs Union, and the re-energization of Turkey’s application to join the EU. These were all incentives to get Turkey to agree to strengthen border control in exchange for potential future membership in the EU. Lastly, the deal called for the exchange of €6 billion to Turkey to help with the refugee population living within its territorial borders, and for both the EU and Turkey to improve conditions in Syria to help stop movement into Turkey in the first place (Corrao, 2018).

The European Commission reported that the E.U-Turkey Deal follows both EU and international law, but as discussed earlier in this chapter, there are several clear violations. First, the policy was formulated under the idea that Turkey was a safe third country for refugees. Violent rapes, inhumane conditions, and violation of right, as explained to me in the field indicate otherwise. Additionally, soon after the EU-Turkey Deal went into effect, the Greek asylum appeals committee ruled that Turkey did not provide proper protection for refugees, which shifted the responsibility of examining claims from Turkey, back to Greece. Rather than immediately returning irregular migrants from the Greek Islands to Turkey, asylum applications would be assessed on the Greek Islands from June 2016 onwards (Gogou, 2017). This shift put the burden of the entire EU-Turkey Deal onto Greece, and more, specifically the islands, including Lesvos. Ultimately, the fact that Greece is required to assess all claims with limited, if any assistance from the rest of the EU is extremely inefficient and forces refugees to wait for months on the Greek islands for their claims to be decided. The reality of the EU-Turkey Deal, which was not outlined in any of the points of the agreement, is that Greece would become the

17 Conversations with the author, January, 2018.
agent of asylum procedures for the EU. Greece would then become partially responsible for the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal for refugees across the Aegean Islands, and specifically on Lesvos, as argued in this thesis.
Chapter 6: The EU-Turkey Deal: Lesvos’ Shift from Transit Space to Permanent Settlement

In the previous chapter, I explained how the EU-Turkey Deal formed in part as a result of the desire to secure the EU. I explained the development of the EU and the process of establishing the Schengen Area was to create an internal Europe without borders, while also creating a standardized system of asylum through the Dublin Regulation. I argued that the formation of those policies, coupled with the impact of migration on the EU in 2015, led to the implementation of the EU-Turkey Deal. In this next section, I seek to illustrate the containment created on Lesvos because of the formation of the EU-Turkey Deal, which results in a range of consequences for refugees further explained in Chapter 7. First, I begin with an explanation of Moria and detail the connections between the EU-Turkey Deal and the Hotspot Approach, another tool of border management established by the EU. I then explain how the policy, by physically containing refugees on the island for long periods of time, is unwittingly leading to the establishment of a potentially permanent refugee settlement, rather than deterring people from traveling in the first. This chapter is particularly important given that at the time of writing, more refugees continue to arrive on Lesvos, indicating that the consequences of the Deal will likely continue to be felt by thousands of newly arriving refugees.

As discussed earlier, Lesvos has long been a transit space for people trying to enter mainland Europe, but what is currently happening on the island, and within Moria camp, is considered unique to this generation. In 2015, over a million people passed through the island but did not stay there. Refugees were on the island for a few days at maximum and registered their asylum claims in Greece before continuing on to mainland Greece. But the day the EU-Turkey Deal

---

19 Jan, interview with the author, January 9, 2018.
went into effect, this system changed abruptly. As my participant, Kostas, a local humanitarian on Lesvos stated poignantly, “People were smiling on a Monday, not smiling on Tuesday,” as soon as they realized their journey to Europe had effectively ended. Kostas said that even though people had migrated in years past, the time since the EU-Turkey Deal went into effect was the first period where refugees were forced to stay on Lesvos.

**Moria, Containment, and the Hotspot Approach**

To explain the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal, I begin by discussing Moria and the ways in which the policy contains refugees on the island. Moria is not designed for permanent settlement and is, without a doubt, one of the least welcoming places in all of Europe. Built at a former military camp, it has been called “Hell on Earth”, “like Guantanamo Bay”, and “a prison” across the news (Pappas, 2017; Carassava, 2017). In the field, I heard it referred to as hostile, a place of insecurity, and a shame on Europe. New arrivals to Moria are welcomed first by its putrid smell. Even in the winter, the stench of raw sewage permeates. Empty plastic bottles, diapers, and food wrappers litter the road outside Moria, a clear sign of the lack of waste and hygiene facilities. It is of no surprise that healthcare actors commonly treat refugees suffering from conditions of poor hygiene, such as scabies and unidentifiable rashes.\(^{20}\) If the foul odor hints at risks to physical health, the oppressive design of the space represents a simultaneous threat to mental health — formidable cement walls topped with barbed wire can trigger stress and even Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in new arrivals who have experienced imprisonment in the past.\(^{21}\) The walls are coated in faded graffiti, white-washed to mislead visitors – in particular Pope Francis and EU representatives – from the realities that transpire

\(^{20}\) Jan, interview with the author, January 9, 2018.

\(^{21}\) Monika, interview with the author, January, 26, 2018
within the camp. Though pale, the terms freedom of movement, stop deportation, and welcome to prison can be seen through the paint. These walls serve to literally contain mobility and prevent irregular movement from the periphery spaces of the EU, such as Lesvos, to its core in central Europe.

Moria acts as a space of indefinite detention, without actually being a detention center, and is a place where inhumanity abounds. It is also a site of layered containment because of the EU-Turkey Deal. I detail my theory of layered containment in the rest of this section, but it is also showed graphically in Fig. 2.

The first layer of containment comes in the form of Lesvos’ island geography. All people on Lesvos, locals, visitors, and refugees alike, are in effect contained and imprisoned by the Aegean Sea that surrounds Lesvos. Mobility is bound in methods of transportation, which Walters (2015) argues, create a system of viapolitics that dictates how and who is able to mobilize. Viapolitics extends to all methods of vehicular movement, from cars to buses to boats. On Lesvos, all people can take a

---

22 Eric, conversation with the author, January 2018.
bus, taxi, or walk to travel around the island, but not all people can leave the island. There are also hierarchies present within the first level of containment, as the nationality of a passport or the status of one’s papers allows mobility off the island. Thus, I could leave, but refugees waiting for a decision on their asylum case could not. My mobility was only restricted by my ability to pay for flights on a different day than what was originally scheduled. As a US citizen in the EU, my only additional restriction was that my legal tourist status in the EU only lasted ninety days from the day I arrived, per the tourist guidelines of the Schengen Area (“Where and how to Apply,” 2018). However, I am also a U.K. citizen, which would have allowed me an indefinite time (or until Brexit is complete) on Lesvos had I traveled under that citizenship. The privilege of mobility against the geographic restraints of Lesvos extends to many humanitarian actors, volunteers, and visitors, but extends to very few refugees because of the terms of the EU-Turkey Deal discussed in the previous chapter. Mobility off Lesvos only extends to refugees whose asylum claims have been accepted and who have received black marks, which allow for movement anywhere in Greece, or blue marks, which allow for movement to designated locations within Greece.²⁴

I argue that the second layer of containment applies specifically to refugees and extends to where a refugee lives on Lesvos while waiting for their asylum interviews. The majority of refugees are housed in Moria, but a large portion of vulnerable families live either at Kara Tepe, or at Pikpa, run by the organization Lesvos Solidarity. Moria is the most restrictive of the places of residence, which again reinforces a hierarchy of containment based on residency dictated in part by the EU-Turkey Deal. In addition, there are a small number of refugees who live in formal housing organized by the UNHCR. As of March 2018, 599 people on Lesvos were housed in

apartments and houses as part of the Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation (ESTIA) program (“Monthly Accommodation Update,” 2018). However, in order to be moved out of Moria, a refugee typically has to qualify as “vulnerable,” but even that is not often enough to merit movement to a place of improved accommodation on the island.\(^{25}\)

My third layer of containment applies to only to those living within Moria because of the oppressive nature of the site. This layer is intimately linked to the EU-Turkey Deal because it requires refugees to register their asylum claims in Moria and to stay there first before potentially being able to move to a less oppressive space on the island. However, the consequences of the third layer vary slightly depending on where a refugee lives within Moria. Moria is broken into different blocks, based on country of origin, gender and size of group. For example, single women are housed far away from single men. However, this system of control does not extend as strongly to the over-flow Olive Grove area, next to Moria, which makes this space fit somewhere between the second and third layer. The Olive Grove is arguably less containing than Moria itself. Additionally, because there is more space outside Moria, the Olive Grove is not as tightly packed and there are fewer fights in this area compared to Moria (Kempson, 2018). The Olive Grove is predominantly made up of single, African refugees, but it, like Moria, is a mix of all kinds of people.\(^{26}\) Although the Olive Grove is somewhat less containing, it can be still be a very dangerous place. General residents of Moria also live at the third level of containment. They are contained literally by walls and barbed wire, but they can technically leave those confines and travel to other parts on Lesvos. Refugees living in Moria and the Olive Grove are contained by the island, by Moria, and by the EU-Turkey Deal as their mobility is restricted because they are waiting for a decision on their asylum claims to determine whether or not they can move forward.

\(^{25}\) Conversations with the author, January, 2018.
\(^{26}\) Conversations with the author, January, 2018.
and off Lesvos, or if they will be deported. Thus, the EU-Turkey Deal and the European bordering regime more broadly contain refugees at Moria and are responsible for creating these layers of containment. However, there is a space within Moria that is even more containing, which is the subject of my fourth and final layer of containment on Lesvos.

The fourth layer of containment on Lesvos is the pre-deportation/ pre-removal center within Moria. It is a space designed for refugees who are in the process of getting returned to either Turkey or to their country of origin because their claim for asylum was denied. This space is where refugees are completely immobilized and contained by migration policies on the island, in that even communication is contained within the pre-deportation center. In January 2018, the Hellenic Police began enforcing a new policy, which stated that all people across Greece in pre-removal centers would no longer be allowed to have mobile phones with them. Their communication was then limited to their ability to pay for a phone card once a week and the fact that their bodies were contained at the furthest level on Lesvos and by European bordering policies. I argue then, that these layers developed as a direct consequence of the EU-Turkey Deal, because all refugees who reach the island are instantly subject to the bureaucracy of this policy and the containment that comes as a consequence.

Lesvos’ island geography and location in the Aegean Sea play a critical role in why Moria exists and contains in the first place. Lesvos is one of the newly coined “Hotspots” for migration in the EU. Hotspots are sites of first reception that “concentrate on registration, identification, fingerprinting and debriefing of asylum seekers” (“The Hotspot Approach,” 2015). First introduced in 2015 by the European Commission, the Hotspot Approach was designed “as part of immediate action to assist frontline Member States that are facing

---

27 UNHCR Meeting attended by author, January 18, 2018
disproportionate migratory pressures at the EU’s external borders” (“The Hotspot Approach,” 2015). The term “frontline member state” critically refers only to EU member states, rather than all European countries at the frontline of migration. This excludes other European states operating at the geographical frontline of migration, such as many of the states on the Balkan Peninsula. In this case, the introduction of this policy focused solely on the use of Hotspots in Italy and Greece, while excluding Spain. These three EU member states are often referred to together in the context of migration, including by the UNHCR, as they effectively act as externalized borders for the center of the EU. Under the Dublin Regulation discussed in the previous chapter, asylum claims must be registered in the country of first arrival, which is, more often than not, one of these three Mediterranean states given their relative geographic proximity to sending nations (“Operational Portal,” 2018). The stated goal of the Hotspot Approach was to provide frontline states with the necessary assistance to adhere to EU law regarding the management of asylum seekers (“The Hotspot Approach,” 2015). This management included registering and fingerprinting new arrivals so that all people could be added to systems for relocation, but not solely for asylum within their country of first arrival. Marina Tazzioli (2017:2), a scholar who has done extensive work on migration in Italy and Greece, argues that for the EU, the Hotspot Approach puts pressure on Greece and Italy to enforce the EU’s migration agenda, and made them responsible for identifying migrants. Tazzioli (2017:5) further argues that the use of Hotspots reconsiders the system of bordering and methods of government control through the use of biometric modes of containment that extend the border directly to the body.

However, the EU-Turkey Deal altered the Hotspot Approach a year later because of its implications for the Aegean Islands. The European Commission stated on March 16, 2016 that,
the Hotspots in the islands in Greece will need to be adapted – with the current focus on registration and screening before swift transfer to the mainland replaced by the objective of implementing returns to Turkey. For instance, the infrastructure in the Hotspots would need to be reconfigured to accommodate the readmission and asylum offices and to deal adequately with vulnerable groups (European Commission, 2016).

This decision also changed Moria from an open center to a closed facility, which is technically illegal under European law, as discussed in the previous chapter. The implications of the Hotspot Approach and the EU-Turkey Deal policies are played out on real human lives within the confines of Moria.

Formally, Moria is called the Reception and Identification Center (RIC) at Moria, Lesvos (“Reception and Identification,” 2018). This terminology is part of the paradox of Greek hospitality with regard to irregular migrants (Rozakou, 2012). It suggests a place of welcoming, whereas the reality is anything but. Moria is better defined as a detention center or a refugee camp, though it still fails to adhere to the definition of either category as its role in migration is so directly linked to the EU-Turkey Deal and exists as a liminal space between temporary accommodation center and permanent settlement. Immigrant detention centers are typically used for short periods of time prior to deportation, which is only the case for part of Moria. On the other hand, recognizing Moria as a refugee camp I would argue, would establish it as an official site of refugee accommodation, which would contradict the temporary nature of the Hotspot Approach and acknowledge the failures of the EU-Turkey Deal.
Establishment of Permanency

During my fieldwork, it became quickly clear that Moria is far from a temporary space of accommodation. Outside the gates of Moria, refugees can get their hair cut at a Greek barber, grab a beer at Katarina’s restaurant or attend church in the Olive Grove. Despite the inhumanity and levels of containment taking place inside Moria, the area around it is beginning to present itself more like a village. There is a legitimate economy outside Moria, generated in part by the paltry €90 refugee salary each registered person receives from the EU every month. This money does not go far, but it provides some money to spend on basic necessities such as a cell phone plan or bus fare to leave Moria. It is also the only source of formal income, as refugees waiting for an asylum decision are prohibited from working for an income. The economic space outside of Moria is also a place where refugees and non-refugees can gather together because it is beyond the area controlled by the Greek Ministry of Defense. For example, every morning, the boys of The Warehouse and the Kempsons started their day with a coffee and conversation at Katarina’s before continuing on to volunteer. This area outside Moria is one place where the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal are not felt quite so strongly.

This sense of permanency is relatively recent and can be attributed to the layers of containment established by forced immobility under the EU-Turkey Deal. In my conversation with Jan, he noted the differences between Moria the first summer he volunteered in 2016 and the present:

First, it was just only a fenced compound with some ISO boxes and a lot of tents because it was way over capacity, but now you see commerce arising, you see.

The first time I came here, there was a few barber shops and that was it and now

you have a Mosque, you have all sorts of coffee stands, you even have some restaurants. There’s a lot of commerce going on the main road of Moria, lots of people selling all sorts of stuff and you know, the average lifespan of a refugee camp is I think 30 years or something, 25 years, 30 years, and so they become villages over time. That’s also what’s going to happen with Moria probably. Kostas echoed the same sentiment regarding the lasting nature of Moria. Forlornly, he cast his eyes downward and nodded while noting, “the situation in Moria looks like it will last.” The likelihood of this was reinforced to me by the increase in new arrivals over the last few months.

The development of a permanent refugee settlement as a result of the E.U-Turkey Deal has also influenced the establishment of an informal economy. This largely manifests in a thriving black market that operates inside Moria. The informal economy centers on the sale of drugs and alcohol, which are frequently used as coping tools for managing stress and anxiety, and contributes to consequences for health and well-being. It also includes the resale of items received through aid organizations. One morning at The Warehouse, David came in and lamented to the group that he had seen somebody reselling one of the strollers they received from The Warehouse earlier that week. This frustrated the team of volunteers because aid is supposed to be free, not cost money. The informal economy also extends to the exploitation of refugees outside of Moria, which has been present long before the EU-Turkey Deal. Interestingly, Kostas stated that the exploitation of refugees by residents of Lesvos was worse prior to the EU-Turkey Deal because once refugees arrived on Lesvos, they felt secure in Europe and were more inclined to spend their money.

However, after the EU-Turkey Deal, exploitation became less visible given the refugees limited €90 income and the fact that refugees are indefinitely contained on Lesvos, compared to the refugees who quickly passed through Lesvos in 2015. However, beyond the individual level, Lesvos itself has also profited immensely from the influx of refugees. The local economy has significantly recovered from the Greek financial crisis because there are now more people coming to the island year-round, rather than seasonally. These groups include Frontex agents, who, according to our chatty cab driver Jerry, spend lots of money at the local thermal spas on their days off. Money also comes to Lesvos from volunteer groups, journalists, and police groups who stay in hotels, eat in local restaurants, and shop along Ermou Street in Mytilene.\textsuperscript{30} The remote areas far north of Mytilene also now operate year-round services to accommodate search and rescue teams and Frontex agents.\textsuperscript{31}

**Two Years Later**

Despite the EU’s development of policies, like the EU-Turkey Deal, which work to deter more refugee arrivals, people keep coming. New refugees arrived on Lesvos nearly every day during my fieldwork in January 2018, a trend that has continued through the time of writing. Once on shore, new arrivals entered the layers of containment found on Lesvos as a consequence of the EU-Turkey Deal. The Hotspot Approach coupled with the Deal has made Moria the space of total containment that it is at the present. I argue here that this is different from more typical methods of immigration detention discussed in my literature review as the majority of refugees are not actually officially detained, but rather contained because of the consequences of migration policy on Lesvos. Containment as it exists on Lesvos supports my argument that the

\textsuperscript{31} Philippa Kempson, conversation with the author, January, 2018.
EU-Turkey Deal has resulted in consequences for refugees on the island in that it both limits agency of the individual, but also because it seriously impacts the mental health and physical well-being of refugees who are subject to its oppression. The consequences of the E.U-Turkey Deal for refugee health and well-being specifically will be the focus of my next chapter.
Chapter 7: “Moria: The Land of Anxiety, Stress, Pain, Depression, Anger”

We sit across the wooden table, soaking in the January sunshine. It is crisp outside, but there is no wind and the sun is a welcome arrival after several weeks of tormenting rain. I set out my bright yellow legal pad as we begin our formal interview with James. We’d met James at the beginning of our month on Lesvos. At first, he appeared quiet and reserved. Later, we learned that was far from the case, but that he preferred to listen to others first before engaging in conversation. At that first meeting, we shared a rotisserie chicken and bread around the dinner table before moving to floor cushions for a longer chat. Together, we spoke about passion and religion and living in Moria for hours before finally heading off to bed. Now, we gather again after three weeks to discuss journeys, migration, and health.

James’ smile can light up a room, but underneath he endures a constant battle with his traumas from Nigeria, furthered by his journey to Lesvos, which he aptly called “a journey of helter-skelter.” Once on Lesvos, he expected something different, something better. It was Europe, wasn’t it? This was supposed to be a place of imagination, where life was worth living, and the future appeared bright. Yet, his trip between Turkey and Greece was the first of many traumas that would happen once James arrived on Europe’s shores. That day, he told us about his journey. He, like nearly every other refugee who came to Lesvos, traveled by rubber boat from the woods along the coast of Turkey to the island. He was lucky compared to other refugees because he knew how to swim, but the waters, he explained, were rough on the night he crossed with 61 others, as the ocean churned out “amazing waves.” With the Greek coastline finally on the horizon, the boat began to take on water. Meanwhile, the lights from a Swedish Coast Guard boat illuminated the dark waters. The water began to overcome the boat, pushing James and others into the water. After he saved three lives, exhaustion and flashbacks made it hard for
James to keep swimming. The arm of a friend reached for him and pulled him out of the water and onto the deck of the Coast Guard ship and they drove to the port of Mytilene of Lesvos before being brought to Moria, which James fittingly called “the land of anxiety, stress, pain, depression, [and] anger.”

While we talk, he tells us that when he first arrived at Moria, there was no tent for him and he had to sleep outside. He went through the initial health screening and was deemed vulnerable from the beginning. His papers went so far as to say he should be moved to the mainland from the day he arrived. That was August 28, 2016. Our interview took place January 28, 2018, nearly a year and a half later. James is still stuck on Lesvos. His vulnerability and psychological issues were only getting worse by being in Moria. He became so sick he could not even make it to medical appointments and he had no support system inside Moria to get him there.

As we sit discussing his health challenges, he gets up and grabs a bag full of all the pills he had been prescribed. He used to take sleeping pills to cope, but the drugs made him high and out of it, which he did not like. He tells us that he now keeps the boxes as a memory of the drugs he used to take. At the same time, he grabs a pamphlet he had been given by someone in Moria, which explains some of the reactions he might experience because of his trauma.

But trauma does not end upon arrival on Lesvos and in Europe. Moria just exacerbates and creates more trauma and vulnerability.
James’ story is one of hundreds that led major international humanitarian groups to call the situation for refugees on Lesvos a public health crisis. In October 2017, MSF issued a report calling the situation on Lesvos and Samos, another Aegean Island, “a mental health emergency” and called for action to end the containment policy established under the EU-Turkey Deal (MSF, 2017). It is important to distinguish this crisis from the political idea pushed by the Greek Ministers of Citizen Protection and Health in 2012 that defined the “migration issue” as “a public health time-bomb that is ready to explode and has to be addressed with seriousness, responsibility, against any form of populism” (Papastergiou and Takou, 2014) because of rising xenophobia. At the same time, the Greek Health Regulation introduced Law 4075/2012 that declared that “the health state of vulnerable persons as a self-sufficient reason for administrative detention and/or their deportation,” (Papastergiou and Takou, 2014). The Greek policy framed the public health threat as a risk to national security and Greek national health, when the reality shows that health issues are largely confined to immigrant population groups often spurred by detention conditions. This declaration of an immigrant as a threat to public health preceded the “refugee crisis” of 2015 and further preceded the detention crisis on the Aegean Islands, and specifically on Lesvos.

The public health crisis that is actually occurring is not one wherein refugees are bringing diseases to Greece, but rather is a crisis brought on refugees by the European bordering regime spurred by the EU-Turkey Deal’s restriction on mobility that serves to aggravate existing traumas (MSF, 2017). In this chapter, I will be discussing the results of my overarching research question focusing on how these uncertain periods of detention and the layers of containment discussed in Chapter 6, that are caused by the EU-Turkey Deal are creating a public health crisis among refugees. I begin by talking about the traumas that occur during transit to Lesvos. I then
discuss how Moria itself is making refugees vulnerable. Next, I discuss the variations in health consequences among different populations living in Moria. Finally, I conclude this section with a subsection on how health and the body can be used as political tools. By connecting these pieces with data obtained in the field, I argue that the EU-Turkey Deal itself acts as a determinant for refugee health and well-being and is directly connected to the public health crisis occurring on the island.

Arrival

Refugees experience trauma throughout their journey to Europe. There is an imagined ideal that trauma in the present is worth it because it could lead to lifelong future security in Europe. Many people are fleeing from war, acts of political disobedience, and general violence. They continue to experience violence along their route in the forms of sexual violence for men and women, exploitation, and hard labor conditions, just to name several examples voiced in my fieldwork. However, the image of a safe and hospitable Europe is quickly dispelled as soon as refugees board rubber boats to cross between the coastal forests of Turkey and the Aegean Islands. This clandestine form of travel by night causes health traumas that can be directly related to the EU-Turkey Deal and the broader European bordering regime.

The black dinghies that serve as the main mode of transit between Turkey and Lesvos can carry as few as a dozen people, or as many as 70 people, depending on the size of the boat and the financial drive of the smuggler. James told me about how his boat was arranged in rings. Children, the most vulnerable passengers sat in the center. A ring of women then surrounded the children, while men, considered the least vulnerable, sat at the edge. Refugees usually operate

32 Conversations with the author, January, 2018.
the boats, even though they frequently have limited, if any, experience driving a boat. David, one of my participants, had never driven a boat before he drove his rubber dinghy across the Aegean Strait to Lesvos. The boats are often overcrowded and in poor condition, which makes them at risk for sinking. This is a problem particularly because most of the passengers, like my participant Salar, do not know how to swim. It is even more of a problem in the winter when the water is colder and rougher.

The boats generally cross at night to avoid detection by border enforcement from the Turkish Coast Guard (TCG). If a boat is stopped by the TCG prior to crossing into Greek waters, its passengers are returned to Turkey per the terms of the EU-Turkey Deal. Between January 1, 2018 and March 12, 2018, the TCG and Turkish police stopped 116 boats, which amounted to 4,690 people ("Aegean Boat Report," 2018). However, getting stopped does not dissuade refugees from trying again. Multiple people I spoke with in the field failed to cross on the first time, but were determined to try again. All were successful in completing their trip the second time. Once a boat crosses into Greek waters, it is in European territory and is thus the responsibility of Frontex and the European bordering regime,

---

with assistance from the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG). At that point, the boats are brought to the port of Mytilene so refugees can begin the process of registration.

If a boat is not picked up by the TCG or spotted by a Frontex or HCG boat, then it typically arrives at one of two main zones on Lesvos. Lesvos North includes the villages of Mytilovos, Eftalou and Skala Sikamineas. This was where the majority of refugees arrived on Lesvos in 2015. The legacy of the sheer volume of refugees can be seen at the Lifejacket Mountain, a few kilometers from Eftalou, shown in Fig. 4. The second area is Lesvos South, which is generally known as the coastal area south of Mytilene (“Aegean Boat Report,” 2018). After the traumatic journey, new arrivals are then transported to Moria hotspot by Greek authorities, where they register their asylum case and are formally “welcomed to Europe.”

Moria Making Vulnerability

The physical space of Moria, coupled with its history and role within EU migration policy actively creates vulnerability. The relationship between Moria and both the EU-Turkey and the Hotspot Approach directly link the policies with the growing public health crisis on

---

35 The Hellenic Coast Guard is the Greek national Coast Guard.
Lesvos. Moria has a capacity of approximately 2,000 people. It is so overcrowded that refugees, largely coming from Africa, live outside the camp in the Olive Grove, discussed in the previous chapter. Only one of my participants from my fieldwork, David, lives in the Olive Grove. He lives specifically in “the big tent,” which can house up to 100 people. In conversations in the field, he told me the big tent only housed men and that the heating and electricity frequently did not work.

When I arrived on Lesvos, there were more than 7,400 refugees on the island, with 5,529 in Moria. On that date, January 3rd, the Hellenic Republic Ministry of Interior stated that the capacity of the RIC was 2,330. Thus, Moria was officially overcapacity by more than 2,000 people (“National Situational…03/01,” 2018). Others would argue Moria was overcapacity by about 2,500 people. The remaining population was split into other accommodation sites, including the pre-removal center that makes up my fourth layer of containment outlined in the previous chapter. When I left Greece on February 5th, Moria’s population was reported as 4,955 and the total of migrants according to the Hellenic Ministry was down to 6,883 (“National Situational…05/02,” 2018). By that date, the official reported capacity of Moria was set at 3,000 because of an increase in ISO container boxes, that still left Moria grossly overcapacity (Masri, 2018). Moria’s overcapacity results from the slow process of making decisions on asylum cases and because newly arrived refugees to Lesvos must stay there for the duration of that process because of the EU-Turkey Deal.

Overcrowding is a major risk for health for several critical reasons. First, it creates a breeding ground for infectious diseases. Remarkably, there has yet to be a major outbreak of any particularly dangerous infectious disease, like cholera, which is a major fear of healthcare
actors. This is exceptional given the amount of raw waste in Moria, particularly in the Olive Grove. There were portable toilets in the Olive Grove during my fieldwork, but this was a relatively new addition, as I was told the area previously did not have any toilets. After I returned to the US, I did in fact hear of a measles outbreak through the Kempsons. Overcrowding not only creates issues for the transmission of disease and problems with maintaining hygienic facilities, but it also creates stress and insecurity among the residents of Moria. This has led to fighting and riots, which my participants told me create a general feeling of insecurity and instability that contributes directly to their deteriorating mental health.

This theme of insecurity in Moria was a near-daily thread of conversation both at The Warehouse and across all of my interviews. Security was referenced in two ways across my research. First, it was referenced in the context of safety within Moria. Salar, Mir, Noor, David, James, and Arash all expressed feelings of insecurity based on the constant fighting at Moria. Additionally, it was referenced in terms of mental security, used in place of the more common phrase of mental health. Insecurity not only affects residents’ feelings of safety within Moria, but it has direct physical health consequences, particularly among women. Many refugees have trouble sleeping and many, particularly men, drink heavily to cope with their experiences. The excessive consumption of alcohol reportedly creates a very unsafe environment for women and contributes to sexual violence within Moria.

Lastly, overcrowding and the physical environment found at Moria can lead to health consequences from exposure. When James arrived, there were no tents. He and several other new

---

36 Jan, interview with the author, January 9, 2018.
37 Jan, interview with the author, January 9, 2018.
38 Conversations with author, January, 2018.
40 Monika, interview with the author, January 26, 2018.
arrivals were forced to sleep on a pile of rocks with only a mat and blankets for several days. Even once his group of four received a tent, it could hold only two people. As a result, they continued to sleep outside while their belongings were kept inside the tent. In a way, James was lucky because he arrived in August, so the weather was relatively comfortable. However, by the winter of 2017, Lesvos experienced snow and many residents of Moria were living in summer tents with no insulation. Fig. 5 shows a picture of James’ tent during that winter. The ground is completely covered in snow and there are visible gaps in the fabric of the tent, letting in cold air and snow. This can cause hypothermia and frostbite and even lead to death.

Several people in Moria died in a week span in the winter of 2017 as a result of the lack of sufficient housing materials (“Alarm Raised,” 2017). There was no snow while I was on Lesvos this January, but the island experienced torrential rains for nearly two weeks. The tents were not well-equipped to handle this kind of weather. To stay dry, refugees used wooden pallets to prop up their tents, but that remained insufficient. On a particularly rainy day, Salar and Mir showed me a photo of the water seeping into their tent that had kept them up most of the night. They just shrugged their shoulders and smiled painful, sad smiles. However, the ultimate reason that refugees are living in these conditions is because of the containment policy established with the EU-Turkey Deal.
The containment established at Moria because of the EU-Turkey Deal serves as the determinant of negative health consequences for refugees on Lesvos. From the moment refugees arrive, their hopes and desires for a safe and secure future in Europe are broken in Moria. Refugees are then forced to live in a place akin to a prison, yet they have not committed any criminal act (Douglas and Sáenz, 2013). The environment inside Moria is also hostile, so even if refugees arrive in a stable mental state, many refugees quickly deteriorate because of the oppressive environment of Moria. For those already suffering from mental health challenges, Moria exacerbates them and causes unusually high rates of PTSD for refugee populations, according to Monika, the Mental Health Supervisor for MSF. Salar frequently spoke about his wish to “suicide himself” because of how bad living at Moria was for him. Despite billions of dollars spent by the EU on Lesvos to help the island accommodate refugees, the results of my research discussed above show a clear link between the structure of Moria under the EU-Turkey Deal and the public health crisis occurring on Lesvos.

**Stuckness**

The conditions within Moria would be more manageable if refugees knew how long they would be there. However, since the EU-Turkey Deal began, refugees on Lesvos have become stuck. In Chapter I, I defined stuckness as forced involuntary immobility, which is informed by Nadia El-Shaarawi’s (2015) work on Iraqi refugees in Egypt, and Sarah Turnbull’s (2016) work on immigration detention in the U.K. Stuckness exists at every level of containment discussed in the previous chapter. It is largely a result of the ineffectual nature of the Hotspot Approach as applied to the EU-Turkey Deal, in that Greece and the EU are unable to handle asylum claims in an efficient manner, which leaves refugees stuck indefinitely on the Aegean Islands. Here, I seek
to connect the relationship between feelings of stuckness and consequences to health and well-being.

Stuckness on Lesvos has no end date. Most people can stabilize and adapt to even the direst situations if they know how long they must endure that environment. However, that sense of uncertainty is a constant feeling on Lesvos. All of my interviewees had been on the island for at least 3 months, and three were in legal limbo for more than a year. All but Noor remain stuck on Lesvos at the time of writing. Until November 2017, first arrivals were stuck inside Moria for 28 days and had their freedom of movement taken away. This creates a sense of imprisonment, which is particularly dangerous for people who have past experiences with prison in their countries of origin. It is also particularly shocking in contrast to imagined ideas of refugees regarding what it means to be in Europe. When I was in the field, the policy changed so that all new arrivals could leave the confines of Moria after just 2 days, which was seen as a significant improvement. There have also been efforts to speed up the timeline of when a refugee has their first interview with EASO, the European Asylum Support Office. Until recently, most people were waiting five or six months for this first interview, but now the wait is reportedly only one month. This does not mean refugees are getting moved off the island, but it is a much faster timeline for the initial asylum interview than what had been experienced for much of the last two years.

This sense of stuckness, when put together with uncertainty and the layers of containment that exist on Lesvos, creates instability and is partially responsible for deteriorating mental health.

41 Monika, interview with the author, January 26, 2018.
42 Arash, interview with Julia Endicott and Shona McCarthy, January 14, 2018.
43 Monika, interview with the author, January 26, 2018.
44 Arash, interview with Julia Endicott and Shona McCarthy, January 14, 2018.
45 Arash, interview with Julia Endicott and Shona McCarthy, January 14, 2018.
Most people in refugee situations can cope when they have basic needs met. By this I mean that they feel safe, have adequate shelter, and have necessary information about how to proceed in their situation. However, Lesvos lacks all of these necessary requirements. The lack of stability associated with stuckness, as well as the structure of Moria make it very challenging, and even damaging to treat refugees suffering from mental health conditions. Monika, my participant who worked for MSF, told me that the environment in Moria is too unstable to effectively treat conditions such as PTSD, so she and other medical actors are limited to providing coping mechanisms and palliative care rather than more typical treatment methods. Stuckness causes stress, anxiety, and depression, which can lead to dangerous coping methods. These include heavy alcohol use, which can lead to physical violence, as well as self-harm.

Not all refugees cope in these ways. My participants Salar and Mir spoke about how they play volleyball and talk with their friends to cope with their situation in Moria. Noor said that when she feels bad, she eats her favorite foods, like bananas, and dreams of what the future will be like. However, alleviating the experience of stuckness, so that refugees do not have to cope with the inhumanity experienced in Moria, requires changing the EU-Turkey Deal to increase mobility off of Lesvos.

Variability

The health consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal, as well as the consequences of physical space and environment found in Moria differ depending on several factors. To better understand the variability of consequences, I asked both the healthcare actors that I interviewed the

---

46 Monika, interview with the author, January 26, 2018.
47 Monika, interview with the author, January 26, 2018.
following question: “do you see different health issues depending on any variables, such as age, gender, or country of origin?” Both of my interviews affirmed that they do see variability in the health consequences of Moria and the Deal. They both said that country of origin was the prominent factor in differing health consequences. In terms of psychological challenges, Jan reported a clear difference between Arabic-speaking or Middle Eastern refugees and sub-Saharan African populations. He discussed how people coming from countries such as Syria and Afghanistan typically express more war-related psychological issues, such as PTSD, flashbacks, nightmares, and stress complaints. These traumas are then often expressed in self-harm, suicidal ideation, and dissociative tendencies. However, people from these countries of origin tend to cope slightly better, because they have a bigger community in Moria that provides a critical sense of support. Additionally, it was reported that adult refugees coming from the Middle East typically have better underlying health status because their countries used to have fairly functional health systems when compared to refugees from countries like Afghanistan or Pakistan. In terms of health, better underlying morbidity means better general health and fewer chronic health issues from treatable illnesses, such as parasites or infections.

On the other hand, medical actors working with refugees living in Moria reported a difference in the psychological and somatic health issues with refugees coming from the African continent, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Cameroon. Rather than being aggressive or yelling, which Jan described as more typical of war trauma PTSD, African refugees will come to health actors in a subdued nature due to very different past experiences with trauma. Their traumas are more typically coming from experiences of torture and rape.

48 Jan, interview with the author, January 9, 2018.
49 Jan, interview with the author, January 9, 2018.
50 Jan, interview with the author, January 9, 2018.
51 Monika, interview with the author, January 26, 2018.
which can cause severely damaged self-esteem and a low sense of self-worth.\textsuperscript{52} Additionally, it was reported that African refugees often experience more psychosomatic or physical issues exacerbated by mental factors, like their experiences with trauma. A repeated rape victim, regardless of their country of origin, may not only suffer from anxiety and PTSD, but also from defecation-related challenges, including constipation, incontinence, and pain when passing stool because of serious damage to their pelvis as a result of violent sexual assaults.\textsuperscript{53} This also affects a person’s sense of self-worth because of the shame associated with the inability to control one’s bowels.\textsuperscript{54} African refugees may have experienced rape first while in their own countries, but then again on their journey. Nearly 70\% of all male African patients experienced rape, according to Jan, which was nearly equal to that of female patients and significantly higher than among male refugees from the Middle East. These rates were reportedly particularly high for a refugee situation and the rapes often took place prior to arriving on Lesvos, usually either in Libya or in Turkey.\textsuperscript{55} During my interviews, James and David spoke of fear of physical and sexual assaults during their time in Turkey and stated that the violence experienced there was one of their reasons for continuing on to Greece.

Similar divides exist among women from the Middle East and Africa, though gender serves more broadly as a key factor in health consequences on Lesvos. Women from the Middle East, particularly of Arab descent, often follow travel patterns set first by male family members. They were reported to experience lower rates of sexual assault while in transit compared to African women, but reportedly experience high rates of anxiety once stuck in Moria.\textsuperscript{56} During

\textsuperscript{52} Jan, interview with the author, January 9, 2018.
\textsuperscript{53} Jan, interview with the author, January 9, 2018.
\textsuperscript{54} Monika, interview with the author, January 26, 2018.
\textsuperscript{55} Monika, interview with the author, January 26, 2018.
\textsuperscript{56} Monika, interview with the author, January 26, 2018.
my interview with Noor, she spoke about how she did not feel free when she lived in Moria because she could not remove her hijab, as she was sharing a tent with another family and there was no private space to do so. She was the only woman with whom I was able to speak with directly about her experience living in Moria.

African women in transit were reported as at a higher risk of sexual exploitation and human trafficking while on the move. This, according to Monika, frequently happens when women fly to Turkey and then receive offers of help, which are actually prostitution rings.  

Frequent experiences of sexual assault can lead to a range of health consequences for women, including damage to the body and fear. Fear is a significant factor in the health consequences for women. Single women are less likely to visit the doctors in Moria, particularly if they have a problem at night, because they are too afraid to walk through Moria at night given the risk for sexual assault. This fear also prevents women from using the bathroom at night, which can ultimately lead to urinary tract infections. Women are more likely than men to experience sexual assault when on Lesvos, which is particularly problematic among single women traveling alone, as opposed to women traveling in a group. Assaults are aggravated by the abuse of alcohol as a coping mechanism, which Monika believes to be in part due to cultural variability between the social role of women, as well as their respective levels of clothing coverage. However, given the delicate nature of these questions and my limited number of female participants, I was unable to confirm these experiences with refugees in the field.

Per my IRB, I did not interview any children and I also ran out of time in my interviews with health actors to discuss variability in age. However, children make up a significant portion of patient visits to health facilities. These mostly come in the form of basic pediatrics, such as

---

57 Monika, interview with the author, January 26, 2018.
58 Jan, interview with the author, January 9, 2018.
infections, fever, and vomiting, but generally nothing too severe. However, there is likely a significant risk for children currently stuck on Lesvos to face challenges later in life due to disrupted development, limited structure of education, and trauma experienced on Lesvos (Mares and Zwi, 2015).

**Lack of Sufficient Resources**

Next, I seek to explain how the health system is unable to meet the demand needed for quality care and thus, is unable to counter the public health crisis unfolding because of the EU-Turkey Deal. As a result of the containment policy, there are many health actors working on Lesvos. The National Center for Disease Control and Prevention (KEELPNO) is the Greek public health department, which is responsible for screening all new refugee arrivals to Lesvos. During these screenings, they are supposed to check for chronic conditions and serious health problems, including mental health conditions. This serves a dual purpose in that KEELPNO can screen for vulnerability and also catch people who need immediate medical attention, such as a person with diabetes who has been without insulin for several days while in transit.\(^{59}\) However, they are extremely overloaded with screenings, particularly since October 2017 when arrivals to the island began to increase steadily for the first time since the EU-Turkey Deal was enacted. Given the number of arrivals compared to the number of staff, screenings are often delayed or skipped entirely. Additionally, KEELPNO does not have a psychiatrist and only seven psychologists, which is insufficient given the need on Lesvos for vulnerability screenings of refugees.\(^{60}\)

---

\(^{59}\) Jan, interview with the author, January 9, 2018.

\(^{60}\) Monika, interview with the author, January 26, 2018.
In addition to KEELPNO, there are a number of humanitarian health actors on the island that work together to create a refugee health system for people with limited access to the Greek health system. The main actors on Lesvos, according to Jan, are ERCI, MSF, DocMobile, and BRF, which each serve slightly different functions. BRF largely provides first aid and basic treatment, but only MSF provides true psychological care. In December 2017, MSF became so inundated with cases that they stopped taking patient referrals from other actors.\(^6^1\) Even so, their capacity is limited and they are only able to treat people in a true crisis situation, such as acutely suicidal patients. For refugees who develop mental health issues while in Moria, they are very few treatment options. Most are only given suggestions for how to cope because the demand for services is so high, and nearly every person living in Moria is suffering because of the insecurity that exists there as a result of the containment policy.

In my interview with Salar, he spoke about his inability to receive care. Salar visited the Level 4 doctor (not MSF) inside Moria, but they could not help him, despite his mental insecurity and suicidal thoughts. They did not have the capacity. At the time of my fieldwork, neither did any other actors. However, in January 2018, MSF was in the process of actively expanding their capacity through the creation of a new clinic. Even so, with daily arrivals numbering in the hundreds and no change to the EU-Turkey Deal at the time of writing, limited capacity of care is likely to continue.

**The Body as a Tool Against Containment**

Finally, I end this section with a discussion of the use of the body, and health, as a tool of political power. Refugees can use their own bodies to push back on the containment and the

\(^6^1\) Monika, interview with the author, January 26, 2018.
inhumanity experienced on Lesvos as a result of the EU-Turkey Deal. I build this argument largely off research from Miriam Ticktin (2006) and Nicholas Fischer (2015) who describe how bodies were used as tools of migration in France. One form of action against the policy, are hunger strikes. My participant Arash engaged in a 41-day hunger strike because his brother and several other refugees were imprisoned without just cause. The imprisoned refugees first began the hunger strike and Arash followed suit to increase visibility, as he had received legal refugee status in Greece and could better access public spaces. The toll of the hunger strike on his body was visible in our interview several months later, as his hands still shook from so many days without food. However, using his body was effective in that Arash did get a reaction from the government and the prisoners were freed from within Moria.\(^{62}\)

Another form of active resistance on Lesvos comes in public acts of injury as protest against the containment policy. On March 26, 2018, a Syrian man lit himself on fire in Moria after his second asylum application was rejected by EASO (ANSA, 2018). This came a week after riots between police and refugees in Moria and three threats of suicide, including one that resulted in the electrocution of a man after he climbed to the top of a pole (“Eight Police Officers Injured,” 2018). These acts did not result in deaths, but did require hospital treatment. They were also active efforts to call attention to the dire situation and the risks for life that exist within the layers of containment on Lesvos as a result of the EU-Turkey Deal.

In this chapter, I argued that from the point of arrival, refugees experience trauma. This in and of itself is not unique to Lesvos, but refugees are then placed in a place that creates vulnerability at Moria, which creates insecurity and instability among its population. Additionally, refugees are contained by the island, which causes feelings of stuckness directly.

\(^{62}\) Arash, interviewed by Julia Endicott and Shona McCarthy, January 14, 2018.
attributed to the EU-Turkey Deal. I also discussed how the consequences of being on Lesvos manifest differently for various groups of people, based on data obtained in interviews. Next, discussed the limits in treating health consequences of the Deal because of the limited resources of healthcare actors on Lesvos. Finally, I ended this section with a brief, but important discussion on the use of health as a tool against politics, a markedly different consequence to health than the others discussed in this chapter. The core determinant of the health consequences on the island is the EU-Turkey Deal itself. Thus, this chapter demonstrates that the most effective treatment plan would be to end the EU-Turkey Deal and increase refugee mobility to end the public health crisis currently occurring on the island.
Chapter 8: Humanitarian and Solidarity Action in Response to Government Inaction

On Lesvos, a range of actors work to counter the violence inflicted on refugees as a result of the EU-Turkey Deal and the structural violence attributed to the European bordering regime. In this chapter, I seek to explain the complex situation of actors working to alleviate the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal outlined in the previous two chapters. Some efforts are considered invaluable by refugees, while other groups that I discuss were repeatedly described as contributing added suffering, on top of that caused by containment experienced because of the EU-Turkey Deal. These actors cannot be easily categorized as humanitarians. Rather, some groups fall within the humanitarian aid sphere, adhering to notions of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence outlined by Pictet (1979). Other actors identify strictly as solidarians. Rozakou (2017) explains solidarity in the context of migration as a practice that “emphasizes lateral and anti-hierarchical relatedness. In this sense, it contrasts both hospitality (the dominant culture code of dealing with alterity in Greece) and bureaucratic frameworks of assistance to immigrants and refugees distinctive of the humanitarian realm,” (100). Only one of my participants, Arash, identified explicitly as an activist, which creates a further category of actors working to counter the effects of the EU-Turkey Deal on Lesvos.

Most of the people I encountered in my fieldwork blurred the lines between these various categories. This blurred line was most evident in regards to the Kempsons, who described themselves as “humans helping humans,” but also frequently acted against the government and the structures in place on Lesvos, serving in an activist capacity. In this chapter, I do my best to express each group’s general practice and to express how they may at times fall within multiple categories.
In this chapter, I aim to provide the clearest results to my third research question: how are solidarity initiatives seeking to mitigate or counteract the effects of detention on Lesvos? This question is central to my larger research topic because there would not be a need for humanitarian intervention or acts of solidarity if there were not significant consequences affecting human life on the island. I found this to be particular notable given the framing of the EU-Turkey Deal as “a humanitarian admission scheme for Syrian refugees in Turkey,” (Corrao, 2018). If the Deal was designed for a humanitarian purpose, why are humanitarian groups on Lesvos dealing with the consequences of this policy? My results were complicated, as the system that exists on Lesvos to provide aid is extensive and includes many actors with various intentions and goals, as described in the last paragraph. I begin this chapter with a discussion of traditional humanitarian structures present on Lesvos and my own positionality as a short-term volunteer and researcher. Next, I discuss two of the common critiques of humanitarian aid on Lesvos, where I focus on the NGO Euro Relief, which became the central aid provider within Moria following the EU-Turkey Deal. After, I discuss the more general critiques of voluntourism on Lesvos, another significant point of tension on the island. Voluntourism is a compound of volunteer and tourism and those who participate are defined by Stephen Wearing (2002:240) as, those tourists who, for various reasons, volunteer in an organized way to undertake holidays that may involve the aiding or alleviating the material poverty of some groups in society, the restoration of certain environments, or research into aspects of society or environment. From my fieldwork, it became abundantly clear that short-term volunteers to Lesvos typically fall under Wearing’s first definition of voluntourists.
In the next section, I transition to the complicated relationship between other actors on the island, including several traditional humanitarian aid groups and several groups who practice Rozakou’s definition of solidarity humanitarianism. These solidarity groups often form through grassroots independent volunteers (Rozakou, 2017). This is an area, alongside traditional humanitarian aid groups that emerged strongly on Lesvos over the last three years, in part because of the relative absence of both the Greek state and the UNHCR (Rozakou, 2017). This is particularly poignant given the fact that the UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, officially leads the humanitarian response. The UNHCR also works alongside the Greek government and many other partner organizations to coordinate the refugee response on Lesvos, but it does not run any of the camps (“Aegean Islands,” 2017). Despite this role, it does little to actually alleviate the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal. Ultimately, the purpose in this chapter is to provide an overview of the actors present on Lesvos and how those groups sometimes further aggravate the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal, while other act productively to mitigate those consequences.

**Volunteering and Humanitarianism on Lesvos**

In Chapter 3, I discussed scholarly work regarding humanitarianism. Here, I bring the aspirations and critiques of humanitarianism into direct conversation with the situation on Lesvos. In 2015, there was a proliferation of traditional aid groups and non-hierarchical solidarity groups because of the scale of the “refugee crisis”. After the EU-Turkey Deal was signed in 2016, several major international humanitarian aid agencies operating within Moria stopped their services in protest of the policy because it violated the rights of refugees. For example, MSF, one of the global leaders in humanitarian aid, pulled out of Moria because they
believed the policy was inhumane (“Greece: MSF,” 2016). Rather than leave the island, MSF relocated outside Moria to continue providing some health aid. At the present, it is the UNHCR that formally manages the coordination of response efforts, but I found, like Rozakou (2017), it is often seen as an absent body, doing little more than organizing meetings to talk about the problems on Lesvos and failing to follow through. The UNHCR is widely perceived to be ignorant of what is really happening at Moria.63

Large-scale humanitarian efforts, coupled with the differing practices of grassroots solidarity humanitarianism, play critical roles in the coordinated approach to supporting the influx of refugees on Lesvos, given the limited presence of the Greek State. Volunteer opportunities to help provide aid to refugees on Lesvos are posted in two places. The first is a website, GreeceVol.Info, which is connected to a Facebook group titled “Information for Volunteers on Lesvos,” the second place to find volunteer opportunities. The website extends beyond Lesvos and includes calls for volunteers, accommodation options, and a range of information for refugees and volunteers alike. The Facebook page acts largely as a forum, where new member post questions to experienced volunteers, or people ask for assistance with a case or with resources. This Facebook page frequently provides examples of voluntourism, while also serving as a critical platform to discuss the situation on Lesvos more broadly.

In thinking about traditional humanitarian groups, it is important to consider power structures that exist between humanitarian workers and refugees. These structure are not unique to Lesvos, but also exist in countless other aid-reliant locations globally. The ReflActionist Collective (2016), comprised of two white, female German activists, reflected on their experiences with power structures, privilege, and whiteness while volunteering on the Balkan

63 Discourse at UNHCR meeting 1/18/18; conversation with the author, January 2018.
Route. They critically reflected on questions that I find imperative to include here, particularly given my own position of privilege in the field. They questioned the privileges that allow for volunteering in the first place, such as time, money, and citizenship. They also questioned knowledge production and assumptions of foreign volunteers. These are questions that I also reflected on, both because of my own position as a volunteer and researcher, but also because of what I heard and witnessed in the field regarding the problematic nature of volunteers on Lesvos.

As a volunteer and participant in humanitarian support in the field, I was privileged. I am a white, female, US American, who also holds British citizenship. There were several times while in the field that volunteers from other organizations directed their questions to either me or other members of my research team, as opposed to my fellow volunteers in The Warehouse. This often was because of assumptions of language, assumptions of power, and I would argue, because of our whiteness. As a result, it is imperative to include my own reflections regarding inequality in the humanitarian sphere before I critique others. I often felt conflicted about my role in The Warehouse and as a volunteer. I had financial privileges because I received funding to conduct research, and racial privileges as a white, English-speaking woman. However, I made cognizant efforts to challenge establish notions of privilege by acknowledging my own limited knowledge and directing questions to the more qualified people working in The Warehouse, all of whom were refugees.

Next, I move from the general situation and my own position to my two main critiques of humanitarianism on Lesvos. These two critiques come in regards to efforts that arguably worsen the situation for refugees contained on Lesvos because of the EU-Turkey Deal.
Euro Relief and Voluntourism: Two Areas of Criticism

Prior to arriving on Lesvos, I was well aware of the proliferation of humanitarian actors that emerged in response to the number of refugees coming to the island over the last three years. By January 2016, there were 81 organizations active on Lesvos (Nianias, 2016). The current data states that there are now slightly fewer, with only 67 organizations active on the island (“NGO Teams,” 2018). Organizations vary from major international humanitarian aid groups, such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC) to smaller local NGOs, like the Legal Centre Lesvos, which provides legal advice and aid to the No Border Kitchen – a group that practices solidarity and provides food to refugees stuck on Lesvos (“NGO Teams,” 2018). However, one organization in particular was new to me: Euro Relief. Their website refrains from connecting to any Christian denomination or clear source of funding, but they were referred to in the field as Christians with a mission to convert.

Within my first day of fieldwork, this organization had come up many times in conversation. It would not be the first day or the last where Euro Relief would dominate a discussion. A visit to the website greets one with the statement: “Euro Relief exists to show compassion to the suffering in Greece and the surrounding regions,” and is outfitted with several pictures of refugee families. Euro Relief’s “About” section describes the organization as a Greek NGO before describing their past involvement in various relief efforts across Greece and the broader Balkan region. Their volunteer application encourages people to join their efforts and make lifelong relationships, stressing the importance of “[waking] up every day with a renewed sense of purpose,” (“Come Make a Difference,” 2018). Quite frankly, it looks like a standard website for volunteers/voluntourism, rather than one rumored to be working on proselytizing refugees. In this thesis, Euro Relief’s position is even more important because it became the
primary humanitarian actor within Moria following the EU-Turkey Deal when other aid agencies left in protest of the policy (Kingsley, 2016).

The initial criticism I heard in the field focused on the close ties between Euro Relief and the Greek state, leading to the dominance of Euro Relief within Moria, as well as their religious prejudices tied to their religious goals. They were referred to as missionaries with an Evangelical goal of converting Muslims to Christianity. In my conversations in the field, I was told that Euro Relief frequently neglected Christian Africans in favor of Muslim refugees because they could work to convert the latter, but not the former. Volunteers were reportedly guided not to make eye contact with the refugees, enhancing the division between volunteer and refugee as well as reinforcing structural power dynamics.

Their neglect was discussed in another way in reference to their failure to provide sufficient cold-weather items for refugees. In conversations in the field, several people went so far as to call Euro Relief explicitly responsible for deaths within the camps in two different circumstances. One circumstance came in January 2017, where several men died of carbon monoxide poisoning (“Alarm Raised,” 2017). I was told that the cause of the carbon monoxide poisoning was Euro Relief’s use of foam insulation to attempt to retrofit a summer tent for winter habitation, rather than utilizing more suitable housing materials. Additionally, in my interview with Arash Hampay, he told a story of a young girl who died at the end of 2017 because of Euro Relief’s unwillingness to provide additional blankets on a particularly frigid evening.

Critiques of Euro Relief extend beyond the conversational level. In August 2016, The Guardian reported that volunteers with Euro Relief distributed fliers of the gospel in Arabic during the Muslim holiday of Ramadan (Kingsley, 2016). Additionally, the well-regarded

---

64 Conversations with the author in the field, January, 2018.
Medium digest, *Are You Syrious?* (AYS) published two separate features since the start of 2018 regarding the egregious reports of Euro Relief’s actions. They cited stories received and instances witnessed by their writers to build these features. The first, issued on January 11, 2018, explicitly called out their subtle conversion methods, alliances with authorities, and bracelet identification system, using first hand accounts of Euro Relief volunteers and refugees as their sources (“AYS Daily Digest 11/01/18,” 2018). Euro Relief is in charge of housing accommodations within Moria and they use these identification bracelets to do so. The colored bracelet represents a different block of housing within Moria and also symbolizes the wearer’s nationality, as sectors are broken up by nationality (“AYS Daily Digest 11/01/18,” 2018). One of my participants also supported the fact that Euro Relief’s system of housing was problematic. During our interview, James recalled his arrival to Moria and first encounter with Euro Relief as he tried to navigate the housing system within Moria:

> The first thing we met, we meet an organization called Euro Relief, we asked them for, when the authority asks us we can go and look for meet people for housing so they can house us. So meeting there and we ask for tent and they say there is no tent and we say okay, where do you want us to sleep? They say they don’t care that we can just find anywhere that’s…there are a lot of people there with no tents. So it was really challenging because we just came in this is our first time and we couldn’t even have a tent. So we stayed outside, there is a place we [slept] on a rock.66

---

As the organization in charge of housing in Moria, not only do they have insufficient quality and quantity of housing resources, but they also fail to provide any sense of humanity to those first arriving. As discussed in Chapter 7, Moria is severely overcapacity because of the EU-Turkey Deal and Greece’s slow asylum system. This would make it hard for any aid group to meet the demands of refugees. However, the fact that the organization chooses to divide refugees by nationality, a practice done under the guise of protection, often leads to added suffering for refugees. It facilitates deportation, arrests, and the implementation of the EU-Turkey Deal based on nationality more feasible because residents of Moria are quickly identified based on the color of their bracelet (“AYS Special on EuroRelief II,” 2018).

AYS’s first piece received such a strong online response, that they continued their investigation further. In response, their writers solicited eyewitness accounts of those working with Euro Relief or from those who were impacted by Euro Relief’s harmful practices, which led to their production of a full feature on the problems associated with Euro Relief, which was released on March 4, 2018. This feature argued that Euro Relief was complicit in furthering inhumane conditions within Moria, given their authoritative position in Moria and their close ties to the Greek authorities. Even as the main aid distributor, they typically required people to wait months for the most basic of supplies, despite their grueling journeys and dire need. Reportedly, this was not due to a lack of resources, but rather strict rules that limited the amount of distribution and set strict and often cruel time frames for distribution (“AYS Special on EuroRelief II,” 2018).

Second to Euro Relief, foreign volunteers received extensive criticism from refugees on the island. No longer just a site of tourism, Lesvos is now a place of voluntourism. My participant, Arash expressed disdain when discussing the problems of volunteers.
We have maybe 400 volunteers in the camp. From Euro Relief or another organization. [Most] volunteers they come to Moria just for work or money. And also this is very dirty; for fun selife, and some show, hey malaka they died, wanna give a selfie. This is very dirty. They take the selfie and they show it in the Facebook, ‘hey we help the refugees’ fuck that. If you wanna help the refugees, you don’t have to show.67

Critiques of volunteers were frequent and often laced with aggressive or frustrated tones. There were also frequent comments regarding the lack of accountability among volunteers. In my interview with Arash, he later discussed his dismay at volunteers who crowd-funded and then spent that money at the local discos, with no accountability to their donors on whether they actually provided any kind of support for refugees.

I also witness problematic volunteers one morning at The Warehouse. We were visited by a Mormon couple, who came to The Warehouse to discuss bringing their youth group to volunteer on Lesvos in the upcoming summer. They wanted to provide their group with a first-hand view of what was happening to refugees on the island. The group they planned to bring was comprised of 16-18 year olds from the United States. After a long, drawn-out conversation about the challenges with bringing a group like that, the woman began crying because she cared so much about helping the refugees. The Kempsons denied their request because of the age of their group, and the couple left in dismay and never returned. Age of volunteers is extremely important to most groups given the trauma and impacts on development that can result from experiencing a situation as tumultuous and violent as Moria at an early age. Generally, most

organizations prefer volunteers who are at least 21, if not 25, but all have a strict minimum of at least 18. Many groups also require time commitments to reduce the risk of voluntourists who only want to come for a short period before returning home with a story and some pictures of how they helped the refugees.

However, despite some of the challenges with humanitarian actors on Lesvos, there are many organizations on the island where humanitarian groups, independent volunteers, solidarity initiatives, local residents, and refugees alike team up to actively alleviate the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal through productive measures. This complicated sphere of actors is far from perfect. Traditional humanitarian aid groups do still continue to promote hierarchical ideas regarding humanitarian support and sometime come into conflict with solidarity initiatives actively trying to counter those norms.

**Action in Response to the EU-Turkey Deal**

In contrast to the work of Euro Relief and voluntourists, there are many humanitarian groups, independent volunteers, and solidarity organizations that are well-regarded by refugees for the effective work they are doing to reduce the negative consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal. The UNHCR oversees all of these efforts, including those of the heavily critiqued Euro Relief, but they largely organize partnerships rather than providing aid. Other groups provide aid where the Greek government fails. Small NGOs, mostly practicing the principles of humanitarianism, provide basic health care where the Ministry of Health does not. Community centers, who also practiced solidarity, provide activities to occupy residents of Moria during prolonged periods of waiting. Most of the groups I spoke with heavily critiqued the EU-Turkey

---

68 Facebook page for Information Point for Lesvos Volunteers, conversations in the field, and my own experience trying to volunteer on Lesvos.
deal, but were cautious of being too outspoken against the Greek government, risking animosity
towards their organizations. If their relationship with the UNHCR or the Greek government were
to fail, they may not be able to provide necessary aid, which places many groups in difficult
positions.

In this next section, I describe the groups I interacted with on Lesvos. Some groups were
strictly humanitarian in their practices, particularly those providing medical aid. Others identified
as solidarity initiatives. Despite their different practices, all the groups I interacted with acted in
support of refugees against the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal. These efforts support my
argument that the consequences are severe enough to require a wide-range of support efforts,
which ultimately have limited efficacy because of the level of containment experience on
Lesvos.

*Healthcare Actors*

According to GreeceVol.Info, there are twenty medical or health care groups active on
the island. These come in addition to the limited resources provided by KEELPNO, the Greek
and work to segment the limited local health services available on Lesvos. Hospitals, ambulatory
services, and local doctors are available, but cannot come close to meeting the needs of
thousands of people living in limbo within Moria, in addition to the rest of the island’s residents.
According to Jan, the main health actors operating on the island are KEELPNO, ERCI, MSF,
DocMobile, Israid, and Stichting Bootvluchteling or Boat Refugee Foundation (BRF). The
various organizations work together to create a health system to the best of their ability.

BRF, which identifies as a provider of humanitarian aid, began on Lesvos three years ago
when they saw a need arise (“PSS Team,” 2018). Until January 1st, 2018, they operated a
medical mission inside Moria to provide basic first aid care during the night for both physical
and mental needs. However, they suspended their work because the overcrowded conditions of the camp put the security of staff and patients at risk (Evita, 2018). When their medical mission operated, it was reported that BRF never turned patients away for initial treatment. Although they always saw patients, they could not always treat patients given limited resources. They provided medicine for basic ailments, but could not treat people requiring chronic care or psychological support.\(^{69}\) However, they were able to refer patients to MSF or send letters to KEELPNO encouraging them to check in on a patient. Additionally, BRF continues to operate psychosocial support mission, despite the end of their medical mission. This mission includes a community center within Moria, where refugees can take mindfulness-based courses to help cope with their psychological conditions that come as a result of their experiences with containment and trauma, if other treatment options are unavailable.

Resources to develop coping skills are particularly important given the limited access to mental health services for refugees. At the time of my fieldwork, MSF could no longer accept any referrals from actors within Moria because their waiting list was so long. MSF is the only aid agency providing any psychological treatment, which makes them an invaluable resource, even when at capacity. In addition to clinical treatment, MSF also provides individualized coping strategies for patients to help them manage inside Moria. They also teach sleeping techniques, as many patients suffer from insomnia. Additionally, one of the simplest tools MSF provides are sets of earplugs for patients to use to help with the noise of violence and fighting at night and improve sleeping conditions.\(^{70}\)

Health actors are limited in their ability to serve refugees for several reasons. First, they have limited resources. These include limited financial means and a small number of trained

---

\(^{69}\) Jan, interview with the author, January 9, 2018.

\(^{70}\) Monika, interview with the author, January 26, 2018.
volunteers or staff members able to provide care. Severe health cases, such as suicide attempts and pregnancy, are referred to the hospital in Mytilene, but that still leaves a gap in standard levels of care, particularly if the hospital is busy. In my conversations in the field, basic health care needs rarely came up. However, in almost all my interview, limited access to mental health care, caused largely because of the experiences of containment and insecurity found at Moria, was a source of significant frustration.\footnote{Salar, interviewed by Ava Baker, Julia Endicott, and Shona McCarthy, January 17, 2018.} Yet, at the same time, health actors can only counter the violence created by the EU-Turkey Deal and the European bordering so much, as they can only treat the basic consequences, unable to treat the root cause of suffering.

\textit{Lesvos Solidarity: Pikpa and Mosaik Support Center}

I next discuss a very different group operating on Lesvos. Located near Mytilene airport, Lesvos Solidarity operates an open site of accommodation at the former Pikpa camp for the most vulnerable residents\footnote{Term used in conversation with the author to describe people living in Pikpa.} on Lesvos. Often referred to as Pikpa for short, Lesvos Solidarity advocates for the principles of solidarity and works completely autonomously from the Greek government. The group is able to house vulnerable people because they have their own medical team comprised of two staff members and one volunteer doctor. The medical team is made up of Greek nationals, which vastly improves their ability to navigate the broader Greek health system, compared with foreign volunteers.\footnote{Tour and guide from Communications at Pikpa with the author, January 23, 2018.} Additionally, Lesvos Solidarity has strict rules regarding age and duration of their volunteers to prevent voluntourism.

The camp is made up of a mix of wooden cabins, dome-style buildings, and housing units provided by the IRC. The cabins predominantly house families, while the IRC units house single men. There is a school on site for young children, but all children over the age of six who live at
Pikpa are able to attend local Greek schools. This is an invaluable resource for residents of Pikpa because most children living in Moria are not able to attend regular school, leading to substantial challenges to development. Pikpa has a large kitchen and dining room, as well as a massive garden, which children look after to gain a sense of responsibility. Every day, a schedule is posted centrally, which tells the days events. There is also a boutique for residents to get new clothing. The boutique neighbors a laundry room/ DJ studio where clothing and life jackets are washed.

Life jackets serve a multifaceted purpose on Lesvos. First, they are the only sense of safety and security when refugees travel across the Aegean Sea to the island. Later, they are often discarded, as observed at Life Jacket Mountain. There, old life jackets serve as a monument to the plight of hundreds of thousands of people who traveled to the shores of Lesvos. Alternatively, they are reused; recycled to serve a second purpose for refugees. That is precisely what occurs both at Pikpa and Mosaik Support Center, which is a collaborative solidarity support center operated by Lesvos Solidarity and borderline-europe (“Welcome to Mosaik,” 2018). At Pikpa, volunteers remove the stuffing from the life jackets and wash them, before they are sent are sent to Mosaik’s safe passage workshop. There, a team of refugees and volunteers sew the life jackets into a range of items, including small wallets and bags sold in the workshop, as well as online. All refugees receive an income for the work they do on this project, which helps them increase their economic mobility.

Mosaik provides many integral services beyond the safe passage workshop. Housed in a former University of the Aegean building, Mosaik focuses on providing classes and workshops to refugees on Lesvos. The center teaches English and Greek courses to refugees, as well as

---

74 Tour and guide from Communications at Pikpa with the author, January 23, 2018.  
75 Tour and guide from Communications at Pikpa with the author, January 23, 2018.
Arabic and Farsi courses for residents of Lesvos and other volunteers or employees seeking to improve their language skills. Additionally, they offer computer courses and a range of courses for children. Mosaik also provides creative and cultural workshops, including upcycling and choir. In the past, Mosaik partnered with another organization, the Office of Displaced Designers based in Mytilene, to offer a storytelling workshop. The Office of Displaced Designers, like Mosaik, provides a space for refugees to spend their time stuck on Lesvos productively. People who take advantage of the opportunities available through these organizations are able to hone skills, such as language or digital design, but also cope better with their situation because they can use their time to produce tangible items, be it stories, language skills, or a piece of art. Kostas of Mosaik noted that creating art in any capacity in the center makes a visible difference to the immigrants and refugees who come through the center’s doors, all of whom are suffering from the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal.

One Happy Family

Another important site for my research was One Happy Family (OHF). OHF occupies a former warehouse and has expansive views of Turkey and the Aegean Sea. Founded in March 2017, this community center serves roughly 800 people a day, most of whom

Figure 3. One Happy Family garden. Photo taken by author, January 2018.

---

76 Mosaik Support Center Tour, January 11, 2018.
77 Kostas used both immigrants and refugees when referring to those who use the center.
simply want to spend as much time away from Moria as possible. It is a labyrinth, with many outpost buildings spread out across the lot. OHF has an indoor gym, a beautiful garden as shown in Fig. 5, a boutique, a library, as well as a health clinic that was built by the Kempsons and is operated by the German NGO DocMobile. The main building of OHF is covered with murals of painted palm trees. Inside, there is a barbershop, tailor, movie theater, children’s activity room, computer room, legal aid office, café, and dining table area for visitors to eat or sit and talk. All visitors receive “swisscross drachma,” OHF’s currency to spend at the center each day (“Projects,” 2018). The purpose of this is to endow refugees with a sense of self-determination, even when the rest of their future is in the hands of politicians and the European Asylum Service. OHF also provides a hot meal and space for companionship every afternoon at 3:00 p.m. to all people at the center for the day, as well as those at Little Happy Family (LHF), and The Warehouse.

Lastly and most importantly, OHF, like The Warehouse aspires to create a self-sufficient space sustainably run by refugees. Of their volunteer team, twelve are European and fifty are refugees. This again returns to the center’s goal: to provide a space where time can be used productively, but wherein refugees can also determine their own days. OHF is funded by private donors, rather than by any government, and states on the front page of their website that “if the needs of the people in need are covered in a satisfying manner through governmental or other organizations, we will cease our activities” (“About Us,” 2018). At the time of writing, they are very much still operating their activities, demonstrating that governments are failing to protect the rights of refugees, despite their obligations under international law.

---

78 OHF Tour guide, conversation with the author, January 16, 2018.
The Warehouse

The final space I discuss is The Warehouse, the place where I conducted the bulk of my participant observation. I describe the space in depth in my methodology chapter, however it is also an important site of active efforts to mitigate the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal. The Kempsons do not define with any labels, as discussed in the introduction to this chapter, but rather just as “humans helping humans”.\(^79\) I would argue that The Warehouse is neither strictly a solidarity initiative, nor the provider of traditional humanitarian aid, but rather something in-between. In addition to distributing supplies to newly arrived refugees, The Warehouse is a space of family and community building for the team of volunteers. First, it provides a work-like environment, where volunteers can spend their time during the day, rather than inside their tents at Moria. It also provides a support system thanks to the Kempsons and the team itself. It builds bridges across ethnic lines and gives women and men equal responsibilities during the day. The team supports one another both during the day when distributing aid, but also when they return to Moria every night. Additionally, The Warehouse is structured in a non-hierarchical way to challenge norms of humanitarianism. The Kempsons’ ultimate goal is to have The Warehouse entirely run by refugees, with little help from foreign volunteers to disrupt systems of power.

These are only several of the groups that actively seek to mitigate the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal on the island and disrupt power dynamics typically found in humanitarian intervention. In this last section, I focused my discussion on the groups I interacted with in the field, rather than additional solidarity and humanitarian organizations, because of the limits of my research. I focused on these groups specifically because of their direct connections to solidarity work, or because they were working to provide solutions that counter the public health,

\(^79\) Philippa Kempson, conversation with the author, January, 2018.
both critical elements of aid given the consequences of containment experienced as a result of the EU-Turkey Deal. However, in the months preceding my fieldwork, I also examined the solidarity culture of Lesvos on larger scale, by following the social media campaign, ‘Open The Islands’, which brought together more than 40 solidarity groups and humanitarian organizations active across the Aegean Islands, calling for an end to the EU-Turkey Deal (“Statement,” 2017).

**Open the Islands Campaign**

On October 12, 2017, the aforementioned collective issued a call for action in anticipation of the start of winter. In the previous winter, six people died in Moria on their way to find safety and life in Europe. The ‘Open The Islands’ social media campaign was an effort to prevent a similar fate in the winter of 2018. I followed this campaign because of its focus on ending the EU-Turkey Deal because of health consequences, inhumane conditions, and violence inflicted by the containment that transpired as a result of this policy. The campaign called on Greek Prime Minister Alex Tsipras to provide a plan for winter and clarify responsibilities for various actors. They also called for the Greek government to close the Hotspots on the Aegean Islands, to provide safe winterized shelter, to stop arbitrary detention based on nationality rather than on merits of a case, and to stop returning asylum seekers to Turkey as, “they cannot fully access their right to apply for international protection in Turkey. Therefore, Turkey cannot be considered a ‘safe third country’ or a ‘safe first country of asylum’,” (“Statement,” 2017). Additionally, the campaign calls for other EU member states to stop returns to Greece under the Dublin III regulation, citing the inhumane conditions in Greece and explicitly calls for the end of the EU-Turkey Deal (“Statement,” 2017).
On December 1, 2017, twelve organizations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the IRC began a countdown to the start of winter on December 21, 2017 and repeated their call for the end of EU-Turkey Deal and called for the relocation of refugees to mainland Greece to prevent another year of deaths from exposure because of the living conditions on the island (“Greece: Move Asylum Seekers,” 2017). I did not visit any of these twelve organizations and few were actively providing direct support on the island, but rather they were participating through reporting and activism from afar. On December 8, 2017, Twitter users rejoiced when Greece announced it would move 5,000 refugees from the islands to mainland Greece. Relocation was slow, but began to happen. However, more people continued to arrive on Lesvos. At the time of writing in April 2018, more than 7,000 people have been moved to the mainland because of the action of solidarity organizations putting pressure on the Greek state, particularly across social media. Still, the EU-Turkey Deal remains in play. The Islands remain closed, and close to 13,000 people remain contained on the islands despite prolonged efforts by solidarity groups to call for policy change.

The Open the Islands campaign included not just written statements, but protests and an extensive social media campaign. The Open the Islands Campaign remains active, if less fervent than at the end of 2017. The campaign achieved success in the fall, as it created enough publicity regarding the situation to require a response from the Greek government to increase transportation to the mainland, directly countering the purpose of the EU-Turkey Deal (Georgiopolou, 2018). The campaign seemed to be gaining additional clout when, as of April 17, 2018, the Greek Council of State ruled that the geographic limitations of the EU-Turkey Deal that cause containment create an undue burden. With that decision, the Greek Council effectively
answered the call of solidarity and stated a need to end the containment and in effect, open the islands (“New Refugees,” 2018).

In this chapter, I covered a wide-range of groups operating on Lesvos because of the EU-Turkey Deal. I argued that some groups actually make the impact of the EU-Turkey Deal worse for refugees. On the other hand, or all the critiques of humanitarianism and the cases of exploitation explored here, there are many groups on Lesvos that do provide useful and critical aid, as well as solidarity action to refugees stuck on Lesvos in response to the limited action of the Greek state.

I also argued that efforts to respond to the crisis of containment spurred by the EU-Turkey Deal are complicated and can be critiqued in several ways. The complexities of the response efforts call into question positionality, power structures, and effective distribution of aid. The UNHCR is largely unresponsive, despite its position as response coordinator at the top of the humanitarian aid hierarchy. There are voluntourists seeking to feel good about themselves for “helping the refugees” and organizations with racist undertones and concealed religious goals. However, there are also solidarity groups, individual volunteers, and focused humanitarian groups whose actions are alleviating the negative consequences for refugees caused by the EU-Turkey Deal. However, until the EU-Turkey Deal is fully repealed, the power of solidarity only goes so far. Boats continue to arrive and Moria remains overcrowded. Greece is unable to provide safe and humane conditions given the containment policy, and the EU is failing one of its member states as well as the thousands of people seeking safety and security within its borders.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

In this thesis, I argued that the EU-Turkey Deal creates a system of layered containment for refugees on Lesvos, which in turn results in negative consequences for refugees who become contained by the policy. Under this Deal, Lesvos became an island that works as an enforcement archipelago for border securitization for the EU (Mountz, 2011). I built my argument in several stages across this paper. First, I began with an ethnographic vignette describing my daily routine on Lesvos this past January, which was marked by the visibility of containment of refugees. In my introductory chapter, I provided the legal framework for refugee status, a central element of this paper and, more broadly, migration studies, before I laid out a roadmap for my discussion. Additionally, I discussed my own motivations for this research, which were largely based on coursework with Nadia El-Shaarawi, and also inspired me to work with her and pursue this focus. Next, in Chapter 2, I moved from the framework of my argument to provide background regarding why Lesvos is such an important place for research on migration studies. In the case of this thesis, Lesvos is important because it is directly implicated in policy enforcement of the EU-Turkey Deal, given its geographic location. Lesvos is also a unique place because it has historic connections to forced experiences of migration, which has shaped the island’s identity.

This thesis also emerged from theory and scholarship relevant to my topic. In Chapter 3, I discussed four bodies of work that were central to the evolution of my research. I built my argument off literature related to immigration detention policies in order to situate the EU-Turkey Deal in broader global trends regarding immigration detention. I continued by discussing relevant work on the public health implications of detention, given my interest in health and migration. From there, I discussed how temporal uncertainty, which occurs under the EU-Turkey Deal, impacts refugees. Finally, I concluded this chapter with a section focused on the field of
humanitarianism, as that emerged as relevant to work given the efforts on Lesvos to counter the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal. My argument related to each of these areas of scholarship in different ways, but worked to connect all four, given the fact that the EU-Turkey Deal acts as an extension of immigration detention policies, impacts public health, creates temporal uncertainty, and encourages humanitarian intervention.

In Chapter 4, I explained my research methodology, in particular my use of participant observation on Lesvos to support my claims. While on Lesvos, I volunteered at The Hope Project, which provided significant data for my argument. I also visited a range of other sites on the island, including Moria and several spaces of solidarity action. In addition, I conducted nine interviews, which provided the bulk of my data to support my argument. After situating Lesvos and myself, I focused Chapter 5 on the development of EU policy. This was an important chapter to explain how the European bordering regime developed through EU policy. The EU-Turkey Deal is an added policy designed to protect the central core of Europe, despite the impacts it has on the external territories of the EU, like Lesvos.

From there, I transitioned to my three results chapters. In Chapter 6, I argued that the EU-Turkey Deal has created a four-layer system of containment that oppresses refugees on Lesvos. To do so, I theorized my four layers based on my data from the field. Additionally, in this chapter I argued that the layers of containment and the long-term effects of the Deal are turning Moria into a permanent settlement, rather than a temporary site for refugee accommodation. In Chapter 7, I detailed how the EU-Turkey Deal and the corresponding system of containment that it created result in severe consequences for the health and well-being of refugees on Lesvos. To do so, I explained that the consequences of the Deal are felt almost immediately for refugees. My data showed that Moria itself makes refugees more vulnerable to deteriorating health because it
contains people in an inhumane physical environment that leads to mental insecurity. In this chapter, I further detailed the EU-Turkey Deal’s consequences through an analysis of the limited healthcare services available on the island and the way that refugees use their bodies as a tool against the policy. In my final results section, I transitioned away from the direct consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal to the system of humanitarian and solidarity actors that work to alleviate the Deal’s impacts. There, I explained how some people working within this complicated sphere, particularly the organization Euro Relief and voluntourists, actually further contribute to the negative consequences of the Deal. At the same time, there are many groups both who fall within the practices of traditional humanitarian aid groups, and others that practice the principles of solidarity that provide aid to effectively alleviate some of the consequences of containment on Lesvos. I argued that the most impactful efforts were those that provided healthcare or comfortable spaces away from Moria. Additionally, places that build community, like the Hope Project provide the invaluable resources of friendship and support that seriously alleviated the constant stress caused by insecurity under the EU-Turkey Deal.

**Contributions to Existing Literature**

This thesis covered a wide-range of consequences related to the EU-Turkey Deal. Given the wide scope of my data and analysis, I framed my research questions to be as representative of my data as possible. I believe my work contributes to the four areas of literature discussed earlier in several ways. First, this thesis directly connects the EU-Turkey Deal to specific consequences for refugees on Lesvos and argues that policy serves as a determinant of health and well-being. There are many articles in mainstream media that examine the problems associated directly with this policy, but limited academic work, if any, directly examines its consequences. Additionally,
I theorized a system of layered containment on Lesvos, which expands on geographical understandings of the role of islands in border externalization, as discussed by Allison Mountz (2011). Next, this thesis argues that Moria as a place of containment actively creates vulnerability, leading to deteriorating mental health among the people forced to reside there. My work also expands on the growing body of literature regarding the impact of stuckness among detained populations (El-Shaarawi, 2015; Haas, 2017; Turnbull, 2016). In my final section, I discussed the complicated sphere of humanitarian actors and solidarity initiatives that act on Lesvos to help alleviate the Deal. This section expands on the academic work regarding humanitarianism in border zones, as discussed by Walters (2013), Albahari (2015), Stierl (2017), and Rozakou (2017).

**Final Conclusions**

My final conclusion regarding my thesis is that the full extent of the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal has yet to be seen. I believe that the consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal are only in their earliest stages of visibility. Additionally, throughout my writing process, the situation on Lesvos continued to evolve. There were near daily news, Facebook, and Twitter developments regarding the situation on Lesvos. My research demonstrated that there are clear short-term consequences of the EU-Turkey Deal for refugees contained on Lesvos. However, I believe the impacts of the policy over the long-term could be an area for future research, particularly depending on how long the Deal persists. At the same time, increasing mobility of refugees could solve the crisis on Lesvos, but that would not solve the root causes of forced migration, nor the reality that the EU is designed to be a secured fortress beyond just this policy. Ultimately, I believe that my research and my argument show that the EU-Turkey Deal has
turned the island of Lesvos into a space of containment that causes harm to people, a very unwelcoming entrance to Europe.
Works Cited


Baldwin-Edwards, Martin. "Migration between Greece and Turkey: From the 'Exchange of


Cheslow, Daniella, and Daniel Estrin. "Lesbos, a Greek Refuge for the War Weary and


Horst, Cindy, and Katarzyna Grabska. "Flight and Exile—Uncertainty in the Context of Conflict-


migration-on-the-balkan-route-as-two-processes/


MSS vs. Belgium and Greece (European Court of Human Rights January 21, 2011).


UNHCR, and ECRE. The Dublin Regulation. PDF. UNHCR.


https://www.politico.eu/article/why-greece-is-germanys-de-facto-colony/.

doi:10.1136/jech.2006.054338.