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Constructing (Hu)man Nature: A Feminist Critique of Western IR Theory, Liberal Economics and U.S. Foreign Policy

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Abstract

Feminism in general exposes the fundamental folly of Western political theorists' view of human nature, which is based on Western, decently well-off, white men's experiences and privilege. This view of human nature, which is not human nature at all, but rather a socially constructed definition of what men's human nature is, is replicated in neoclassical economics and perpetuated in mainstream Western International Relations theory. Understanding the social construction of norms exposes how what is conceived in conventional theory as human nature and state behavior is unnecessarily limiting. The U.S. is the greatest benefactor from the worldview of Western political theorists, because it is the most powerful state in the international system. Using a feminist critique as a starting point, this thesis uncovers the assumptions that thread together Western political thought and unpacks them to advocate for a whole new range of possibilities, in which we can expect more from people and states and emphasize the agency of U.S. policy-makers.

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<u>Introduction</u>

Political theory analyzes and interprets political life, making evaluations of its principles, concepts as well as institutions ("Political Theory," 2017). Western political philosophers have developed ideas about human nature, the concept of the state and civil society to inform how social organization works. They have done so because they believe that by conceptualizing certain characteristics that define humanity and society, they will be better able to predict behavior, build institutions and understand organized social life. It is true that postulating about the laws of human nature creates a clear formula to explain and predict behavior, and thus develop policy based on these predictions. However, these Western political philosophers generated these laws of human nature with a unique vantage point in mind: their own. Their worldview was different from many other people and was based on how they themselves lived in and perceived the world. They drew from their own experiences to inform themselves about how to understand the concept of human nature and other aspects of political theory.

At first glance, the fact that these political philosophers drew from their own experiences seems inconsequential. Observing and postulating from one's own observations in of itself is a completely valid way to establish hypotheses and make claims. What is natural about making observations is that people are idiosyncratic, and they are innately inclined to bias. But having bias is not necessarily a bad thing: bias is manifested in the form of a person making the choice to study or write about a certain topic, like my bias to choose to write about this one. Bias, in whatever form, is almost inevitable, and hence it is expected that at least some bias will influence people's perceptions and choices.

So why care about these Western political philosophers' biases?

Their bias became a problem when the descendants of these political philosophers took their postulations at more or less face value. This is erroneous because these founding political philosophers conflated their experience with how everyone else perceives and experiences the world. But an idea or a belief is neither universal nor essential if it is based on only one subset of society, i.e. Western white men who had a high enough level of socio-economic-status to afford to theorize on human nature. Therefore, these political philosophers, in relying on their own worldviews, made particular assumptions about how people act in a society. These assumptions have worrisome implications for the application of their theory and philosophy, especially if these philosophers claim to have developed universal and comprehensive theories (Grant, 1991, p. 9). Western political theory—the foundation for the study of neoclassical economics, Western international relations theory (IR), and ultimately U.S. foreign policy—is the study of Western, decently well-off, white men's privilege to be able to experience certain parts of what is studied, codified and perpetuated as essential human nature. Western political thought is rooted in the fact that Western society is patriarchal, but the power relations that define Western society is a created, not natural, thing, and true Western political thought would look very different once all people's perspectives and experiences are included.

Western IR theory and neoclassical economic theory use the same underlying assumptions in Western political theory's analysis of human nature. The foundation of these two disciplines, like Western political theory, is thought to have derived from objective knowledge that has enabled theorists to prognosticate or understand state behavior. The idea that this knowledge is objective is a misconception, because it is rooted in masculinist concepts and assumptions. The epistemology of Western political theory exposes the underlying assumptions that are replicated in neoclassical economic theory and Western IR theory. Feminism exposes

how Western political theory was based on socially constructed concepts of the time, place and perspectives of the androcentric political theorists whom established it. Instead of acknowledging that by universalizing their worldviews these Western political philosophers perpetuated a unique and a uniquely privileged viewpoint, Western IR theory and neoclassical economics built on this viewpoint and used it as a framework to comprehend state behavior and markets.

Why and how did this androcentric political theorizing happen? The people who had power at the time, whether in ancient Greece or Europe in the 17th through 19th centuries, created Western political theory. They used their own experiences when establishing this theory and claimed it to be universal. They also validated traits and characteristics associated with their own experiences, which became the foundation for this theory. A convenient and clever way to maintain the status quo, no? Power begot more power and eventually concepts of men being heads of state and war being a politically viable tool seemed so normal, so ingrained in society and how people viewed the world that it seemed almost natural or innate.

The way Western political theory teaches us how to view the world is not based on natural processes. Quite the contrary. Simply because something has been the way it is for decades or centuries does not automatically give it validity. U.S. foreign policy needs to reflect this. The U.S. is the greatest benefactor from this the conventional Western way of perceiving human nature, and, in turn, state behavior and thus it is particularly susceptible to the negative aspects of Western IR theory. It benefits from this approach put in place more than any other country, because it is by many accounts considered the global hegemon.

With this strength, the U.S can enact certain policies more successfully than another country and yet its combined power and mindset of realism for foreign policy is a noxious cocktail. This cocktail becomes even more foreboding when the U.S. has embodied a strategy of

liberal internationalism with its foreign policy decisions (compared to its identity antebellum). A

strategy of liberal internationalism means that the U.S. supports foreign policy decisions that

promote liberalism, the political ideology,[1] and internationalism, which is based on the notion

that a country should engage with the international system and promote its own values globally.

In essence, I am critiquing a common flaw found in neoclassical economic theory,

Western IR theory and U.S. foreign policy: a patriarchal thread that is in the foundation of these

theories, because they have all been heavily influenced by Western political theory. I argue that

conventional Western political thought is inherently masculinist. Feminism is the key to realizing

this theoretical flaw, and I attempt to establish a new way of understanding human nature,

market forces, state behavior, and foreign policy. While feminism is the inspiration, I expose

how supporting a social constructionist approach to the epistemology of Western political

thought is fundamentally feminist, but is not necessarily exclusively feminist.

Before I develop my argument for why the foundations of Western political theory are

masculinist and why and how this can change the outlook of U.S. foreign policy, I must establish

a conceptual baseline to ensure that the reader has at least a basic understanding of ideas that are

heavily employed in this paper. First and foremost, masculinism means valuing culturally

defined and socially created traits over culturally defined and socially created feminine ones. I

use masculinism as my noun of choice, because it is more specific and more accurately reflects

the social construction of gender norms. Furthermore, it also emphasizes the intentional decision

to create a hierarchy in which supposedly masculine traits have a higher value than "feminine"

traits, as opposed to merely observing how females and women are less valued. This brings me

to my next point distinguishing gender from sex. Sex refers to chromosomal qualities of people

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[1] A basic definition of liberalism is that it is a political ideology based on the concepts of "individual liberty, free
trade and moderate political and social reform" (Oxford Dictionary, 2017).

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and is what the adjectives of female and male attempt to describe. Sex is related to the biological functions of people. Gender, in contrast, refers to the adjectives of women and men and how one identifies in a social context. Many conflate gender with sex. However, gender is a socially constructed concept that depends on a society's cultural context. One can characterize social constructivism as: "X is socially constructed if and only if X's existence or persistence or character is caused or constituted by human mental states, decisions, culture, or social practices" (Mallon, 2016, p. 5). Moreover, "X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable" (Hacking, 1999, p. 6). I do not intend to essentialize gender in this paper by ascribing certain characteristics to certain genders. Instead, I attempt to exemplify how gendered norms are socially constructed.

Finally, the last term to describe is patriarchy. Patriarchy is defined as a way of organizing society that grants supremacy to the father in the family and the subordination of the mother and children, a male line of inheritance and bloodline, and which ultimately results in men having a disproportionately large share of power in society in relation to women. Last, but not least, I define feminism as the acknowledgement that women (as culturally defined and socially created) are categorically discriminated against legally, economically and socially; the acknowledgement that women and men both suffer because from the institution of sexism; and finally, the desire to fix this discrimination and remove the barriers that perpetuate sexism in order to promote gender equality legally, economically and socially.

In the first chapter of my thesis I seek to explain why Western political theory is inherently masculinist and lay the foundation for understanding Western IR theory and neoclassical economic theory. I also use feminism to critique these disciplines and thereby gain a deeper and more complex understanding of human nature and state behavior. Chapter Two

exposes how Western political theory and the study of economics echo each other in terms of reinforcing masculine privilege, as well as exemplifying how gender, sex and sexism are created concepts that are neither natural nor innate. The normality of something should not be equated with inherent worthiness or legitimacy. Chapter Three, using the concepts of social constructivism delineated in the previous chapter, relates the foundation of Western political theory to Western IR theory more specifically. It also traces how certain features of the current international system are not inherent to the system, but were created, by looking at the history of the development of the modern Western state in Europe and exemplifying how the Western concept of the international system is guided by a masculinist viewpoint.

Chapter Four offers a new approach to Western IR theory and the basis of states' foreign policy, which inevitably reorients what values, norms and goals states should and could consider, which conventional Western IR theory would not have permitted. This realignment is only made possible by the findings exposed by feminism in Western political theory and uses this as a catalyst for an inherently feminist, but not exclusively feminist, approach to Western political thought. In Chapter Five, I show how the U.S. benefits from this masculinism found in Western political theory, neoclassical economic theory and Western IR theory more than any other country because of its position and identity in the world. In this way, I expose how the decision-makers curated the U.S. foreign policy mindset, and I critique certain policy decisions the U.S. has made, which I posit are only possible based on their stature and power and are intended to perpetuate the U.S.' power. Moreover, I reveal commonalities between hegemonic power and hegemonic masculinity. Finally, Chapter Six offers a completely new way of understanding the foundation of U.S. foreign policy and also explains why it is necessary, now more than ever, for the U.S. to engage in this reconstruction process. Features of globalization and global inequity

demonstrate how and why the U.S. needs to prioritize solidarity, international society and pluralism. Chapter Six concludes with a psychological understanding of how gender developed and is perpetuated today to better understand how social hierarchies and gender specifically are created.

This thesis by and large focuses on two genders and two sexes, but in no way does this mean that I am endorsing the binary view that only two genders and two sexes exist. Instead, I use female and male and women and men as foundational concepts because of time and length constraints. By the same token, in my writing and argumentation I endeavor to include an intersectional perspective that elucidates how feminism is connected to racism and classism. If some believe that I have not given enough justice to either of these other systems of oppression, I again say that due to time and length constraints I am limited to how much I can include. Even though I critique bias in certain usages of it, I admit that I too had to make choices and decisions in what I focused on during my year-long research and that I only claim to have started the critique of Western political theory, but this is not a comprehensive and final criticism. I also acknowledge how I am critiquing Western political thought more broadly, which is a daunting and gargantuan task. This is my first aggregation of thoughts and argumentation on the topic, which means that I undoubtedly have room for improvement. Once again, time was a factor in my writing and many of my thoughts deserve to be further developed.

I use social constructivism as an analytical framework, and I am part of the constructivist camp of IR theory. Allan V. Horwitz's book *What's Normal* (2016) exposed me to the history of the nature versus nurture debate and convinced me that much of what people take for granted today is actually a manifestation of norms codified by cultures over time. In terms of social construction of gender and feminist theoretical perspective, I am heavily influenced by R. W.

Connell's study of hegemonic masculinity and gender and Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* (1949). Virginia Woolf's *A Room of One's Own* has also impacted my outlook on the ramifications of the patriarchal power relations of Western society. Howard Zinn's *A People's History of the United States* reinforced my belief in the conception that traditional approaches to canons of study can focus on the powerful of society, but that there is much to be learned by acknowledging the perspective of those who are less powerful as well as studying how the powerful are able to develop their perspective based on their privilege.

Finally, the two authors who have most significantly influenced my study are Andrew Hurrell, and his book *On Global Order*, and Hannah Arendt more broadly. Hurrell's book helped crystalize for me what a reconstructed approach to IR theory could look like. Arendt's body of political philosophy exposed me to an entirely new approach to the ways in which politics and the world work. I argue that Hurrell and Arendt write with a feminist background because they subvert the traditional viewpoint of Western political or IR theory, but they themselves did not claim to be writing with overtly feminist motives in their works.

In conclusion, the overarching theme of this thesis is that Western political thought privileges the culturally defined and socially created masculine perspective. Feminism helps expose this truth. A foundation of Western IR theory is realism, and realism uses the same fundamental worldview in explaining state behavior that conventional Western political theory uses in describing human nature. Neoclassical economic theory is also uncannily similar in terms of how it views human nature. The founding fathers (because yes, they were all men) of Western political theory made a mistake by conflating their experiences and perspectives as applicable and true for everyone else, without recognizing how they were privileged to be able to have those experiences and espouse those perspectives. But this crucial misstep was made again and

again with the reinforcement of the masculinist foundation of Western political theory to economics and Western IR theory. Therefore, once feminism is applied to Western political thought, a whole new set of priorities, concepts and ideals can be possible.

Furthermore, the foundation for modern Western IR theory is inherently flawed and that a new way of approaching IR theory is needed and essential for U.S. foreign policy. U.S. foreign policy should be reassessed through the lens of feminism to give a more enlightened approach to policy, as well as to give a more accurate perspective. The subsequent pages will introduce an argument that produces an entirely new approach to U.S. foreign policy. Ultimately, Western political theorists perpetuated the notion that it made sense that Western society was patriarchal, this presumption, however, resulted in the reinforcement of gendered norms, power relations and a masculinist mindset that has influenced Western theories of politics, neoclassical economic theory, and international relations. This belief has institutionalized and compounded sexism from ancient Greek political philosophy to the framework of U.S. foreign policy today. Once this misstep of Western political thought has been established, a reorientation of the conceptual framework used to determine human nature and state behavior is required, which leads to a reconstruction of the foundation of U.S. foreign policy.

Chapter I: How the Perspectives of Theorists Influenced
Western Political Thought

The epistemology of Western political theory exposes the masculinist framework that is used to elucidate human nature. Feminism advocates for the criticism of this perspective and connects how Western IR theory and neoclassical economics replicate the masculinist influences of Western political theory.

Public Sphere versus Private Sphere

The sharp distinction between the public and private sphere reveals the root of the created patriarchal structure of Western society. Political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain acutely observes, "All social ties and relations suffer as the split between public and private widens into a gap and a chasm" (1981, p. 99). Tracing the roots of how the definition of the public and private sphere became so strict and rigid clarifies how perceptions of sphere became skewed and hierarchized. These socially constructed ideas about opposing spheres with opposing values have influenced the development of Western political theory and created negative repercussions that necessitates that these conceptions be modified.

German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas sheds light on the definition of the public and private sphere; he argues that the term 'public sphere' is essentially a part of social life, civil society, where public (as opposed to personal or private) opinion can be created (1964, p. 49). Citizens can engage in a public forum where they can exist without restrictions, i.e. with the rights to freedom of assembly, association and expression. Thus, the very term of a public sphere, as defined by Habermas, assumes a baseline of some democratic guarantees bestowed upon those who are recognized as citizens by some authority (most likely the state).

The distinction between the public and private spheres of life affected how philosophers viewed different people and traits and influenced their perception of how to value each sphere. This is manifested through language. Language reflects the value associations attached to different parts of society. It reinforces socially constructed perceptions, as opposed to creating this value judgment organically. In ancient Greek, the word for private has a negative connotation. A private person is an *idiot*, which denotes a lack of rationality, goodness and lesser purpose than that of a *polites*, meaning public citizen (Elshtain, 1981, p. 22). In Plato's *Republic*, "the private speech of households is…without meaning," otherwise *doxa*, mundane or unorganized knowledge (Elshtain, 1981, p. 22). Plato, who philosophized about the merits of the public sphere, was influenced by his time, place and identity as a man who benefited from his association with the public sphere. The *idiot*, connected to the private sphere, was associated with women because ancient Greek society generally did not include women in the public sphere because of socialization and culture (Elshtain, 1981, p. 24).

Plato's worldview developed out of a very specific and narrow perception of what was worthy and important and further polarized the public and private sphere. He defined the "true man" as one "who has developed his male humanity and can participate in the highest functions of a man, politics and war" (Elshtain, 1981, p. 24). "Politics and war" were a man's world in ancient Greek society, because to Plato, sex and gender were synonymous. Plato's discourse excluded women. They were not relevant because women were relegated to the private sphere and understanding the private sphere was not necessary to understanding politics. Plato's conception of the value of the public and private sphere is an example of political theory being limited to people in the public sphere. When Plato theorized about an ideal state, he was only talking about what he saw *men* (as socially constructed and culturally created) in the public

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sphere doing, whose action and behavior obviously do not apply to all humans. How did the relationship between the public sphere, men and the notion that it was comparatively more desirable than the private sphere (and women who were associated with it) develop?

According to political philosopher Hannah Arendt, in ancient Greek and Roman society the word for social, or 'society' did not exist. Instead, *polis* was a word used to describe the arena for political life and freedom, while *oikos* referred to the household and the space of necessity (Walsh, 2014, p. 127). The difference of the *polis* and the *oikos* relates to an essential "structural, spatial and symbolic division" of activities that was prevalent in ancient Greek and Roman urban life (Walsh, 2014, p. 127). This distinction between household life and political life was not only or mainly due to the economic organization of these cultures, but rather due to a cultural expression of these two spheres—one that was rooted in norms, customs, traditions, and standards that attached particular meaning to these spaces conveniently correlated to the prevailing system of domination. Unsurprisingly, those who dominated were a small group of wealthy (enough) men who had absolute rule over their household.

With absolute rule over their households, these aristocratic men could gather in the *polis* as individuals, on equal standing with each other and had the freedom to congregate because they did not have the responsibility of engaging in certain labor (Walsh, 2014, p. 128). Thus, Arendt recognizes that the *polis* was made possible because people other than these men were doing the labor to run everything else in their lives: slaves to clean, cook, etc. and wives or female family members to take care of the children and the house. In fact, "The suborning of slaves and family members in the household allowed the *polis* to flourish as a space for a small segment of the population to speak and act with each other as equals, and thereby to govern the community" (Gündoğu, 2014, p. 128). Thus, the *polis* was where freedom was viewed as possible and

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determined the 'history' of the period, whereas the household sphere was invisible, not pertinent to 'history' because what went on in the household had only an instrumental or institutional purpose. This is why such an emphasis has been made on the public sphere over the private sphere. The sphere outside the household reflected those who had power, in the traditional sense, over others. With this knowledge in mind, it is easier to understand how notions of power and the emphasis on the public sphere were replicated over time and affirms the need to change these notions.

When Plato (and others like Aristotle) was theorizing, he infused the notion of dominance derived from the private realm into his thoughts: the idea of a hierarchical structure was exclusively based in the private sphere (Klusmeyer, 2014, p. 148). Arendt postulated that the ancient "Greek political experience was incompatible with developing such an understanding of authority," because of the normative connotations associated with the political (public) realm and the private realm (Klusmeyer, 2014, p. 147).

> The Greeks experienced [the public] realm…free from any relationships of domination/subjection, ruling/being ruled, or command/obedience. They identified these relationships with the structure of the private realm of the household, which was organized around supplying the necessities of life. In the household the master ruled over the slaves and family as a despot or monarch. The experience of subjecthood then lay outside the political realm and was understood to be a degraded status" (Klusmeyer, 2014, p. 147-8).

Essentially, Plato and Aristotle introduced the concept of authority, or something like it, into the public life of the Greek *polis* (Arendt, 1968, p. 104). Hence, the value associations with different parts of society show how gender and sexism was a part of the foundational structure of Western political theory as we know it today.

The Male Neutral

Plato is not unique; Aristotle, too, "established a philosophical framework by which he [could] legitimize the status quo" (Okin, 1979, p. 80). Aristotle used the different biological functions of males and females to justify their hierarchical relationship and why they should be separated as much as possible (Okin, 1979, p. 82). He also associates the male sex with the *gender* of men, which becomes problematic when he links certain gendered characteristics with the male sex. Aristotle assumes that men are the baseline for humankind and women develop, not irrespective of, but as a reaction to, men. He asserts that females are the "first deviation" of nature and that the female sex is only necessary for the reproduction of society (Okin, 1979, p. 82). And thus females, of course, all share feminine (as socially created and culturally defined) characteristics. Automatically, Aristotle has created a framework in which women are lesser and associated with 'the other,' whereas men are the baseline. He believes that females are so different and inferior that he even says, "We should look on the female as being as it were a deformity" (Okin, 1979, p. 82). Furthermore, he says that the difference between males and females creates "relationships of necessary dominance and subordination (Elshtain, 1981, p. 45).

Aristotle's perspective on these two sexes exposes an inherent bias in his thought because he imposes his conceptions of what males do to what men do, which favors this essentially male, practiced-by-men action, over what essentially female, practiced-by-women, do. Thus, when theorizing, he does not consider characteristics associated with women as even viable possibilities of potential influence vis-à-vis his theoretical explanations, because women themselves are not truly human, since human, to Aristotle, means man. Moreover, Aristotle postulates that males are the base—the neutral—and everything else is considered 'extra.' This is where the notion of male-as-neutral is derived from, which inherently weakens the argument that

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Western philosophers make about the study of politics. One cannot assume that a male (which these philosophers interpret as a man's perspective) is the natural starting point for discussion. Moreover, this becomes noxious when Western political philosophers like Plato and others continuing to today do not realize that they have internalized the idea of the male-as-neutral in their theoretical claims. Plato validated the hierarchy between the public and private sphere, and Aristotle substantiated a hierarchy between men and women. Unfortunately for scholars of Western political theory, these dichotomies, which are taken for granted, serve as the framework for Western political thought and permeate Western IR, economics, and the foreign policy of Western countries.

The Creation of (Hu)man Nature: The Folly of Western Political Theory Beyond Ancient Greece

Many political philosophers have remarked on human nature. Understanding human nature means that one can strategize about how people interact with each other, and eventually about how states will interact with each other. How do many influential Western political philosophers define human nature? Niccolò Machiavelli, 15th century Italian diplomat often called the father of modern political theory states, "For it may be said of men in general, that they are ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers, anxious to avoid danger, and covetous of gain" (Machiavelli, p. 61). His understanding of human nature is cynical and pessimistic, and he has derived his knowledge of human nature based on his own experiences. He was reacting to a tumultuous time in 16th century Italy, in which war was plentiful and chaos was constant (Elshtain, 1981, p. 92). Hence, time, place and perspective are all factors in determining Machiavelli's worldview.

Thomas Hobbes, another acclaimed political philosopher writing in 17th century

England, asserted that the "condition of man…is a condition of war of everyone against

everyone" (Hobbes, xiv, 4, 80). This conception of human nature does not create a particularly

optimistic outlook (Elshtain, 1981, p. 93). However, instead of acknowledging that these

definitions of human nature are contextual and based on either philosopher's worldview, these

words from influential political philosophers are taken for granted and assumed to be applicable

to everyone. This conflation inevitably becomes troublesome since these Western political

philosophers treat men's "nature" as human nature because men are the foundation for humans.

But men's human nature does not have a transitive property that (magically, or scientifically) can

be used to understand all human nature. Consequently, the philosophy of the forefathers of

Western political theory, whose ideas influenced the development of economics, IR theory and

U.S. foreign policy use men to describe human nature, but they cannot be universal because of

their blind-sightedness to everyone else other than men.

Summary

Ultimately, the problem with these political philosophers is not *what* they theorized, but

rather *how* they did. They claimed their theories to be universal and true for everyone, but these

political philosophers' experience with human nature was based on their knowledge of, and

association with, the public sphere. They also reemphasized the value hierarchy imposed on the

sexes, which were associated with specific gendered traits. By doing this, they essentially

legitimized the views of the people who already had control of power in society, i.e. white men

who were well off enough. While what they ascertained as comprehensive behavior was based

on the spaces they looked at or how they lived their lives, they assumed that their perceptions

matched others and thus were universally applicable. But if they were using their own, individual experiences to inform laws of all human nature, how can that be considered truly essential knowledge?

It is not: they were using their knowledge—men's knowledge—not human knowledge, which conflates sex characteristics with gender characteristics to reinforce the power structure of society (Elshtain, 1981, p. 6). Androcentrism, the focus or center on men, explains how men and men's experiences are considered the neutral starting point. The idea of the male-as-neutral pervades much of political philosophy because the public sphere was the only valued sphere and only men were in the public sphere (and correlated maleness to the gender of men). Thus, this androcentrism informed the thinking of Western philosophers from the ancient Greeks to liberalism in the 17th and 18th centuries. As a result, by understanding only part of the picture, these philosophers' theories make weak claims to universal application. The use of the male experience to speak for all of humanity's experience is a source of bias that affected conceptions of laws of nature, universal truths and also informed ideologies. This is a flaw within the system of Western political thought. V. Spike Peterson, professor of International Relations at the University of Arizona, states, "It was not simply the range and scope of objects that required transformation," but "the very questions posed and methods used to answer them" (1992, p. 8). By reviewing even a limited amount of political theorists' work, one can ascertain the inherent bias that permeates it. Thus, it is crucial to review political philosophers' work to examine how their views about society were limited and to move forward from this by remodeling the theory to include more than what is just considered the culturally-defined masculine perspective.

Western International Relations Theory and Realism

IR theory is the study of how states interact with each other on the global scale. Understanding states' behavior and what motivates them makes it easier to predict how states will respond in real-world situations. In the international system, no unequivocal power exists. One of the foundational theories of Western IR theory is realism. In realism, the domestic politics of a state occupies an entirely different and mostly irrelevant dimension (or level of analysis) than the level of the international system because, within a state, there is a clear hierarchy and enforcer of law. Classical realism does not focus on the individual (except the state leader), treating states like black boxes that are impermeable.

The international arena is an amalgamation of all states, and it is an anarchical place: referring not to its chaotic nature, but rather intimating that it lacks a hierarchy or supranational power to enforce tangible or intangible institutions. This creates an inherent insecurity on the part of states, because their security, their ability to survive, can never be taken for granted. Only the state itself will look after it and ensure its existence. All other states have no incentive to care about the ultimate existence of other states, because they too are concerned with their own security. Hence, the nature of the international system makes states self-interested. If states want to continue to exist, they must be ruthlessly committed to their interests because they cannot rely on anything or anyone else to ensure it.

The most expedient way for states to secure their self-interest is to attain as much power as possible, because the more power they have, the stronger the guarantee (in a guarantee-less system) of their survival. The nature of the international system, realists argue, means that states exist in anarchy. Therefore, states are motivated to act self-interested through power maximizing

decisions to survive. Using rational thought to achieve self-interest spurs states to act aggressively and maximize their power.

Another feature of the international system is that states can never be certain about another states' intentions. The strategy of aggressive behavior, coupled with uncertainty about states' intentions, creates a security competition. States will build up their military because they believe they are acting in defense of their sovereignty, while other states, unaware of the state's true intentions, will interpret this buildup as offensive action that could jeopardize the security of the other state. Consequently, the other state will react by building up its military, viewing this policy as defensive in nature, as well. However, the state that started the military buildup will inevitably perceive this as offensive. For realists, this is called the security dilemma—an unfortunate characteristic of the international system. It is a self-fulfilling prophecy where states end up less secure than when they started. This game theory is an example of a concept used by both economists and political scientists called the Prisoner's Dilemma, to model how uncertainty about another's intentions leads to mistrust and selfish and suboptimal behavior. (This results in both parties worse off than before or if they had assumed the best intentions of the other.) Another aspect of realism is that cooperation between states only occurs when states believe it is in their self-interest to cooperate. In this way, cooperation vis-à-vis international institutions and norms are reflections of states' power, as opposed to states' inherent desire to participate in multilateral action.

Western Political Theory and Neoclassical Economics

Conventional Western political theory has many similarities to the study of neoclassical economics, which helps further expose the masculinist perspective that has influenced these

disciplines. Neoclassical economics focuses on the study of supply and demand for goods and services and that this relationship generates market equilibrium of prices for goods and services. This theory holds that economic actors are rational individuals with the intent of maximizing efficiency and profits. Neoclassical economic theory is different from classical economic theory because it perceives that actors operate on the margin, which means that price signals influence their decision-making; this creates a 'psychological' aspect that classical economic theory lacks.

In Western political theory as well as neoclassical economics, the individual is at the core of the theory: know and understand the individual, know and understand the theory. This is problematic when this individual used as a starting point is not objective, unbiased or neutral, but based in masculinist values and perspective: rational, self-interested, autonomous, and separated from one's environment to a default. This concept of the individual's human nature is created and gendered. It neglects the reality of how human nature works. Regarding the study of economics, Katrine Marçal, lead editorial writer for the Swedish newspaper *Aftonbladet*, writes,

> "If the economy changes, it's not because the individual has changed—his identity is always unaffected by others. But he does make choices. Every change is just a new pattern that he has arranged himself in. New choices that he has made in relation to others. The never meet, but they interact. Like billiard balls. The consciousness of the individual, that no one but the individual himself has a say over, will remain forever unchanged" (2016, p. 13-14).

But individuals are not billiard balls. It is much more complex than that. By focusing on the individual permits other, relevant parts of society to be excluded from the picture. Feminism helps realize this.

The Masculinist Roots of Western Political Thought

In realism and neoclassical economics, as in Western political thought, the belief exists that objective, intrinsic and unchanging laws (like ones found in the study of physics) exist

within society (Tickner, 1991, p. 29). The idea that certain 'laws' exist that pertain to all of politics and society, and that their legitimacy is derived from their objectivity, mirrors the arguments made by political philosophers such as Hobbes, who argue that they have developed laws of nature through objective analysis and thus are able to claim a monopoly on the definition of human nature (Grant, 1991, p. 10). J. Ann Tickner, international relations theorist, finds this to inherently favor a specific gender, observing:

> "While realists claim that their theories are objective and of universal validity, the assumptions they use when analyzing states and explaining their behavior in the international system are heavily dependent on characteristics that we, in the West, have come to associate with masculinity" (1991, p. 29).

Realism and neoclassical economics adopt the value structure associated with mainstream Western political thought: the concepts of objectivity, power, rationality, and autonomy are seen as positive, desirable traits because they are viewed as masculine traits. Essentially, any traits associated with masculinity are coveted in realist theory, but these are socially constructed definitions of masculinity and desirability, because the roots of these concepts are derived from limited viewpoints.

Realism applies a masculinist framework to state behavior. In realist theory, interest is based on power: states are motivated by one thing only, to maintain their survival. Because of this, they want to gain as much power as possible to make them feel more secure. Realists' concept of realpolitik stipulates that states' interests are not defined by ethical considerations (Gilmore and Reif, 2012), but by balance of power politics. In other words, as Machiavelli said, "politics is the endless struggle for power;" because it is the driving force behind all state behavior. But this is a perception, not a universal truth (Elshtain, 1987, p. 56). In addition, the Machiavellian idea of politics being amoral, which conventional Western political theorists define as rational, relates to the way that emotion, feelings, etc. are not valued in Western

political theory because they are associated with the private sphere and thus women (Grant, 1991, p. 10).

Power is considered desirable because of the inherent appeal of resisting domination by another state, which to realists means guaranteeing sovereignty and survival. This value on domination and obtaining power can be traced to Western political theorists like Socrates. Socrates, among others, believed that humans gain power by having control over another person. In ancient Greece, Socrates ruminated on the desire for domination and repugnance at being dominated through the example of homoerotic relationships. In these sexual relationships between two men, Socrates argues that the man being penetrated loses his authenticity of being a man—he becomes "womanized," and has to "voluntarily relinquish or be deprived forcibly of his public existence as a citizen" (Elshtain, 1981, p. 28). The disgust with acting in the non-dominant role is associated with the values superimposed on different sexes (which are also conflated with wholly separate gender identities). In essence, the desire for domination is a socially constructed, masculinist concept, which must be considered when considering the essence of human nature or state behavior.

The idea that states, or markets, are autonomous, as opposed to interconnected or symbiotic, is a concept developed within Western political thought and taken for granted in realist and neoclasscial economic theory. However, autonomy is a privilege that men have historically had to a far greater degree than women, which has informed men's worldviews. But, autonomy is neither a universal nor essential characteristic of people, and it should not be considered as such for states or markets.

A Feminist-Inspired Review of Western International Relations Theory

If traditional realist IR theory presents a limited perspective, a different way of analyzing international relations is necessary. Feminism not only exposes the limited viewpoints of Western political theorists and realism, but it also fills the crucial role of offering alternative and more accurate explanations and solutions for state behavior. Susan Moller Okin, political philosopher (and heralded as one of if not the person to found feminist political theory), asserts "when women, who have always been minor characters in the social and political theory of a patriarchal world, are transformed into major ones, the entire cast and the play in which it is acting look very different" (1979, p. 12). Thus, a recasting of the way Western political theory and Western IR theory explain how to perceive the world is necessary, because the current leading theoretical perspective limits the range of understanding and options for decision-making by valuing certain perspectives and traits over others.

A fundamental starting point for this is to examine the social construction of gender and how it influences other political theories' basic premises. Masculine characteristics are not inherently male, just as feminine characteristics are not inherently female. Yet society preaches that masculine traits are male and feminine traits are female. This binary leads to a hierarchical association, and values are given to either side. Since those in power (historically male) have a stronger ability to control the value given to these traits, masculine traits have a higher social standing than feminine ones, which has the effect of systematically subordinating the culturally feminine voice. As the history of Western political theorists shows, those in power, those who determine what the viewpoint is, embraced this privileging of masculinity because it maintained their power and reinforced their own experiences.

The dichotomies of rational versus emotional, public versus private and protector versus protected are some concepts that are often categorized as gendered antitheses in which one part of each pair is attributed to one or the other gender. But these binaries are illogical, outmoded, or more ambiguous than what is taught and perpetuated. Dichotomies help categorize and understand the world more efficiently, but not necessarily more *effectively*. This hierarchy does not give inherent affirmation of certain traits, but rather reinforces the traits the powerful value. For example, the idea that states are rational assumes that states use reason and logic to objectively determine how to act. Rationality and objectivity are highly prized traits in Western society, but in reality, they cannot be perfectly achieved by the individual or state: subjectivity and emotion infiltrate people's thought processes, and would affect a state's determinations as well (Mercer, 2005, p. 77). Similarly, the emphasis on the public sphere in realist theory and political theory as a whole exemplifies the lack of understanding of the private sphere's effect on society, which cannot be dissected from the political (and public) world.

In the West, the concept of protector is seen as a male role and the protected is seen as the female role. The protector is highly valued in society. But women (because they are associated with femaleness) have historically been excluded from acting as the role of protector. For a long time they were not permitted to participate in the most pervasive example of protectorhood: the army, let alone combat roles. Beyond questioning whether women have access to the identity of the protector, however, it is worth questioning the values bound up in this binary. What makes a protector—someone with guns or state-sanctioned authority—more significant than someone who is the guardian of her family or her community? This role as protector is considered less valuable, but why?

Plato, Aristotle, and other political philosophers focus their study on the public sphere of society, which was exclusively a zone where men interacted with one another. They wrote during a time in which gender roles were even more strictly delineated than they are now, and the state condoned the hierarchical structure of value-based binaries by claiming that only men could be citizens because they only were part of the public sphere. By granting different rights to men and women, states disenfranchised women and also marginalized any traits associated with women. It is not necessary, however, for current political theory to perpetuate this worldview and political situation; so why is Western IR theory still based on concepts established in ancient Greece? In essence, these socially constructed binaries are more fluid than what conventional wisdom would assert and thus theory should reflect that and recognize the bias in its inherent masculinist assumptions.

By trying to impose a universal and comprehensive framework for how states interact, realism neglects idiosyncrasies within their current context of the time. Gender is defined as a binary (a remnant of past thought) but this outmoded categorization still imposes itself on the study of IR. Politics is much more complicated than using rational knowledge over emotional knowledge or acting as the protector instead of the protected. Political theorist Robert Keohane asserts that realism does not account for institutional aspects of the system of states and thus does not allow for the system to change or update itself unless the capabilities of states themselves change (Sylvester, 1992, p. 163). Therein lies another problem with Western IR thought, which is why feminism is needed to be able to enlighten realism so that the system can changed to more accurately reflect the nature, or the range of options, of the system.

Chapter II: Western Political Thought's Masculinist Influence on Neoclassical Economics

When Adam Smith was writing *The Wealth of Nations* he reduced society to an individual, because he was using his own perspective to make sense of the world. Smith could write and theorize about economics because other people were doing things for him that he did not have to do, and thus he surmised that he did not have to think about, such as washing his clothes, cooking his meals and taking care of the house. Consequently, since Smith did not have to be responsible for any of these duties, he did not see the need to include them in his economic theory about laissez-faire economics and the invisible hand. Makes sense, right? Wrong. Smith, like Aristotle or Hobbes, when devising a theory for something that they claimed to be universally applicable, did not think about all the time and energy spent on things that people unlike themselves did to be able to give the opportunity for people *like* themselves to wax theory.

Yet, "however you look at the market, it is always built on another economy. An economy that we rarely discuss" (Marçal, 2016, p. 16). This is true for Western political theory as well. The emphasis on one society is always built on another society, which is a society seldom spoken about or discussed in conventional theory or literature. Why is this the way it is? Marçal summarizes Simone de Beauvoir, existential philosopher and author of *The Second Sex*'s answer: "it's the man who comes first. It's the man who counts. He defines the world and the woman is the 'other,' everything he is not but also that which he is dependent on so he can be who he is" (2016, p. 16-7). Women are the second sex, because those who identify as women are different from the male neutral. Men—as socially created and culturally defined and propagated—are allowed to be sexless and live sans the baggage that weighs down anyone who is expected to be anything different from this baseline.

Historically, wealthy, white men have been allowed to act out of self-interest: neoclassical economics and Western political theory encourage men to narrowly focus on themselves and their myopic gain, whereas women have not been allowed to act out of the conventional definition of self-interest. Instead of focusing on maximizing her profit, she is expected to take care of others. Since she is different from man, she must have a different purpose and role. She gives birth and menstruates. Thus, she cannot possibly be rational or autonomous. Women are tied to their bodies, so that men can be tied to their minds. "When legitimating the patriarchy…woman became 'body' so man could be 'soul.' She was bound more and more tightly to a corporeal reality so he could be freed from it" (Marçal, 2016, p. 36). This is why today (and even more so in the past) people are used to (while maybe not comfortable with) having 45 U.S. presidents who are men. Or why in the 21st century 2,017 years since the inception of human society, only four percent of 500 of the U.S.' largest companies are women (Zarya, 2016). Is it because socially constructed men are somehow endowed with a better ability to lead countries or head businesses?

Since biological differences do exist between males and females, this has been interpreted as a way to evince a certain type of politics. If this method of politics is questioned or rejected, one is assumed to naively believe that biological differences do not exist. Western political theory and economics leads us to believe that the essence of society does not have a gender or a sex. But this is unabashedly false. The individual in political theory, has all the characteristics that Western culture attributes to masculinity. Qualities in the table below show what characteristics are historically, culturally, socially, politically, and economically associated with the gender of people who identify as women and men.

Rational, mind	Body
Distant	Tenderness
Objective	Feeling
Competitive	Passivity
Alone	Dependence
Independent	Kinship
Selfish	Self-sacrifice
Uses common sense	Unpredictability
Wants to conquer the world	Connection, nature

(Adapted from Marçal, 2016, p. 40. Table my own.)

Qualities like those in the table above are culturally constructed masculine (on the left) or culturally constructed feminine (on the right) traits.

By thinking the traits on the left were and are more desirable, Western political theory and economics excluded other conceptions of how to view individual-to-individual interaction. (Since Western IR theory developed from Western political theory, this meant that conventional IR theory developed in way that excluded other ways to view state-to-state interaction as well.) Traditional notions of masculinity are associated with the traits on the left column, but in no way are they inherent. Neoclassical economics, like Western political theory, essentializes gendered norms (Feiner, p. 164, 1999). The individual in Western political theory can be the paradigm of reason and freedom since a different individual is the opposite of reason and freedom. The way the world works is purportedly based off self-interest because there is an entirely separate world that is based off something else entirely. But never the two shall meet. The masculine is in one world and the feminine in the *other*. Marçal observes, "Feminism has always been about pointing out inequalities that the rest of society thinks are perfectly normal" (2016, p. viii). The point of this paper is show how inequalities were created, exist, are perpetuated and how to ameliorate the damage already done. With economics, Western political theory or Western IR theory, feminism is necessary. Mainstream economics, i.e. neoclassical economics, is taught from the

same perspective of Western political theory, focusing on the individual, economic *man*. Once this masculinist chain is shed, new possibilities for political economic policy will be afforded.

Feminism reveals "the consequences of undervaluing the work that matters most" (Marçal, 2016, p. viii). And "about how we have set the wrong priorities, misallocated resources on a catastrophic scale, and failed to understand our own needs as human beings—and then created an economy" around it, or Western political theory or Western IR theory around it (Marçal, 2016, p. viii). It is crucial to "change that system, to make it human again and to use it to create a world that can actually work" (Marçal, 2016, p. viii). True, feminism needs political theory. But Western political theory, economics and Western IR theory need feminism a whole lot more.

Biology versus Culture: A Reconciliation

An Argument in Favor of Social Constructivism: The Sophists versus the Socratics

TABLE 12.1 The Content of Gender Stereotypes

	Beliefs about Women	Beliefs about Men
Traits	Able to devote self to others	Active
	Aware of others' feelings	Can make decisions easily
	Emotional	Competitive
	Helpful	Feels superior
	Gentle	Independent
	Kind	Never gives up easily
	Understanding	Self-confident
	Warm	Stands up well under pressure
Roles	Cooks the meals	Assumes financial obligations
	Does the household shopping	Head of household
	Does laundry	Financial provider
	Is fashion conscious	Leader
	Source of emotional support	Responsible for household repairs
	Takes care of children	Takes initiative in sexual relations
	Tends the house	Watches sports on television
Physical Characteristics	Beautiful	Athletic
	Cute	Brawny
	Dainty	Broad-shouldered
	Gorgeous	Burly
	Graceful	Muscular
	Petite	Physically strong
	Pretty	Physically vigorous
	Sexy	Rugged
	Soft voice	Tall
Cognitive Abilities	Artistic	Analytical
	Creative	Exact
	Expressive	Good at abstractions
	Imaginative	Good at numbers
	Intuitive	Good at problem solving
	Perceptive	Good with reasoning
	Tasteful	Mathematical
	Verbally skilled	Quantitatively skilled

SOURCE: Kite (2001, p. 563). With permission from Academic Press.

(Whitley & Kite, 2010, p. 462)

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Now that the masculinist tendencies of Western political thought have been exposed, it is crucial to understand how the social construction of gender norms have originated to be able to move past them. Cultural definitions of gender are socially, not biologically, constructed. The table above is a fabrication of what U.S. society perceives to be more like a woman and what is more like a man (gender stereotypes), as well as what is more valuable and what is less valuable to embody. How does one understand why things are the way they are? How much of it is biological influences that determine our personality, behavior, thoughts, feelings, trajectories, etc. and how much of it is cultural influences? Socrates and, his schools of thought, the Socratics, believed that essential values existed that determined basic right from wrong and good from bad (Horwitz, 2016, p. 3). They endeavored to reveal what replicable, universal, essential and truths existed about the world and human interaction. This would enable them to decipher what was natural and unnatural, innate and learned. The Socratic school surmised, "natural or unnatural behaviors were not arbitrary but stemmed from standards that all rational human beings [could] recognize…these rules do not vary from culture to culture but hold in all places and times" (Horwitz, 2016, p. 3). Thus, studying human nature was like a science and should be treated as such. Moreover, certain observations made by the Socratic school should *not* be nuanced to acknowledge that the observations these philosophers made were based on the time and place of when they were writing, but rather assumed that certain things they saw and what they experienced, to an extent, transcended temporal and conjectural factors and could offer answers for how the whole world worked.

Another school of thought known as the Sophists developed during a similar time and countered the Socratics. Herodotus, an ancient Greek historian and face of the Sophist school believed that what was deemed normal or abnormal for human behavior did not have much to do

with the properties of natural law, presumably seen in scientific studies, nor could they have much to do with these universal principles, because human nature was a lot more complicated and multi-faceted than the reason behind why the sun rises every morning.

Unlike the Socratics, the Sophists believed that norms were not a reflection or form of human nature. Instead, they posited that what was considered normal and abnormal were "arbitrary social conventions that lacked any objective basis" (Horwitz, 2016, p. 3-4). For the Sophists, culture was insuperable. It determined everything. The Sophists believed that normality was rooted in what the particular group that created the culture valued, and hence different groups had different behaviors and expectations. Culture, not biology, became destiny then. Cultural norms taught people how to live their lives: how to behave, act and feel. Thus, since norms were not objective, not rooted in nature's principles, then there was no way to determine the inherent worthiness or legitimacy of norms. While the Socratic school posited that norms were innate from birth, which automatically gave them authority, the Sophists believed that since norms were so contextual—that they had to be learned based on external factors—they "were always at risk of being considered capricious and, therefore, not deserving of respect" (Horwitz, 2016, p. 3-4).

By tracing the history of the study of human nature in relation to the nature versus nurture debate, a wider array of scholars, though not as widely known nor studied as the Darwinists or eugenicists of the day, waxed insight and wisdom in favor of the nurture (versus nature) side of the debate. Baron Charles-Louis Montesquieu, French political philosopher, wrote in the 18th century about how society was organized by norms and customs unique to that society, as opposed to a divine mandate by God (Horwitz, 2016, p. 5). In more modern times this divine mandate would not have been from God but from science, namely biology. But it is important to

separate biology from cultural norms. In the 19th century, Adolphe Quetelet, Belgian

mathematician and sociologist, observed that "what most people did was not just common but

positively esteemed: Norms not only described behavior but also actively shaped standards for

moral evaluation in each group" (Horwitz, 2016, p. 6-7). What seemed to always have been done

before was, more or less, done again. Norms created morals, not vice versa.

      For example, in this very paper I have cited many men when offering evidence. This in

no way means that this is the case because men are naturally more inclined to what I am writing

about than women are. Historically, yes, Western political theory, economics, history and,

frankly, opinions, have been considered the domain of wealthy (enough), white, men. However,

this is because society has privileged the masculine viewpoint in a way that enabled them to

expound on these subject matters more than the culturally defined woman. And this has been

occurring for centuries across a variety disciplines. This privilege is like a poison ivy rash that

refuses to go away. Scratch, and you will only spread the poison ivy. Well, those in control of

power in society have been scratching for a long time and reinforcing their privilege, which is

why I have cited men from ancient Greece all the way to men from the 21st century. Not because

women are not interested (or less interested) in this subject matter, but because they have had a

lot of catching up to do: institutionalized sexism can do that (let alone other forms of

discrimination). In essence, while the founders of Western political theory may have followed

the Socratic school of thought, and thus believed that patriarchy was natural for Western society,

it was in fact a created thing and fundamentally clouded conventional Western political theory,

which had ramifications on the development of neoclassical economics (and Western IR theory)

The Sexism of Sex: How the Sex Dichotomy is Created and Skews Reality

Accordingly, people's environment, circumstances and history were less of an invisible hand, but rather a very conspicuous one in molding human nature and what was valued in cultures. People enacted certain behaviors because that is what their environments reinforced. They adhered to socially acceptable ways of doing things because they were **socially acceptable, not biologically inevitable.**

More than Two Types of Chromosomal Structures & Its Significance

The notion of "sexual identification…gives an unwarranted hegemony to binary categories of male and female" (Horwitz, 2016, p. 9). Yes, some people are born with XX chromosomes and others XY chromosomes. Yet in actuality, some people are also born XXY or XYY and the notion that we live in a world where only two sexes exist is incorrect. People with XO chromosomes are sterile females with ovarian dysgenesis, more commonly known as Turner's syndrome (Baccetti & Collodel, 1998, p. 389). Turner's syndrome is when a female is born missing a full or part of an X chromosome ("Turner's syndrome," 2017). XYY are seemingly 'normal' (because what really is normal?) males, but have the potential to display aggressive behavior and be mentally below average. People can have a plethora of combinations of chromosomes that do not fit into the tidy, simple and compact dichotomy of XX and XY, such as XXY, XXXY, and XXXXY. These people can be surgically created into a certain sex when the child is born, or, for some, signs of their lack of representation in the clean-cut XX or XY categories develop later in life.

Fe-males

During gestation, the embryos of both sexes experience exposure to high levels of estrogen and progesterone, which the mother and the placenta produce (Hornstein & Schwerin, 2013, p. 240). "Sufficient quantities of testosterone must be secreted by the male embryo's testes to overcome not only the innate predisposition toward femaleness, but also the high circulating levels of maternal hormones" (Hornstein & Schwerin, 2013, p. 240). This means, in probably one of the greatest ironies of our time, that the *female* neutral actually exists. "The default body plan is female, and fetuses only become male if sufficient testosterone is present during development (Hornstein & Schwerin, 2013, p. 240).

There are two contradictions exposed by this revelation. First off, even though the X chromosome is clearly the basis for human sex phenotypes, and the Y chromosome must be added in order to change the outcome, females are still considered the other, the add-on. While males, because of their association with men, are not sexed in Western political theory or economics in terms of creating the individual person who operates within society, females are. Secondly, when people with at least two X chromosomes experience something that is completely unique to them, i.e. childbirth (and all that comes with it), they are considered *different*, other, whereas people with a Y-chromosome quality that gives them testes are considered *special*. With this realization, it also begs the question why males are called males and females are called females. Males act as the default, when females arguably have a stronger case to be the default. But instead, in modern language, to define the sex most distinguishably different from those with XY chromosomes, a fe- is added. So why is this the case?

Social Constructionism Related to Sex and Gender

Having XX chromosomes or XY chromosomes does not directly indicate that a person

will be female or male, respectively (Sigmon, 1997, p. 882). A genetic XY fetus may develop

female genitalia and some internal reproductive organs if the fetus does not develop a certain

hormonal production during the fifth to the eighth week of embryonic life (Sigmon, 1997, p.

881). Similarly, an extremely large exposure of genetic XX female to male chromosomes makes

the fetus develop male external genitalia.

> "There is an expected frequency of occurrence of these chromosomal variants, and no
> population is immune in this regard. Presumably such variants have arisen in every
> human population at some time. Some human populations have a third or a fourth sex
> category for people who look different or express behavioral preferences other than
> standard male or female into which they were classified at birth based on which type of
> genitalia they had or seemed to have had. Perhaps this group of sex chromosomal
> variants might have occasionally fit into this 'other' sex classification for a third gender
> type. **The important point to note is that there is a biological basis for having more
> than a dual classification of sex.**" (Sigmon, 1997, p. 882). Emboldening my own.

Animal behavior is, in some ways and to a spectrum of extent, unique to the species itself. For

reproductive behavior, animal characteristics are extremely species-specific. These biological

determinants guide the animal how to act in a situation involving other members of its species or

members of other species more generally, which enables a more or less foreseeable and

established development of events in an animal's life. For humans, the most complex species that

exists in the world, they develop a little differently. In fact, "when the earliest humans began to

develop culture, they also began to 'override' the innate biological dictates" (Sigmon, 1997, p.

882). Cultural ways of processing life began to be used as a way to understand life instead of

using biology. Human sexual behavior was mainly defined based on the social context of which

individuals were born and the groups from which they associate with and used as a paradigm for

their behavior. Thus, the society of which people are a part affects every aspect of his or her sexual behavior indirectly or directly" (Sigmon, 1997, p. 882).

It was not until historical times, which correlated to the development of writing, that cultural practices of sexual behavior could largely be studied. Historically, children are dubbed male or female at birth, depending on whether they have external manifestations of certain sex organs, "but the appearance of the genitalia may not always reflect the biological sex, and it may also not reflect the gender orientation of the individual" (Sigmon, 1997, p. 883). A third gender is generally referred to as "berdache," is not spoken of frequently, but has been socially legitimized in the past.[2] Berdache-like people are found in a variety of societies throughout the world, regardless of time and place. Essentially, the berdache are people "who have been allowed to assume the gender role opposite to that assigned to them at birth" (Sigmon, 1997, p. 883). Notwithstanding, a binary is an incomplete and faulty assessment of what actually exists. There are more than two sexes and two genders.

Relating Biology and Culture to Western Political Theory
And the Study of Economics

Some fundamental misconceptions about sex and gender exist that are derived from traditional notions of what is natural and what has a higher or lesser value. Relating the study of the social construction of norms back to Western political theory and economics, I exemplify a different way of approaching these disciplines. In 1979, Israeli researchers Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky offered evidence that the human decision-making process was not objective or rational at all, which contradicted the presupposition of Western political theorists'

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[2] Of course, I would argue that gender is not real, but I am using the example of a third gender to exemplify the malleability of what we think or learn is the way things are.

understanding of the objective and rational individual (Marçal, 2016, p. 94). In fact, these researchers posited that people are more concerned with avoiding risk than with maximizing profit. The presumption that human nature was rooted in maximizing profit, was based on how Western political theorists viewed the world, (which affected how Western IR theorists viewed states). Ultimately, the underlying cornerstones of Western political thought are based on faulty conceptions of human nature, because of their cultural context in which they were postulated into theory.

Western political thought is a lot more cynical than it needs to be. While the origins of this theory claims that people are ultimately self-interested and want to maximize our survival as much as possible, people put the safety of others ahead of themselves in many circumstances (Marçal, 2016, p. 95). Think of 9/11. People put the preservation of others before themselves, even when it is to the detriment of them.[3] Moreover, real people often cooperate. People are not necessarily rational, selfish, autonomous individuals. It is much more complicated than that. People can be thoughtful, caring, confused, selfless, worried, illogical... and the list continues. In fact, the list never stops. Ultimately, "not one of us is an island" or a billiard ball (Marçal, 2016, p. 95). Western political theory is essentially an erudite way of describing what the dominant worldview is in society and who holds this dominance. Western political theory tells us how people really operate and why they operate this way and it is one of the largest fables of the world. In this fable, the strongest identifying trait of this individual is that *he* is not a woman and when Plato or Hobbes speak about humans, they really are referring to "men."

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[3] Read "7 incredible stories of heroism" by Paul Szoldra from *Businessinsider.com* (last modified September 11, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/7-incredible-stories-of-heroism-on-911-2015-9) to evince my claim about human nature.

If you think about it, creating an individual as the defining feature and tool for insight in political theory is an extremely clever way of excluding women: Marçal observes that,

> "We have historically allocated women certain activities and said that she must do them because she is a woman. Then we create an economic theory that states that these activities have no economic meaning. We tell the woman that she must embody certain driving forces so that the man's society can function: care, empathy, altruism, thoughtfulness. At the same time we'll say that the economy is the only thing that matters, really" (2016, p. 171).

Exchange political theory or social organization for economics and one can come to the same conclusion about economics. Both Western political theory and economics start with an individual that is similar to the other discipline's definition of individual as well as lens of how to view the world, through an individual. A certain masculinist way of viewing people and categorizing them in carefully built boxes has infiltrated most aspects of Western society, which has maintained the power of those already in power and made people believe that this power was natural or innate. But this power structure is not natural or innate and feminism is the key to critiquing this decidedly individual *man.* While Introduction to Microeconomics may have taught us that there is no such thing as free lunch, what is more realistic and what feminism tells us is that "there is no such thing as free care" (Marçal, 2016, p. 192).

Free care means that while someone was working in the public sphere, or in the 'formal' economy, someone else had to be working in the 'private' sphere or the informal economy. Someone had to be cleaning the house, taking care of the kids, cooking the dinners, planning the parties, washing the clothes, dealing with neighbors, while someone else could focus all their efforts elsewhere. What happened at the home was dubbed the private sphere and thus not included or considered relevant in the public sphere determinations of political theorists, because they had taken this arena for granted. True, conventionally women's work does not "create tangible goods that can be bought, traded or sold," but that does not mean that they did not have

a part in what made a society prosperous (Marçal, 2016, p. 30). Without conventionally women's work, no other work would be possible because everyone else would have to be doing the work required inside and outside the home.

Mainstream Western political thought perpetuated the factory of masculinist thought by not realizing, or at least not giving full deference to, the fact that Western political theory is a created thing. It was created by people who were lucky enough to have free care in abundance, who had the tools and skills needed to be able to speak about philosophy and write it down. They did not look outside themselves, outside their own unique experiences or privileges afforded to them even when they claimed to have developed laws of human nature; and this misstep was replicated throughout history and the development of economics and Western IR theory because these people had never felt the need to critique the system from which they benefitted. In their theory, they affirmed qualities associated with their own experiences, which perpetuated their power even more, and made it seem like what they valued (or did not value) was what the world was like and what it should be like. In determining this, they did not realize that what traits and characteristics they deemed worthy were actually merely a reflection of the culture of their society at the time. Public and private sphere are separate? Norm. Rationality more admirable than irrationality? Norm. Men more powerful (and thus more intelligent, capable, etc.) than women? Norm.

Furthermore, in an ironic twist, the traits associated with men and the traits associated with women in terms of personality, how each views the world and how each behaves, is socially constructed. They have been reinforced and reproduced overtime for such a long time that it makes them seem natural. The very fact that the world is bifurcated and is attempted to be categorized into a clean, organized and simple binary demonstrates how the powerful attempt to

hold on to their power. Truthfully, the world and people cannot be so succinctly organized into one box or the other. Choosing either/or is a rudimentary understanding of the issue. By choosing to see the world as a both/and issue world hunger might have been solved by now. Or at least we would have been much closer to a solution than we are today.

To be able to move forward, it is necessary to remove the stigma of socially created and culturally constructed feminine traits and understand that gender norms are norms, not innate qualities. Furthermore, stop hating women as they are culturally defined and devaluing what is considered "feminine." Or better yet, stop hating people who have two X chromosomes, because Western society has conflated the two. People and society have a lot of unlearning to do. We need to understand how the world is not—and therefore should not be viewed, theorized, or enacted upon—as black and white or cut and dry. One important phrase to keep in mind while one approaches the world with this perspective is that **simply because something is normal does not mean that is the way things should be.** Normality does not equate to being right. Norms equate to keeping the powerful in power. With this in mind, we must view Western political theory, neoclassical economics and Western IR theory with different definitions, breakdown assumptions and broaden contexts to be able produce a more relevant perspective.

Chapter III: The Social Construction of State Behavior in Western IR Theory

Western political theory influences Western IR theory in making it seem like state behavior is limited, because these theorists' view of human nature is limited. The foundation for Western IR theory assumes that conflict is inevitable, society is pluralistic, disparate independent pieces, and states overarching goal is self-preservation. But it does not have to be this way. This is a choice. Imagine a world where peace is considered a realistic goal. Where states are more interested in the greater good than how they compare to their neighbor's economic standing. Where trust, compassion and happiness are more common than avarice, superficiality and jealousy. By reframing the perspective, we reframe the question, reframe the debate and reframe the outcome, i.e. state foreign policy.

Let's begin with state sovereignty. State sovereignty is considered a sacred cow of Western IR theory. One assumption Western IR theory makes is that it is state's essential nature to survive. Since no supranational authority exists states would have no other reason to cooperate with each other and thus have no way of maintaining their security without their survival instincts. But why is this the expectation? It is an unfounded assumption. By looking at the history of how the modern Western state developed, one can ascertain how many perceptions of state behavior is not natural, but created.

The creation of the Westphalian system enabled Europe in the 17th century to establish an order that would enhance opportunities for peace. The demarcation of swaths of territory to different powers for a perpetual and permanent lease allowed each power to feel safer as well refrain them from trying to take power away from another power. It basically was a way to quell the insatiable desire that powers had to want as much power (and in terms of this that meant land) as possible. Thankfully this treaty happened in time, because without it, Europe could have

been living in chaos today. Many more wars could have occurred. Stability would be an aspiration, but never truly a possibility… right? This is at least what Western IR theory would have us believe. But by privileging state sovereignty to the extreme, we privilege the masculinist perspective, which has negative ramifications as to what state behavior looks like.

Lessons from the Westphalian System

The Peace of Westphalia's goal was to establish a balance of rivalries and "peace for Christendom" (Kissinger, 2014, p. 25). The Treaty of Westphalia was to assert order and stability after the Thirty Years' War that ravaged Europe in the early 17th century. The treaty was revolutionary and unprecedented. The inherent equality of states was established for the first time, and it acknowledged each states' sovereignty, regardless of the size of the country's power or the way the head of states' ran their country. The Treaty of Westphalia put the long-established powers like France and Austria on equal footing with the newly minted countries like Sweden or the Dutch Republic. Europe took a stand during this time with the treaty by saying that the state was bar none and it was the state that defined the European order, as opposed to the empire, dynasty, or religion. This was a foreshadowing of the development of Western IR theory.

Fast-forward three centuries later and this way of defining and organizing the connection between power and physical territory had outlasted most, if not all, fads from the 17th century. Empires, dynasties and religious authority as a way to define swaths of power were considered anachronistic, at least in the West, if not most of the world. In fact,

> "With the end of the universal Church as the ultimate source of legitimacy, and the weakening of the Holy Roman Emperor, the ordering concept for Europe became the balance of power—which, by definition, involves ideological neutrality and adjustment to evolving circumstances" (Kissinger, 2014, p. 27).

Conveniently enough, Hobbes published his pioneering work on political theory, the *Leviathan*, only three years after the Treaty of Westphalia. Hobbes believed in an extremely pessimistic view of human nature and developed the solution of having a strong power—a leviathan—to be able maintain security and peace within the state. According to Hobbes, "the sovereign state's monopoly on power was established as the only way to overcome the perpetual fear of violent death and war" (Kissinger, 2014, p. 31). Outside the state's borders, Hobbes felt like there was no hope. A leviathan is not even a possibility in the greater world order.

According to Hobbes, the international system was a simply another, larger state of nature. It was a state of anarchy because no leviathan could possibly control the entire world and impose its own order on it. No social contract existed. "Thus each state would have to place its own national interest above all in a world where power was the paramount factor" (Kissinger, 2014, p. 32). Through Western political theorists like Hobbes and the Peace of Westphalia, the balance of power became codified as an institution in the international system and became so normalized that is how the world seemed to work naturally.

Possibility for Peace

German philosopher Immanuel Kant, known for his theory of 'perpetual peace' in this new world order, clearly displayed how even during the incubation period for modern-day Western IR theory, the elite of the society postulated theory within the framework that they believed was the only way possible, which limited their outlook. Kant believed that in order to have an eternal peaceful world order, it was essential to have democratic federations as the system of government of choice, because it would reduce conflict to a point where it would become negligible. Kant posited that humanity was defined by its "unsocial sociability," in

which it had "the tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up" (Kissinger, 2014, p. 40). That is why achieving an international order was so difficult.

Anarchy is What States Make of It

Alexander Wendt argues that the balance of power politics, considered a given in the development of the modern Western state, is, in reality, a social construction. Instead, states' perception that they must be self-interested to the extent that they need to survive in a system without a central authority is due to established institutions, but is not inherent to the structure of the system, and thus, "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992, p. 395). This relates to IR theory and Western political thought because institutions are well-established norms, but they only exist through the actors' perceptions.

Wendt's theory opens the possibility of states' having agency in how they respond to the international system. If identity and interests are cultivated, created entities, then they can be reoriented. States are not passive actors that need to view the international system as what Western IR theory, and realism in particular, has stipulated, which is why anarchy is what states make of it. The conception of the modern Western state is in many ways the embodiment of Western political thought's conception of what is natural and what is good in the world and mirror the male-neutral in political theory and neoclassical economics: states are disparate, autonomous and self-interested units. But the world is not so isolated from each other and we can take a different approach by prioritizing the global community, not merely states' rights.

The Debate About State Sovereignty

What if instead of treating state sovereignty as a sacred cow, we instead felt comfortable

with critiquing it? One perspective on state sovereignty, and the obstacles that develop from it is

> "The notion of sharing a world, the essential interconnectedness and interdependence of the global environment, and the scarcity of the resources available to humanity that need to be distributed both within and between generations all create conditions within which it becomes much harder than in the past to accept that consideration of justice in general, and of distributive justice in particular, ends at the borders of states" (Hurrell, 2007, p. 233).

By not being able to critique state sovereignty within the system that currently exists, it creates

great obstacles as to what possible solutions are even considered when trying to fix problems.

State sovereignty gave credence to national self-determination. Since state sovereignty

was assumed to be the best and necessary characteristic of world organization, national self-

determination complemented this assumption well. State sovereignty legitimized the concept of

national self-determination, which basically meant that states were able to determine their own

paths, set their own goals and find their own happiness in terms they chose for themselves. Or at

least that is what advocates of stringent definitions of state sovereignty say. Yet, in reality, this

meant that states were able to prioritize their needs over others, determine what issues were the

most critical and which were not and perpetuate any privilege that benefitted their endeavor for

power accumulation. But there is a different way of approaching this issue. Instead of state

sovereignty and national determination basically legalizing states to have more or less free rein

in how they address problems of the world, these two concepts should instead "provide the

political power and the moral meaning to the idea of an international society" (Hurrell, 2007, p.

122). It is true that "the assumed naturalness of living in a world of states is derived in large part

from the notion that nation-states represent meaningful political communities" (Hurrell, 2007, p.

122). But is not the world a political community, too? Conventional Western IR theory would

have us believe that it is not.

Chapter IV: A Reorientation of the Approach to Human and State Behavior

Feminism in general exposes the fundamental folly of the Western political theorists'

view of human nature, which is replicated in neoclassical economics and perpetuated in Western

IR theory's view of state behavior. After using feminism to raise awareness of this problem and

use it to break the patriarchal cycle, it enables the potential for a whole new range of

possibilities, in which we can expect more from people, emphasize choices and acknowledge

that life is hardly ever 'all else being equal.'[4]

Once the artificial masculinist tendencies of Western IR theory are redacted, states'

outlook on foreign policy can change. The fundamentals of Western political thought that

influenced the development of Western IR theory are impeding global progress, which is made

starker now more than ever because of globalization. Globalization has transformed political

identity. "The globalization and de-territorialization of identity politics is one of the most

important reasons why a neat pluralist global order has been rendered obsolete" (Hurrell, 2007,

p. 294). The world is currently experiencing social, environmental and technological change.

Global issues like the spread of new strains of disease as well as the effects of climate change[5]

will require long-term solutions and alter the equation—whether states like it or not—about how

to approach global issues (Hurrell, 2007, p. 293). This means that states will likely need to lose

some power because of the "*scale* of governance challenges, the *sources* of control and

governance, and the *subjects* of control" (Hurrell, 2007, p. 293).

> "If states are to develop effective policies on economic development, environmental
> protection, human rights, the resolution of refugee crises, the fight against drugs, or the
> struggle against terrorism, then they need to engage with a wide range of international

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[4] Term is used in the study of economics to hold certain factors constant to be able to establish an equation.

[5] Read "Why 20 Million People Are on Brink of Famine in a 'World of Plenty'" to understand one of the severe repercussions on human life that climate change generates (Somini Sengupta, *The New York Times*, February 22, 2017).

and transnational actors and to interact not just with central governments but with a much wider range of domestic political, economic, and social players" (Hurrell, 2007, p. 292).

With the ever-increasing rise of globalization—a fact of the current system, not an ideology of it—then the complications that arise with the multifaceted issues of global governance necessitates intervention and strong engagement. Feminism helps rework the foundations of Western IR theory by exposing how human nature and states' behavior is not static and innate, but rather is a created thing. In this manner, feminism helps offer alternative solutions to how states can act, which are more productive pathways and necessary due to the current features of the world today.

One example of a reconfiguration is that states need to stop being the primary locus of identity for civil society (Hurrel, 2007, p. 198). Globalization is here to stay, regardless of the rise of nationalism and populism in the world right now. Admittedly, some argue that globalization is the new religion of the 21st century (Saul, 2004). However, the rise of the recognition as well as severity of global problems, coupled with the burgeoning development of non-state terrorist actors, translates to the new norm of a globalized world that will not be easily dismantled by minor detours of protectionist trade or nationalist immigration policies in the four years that say, Donald J. Trump is president of the U.S. In the grand scheme of things, globalization will outweigh any return to populist, far right and nationalist politics since *time* is a factor. Regardless of what happens in the next four, eight, or 48 years, the world does have an expiration date. Climate change can expedite that process or humans can delay it. But either way, the world will end if humans do not do something about it. Non-state terrorist actors will continue to exact destruction on humanity if humans do not do something about it. Disease will threaten the world if humans do not do something about it. Thus, globalization is not a choice, because it will become, eventually, the only choice.

Many things are more subjective than what we are taught or believe. The idea that an objective good or bad exists is a superficial understanding of norms and morality. In truth, someone has always had the privilege of being able to have the right to interpretation of good versus evil and the right to make a judgment in case of conflicting views (Dallmayr, 2003, p. 434). But, the right or capability cannot be haphazardly granted to a select few of theorists or intellectuals who claim universality in the views they espouse. "It is insufficient—on moral and practical grounds—to throw a mantle of universal rules over humankind without paying simultaneous attention to public debate and the role of political will formation" (Dallmayr, 2003, p. 434). Socially constructed and culturally created masculine traits have been deemed better then socially constructed and culturally created feminine ones in Western political thought. Since this bias is established, we can move past it to create a more precise notion of what human nature and state behavior can look like.

Redefining Assumptions, Hannah Arendt Style

Let's start with the most basic concepts taken for granted that colors most other aspects of life and foreign policy. Hannah Arendt, acclaimed 20th century German-born political theorist who eventually became a U.S. citizen, beseeches us to reframe Western society's most basic perspective. Instead of thinking that the most fundamental human characteristic is mortality, or death, we should think in terms of birth and natality (Hayden, 2014, p. 15). With this seemingly simple reorientation, a completely fresh and new way of thinking is uncovered. By stressing the foundation of life as being birth, not death, an alternative moral and political outlook develops out of this logic. The focus on the notion that all humans are finite and mortal automatically exposes the emphasis on the singular, disparate, independent, and autonomous self (Hayden, 2014, p. 15-16). In contrast, the emphasis on the notion that all humans share the experience of

birth instinctively realigns the scope of the defining human experience by acknowledging the "creative act between plural selves—a 'we' rather than an 'I' (Hayden, 2014, p. 15-16). While it may be true that all humans exit the world through death, the more salient feature of human existence is that the fact that all humans enter the world through birth. According to Arendt, it is more important to focus on the shared birth experience, rather than the shared death experience, because without birth humans would not have the chance, or opportunity, to die. No world would exist without birth and death is not possible without birth.

Patrick Hayden, Professor of Political Theory and International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, writes in a commentary of Arendt's work, "the capacity to create new human beings not only replenishes the world of human togetherness, it also corresponds politically to the capacity to initiate something new and perform something spontaneously, that is, human action;" by redefining the focus on the most elemental human process, it offers a sense of agency, ownership, and, frankly, optimism about humans (2014, p. 15-16). It puts the impetus on them. Death is passive and inevitable, but birth is intentional and happens actively. Birth encompasses more than one person, one individual: at the very minimum, birth requires three different people that work symbiotically to create a human. It also emphasizes people with XX chromosomes who can give birth to humans. Interesting, no? The fact that for most of recent history, birth is not viewed as the most basic human experience that unites us all. As well as people with XX chromosomes who most often identify as culturally defined women are also an integral part to birth, and potentially even more integral than those with XY chromosomes? Seems convenient to focus on death, which treats human relationships, feelings, emotions, and experiences as irrelevant or non-issues because death is an individual experience that involves, ultimately, only one person. This reframing is meant to make the reader question and critique

assumptions and ideas they may have been taken for granted without realizing the origins of the idea or acknowledging a different approach, outlook or perspective to take.

This simple reorientation acts as a catalyst for a different, and more optimistic, approach to life. By focusing on death and mortality it makes the task of trying to distinguish oneself on earth fruitless (Fry, 2014, p. 29). Alternatively, Arendt views the start of life with where freedom begins for humans, and thus, complementary to beginning with freedom is the ability to act:

> "[Man's] coming into the world is equated with the appearance of freedom in the universe; man is free because he is a beginning and was so created after the universe had already come into existence…In the birth of each man this initial beginning is reaffirmed, because in each instance something new comes into an already existing world which will continue to exist after each individual's death. Because he *is* a beginning, man can begin; to be human and to be free are one in the same" (Arendt, 1961, p. 167).

With this notion of freedom and the ability to act due to the emphasis on the start of a person's life, rather than the end of it, it makes political activity a more hopeful pursuit and makes individual action as well as worldly events more significant (Fry, 2014, p. 23).

By refusing to focus on natality, the significance of this world as well as the realization that humanity is so valuable (because each person has his, her or their unique potential to act and be different from everyone else) is lost (Fry, 2014, p. 29). The notion that every person is unique is an important one. When Arendt speaks of this uniqueness, she is not referring to the physical differences of people, but rather the plurality of them, meaning that no two people are exactly the same (Fry, 2014, p. 30). Arendt defines plurality as "*the* condition—not only the condition sine qua non, but the condition per quam—of all political life" (1958, p. 7). By this, Arendt means that plurality—what makes each person unique—is not merely the essential feature of humans, but is also what determines the fundamental nature of political life. Heretofore, with political theory vis-à-vis Plato, the political community was defined by the acceptance of the idea of an ideal of the best type of state (Fry, 2014, p. 30). Arendt, in turn, disagrees with this assumption

and argues that no true ideal state exists because politics, like humans, are based on the uniqueness of each human, and for politics that means differences in opinions and points of view. Consequently, political action is the actualization of the condition of natality.

All this talk about birth and emphasis on natality begets the question, why are humans called mortals? Why not be called natals instead? Focusing on birth and natality equates to focusing on every person's potential and "allows humans to have faith and hope for the world because new possibilities for action occur with each new birth" (Fry, 2014, p. 32). It is not difficult to conclude that because of the conventional norm of prioritizing mortality over natality, people internalize a less optimistic view of the world. This becomes noxious when the creators of Western political theory, and Western IR theory by association, inadvertently share the view that the most important part of people's lives are when they die, because this influences their perspective on the potential of people and interpersonal relationships. It would behoove the conventional Western IR theorists to remember that people "are not born in order to die but in order to begin" (Arendt, 1958, p. 246).

A second reorientation is based on the definition of power. The traditional definition of power, when related to political power, identifies power as the capability to have "possession of control, authority, or influence over others," to be able exact one's own desires against the will of others (Merriam-Webster, 2017). In contrast, Arendt views power not as a description of power relations, but as a latent energy that is "actualized only when unique human beings, recognized by others as equals, speak and act together and thereby constitute a world shared between them" (Hayden, 2014, p. 16-17). Unlike the binary of those with power and those without, Arendt expands the scope and concept of power. The handling of power is tied to a social contract, meaning a contract between two or more people. Power develops out of the

implicit or explicit mutual commitments and agreements between people who have a common

goal. According to Arendt, power is the opposite of "domination and violence in that it is the

result of participatory interaction between unique individuals who reciprocally affirm their

equality" (Hayden, 2014, p. 16-17). Power becomes actualized with collective action and speech

that is meant to accomplish mutual interests and goals in a relative safe space. Elizabeth Frazer,

associate professor of Politics at Oxford University, observes,

> "On the question of what power is for, it is not for dominating or subjugating populations
> or individuals or classes, nor for maintaining advantage. It is for 'the world' and for the
> maintenance of the 'in-between' space by which we are related to each other" (Frazer,
> 2014, p. 156).

With this redefinition of power, it is easy to understand how power can be viewed as a function

of cooperative effort as well as the acceptance of the plurality of people. Even though no two

people are the same, they still have the capability to come together and take action in some way.

Power and anything and everything that occurs in the public realm are symbiotic and

should be viewed as working together. In the public realm, human empathy and harmony is

possible. The public realm, by nature, allows a free exchange of ideas, views and opinions

among people that have a more leveled playing field to share their voices because it is a

communal space. Power and public sphere often relate to politics, which is about the debate

about how to run a society. Thus, intuitively, politics advocates for a plurality of opinion. There

is no right way or wrong way to do something, but merely an opinion about what is the right or

wrong way, different values, priorities and assumptions made by the decision-maker. We should

view "politics as an *empowering activity*," an activity that is inherently pluralistic and that works

to advocate this part of its character (Frazer, 2014, p. 156).

If power is more about empowerment than the perception that power is about controlling

the will of others, then this has significant implications for future prospects of world progress.

This concept of empowerment, coupled with the emphasis on natality instead of death for the condition for being human, makes it easier to adhere to policies of promise and forgiveness, and productive change and improvement (Hayden, 2014 p. 18).

What Do Rights Mean?

The world will continue to become more interconnected because of some qualities that supersede state boundaries or nationalism: climate change, technology and non-state terrorist actors. Despite globalization being a feature of the system, basic individual rights are still disproportionately related to and qualified on citizenship. The rise of globalization could imply that there will be a decline in the nation-state. Due to the emphasis on citizenship as being a guarantor and enforcer of people's rights it begs the question; how do people ensure their rights if they do not have citizenship?

Tracing the roots of the notion that certain rights should be applicable to everyone, we return to the discussion of the development of the nation-state. During the 18th century, the idea of the rights of man developed parallel to and in conjunction with the construction of the United States of America as well as was professed by political philosophers like John Locke in Western Europe. Certain rhetoric applied to rights revolutionized the concept of them, such as qualifying specific rights as natural and inalienable. These rights were assumed to be innate simply because of the virtue that people were human (Gündoğdu, 2014, p. 113). These innate rights were and are considered different from rights derived from history that changed based on one community to the next. Since the rights of being a man were based in human nature, they were assumed to be universally applicable and not rooted in membership to a political community. Since they were inalienable they were not dependent on a sovereign power's ability to enforce or withhold them.

Since they were "irreducible and undeducible from other rights and law; as the source of all the other rights and laws," no unique law was needed to enforce them, "but these purportedly natural, abstract and inalienable rights were coeval with the nation-state" (Gündoğdu, 2014, p. 113).

This assumption of natural, inherent rights becomes a problem when the decline of nation states becomes a trend, whether that means in the mid-term or long-term. Arendt argued in 1951 that the nation-state was already deteriorating, because "modern power conditions which make national sovereignty a mockery except for giant states, the rise of imperialism, and the pan movements" (1951, p. 344). Even though Arendt was making observations almost 75 years ago, the words she used to describe the world accurately reflect world politics of today. Thus, in order to account for what could happen and is beginning to happen to people's rights after they lose their political community, seek a new one or do not identify with their citizenry, it would be better to rework the assumption that a universal human rights framework exists and develop a new structure that establishes the notion that people have a right to have rights" (Gündoğdu, 2014, p. 122).

A Return to the Roots of Western Political Theory

There is more to be spoken about the ramifications of the roots of Western political thought. After Socrates' death, Plato desired to make an argument for how persuasion, or opinion, should be rendered useless with in the political realm, the *polis*, and instead used reason to guide men and deter them from using violence to make them obey (Arendt, 1968, p. 107). To him, this meant creating a set of standards, viewed almost like laws that attached value to certain

human actions, traits, or viewpoints, therefore establishing the "true 'essence' of goodness, justice, courage and other virtues" (Klusmeyer, 2014, p. 148).

One positive takeaway from this anachronistic structure of ancient Greek life is the idea that the sphere of politics is a space where people are equals, but their plurality is considered, where they can speak freely and endeavor to achieve collective goals as characterized by Arendt (Walsh, 2014, p. 135). This should make students of Western IR theory, lawmakers and others reconsider what the purpose of politics is and how to reframe the purpose of politics to be able to produce better goals and policies for the future. Moreover, the knowledge that the structure of the private sphere was applied to the arena of politics, to crystallize a certain structure, as opposed to using persuasion as the primary framework to delineate conduct emphasizes once again how merely because of the way things were or are does not validate their inherent worthiness.

It should be of no surprise, with Arendt's deduction, that tradition is closely linked to authority and those who have power. Tradition is a "normative mode of knowledge through which…ascribed linkages to the past are conceived as sources of authority for institutions and actions in the present" (Klusmeyer, 2014, p. 138). These sources of authority can be translated to certain societal standards, ways to act, ideals and or accounts of origins. In essence, neither tradition nor authority would be as strong without the other. They have a symbiotic relationship. However, "any tradition offers a highly selective, stylized portrait of a society's relationship to its past that obscures diversity and conflict in order to emphasize perceived continuities" (Klusmeyer, 2014, p. 140).

Conclusion

The fact that Western political theory is masculinist has consequences. It has influenced other modes of Western political thought, which has meant that certain traits and certain specific perspectives have established what power structures are perpetuated and what range of options states' think they have when determining behavior. We cannot sit idly by and allow this misrepresentation of what human nature and state behavior look like. Now that we have the answers to why certain things are the way they are, why specific traits and characteristics are more valued than others, what needs to be done to allow others the luxury of theorizing, what assumptions people and society have made that were based on norms, not biology, and how those with power, in the conventional sense, feed off tradition. Now we also have the tools to reframe the entire discussion from the smallest part of the process—the individual—to complete disciplines of study. Power can be redefined. The purpose of politics can be rediscovered. Assumptions should always be critiqued. Traditions should always be unpacked. Nothing should be taken for granted or taken as fact without intensive and comprehensive research.

So where do we go from here?

I began this project by describing how the way things were. I defined the foundations of Western political theory, neoclassical economics and Western IR theory and offered a critique of the conventional perspective, by introducing feminism. I set the stage for how to possibly even think outside the traditional framework of Western IR theory. I traced the epistemology of norms, in reference to Western political theory, neoclassical economics, Western IR theory and sexism. I showed how the idea of the nation-state developed and why sovereignty is considered so important. After delineating how the world came to be the way it is, in this chapter I explained

how we could perceive things differently, since I argued in the preceding pages *why* we should perceive things differently.

In the subsequent chapter, I will apply what we have learned over these previous pages to real life. I will translate theory into what could and should work for the U.S. I will show how the U.S. benefits from this system of masculinist norms more than any other country in the world. My model will be normative and prescriptive and I will define a new type of framework to guide it in its foreign policy endeavors. By reassembling the U.S. foreign policy outlook, I envision a better, safer and happier world because the U.S. is the most powerful country in the world and if it can successfully reframe the debate, other countries will be able to do so as well.

Chapter V: The U.S.' Relationship to
Hegemonic Masculinity and Hegemonic Power

The U.S. uses the foundation of Western IR theory to determine the basis of its foreign policy, which is rooted in the perspectives of Western political theorists view of human nature. It adheres to a strict definition—its own—for how a state of its nature should act. This process is like the hegemonic masculinity that cripples, as well as defines, U.S. society. Hegemonic masculinity is defined as the way a certain definition of masculinity is encouraged by society. R.W. Connell, sociologist and feminist theorist, states, "hegemony is likely to be established only if there is some correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power, collective if not individual" (1995, p. 77).

Connell's definition of hegemonic masculinity is crucial to understanding the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process and how U.S. society operates. The framework of U.S. foreign policy is derived from Western IR theory. Those who formulated Western political theory were in a position where it was beneficial for them to establish a system that supported their own beliefs and perspectives of the world, which conveniently validated their own experiences. But Connell asserts: "gender exists precisely to the extent that biology does *not* determine the social" (1995, p. 71). Western political theory, like Western IR theory, is conceived with the intention of perpetuating the power and privilege of those already in power and those who already have privilege. But this power is socially constructed.

In reviewing how U.S. identity vis-à-vis the world developed, especially in congruence with the development of Western IR theory, it is necessary to understand how certain traits and characteristics were lionized and became associated with only a certain type of person. These traits were and are culturally constructed masculine traits and by thinking that these traits were

more desirable, Western IR theory excluded other conceptions of how to view states' interaction and added water to the seeds of a system of hierarchy and inequity.

IR theory in the U.S. kept the same assumptions about what traits and characteristics were valued by Western society and thus assumed that everyone desired them. So, the assumption was made that if everyone could be like them they would, and therefore people's true nature were of course what society and culture deemed the most appealing. However, what that reflected was the fact that hegemonic masculinity was alive and real. Hegemonic masculinity perpetuates the view that gendered norms are biological or natural, but these are social constructions, as exposed in Chapter II.

Western IR theory asks the question: how can states harm each other in the least bad way possible and survive in a world despite total war and nuclear weapons being facts of the world? And thus, IR theory in the U.S. uses these same starting points to negotiate foreign policy. In contrast, what IR theory in the U.S. should be asking is, "how might human beings create forms of international society or schemes of international cooperation that embody all aspirations of justice or which universalize some particular conception of the good society? (Hurrell, 2007, p. 3-4). Essentially, the cornerstones of IR theory in the U.S. need to be reframed, because these cornerstones are assumptions, not fate. They are learned perspectives, not inborn traits. IR theory consists of a series of choices: nothing is inevitable and nothing is essential. States, like people, can choose to cooperate, can choose to strive for a better, safer world, or they can choose not. A world without hunger, war or inequity is not a naively ideological goal only achievable in fiction or in utopian philosophy. Instead, if heads of state, world leaders and other influential figures make the right choices, then these things will be attainable.

Understanding the Origins of the Positioning of the U.S. Foreign Policy Playbook

The Impact of World War II on U.S. Foreign Policy Formulation

The concepts of IR in the U.S. developed formally during the second half of the 20th century, which also marked the rise of U.S. preeminence. World War II (WWII) devastated the previous stalwart of political, economic and military might: Europe. In fact, the U.S. was the only powerful country in the 1940s to become wealthier instead of poorer because of WWII (Kennedy, 1988, p. 358). The U.S. had benefitted immensely from not experiencing two great wars on its mainland during a time of industrialization and economic liberalization. Neither the two "World" wars of the 20th century affected U.S. capital in terms of land in a significant way. While the 1920s was a time when Europe had to rebuild its economy and replenish the population, the U.S. could focus on accumulating more and more capital. Similarly, WWII in some ways became an excellent economic opportunity for the U.S.: European countries were dependent on it for manufactured goods that by the nature of war were impossible for them to provide for themselves.

Moreover, while Europe was experimenting with different types of political ideologies to determine which was the right fit and would provide the best life for its citizens, the U.S. was comfortable with the position it had carved out for itself. It did not try communism, socialism or fascism (or at least those who supported these ideologies failed in imposing their beliefs on the whole country nor convince their beliefs were correct answer to the U.S.' problems). Furthermore, the reason why the U.S. was the only country to gain economically from WWII was because of its manufacturing economy. More than 50% of total manufacturing production in the world was in the U.S. (Kennedy, 1988, p. 358). By the end of the war, the U.S. was the largest exporter of goods, understandably, because they could manufacture goods in a peaceful

and safe space. Finally, after the war the U.S. also had control of 50% of the world supply of shipping (Kennedy, 1988, p. 358). In essence, control of the means of production and production itself gave a lot of credibility to the U.S. and catapulted it to superpower status in a very short period of time.

Economic legitimacy gave the U.S. the opportunity to spend money on military endeavors, which helped secure its physical strength. The U.S. helped rebuild Europe and Japan politically and economically and now it could also focus on investing in a way to maintain its power, through its military apparatus. While the true military power of the U.S. in the latter half of the 20th century is contested, the fact that it was perceived to be a military powerhouse is what matters. Remember, a lot of knowledge is subjective. The U.S. had the "image of ineffable superiority," which "remained undisturbed until the Korean War, and was reinforced by the pleas of so many nations for American loans, weapons, and promises of military support" (Kennedy, 1988, p. 358-9).

The Development of U.S. Liberal Internationalism

For the majority of its history, the U.S. was an isolationist country. It was only until the two world wars that it became internationalist.

> "Once the [U.S.] had taken up an active part in world affairs in 1917, and reconfirmed this in the 1940s, the idea of the United States as exemplar of the world had to be given a new practical expression, and that is what liberal internationalism accomplished" (Pfaff, 1989, p. 11).

During the first half the 20th century, the U.S. power was overall moving in a positive direction. This power changed its approach to foreign policy with a transition to a policy of isolationism to liberal internationalism, in which it felt validated to become more involved in world affairs than it had ever done before. This internationalism further developed into a policy of interventionism

in the late 1940s and 1950s (Pfaff, 1989, p. 12). A perception percolated that with the U.S.'

interventionist policy the world would be safe because it would export "democracy, law,

representative government, human trade, a free-trade capitalist economy" (Pfaff, 1989, pg. 12).

The U.S. knew that countries had different goals and motives than the U.S., but since it was so

successful, the "American" way must be a positive affirmation for how other countries should

act. U.S. policymakers assumed that other countries would want to eventually emulate the U.S.

and that other countries would share the same motives and goals of the U.S. once they

understood what it was like to have the U.S. system injected into their bloodstreams.

 The U.S. had redefined what it meant to be a superpower. It considered exporting its way

of way of life as a crucial part of its foreign policy that would benefit the world (read:

internationalism). In the West, previous European superpowers had used their strength to defend

territories or support narrowly defined national interests, whereas the U.S. had large, grandiose

frameworks that they defined as what would be best for the world. And to the U.S., that meant a

framework rooted in liberal ideology. How would it approach non-Western or white parts of the

world?

> "The American view of the disorders of the Third World has typically interpreted them in
> terms of East-West conflict, and has justified intervention as essential to block the other
> side from taking over…" as ex-President Ronald Reagan said, "that vital and strategic
> area of the earth, or, for that matter, any other part of the earth" (Pfaff, 1989, p. 156).

Essentially, the U.S., after becoming powerful, has wanted to maintain its position in the world

and replicate its strength as much as it possibly can. It has determined that it is morally superior

to non-Western European parts of the world (Pfaff, 1989, p. 168) because it benefitted so greatly

from the geographical location, political ideology and economic system it had at the time of

WWII.

U.S. Exceptionalism: The Crux (or Crown) in The U.S. Foreign Policy Outlook

The concept of U.S. exceptionalism has weighed down and muddled the unique opportunity the U.S. has. The U.S. is a country that is politically and economically more powerful than any other country in the entire world and can spearhead world problems of hunger, poverty, inequality, etc. Yet, instead it chooses to spend a lot of its time finding new ways to reinforce its power, impose its belief system on others and create contradictions for itself so that it can benefit the most from every encounter it has with other states. This is not a responsible use of power.

It is an abuse of it.

The U.S.' power is not natural or inherent. The U.S. is such a powerful country because of the unique circumstances of its situation (geographic location, world events, etc.) that enabled it to become a powerhouse. However, similarly to the creation of Western political theory, simply because the U.S. *has* power does not validate its ownership of this power, decisions, goals, and motives through transitive property. It does not necessarily mean that the "American" way is the best way. It just means it is *a* way that has worked or works for some people.

The concept of U.S. exceptionalism is uncomfortably reminiscent of the expression, 'boys will be boys.' The New World Encyclopedia defines U.S. exceptionalism as "the belief that the United States differs qualitatively from other developed nations because of its national credo, historical evolution, or distinctive political and religious institutions" (2016). Thus, because of its special position (in terms of its political and economic might) and history, the U.S. is afforded more exceptions to rules, institutions and norms because its power enables it to cherry-pick what rules it chooses to follow, what institutions it benefits from and what norms enable it to perpetuate its power. Likewise, the concept 'boys will be boys' essentially means

that boys are able to have a certain amount of leeway in terms of their actions (or room to make mistakes or do socially unacceptable things), because they are boys and cannot adequately be held accountable for everything they do. However, this reinforces concepts of the powerful finding ways to justify or excuse the actions of those in power. Ultimately, a parallel exists between many of the privileged members of society and the most privileged in state in the world. This connection does not seem to be coincidental.

Barry Buzan, Emeritus professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, argues that the roots of U.S. exceptionalism changed during WWII. Before WWII, and for most of U.S. history, U.S. exceptionalism meant that the U.S. was a 'city on a hill.' It was supposed to be a model for other countries: lead by example and not let other countries taint or dilute it by involving itself with them (2011, p. 6). This identity complements the U.S.' foreign policy stance of isolationism. Yet after WWII, the U.S.'s identity changed and its concept of U.S. exceptionalism changed with it. It became extremely engaged with the world politically and militarily and its foreign policy became more interventionist than ever before.

The Command of the Commons

How was the U.S. able to achieve hegemonic power? And why is it able to act so mercurially? It says it wants to establish international humanitarian rights, and yet will not ratify the treaty that was purposefully created to address exactly those issues. This is because the U.S. has command of the commons more than any other country in the world. Other states do not have this luxury or privilege of acting so unilaterally because they do not have nearly as great of a command of the commons as the U.S. does. The commons are areas that belong to no state specifically and enable access to the majority of the globe (Posen, 2003). The U.S. has command of the commons because it has the most power over these areas, namely the sea, space and the

air, which supports a larger hegemonic strategy. The benefit of having command of the commons is threefold: to have the ability to get more military usage of the sea, space and air than other states, to deny others from using that space and to deter others states from entering into a military contest for the command of the commons if they tried to jeopardize the U.S.' hold over them. The nice thing about command of the commons is that it has the snowball effect. Command of the commons reinforces the U.S.' military strength, which reinforces its political strength, which reinforces its economic strength. Moreover, by the U.S. apparatus growing in strength, it weakens other countries (Posen, 2003). And so the game continues and the U.S. continues to win the game, as defined by realism.

Understanding the Development of the U.S. Military

Why does the U.S. have such a hold on the commons? A multitude of factors explain this. Today, the U.S.'s bases and command structure—legacies from the Cold War—help the U.S. maintain its power and control. Most of the U.S. Cold War base structure is still in place (Posen, 2003). By the end of WWII, the U.S. military was building bases on average of 112 per month, granting it the title of having the most bases abroad in world history (Vine, 2015a, p. 27). Today, the U.S. has 686 base sites outside the continental U.S., but David Vine, author of *Base Nation* and military base expert, says the number could actually be as high as 800 depending on how one defines a base (2015a, p. 4). For the rest of the world combined, only 30 foreign bases exist (Vine, 2015a, p. 5).[6]

While the number of U.S.' foreign military bases was cut in half after the demise of the Soviet Union, the number of countries that have a U.S. military base presence doubled from 40

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[6] The U.K. and France have 13 bases in total and Russia has nine, but only in the former Soviet republics (Vine, 2015a, p. 5).

to 80 (Vine, 2015b). The fact that the U.S. maintained more or less the same military structure

that it had built up during the Cold War after it is at the very least questionable. So why is that

the case? The U.S. interpreted the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 as a reflection of the inherent

superiority of the U.S.' way of doing things—politically, economically, etc. However, the U.S.

actually had less to do with the Soviet Union's demise than it thought it did (Johnson, 2004, p.

18). The Soviet Union was on a path to failure because of its "internal economic contradictions,"

due to its ideological stubbornness, heavy imperial hand and lack of reform (Johnson, 2004, p.

13).

The U.S. political decision-makers embraced this misinterpretation of the factors in the

outcomes of an event:

> "That the geographical commands were barely touched by the passing of the Cold War is
> mute testimony to the quiet consensus among the foreign and security policy elite that
> emerged soon after the passing of the Soviet Union: The United States would hold on to
> its accidental legitimacy" (Posen, 2003).

The system that benefits the biggest and most powerful kid in the sand box unsurprisingly works

for it. The U.S. command of the commons creates the military infrastructure that builds the U.S.

political power. The fact that it has command of the commons means that the U.S. is able to

employ the hegemonic foreign policy it has been employing since the end of the Cold War

(Posen, 2003). The command of the commons is what enables the U.S.' political power. It also

gives the U.S. tremendous ability to inflict harm upon others. This military foundation for U.S.

hegemony needs to be recognized and be offered as evidence for how the system needs to change

and the U.S.' desire to build up its military can be traced back to masculinist definitions of power

and survival in the international system.

The Current Viability of Institutions

The world today offers ever-increasing evidence and support for a weakening of attachment to statist world politics. Globalization has given birth to the notion of political identity that is not territorially based (Hurrell, 2007, p. 142). In fact, even before the phenomenon of globalization, ways of political organization existed that transcended and traversed the nation-state, such as human rights, environmental degradation, and the threat of nuclear proliferation, to name a few. These are issues that should not be left up to the discretion of states' national self-determination decision-making abilities, but to an authority greater than any individual state.

But don't we already have the United Nations (UN) or the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), one may ask? While it is true that some effort has been made to create supranational powers to solve global problems, they do not have nearly enough validity, because they do not do nearly a good enough job of enforcing their creeds, laws or propositions that they want enacted. Instead, the UN is more or less beholden to the fancy of the strongest (or previously strongest) countries in the world and whether or not they feel like supporting a certain issue that day, i.e. the UN Security Council (UNSC), and their ability to have veto power for the UN to adopt any substantial resolution. Even besides the UNSC, countries have been known to defy UN mandates or, potentially worse, creatively interpret this mandate and carve out their own path because they have the power, money, military strength and or will to do so.

While the NPT deserves some praise, it is not strong enough legitimacy-wise to be able to deter all states, sans the first five, to proliferate. India and Pakistan are an obvious example of this. Rogue states like North Korea and Iran are other examples, although progress has been made vis-à-vis Iran. But, ideally, the NPT would be successful in creating a pact with all states to

refrain from proliferating. Realists like John Mearsheimer, professor of politics at the University of Chicago, argue that these institutions are simply reflections of power politics. Mearsheimer rightly acknowledges, "the most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it" (1995, p. 13). Put in a real-world context, the military, economic and political power forces in the world deem which states have to adhere to the NPT and who can get away with it.

Instead of states focusing on their myopic interests, like whether they will be a strong enough threat to Pakistan (India), or whether they can stuff their strength and privileged position in the world down the throats of other countries and the international system as a whole (the U.S.), a feminist critique of realism argues that countries should be concerned with the collective security of the global system. In lieu of thinking in pluralist terms, democratic versus nondemocratic state, or wealthy versus not wealthy country, why not think in terms of solidarity? Any type of solidarity that exists within the international system today is based on and simultaneously fortifies the strength of the most powerful states within the system, as indicated by the UN, NPT and other examples (Hurrell, 2007, p. 9).

The United States is notoriously notorious for undermining the UN's authority: "U.S. actions…have weakened the UN even as the world body has become increasingly indispensable" (Karns & Mingst, 2002, p. 268).[7] It actually makes sense that the U.S. would do this, because it can do this, since state sovereignty is a sacred cow of world politics. State sovereignty enables certain bodies of power to keep their monopoly, or hegemony, on power. The U.S. feels empowered enough to be able to do more or less whatever it wants because power begets power.

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[7] Read Chapter 11 of *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement*, ed. Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), called "The United States as 'Deadbeat'? U.S. Policy and the UN Financial Crisis" written by Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst in full to gain more background to corroborate my assertion.

Moreover, no norm exists that would deter the U.S. from vacillating in its adherence to international law. Yes, if the U.S. abrogates international law it can face a loss of legitimacy and soft power, but history has set the precedent that it will always be able to bounce back from an infringement, no matter how grave.

The International Criminal Court

U.S. action, or lack thereof, vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court (ICC) underscores yet another example of U.S. stubbornness and selfishness in order to maintain its power and position in the world to the detriment of smaller, weaker countries and the world at large. The ICC is an intergovernmental institution that has the authority to prosecute against international crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. In 1998, 60 countries ratified the ICC, and it officially went into force in July 2002 ("History of the ICC"). The U.S. was not one of those countries that originally ratified it or voted for it (Brown, 2002, p. 323).[8] The reason why the U.S decided against ratifying the treaty was because of the possibility of the U.S. military becoming beholden to the jurisdiction of the ICC. The U.S. would be hesitant to act through an institutionalized (and therefore legitimized) form of multilateralism, despite the fact that the majority of the international community had come to a consensus about the ICC as an important arena to develop international law and promote multilateral institutions. The U.S. cared about certain values and principles that the ICC promoted, such as criminalizing and enforcing the criminalization of crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and other infringements on international law (Brown, 2002, pg. 324), but they did not want to give too much legitimacy and

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[8] The U.S. eventually signed the treaty on December 31, 2000.

authority to the ICC in case the U.S. military ever potentially obstructed international humanitarian law.

The U.S. likes to have its cake and eat it too, which is manifested through its official position towards the ICC: "For Washington the task was to exercise leadership in the shaping of this multilateral institution, while at the same time maintaining an appropriate degree of unilateral freedom of action" (Brown, 2002, p. 325). While it has generally not been U.S. policy to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity or acts of genocide, it has been U.S. policy to attempt to sidestep establishing international criminal courts that have the power to investigate— or worse, prosecute—U.S. personnel for the aforementioned crimes (Brown, 2002, p. 326). If the U.S. ratified the ICC, it would have the authority to determine the criminality of U.S. military activity in foreign countries (Brown, 2002, p. 328), and it is not in the best interest, as defined by realists, to succumb to the possibility of being punished for criminal activity led by the state.

The U.S. has chosen this path for itself—it is not necessary nor inevitable. Policy-makers in the U.S. are influenced by the foundations of realist IR theory, which inherently limits the scope of possibilities on the menu of foreign policy, and defense policy, decisions. Thus, a reorientation of the basis of U.S. foreign policy is essential in order to reconstruct it.

Chapter VI: Reconstructing U.S. Foreign Policy

"Not everything that is faced can be changed, but nothing can be changed until it is faced"
(Baldwin, 1962).

By acknowledging the masculinist norms established in the creation of Western IR theory, we have reoriented what perspectives of state behavior are possible. Furthermore, correlating hegemonic masculinity to hegemonic power exposes how the basis of U.S. foreign policy feeds off these masculinist norms unearthed in Western political theory. Accordingly, how do we reconcile this new outlook and what would this reconstruction process look like?

First and foremost, it would behoove the U.S. to adopt a general policy of supporting efforts in the international community to maintain human rights, not necessarily efforts to promote democracy. While the support of human rights may correlate to supporting democratic politics, this should be a side effect, not the central motivation. Liberal democracy is not the be all end all; it is not the answer to all the world's problems. Kant's central hypothesis of 'perpetual peace', is that democracies will not engage in war with other democracies. This, however, infers that two countries battling with militaries define war. It does not account for other types of war and how that can affect things other than the state itself. Economic war, social inequity, domestic violence, etc. should be considered types of warfare that can, and do, ail democratic nations. But other types of war are not considered when speaking of peace between states, because the powerful and privileged are not (or at least less) affected by impoverishment, systematic discrimination and domestic abuse.

In essence, the privileged, wealthy, white man's interpretation of what the best way to govern and what the best way to live is not applicable to everyone. Instead, the better, because more accurate, approach to postulating about IR should embrace the notion that very little if

anything at all should be taken for granted, no moral order should be assumed and all that we know should be consistently critiqued from different perspectives. By doing this, a fuller picture of the problem and solution would be able to be attained.

Macro-Issues Concerning the Elites in the U.S. (and the World)

One percent of the country owns a third of the wealth in the U.S. **Eight people in the world own the same amount of wealth as the bottom half of the entire world's population** (Mullany, 2017). These eight people are all men: Bill Gates, Amancio Ortega Gaona, Warren Buffet, Carlos Slim, Jeff Bezos, Mark Zuckerberg, Larry Ellison, and Michael Bloomberg. 75% of these men are from the U.S. and the men from the U.S. are all white. Furthermore, economic inequality is increasing around the world as well as the U.S. (Cohen, 2017). In the Inclusive Growth and Development Report 2017, nations were ranked based on how much their economic gains benefited the country's wealthiest citizens or the population at large. The U.S. ranked 23rd among the most advanced economies in the world, 29th out of 30 in net income inequality, 29th in wealth inequality, and 28th in poverty rate. The world is still clearly in the hands of the Western, white male elite—those who are wealthy and privileged by the current system derived from Western political thought. This should come as no surprise because the foundations of Western political thought favor the male, the wealthy and the privileged. Thus, the need to break the cycle of perpetuating the power relations that keep the poor and disadvantaged impoverished to be able to solve issues of global inequities is crucial.

The World Economic Forum in Davos Switzerland is an annual assembly of business executives, heads of state and other influential figures who meet to discuss the economic qualms of the world today, such as the rise of populism, the rejection of globalization, and the failing middle class (Goodman, 2017). The impact of globalization has decreased the bargaining position of workers and corporations have capitalized on that vulnerability. Poor and middle-class workers' incomes have been leveling off or declining, while the extremely wealthy—those that make up the Davos elite—have seen their earnings increase. Despite this dissonance, the solutions developed to ameliorate the ramifications of globalization kept corporations and the wealthiest barely affected by the solution making process. The system of addressing the plight of those hurt by globalization needs to be updated, refurbished and tackled from a different viewpoint.

According to Ian Goldin, Professor of Globalization and Development at Oxford University, the nature of the world today—a globalized world—means,

> "We are not simply connected. We are entangled. Our lives, our destinies are intertwined. What happens in China, what happens in Indonesia, what happens in India, what happens across Europe, and what happens in North America, across Africa and Latin America will affect all of us in dramatic new way" (Goodman, 2017).

This is why the poorest of the poor and the wealthiest of the wealthy are having two distinctly separate conversations. Poor people are responding to this interconnectedness with support for populist policies and the wealthiest of the wealthy are not truly grasping the negative side effects of globalization because they are not willing to treat the wound in a way that could potentially hurt themselves too.

Benjamin Disraeli, before he was twice the prime minister of the U.K. in the late 19th century, developed early theories of his political ideology in a book called *Sybil* in 1845.

Disraeli, known as a father of the political ideology of conservatism, believed that the rich and the poor were living in two separate nations. In *Sybil*, aristocrat Charles Egremont heaps praise on the U.K., remarking on it being at the pinnacle of its success, while Walter Gerard, working-class radical, retorts in contestation saying that there are

> "Two nations; between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws" (Disraeli, 1930, 9th ed., p. 77).

Gerard refers to these two nations as the Rich and the Poor.

The separate languages the rich and poor speak are hurting the powerless and helping the powerful. U.S. foreign policy works to maintain the power of those already in power and considerable change needs to be implemented to ensure that "globalization is sustainable, that connectivity is sustainable," Goldin pleads (Goodman, 2017). Instead of processing the solutions to the problem of globalization as "the people who have not benefitted from globalization need to try harder to emulate those who have succeeded," it is advisable to apprehend what problems globalization created in the first place and how to alter the equation so that historical discrimination has less effect on the outcome of a person's success (Goodman, 2017). The way globalization has been managed—with the U.S. at the wheel—has had a large part in perpetuating inequality. The U.S. needs to be leading the charge of attempting to seriously mitigate the negative effects of globalization, because of the position it has so carefully cultivated over the past 75 years.

The U.S. needs to be more predictable, trustworthy and non-coercive. For a country that not so subtly infuses Christian beliefs in a lot of what it does, it should respect the old platitude of treating others the way they want to be treated. Hurrell acutely observes, "if you want to solve

problems in a globalized world, you cannot simply persuade or bully governments into signing

treaties and are therefore inevitably drawn to become involved with how other people organize

their own societies" (2007, p. 272). The U.S. cannot lambast other countries for human rights

abuses, if it engages in human rights abuses itself abroad and within its own country.

With great power comes great responsibility, and the U.S. certainly needs to remember

that with its position in the world it has entered a social contract. Other countries have deferred

to the U.S. because it expects the U.S. to engage with the international community responsibly,

fairly and lucidly.

> "Asian and European states agree to accept American leadership and operate within an
> agreed-upon political-economic system. In return, the United States opens itself up and
> binds itself to its partners, in effect, building an institutionalized coalition of partners and
> reinforces the stability of these long-term relations by making itself more 'user
> friendly'—that is, by playing by the rules and creating ongoing political processes with
> these other states that facilitate consultation and joint decision-making" (Ikenberry, 2001,
> p. 27).

But that is not what happens. If a country is allied with the U.S., quite frequently the opposite

actually occurs: they lose power and decision-making capabilities. Ironically, working with the

U.S. can often have the opposite effect of strengthening the said state (Hurrell, 2007, p. 282).

This does little to address global interconnectedness and promote cooperation, multilateralism,

and collective security.

Unequal bargaining power exists among the countries of the world. It has become the

norm for those whom have the most power to also have the most legitimate claim to moral

authority, even though those two features of a state should not be conflated with one another.

Power and authority does not automatically give validity to a state's (or a person, institution,

etc.) position on how to run a country or carry out foreign policy, which, it is something that is

taken for granted—disconcertingly—too frequently. Military power continues to play too much

of a role in determining the legitimacy and authority of a country. Worse, the safety of states, their security, is based off an order that is rooted in a hierarchical power politics (Hurrell, 2007, p. 192). Today, U.S. interests are met by heavily integrating itself into the way other societies organize themselves (Hurrell, 2007, p. 271), as opposed to approaching conundrums and situations with a broader lens, without such a strong claim that only the U.S.—and other Western or strong U.S. allies—have a monopoly on the best strategy to govern and engage in international relations.

How should the U.S. approach a notion like this? It should endeavor to help (not dominate) to create a global moral community that sets certain foundational standards that are neither all-encompassing nor claim to be universal and provide a guideline for certain values that should be sought to be promoted by states. Moreover, an autonomous review board (i.e. one that consists of a variety of countries and separate from any other institution in order to help prevent against any single countries' outside influence in the situation, aka like the U.N., the IMF, etc.) should congregate every two years in order to determine if this code should be updated, revised or edited in some way, based on the development of humanity and the consistent cycle of changing norms.

Redesigning the Concept of Security

The U.S. should broaden the conventional definition—and its approach—to security, through an emphasis on collective security regarding its foreign policy initiatives. Security is traditionally conceptualized as the protection of state from organized violence, such as through intra-state warfare, weapons of mass destruction or terrorist threats.

However, the U.S. can no longer afford to escape blame or punishment with narrowly defining its security interests. The benefits and ramifications of globalization are features of the world, not fads, which is why U.S. policymakers need to focus on the entire world, the biosphere, when conducting its foreign relations. Out with the outmoded, constricting and basic concept of traditional security and in with the idea, and ideology, of collective security. The conventional definition of collective security refers to the Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which stipulates that an attack on one is an attack on all. However, I posit that collective security should be defined as countries working in tandem together to be able to ensure the enforcement of human rights of all peoples, which would support the idea of reducing and eventually doing away with hunger, inequity, global diseases, and the negative effects of climate change. With this notion of collective security in mind, the formulation of U.S. policy would be to benefit the whole world, the world's future and individual people, which would encompass a much more comprehensive range than what it would with the traditional concept of security. Furthermore, in an ironic twist, if the U.S. continues on its path of a blunt and "exclusivist" idea of its self-interest in order to maintain its definition of order rooted in its hegemonic power, then its intended goals of maintaining the power structure it has put in place has the potential to backfire in an "empire of insecurity" for itself as well as other countries (Hurrell, 2007, p. 283).

Seriously Committing to a Policy—and Mindset—of Multilateralism

A commitment to collective security means a commitment to multilateralism as well the foundation of U.S. foreign policy-making. The U.S. needs to reframe the concept of multilateralism so it is not so top-down, prescriptive and coercive. The idea that " 'we can do it

together' depends on who 'we' are, on what 'it' is, and what is meant by 'together'" (Hurrell, 2007, p. 283). The institutions that exist today to promote world cooperation and efforts for peace should not be reflections of military power or the major powers of the world's desires and whimsies. The advantages and disadvantages of unilateral action by particularly socially privileged countries, like the U.S., that can act alone and defy international institutions much more flippantly than most other countries, is hotly debated. Yet working together, focusing on the long-term and learning to cooperate with the international community is much more important than normalizing a country's interpretation of what is morally right and interpreting something akin to their divine right to carry out their country's political code and moral compass. Working multilaterally and making international institutions stronger can be a failure or a success depending on how much the U.S.—and other countries—make the commitment to reorient themselves and upend their conventional definitions of security interests.

The international community attempted to propagate norms of collective management and collective security through the NPT, but this has been ineffective (Hurrell, 2007, p. 193). Instead of creating a world in which states feel safer because nuclear weapons are not a topic of concern, nuclear weapons continue to be a focus of many nation's foreign policy. The U.S. is no different. Due to the U.S.'s unique position in the world, it has taken on the responsibility of acting as the deterrent factor in states developing nuclear weapons, such as Iran or North Korea. Instead of focusing on ways to assuage the conflicts that the creation of nuclear weapons has created, the U.S. should spend its time, energy and money on emphasizing norms of collective security and collective management.

This is exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. has a tacit policy of not reducing its sovereignty in any way that makes it feel uncomfortable. Instead of focusing on ways it can

maintain its autonomy as much as possible by participating weakly in certain treaties like the

Chemical Weapons Convention (Smithson, 2002, p. 248)[9] to its fullest extent, it should set the

example of eagerly embracing treaties. Yes, this means the U.S. will lose some sovereignty and

independence through the process. But if the very world we live in is at stake, what does it matter

if some independence is lost? Moreover, why are independence and sovereignty considered such

highly desirable attributes for the U.S. to have? It is because by maintaining its sovereignty the

U.S. can maintain its power and control over the international system. Instead, as Wendt has

argued, a different way of approaching the international system is possible, one in which the

global community is prioritized before any states' rights.

A Call for A Just Global Order

Instead, the goal should be to create a just global order. A wider and deeper function of

governance is necessary to combat issues of today that often correlate to one another: inequality

and security, political and environmental problems (Hurrell, 2007, p. 296). Due to the expansion

and extension of governance, coupled with the issues of globalization, the desire for global

democracy will be contested now more than ever, since the desire for global democracy

institutionalizes the liberal world order led by the U.S. and its desire for hegemony. Many

smaller states are 'rule takers,' whereas larger states (with exceptions) are 'rule makers' (Hurrell,

2007, p. 305). But this should not be the case.

In this vein, we need to have stronger institutions, because global justice should be a

"negotiated product of dialogue and deliberation and therefore always subject to revision and

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[9] See "The Chemical Weapons Convention" by Amy E. Smithson in *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement*, ed. Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 248, for more detail about this assertion.

reevaluation" (Hurrell, 2007, p. 308). A just global order, as Hurrell calls it, cannot be rooted in coercive tactics or cooperation out of the petty, stilted and old definition of self-interest. Rather, states should engage in a critical reflection and non-coerced decision-making process in order to actualize a shared exercise of deliberation and logical justification for policy (Hurrell, 2007, p. 314). In this process, it is critical to recognize that "human diversity and value conflict remain important and that perspectives on issues of international order and justice vary enormously from one part of the world to another" (Hurrell, 2007, p. 314). Remember what Hannah Arendt theorized. Plurality is what defines us as humans. Plurality is a good thing. We should stop trying to make everyone be the same. Why are we so afraid of difference and of people being different from us? Because those who have power in society benefit from one ideal identity existing. If there are many ways to be successful, then it will be harder for those already privileged to be successful. But if there is one concrete, certain definition of success, then those that already have an edge in society—because of their race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and or religion, etc.— can have a more secure way to climb the ladder of success.

Now more than ever there is an impetus to critique and reform many of the socially constructed norms of society:

> "The conditions of global society make it impossible to evade the issue of unequal bargaining power. The massive inequalities of power and condition; the continued occurrence of war and intervention and the continued willingness of major states to use military power as an instrument of state policy; the role of power in skewing the terms of the capitalist global economy and the close links that exist between globalization and inequality; and the deformity of many of the core institutions of international society—all these point towards the pressing need to consider the minimal political preconditions that might underpin a global moral community in which reasoned deliberation and uncoerced consensus could even begin to be possible" (Hurrell, 2007, p. 315)

What does this mean for the U.S. and other countries' approach to foreign policy and global governance? There needs to be:

I. Some effort for reciprocity and the public justification of a state's actions

II. A baseline expectation of un-coerced eagerness to participate

III. A system in which the disadvantaged—by history or geography—feel like they have a part in the way things are run

IV. Institutional processes that enable the weak and disadvantaged to express discontent, feelings about poor treatment and an avenue for their voices to be heard

To attain the goal of a more just global order, the political process by which states operate with each other needs to improve. Reconstructing this political process will mean having a significant redistribution of resources from the rich to the poor. It will also mean establishing a semblance of global human rights that stipulate the rights of access to law and to an effective and efficient legal process (Hurrell, 2007, p. 316-7).

What if, for a moment, we imagined how the foreign policy of countries would look if we did away with national boundaries (Zinn, 2003)? Or what if we saw the children of the world as our own (Zinn, 2003)? A huge impediment to our ability to attain a healthier, happier and better society is by not being able to sympathize or empathize with people who do not look like us, eat like us, act like us, believe like us and overall live like us. The 'us' is always contextual, but people different from oneself have weirdly been 'othered' in many parts of history. But it is not because this 'othering' is natural, but it is because by creating an in-group and out-group, the wealthy and powerful are able to maintain their wealth and power.

Using Psychology to Gain Insight into the Foundation of Western Political Theory and IR Theory in the U.S.

What can we learn from psychology to understand the development of norms and perpetuation of specific ones in the U.S.? Psychologist Henri Tajfel and his colleagues, after

experimentation and study, concluded that when people associate with a group and categorize other people as members of a different group than themselves, then they discern that their group ('ingroup') is better, or at least more positive, than the members of the other group ('outgroup') (Whitley & Kite, 2010, p. 330). Thus, even when the members of these disparate groups never engage with one another, psychologically, people will have a bias in support of members of their own group.

Why is this? Power relations, or the desire to feel better than another person, are not a natural part of society, right? The self-esteem hypothesis states that people are motivated to attain and keep positive social identities (Whitley & Kite, 2010, p. 332). Understandable, no? Since people's social identities relate to their personal identities, people gain positive self-esteem by having a positive social identity. Translation: when a group of people identify with one that does well, its members feel good about themselves (Whitley & Kite, 2010, p. 330). The problem is that categorization builds the foundation for the development of stereotypes and prejudices. Four factors help construct this process:

1. Essentialism: Essentialism is the belief that members of a certain group, category, and/or identity all have more or less similar psychological traits and these traits are more or less stagnant. Researchers have found that children who believe (or are taught) that personal characteristics cannot fluctuate or change have a higher chance of developing more extreme attitudes to groups in general.

2. Ingroup favoritism: With ingroup favoritism, children have a higher chance of associating positive traits to their groups, although in this developmental stage, psychologists have found that this does not necessarily mean that children also develop negative associations to outgroups.

3. Explicit teaching: Explicit teaching is one way categorization develops, although, at least today, this is rarer than in the past. Categorization and positive versus negative attributions to different groups are more often taught intangibly and reinforced through what children observe and in language and culture.

4. Implicit teaching: Implicit teaching is the opposite of explicit teaching. Children, like adults, can develop stereotypes based on the process of false idea of a corollary relationship. For example, children could intuit that only women can or should be elementary school teachers since a significantly higher proportion of elementary school teachers identify as women, as opposed to men.[10]

In turn, this all warrants the question, where does prejudice come from? Psychologists say that it comes from social learning, inner states and cognitive development (Whitely & Kite, 2010, p. 311). Each person develops, to a greater or lesser extent, the personality features that correlate to a prejudice. Social learning—learning by the very nature of being a member of society—imbues to children which social categories are important, which attributes are stereotypically related to those categories, and which of these characteristics are better or worse than another.

Indubitably, "there is a natural tendency to organize and simplify the world around us" (Whitley & Kite, 2010, p. 318). It is for this reason that what children observe, absorb and implicitly or explicitly learn can be so enlightening or damaging. The fact that children are able to detect differences between social groups does not imply that they already have preferences for a certain group or groups over others or value one over the other. "When value judgments are

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[10] Only 2.3% of all pre-k and kindergarten teachers in the U.S. identify as men…and you wonder why there are so many things wrong with the world ("The Teacher Gender-Gap," 2012).

added to children's distinctions between social groups, then positive and negative attitudes (in other words, prejudices) are formed" (Whitley & Kite, 2010, p. 318).

Gender is a socially constructed concept. The root of gender-based positive or negative correlations begins when people are toddlers, when children begin to show partiality towards gender-stereotyped toys (Whitley & Kite, 2010, p. 318). By three years old, children know their gender and the gender of other people, but their gender identity is not fully formed (Whitley & Kite, 2010, p. 318).

Gender becomes a problem with the reinforcement of gender polarization. Gender polarization is the assumption that traits tied to gender are bifurcated: people believe that what is masculine is not feminine and that what is feminine is not masculine (Whitley & Kite, 2010, p. 332). As a result, people expect a person who they identify as feminine (or masculine) in one gender-stereotyped dimension to also be feminine (or masculine) on other aspects as well. This can clearly become a problem if certain gendered traits are privileged over others, or certain people who identify with certain traits are privileged and their privilege is reinforced from generation to generation. What does this look like in practice?

> "Maintaining the status quo means keeping women out of leadership roles. According to role congruity theory, two forms of prejudice keep women such positions. The first form of prejudice stems from the belief that women do not possess the characteristics needed for leadership; this belief discourages women from pursuing it in the first place. Yet even when women do pursue and land leadership positions, they face a double bind created by expectations of what women are like and what leaders should be like—that is, a man. Because women cannot meet both sets of expectations, they may face negative performance evaluations (Whitley & Kite, 2010, p. 492).

Why does this happen? Why are women systematically discriminated against whether they adhere to their socially appropriate gender roles or try to defy them? The problem lies with category constancy. Category constancy is the implicit belief that someone's affiliation in a social category (i.e. gender, race, etc.) stays stagnant across space and time or as a "matter of

superficial changes in appearance" (Whitley & Kite, 2010, p. 309). Children are only able to first understand the concept of constancy sometime between five and nine years old and it is only until this time in which they viably categorize others (Whitley & Kite, 2010, p. 309). Category constancy is about **the "belief that physical differences imply abstract differences," which "provides the basis for the development of stereotypes"** (Whitley & Kite, 2010, p. 310; Emboldening my own).

Where do we go from here? What is the right way to amend the power relations that were once created by society, but now seem to be an intrinsic part of it?

The root of the problem is that the U.S. assumes it has the unique key to understanding the universal moral code. But no universal moral code exists. Norms have developed overtime to distinguish what most societies understand as good or bad (ex. murder) or what certain societies determine is good or bad (ex. marital rape). The truth of the matter, as this thesis has been trying to impart to you, is that it is a lot more complex than that and that there are many more possibilities. Whoever controls the wealth and military strength also controls official ideology, and those that have preeminence of official ideology also control culture (Zinn, 2003). Many aspects of culture are created to perpetuate the power of those already in power. The history of the United States, the history of the West and traditions, which created culture, all have influenced the gender dynamic, regime and narrative of U.S. society today, which inevitably has permeated other parts of society, and most relevant to this paper, U.S. foreign policy.

How Gender Helps Mold World Politics

"Men do dominate world politics and male dominance is promoted and protected by a host of hegemonic strategies that vary across the world and that have changed over time. Though the strategies differ, the end result remains the same: men in power, [use] power to police the mental paradigms, the social practices, the sort of manual and professional labor, and the political institutions that perpetuate male dominance worldwide" (Beckman & D'Amico, 1994, p. 197).

This excerpt from *Women, Gender, and World Politics* by Peter Beckman and Francine

D'Amico (Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges and

Associate Professor of International Relations at Syracuse University, respectively), explains

how gender helps mold world politics (1994, p. 218). World politics and issues of gender are not

like oil and water, but rather they permeate each other. The gender relations of Western society

reflect what the dominant viewpoint is in political thought. Since Western society is patriarchal,

the dominant viewpoint is patriarchal. Yet, gender and the patriarchy are created things: they are

not inborn, they are socially constructed. Feminism exemplifies how the way Western political

thought has been conducted is clearly tainted with a certain framework and a specific way of

thinking that intrinsically favors the culturally masculine viewpoint and characteristics, which

ultimately reflect the power relations of society and, ultimately, U.S. foreign policy is not

immune to this gender regime[11], narrative and dynamic. Then, once this masculinist foundation

is established, we can transcend the gender norms in Western society to develop new approaches

to state behavior and foreign policy.

R.W. Connell's framework of gender relations exposes the social practices that people

are taught and which they implement through power, labor, emotional relations, and cultural

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[11] A gender regime is based on specific institutions and does not necessarily reflect the gender relations of society as a whole (even though it can), but rather is institution-specific (Connell & Pearson, 2015, p. 73).

symbolism. The gender order[12] that dictates many of the social practices shows that these four dimensions of gender are often interrelated or have a direct causal relationship. For example, cultural symbolism reinforces the gender relations of power and how society and the individual are influenced by how power is allocated and whose opinions society values. On a micro-perspective, the gender regime of a particular institution demonstrates how that institution has chosen to adhere to or abrogate the gender order of society, which is often has a more traditional interpretation of gender. It is often not a clear answer, but rather a combination of different approaches that make an institution's gender regime more traditional or more progressive (Connell & Pearse, 2015).

The historical valuation of masculinity itself is an important part of how political theorists are fixated on the social construction of masculinity: the hierarchical binary exists because the powerful reinforce their power through the promotion of the ideal of those in power. "Masculine" traits have been given authority in IR theory because it is a method for those in control of the state to legitimize their power. Hegemonic masculinity is understood by the concept that the type of masculinity associated with those in power is considered desirable and, thus, should be replicated (Connell, 1993, p. 77). This type of masculinity can become noxious because it places masculinity (as culturally defined) above femininity (as culturally defined), which limits the range of masculinity that people can embody and or associate with masculinity (the same holds to the concept of femininity). But "the gender order is not and never has been immanent in biology. Rather it represents a particular historical response to human reproductive biology" (Connell, 1987, p. 286).

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[12] A gender order, in turn, is the gender relations of an entire society (Connell & Pearson, 2015, p. 73).

Similar to hegemonic masculinity, the hegemonic state in IR theory acts as a model for other states. Western IR theory is rooted in hegemonic masculinity, because those in power ("masculine" identity) perpetuate their power by focusing on what is seen as the most masculine as possible (hegemonic masculinity) through their approach to conceptions of power, authority, protection, sovereignty, self-interest and other concepts that are a part of IR theory. The U.S. benefits the most from this system, because of its unique position of power and strength in the world. Ideas such as sovereignty, freedom, and power need to and can be redefined to give more precise descriptions, which could alter statecraft and the ways state understand how to interact with each other.

The framework for the decision-making process for U.S. foreign policy developed out of a masculinist viewpoint, one that was trying to maintain its hegemonic masculinity on the system. The U.S. is in a unique position as the world's largest superpower, and it has an incentive to maintain its power in the way Western IR theory has taught it: through physical force, which is based off conceptions of gaining power by force. But by breaking down the conceptions of otherness, it is possible that less culturally masculinized methods of state interaction would occur. Instead of perceiving the world to be zero-sum, related to the realist perspective, the U.S. should consider mutual enablement between states and prioritize the global community over state sovereinty (Tickner, 1992, p. 65).

By using war as the basis for statecraft in Western IR theory, it privileges "masculine" characteristics and men's role in the world in U.S. foreign policy. Women in the U.S. have systematically been excluded from participating in war and in society since citizenship, in the past, had been connected to a combatant role and women have been not permitted to be combatants. Petereson asks, "Is militarism without masculinism possible?" (1992, p. 48). While

the answer is uncertain, it is clear that the state has perpetuated the gender-based hierarchy in society by acting on this militarism and using war as a method of statecraft to obtain what the state determines is in its self-interest. In essence, the state has glorified violence and thus it reinforces the "masculine" privilege that enables the masculinist perspective to be perpetuated without acknowledging other experiences and viewpoints.

When the Problem with the System Continues to Replicate Itself

This past fall, I took a 400-level Senior Seminar class for my major, called U.S. Foreign Policy. The issue of the replication of static two-option box highlighted when even in the classroom, with an expert teaching the future of the world (i.e. his students) my Government professor told his class to focus on the realist and liberal sections of a particular reading and "skip the section on constructivism" (GO432 Syllabus, 2016). How is anything supposed to change if youth—the future—are being taught to feed from the same (Western, masculinist) spoon generation after generation? I attend an elite liberal arts college with a heralded Government Department that has professors who are highly regarded in their respective fields of study. This phenomenon is not simply a problem of misguidedness. It is an abomination. We are molding a dismal future if we are only teaching our prospective leaders to continue to think of issues as two-sided (accepting variations on each side). In IR theory classes in the U.S. constructivism and feminist theory (as well as others) need to be discussed as much as realism and liberal theory are. How else will the system change and improve if we keep perpetuating the system? Some ownership needs to be taken to be able to redirect the path the world is currently following and invest in a better future.

A Call to Reconstruct the Foundation of

Western Political Thought Today More Than Ever

Globalization reemphasizes the need to review way the world is run right now. "Globalization has created the conditions for an ever more intense and activist transnational civil society that challenges the state as the dominant locus of identity and as the primary site of political mobilization" (Hurrell, 2007, p. 198). With globalization, more global governance is needed to tackle problems that warrant collective action and a sense of solidarity. The world today is in some ways and for many non-white, non-wealthy, non- "masculine" XY people, a dire place and seems to only be worsening. Climate change has and is exacting environmental devastation on the world. People live on less than two dollars a day. Poverty and hunger are not problems of the world's society, but rather features of it.

Ecological Concerns

The fact that climate change is one of the most pressing issues of our time should not be taken lightly. The effects of climate change could negate this whole paper, because without a world there are no states, politics, or international organizations. It completely changes the equation—the equation of the way the world is run and the way things are valued—in ways that were never considered before. Climate change is comprehensive, because it affects everyone, everything and the very reason we live to begin with because we have the world to live. It is unpredictable, because it is such a gargantuan and severe problem that it is extremely difficult to solve and, in addition that so much damage has already been done that humans are only trying to ameliorate now. Climate change is a chronic issue because it is a long-lasting issue that does not have an expiration date. Ultimately, ecological concerns basically are reduced to humans versus

climate change and in this unique case there can only be one winner. Climate change has the potential to exact damage on such a large scale that reform or symptom relief would be futile, which also means that it has the potential to change the physical geography of the world and sabotage the current system of social and economic organization for good (Hurrell, 2007, p. 219). The climate change problem is so significant because it questions the very nature and legitimacy of the state-based global order of the world today, as well as the way it has already inadvertently portended what the new world order should look like, by inherently promoting international cooperation and global governance among countries of the world more than any state has experienced before (Hurrell, 2007, p. 218).

If society in the U.S. thought of the world as a "community of all beings supported by the earth," (Shiva, 2005, p. 1) then the U.S. would take a different approach to tackling the negative effects of climate change—a more serious, time-sensitive and urgent one (and through transitive property, other countries would do the same).

The world should not be perceived as an amalgamation of private property units, like the U.S. does, but as a planet made up of commons (Shiva, 2005, p. 2). Similarly, "in contrast to experiencing the world as a global supermarket, where goods and services are produced with high ecological, social, and economic costs and sold for abysmally low prices" cultures and communities *should* react against the "destruction of their biological and cultural diversity" (Shiva, 2005, p. 2). Instead of promoting a free market economy on a global scale that is "based on plundering and polluting the earth's vital resources," communities—and U.S. policy-makers, politicians and influencers—should promote "living economies that protect life on earth and promote creativity" (Shiva, 2005, p. 2). In fact, why is the command of the commons even a term we use?

"Instead of a culture of abundance, profit-driven globalization creates cultures of exclusion, dispossession, and scarcity…globalization's transformation of all beings and resources into commodities robs diverse species and people of their rightful share of ecological, cultural, economic and political space. The 'ownership' of the rich is based on the 'dispossession' of the poor—it is the common, public resources of the poor which are privatized, and the poor who are disowned economically, politically, and culturally" (Shiva, 2005, p. 2-3).[13]

The need to uproot the masculinist mindset created in Western political theory, economics and Western IR theory is starker than ever.

The West, and the U.S. especially, need to learn that they do not have a stronger claim on the future than anything else. It is true that they imposed their political and economic beliefs onto much of the rest of the world, and thus have a stronger hold on molding what the future of the world will look like. "Now, however, they have to both acknowledge that not all of this was either good or well done, and let the rest of the world experiment on how best to accommodate its various cultural and historical characteristics to the Western legacy" (Buzan, 2011, p. 22).

At the end of the day, feminism is needed to uproot this wealthy, white man's perspective on what is natural and how the world should work. Western political theory's analysis of human nature, which is replicated in neoclassical economic theory and perpetuated in Western IR theory, is based on socially constructed notions of gender. But gender is one form of perpetuating the patriarchal power relations of Western society. "Gender is what gender means" (MacKinnnon, 1987, p. 173). It can mean whatever we want it to mean and is only understood in the context of power relations. With Hannah Arendt's political philosophy, we can reorient how to perceive politics, power and the world. While Arendt may not have claimed that her theoretical perspectives were feminist, feminism realizes the value of her alternate way of perceiving the world. The dominant and traditional viewpoint of Western political thought has

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[13] For more information about the concepts mentioned in this section, read *Earth Democracy: Justice, Sustainability, and Peace* written by Vandana Shiva (Cambridge: South End Press, 2005).

grave repercussions for what humans and states think they can do. But Wendt, Hurrell, Arendt

and others show how the range of potential for human nature and state behavior is much wider

and we can hold people and states to a higher (normative) standard.

The U.S. is in a unique position in the world today. Instead of abusing its position and

power, it can harness the power and influence it has developed, cultivated and perpetuated for

the greater good.

> "The international community has a legitimate role in ensuring that governmental power
> is not abused, in setting human rights standards, and in reviewing compliance with those
> standards. If external involvement is extended beyond this into the detailed ways in
> which policies are chosen and implemented, the central liberal principals of
> representation, of accountability, of pluralism and the respect for diversity will be
> undermined" (Hurrell, 2007, p. 163).

This can be transferred to specifically, and especially, the U.S. It means that based on the

lucky nature of its geographic location, history and nature of world wars, rates of development,

otherwise known as macro-factors—not micro-decision-making—that this does not qualify them

to feel like their belief systems are necessarily convincing, and better, than the rest of the

world's. This explains why global governance is needed and needed in a new light. Global

governance can be defined as an answer to the "increasingly serious collective action problems

generated by growing societal, ecological, and economic interdependence" (Hurrell, 2007, p.

15). An emphasis on collective security necessitates a mutual understanding of "what kinds of

force have been proscribed" as well as a mutual acceptance that "a threat to the peace threatens

the interests of all states" (Hurrell, 2007, p. 169). This refocus and reconstruction is critical for a

better, more effective and safer world.

Aristotle did not fail in some of his intellectual musings. He said, "The whole is greater

than the sum of its parts." This mindset should be applied to the international system. The power

of the international system should be mobilized in a way that benefits the whole community to

achieve a common social goal (Hurrell, 2007, p. 165). States should have multilateral security institutions that serve dual purposes: material responsibilities of security management as well as the political responsibilities in order to obtain the soft power and authority that solely hard power is unable to effectively attain (Hurrell, 2007, 192). Soft power refers to the intangible authority, legitimacy and power of a country. Hard power, alternatively, is determined by strength of a country's military and its economic power.

What does prioritizing international society and thus prioritizing a step towards global governance look like? It looks like a basic set of human rights that establishes the impetus for international action, as opposed to the white masculinist interpretation of the basic set of human rights and moral code idealistically called democracy:

> "There has to be a difference in a world of cultural, religious, and social diversity between proscribing and preventing manifest violations of human rights and externally seeking to dictate the ways in which societies organize themselves and determine their priorities and values" (Hurrell, 2007, p. 163).

No one country or one political ideology has the special key or blueprint to the best moral code or way of living. Norms determine culture much more than biology (Horwitz, 2016). The fact that the West has been historically successful economically and politically does not, in turn, validate the notion it has the key to how to live as well as how to run the world. The U.S.' liberal democracy, while it does have many attributes and principles to replicate, is not *the* paradigm. It is *a* paradigm.

It is time to take a step back and realize that the West does not have a monopoly on what is the best answer to everything. States are created things. Now that we have studied the history of how and why states developed in Europe, we can understand how norms, values and culture— all created entities—reinforced masculinist Western political theory through the establishment of Western IR theory in the Western world. Feminism exposes the notion that what works for some

people may not work for others and that **success in the way that the powerful defines it only makes the powerful more successful.** While masculinism would have us believe that humans and states have very little choice in how they act and how others will act, a feminist-inspired reading of Western political thought shows how very little is actually inevitable when it comes to this theoretical perspective. Choices do exist. In fact, they have always existed. Thus, if the U.S. is serious about achieving some of its goals of liberal democracy, world peace and ending world hunger etc., it needs to reconstruct its values, norms and aspirations that permeate its U.S. foreign policy and embrace a reorientation of its preconceived notions and assumptions. Remember, it is a choice.

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