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Demographics as Destiny: Modeling Population Change and Party Strategies on the Electoral Map, 2016-2040

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"A politician thinks of the next election; a statesman thinks of the next generation."
–James Freeman Clark

"Votes are like trees, if you are trying to build a forest. If you have more trees than you have forests, then at that point the pollsters will probably say you will win."
–Vice President Dan Quayle

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Abstract

This thesis examines the ways demographic change will affect presidential elections over the next 25 years. It utilizes a detailed, interactive model to project the electoral effects of demographic growth in every presidential election from 2016 to 2040; the model allows me to simulate how voting rates by demographic groups might be altered by changes in party strategies. The two alternative Republican strategies this model simulates are a "doubling down" on white voters and a "diversified coalition" approach, where Republicans would reach out to minorities to build a coalition better suited to America's growing diversity.

The model's results indicate that, with current voting patterns, demographic change (especially Hispanic growth) will keep Democrats in the White House through 2040. The “double down” strategy could lead to Republican victories if the party were able to attract a record share of white votes; the strategy carries significant long-term risks for Republicans. A “diverse coalition” would position the GOP to capitalize on demographic shifts and provide the party with more long-term flexibility. Beyond partisan electoral success and failure, a racially polarizing “double down” strategy has the potential to cause deep and lasting damage to America's democratic values.

I. Introduction

For a variety of reasons, a growing number of American presidential elections are being effectively decided long before anyone sets foot in a voting booth. Demographic patterns, ethnic trends, and partisan leanings—all increasingly identifiable through modern technology—reliably sort a majority of the nation into solidly red or blue states. In our winner-take-all Electoral College system, those red and blue states fall by the wayside as candidates devote the preponderance of their time and money to a handful of swing states and a fraction of the electorate. The size or exact grouping of battleground states may vary slightly from election to election, but it has become a cliché in presidential politics that just as the path to the nomination passes through Iowa and New Hampshire, the road to the While House runs through Florida and Ohio.

But as the tectonic plates of America's demographics shift rapidly and irreversibly over the next several decades, the electoral landscape they support will inevitably show the effects. Currently receiving a paltry 20% of the minority vote in a nation projected to become majority-minority over the next 30 years, the Republican Party clearly has a serious demographics problem. White voters who have served as the bulwark of the Republican Party for the past half-century are seeing their power rapidly diminish as their share of the electorate shrinks. As *The Atlantic's* Derek Thompson points out, in 1988 Michael Dukakis lost the white vote by 19 percentage points and was steamrolled by Ronald Reagan, winning only 111 electoral votes. In 2012, President Obama lost the white vote by a slightly larger margin of 20 points, but tripled Dukakis' 111 with 332 electoral votes (Thompson 2012). With its current electoral strategy and bases of support, the GOP

will find itself facing increasingly untenable electoral math as the share of the white vote continues to decrease.

Historically, our political parties have demonstrated a remarkable capacity over time to reinvent or realign themselves when the electoral scales start to tip against them (Sundquist 1983): from Roosevelt's creation of the New Deal coalition to the Republican Party's capture of Southern whites after the Great Society to Bill Clinton's luring back of Reagan Democrats to his "Third Way" after a disastrous 1980s. Thus while the GOP's demographic problem is serious, the party is unlikely to go the way of the Whigs. But having lost the popular vote in five of the past six elections, they cannot afford to ignore it much longer.

While America's demographic trends are well documented and there exists a general consensus that they will prove problematic for Republicans, few researchers have attempted to project specifically how these changes will affect the presidential electoral map: which swing states will turn solid for one party or the other and when, which safe states will turn into toss-ups, or more generally how these changes will affect the electoral calculus in the race to 270 electoral votes. The goal of this thesis is to build a model that helps to answer those questions.

The model developed in this thesis projects state and race/ethnicity specific population growth in order to capture the changing size, demographic composition, and geographic distribution of each major group in the American electorate. It then adds recent data on national and state-level voter registration and turnout, exit polling, and partisan voting patterns to project the electoral map in every presidential election through 2040. Producing estimates of everything from the number of black Democratic votes in Georgia to

the full count of electoral votes nationwide, the model can project the effects of current demographic trends on the electoral map, and then be manipulated to approximate the additional impact of specific changes in policy positions and political strategies.

Recent electoral results inform several *a priori* expectations for these projections. Covered more extensively in the literature review, the general trends have been that white voters lean solidly Republican (recently, at a ratio of about three-to-two) while minorities—especially blacks—support Democrats by much greater margins, at a ratio of roughly four to one in recent elections. As America's demographic composition shifts, the Hispanic share of the population is expected to nearly double by 2040 while the white share declines and the black share holds roughly constant.

These demographic shifts are not spread evenly across the country, but are especially concentrated in the "New Sun Belt" of the Southeast and Mountain West, which is growing and diversifying rapidly through both immigration and domestic migration (Teixeira 2015). This concentration carries substantial electoral importance because battleground states Nevada, Florida, Colorado, and North Carolina are among the top ten states in projected population growth (2010-2040), along with potentially purpling Republican strongholds Arizona, Georgia, and Texas (Cooper Center 2012). Nevada, North Carolina, and Georgia also have the three highest Hispanic population growth rates, with the Hispanic population in each state projected to nearly triple over that period.

Looking at those trends in combination, it seems clear that—if current voting patterns hold constant—demographic change will turn red states purple and purple states blue, uniformly favoring Democrats and graphically illustrating the GOP's burgeoning

demographic problem. Given that they already earned an electoral majority in 2012, Democrats should continue to win, and by steadily increasing margins.

The second expectation is that Republicans, who have already lost two consecutive elections with more favorable demographics, will eventually accept that the status quo is untenable and move in one of two directions. The first is to invest seriously in winning back a viable share of the minority vote. The GOP's 2012 election post-mortem report partially acknowledged the party's demographic problem and prompted the launch of a "Growth and Opportunity Project" that includes nearly $10 million per month in minority outreach. Yet a true strategic change would require far more resources and, more importantly, significant changes to the party's stance on several key issues, such as support for comprehensive immigration reform (a critical issue for Hispanics) and a softening of the party's stance towards voter ID laws, the social safety net and income inequality. Mitt Romney's disparaging comments about "the 47%" constituted a major gaffe but resonated with the public as reflective of the party's writing-off of large sections of the electorate, especially minorities. Republicans will not only need to change that perception to win back minority votes; they must also negotiate the inevitable tradeoff with their current base. Immigration reform and safety net programs crucial to competing for minority voters are deeply unpopular with the GOP's conservative core, constituting a substantial risk to both their share and the turnout levels of the white vote. This thesis will demonstrate that, although certainly risky, this effort to build a racially diverse coalition represents the GOP's best chance to capitalize on America's demographic changes and build strength for the long haul.

This strategy appears to make the most long-term sense considering the decreasing white share of the population, but some have argued that Republicans' best strategy is to move in the completely opposite direction. Among others, *RealClearPolitics*' Sean Trende advocates a "racial polarization scenario" in which Republicans concede the minority vote in order to "double down" on white voters (Trende 2013). This double down would embrace the GOP's role as the party of white people—88% of Republican voters in 2012 were white—and strive to improve upon their majority of the white electorate. This strategy may seem shortsighted in light of America's rapidly changing demographics, but Trende has laid out a scenario in which this double down could win Republicans the White House in every election through 2040.

These discussions lead to a number of questions that our model can test. Where—and how quickly—will the map turn blue, assuming current party positioning? If Republicans embrace immigration reform, how much of the Hispanic vote will they need to peel off to alter the electoral map in their favor? If they go all in on white voters, how great will that margin need to be to hold off a growing and increasingly hostile minority electorate? The model will run each scenario on every presidential election from 2016 to 2040 to help answer these questions, and more.

II. Previous Literature

Demographic Projections

The literature on demographic projections is largely based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Using somewhat different statistical methods, detailed data from decennial national censuses are utilized by a number of researchers to project future population

growth and shifts. The University of Virginia's Demographics Research Group, for example, uses the Hamilton-Perry method—a reduced form of the cohort component method that captures the major components of population change (births, deaths, and migration)—to produce detailed state level projections for 2020, 2030, and 2040 (Cooper Center 2012; Hamilton and Perry 1962). It predicts the total national population will rise from 308 million in 2010 to 382 million in 2040, with much of that growth attributed to the Hispanic population more than doubling from 50 million to 106 million over that period. The African American population, projected nationally and state-by-state, will also increase from 40 million to 50 million, but while staying relatively constant as a percentage of total population (Cooper Center 2012). The states projected to grow most rapidly are concentrated largely in the "New Sunbelt" across the Mountain West and Southeast, while the slowest growing states lie in the "Heartland," defined as the mid-Atlantic, Deep South, Midwest, Great Plains, and parts of New England (Teixeira 2015).

The Congressional Research Service's 2011 projections analyze current and historical growth, birth, death, and net immigration rates from decennial censuses to produce national projections through 2050 (Shrestha and Heisler 2011). These projections predict the Hispanic share of the population exploding from 12.6% in 2000 to 30.2% in 2050, as the national population grows to approximately 404 million by 2040 and 440 million by 2050 (Shrestha and Heisler 2011, 2, 22). They also forecast the African American population to increase from 39.9 to 52.9 million, with its share of the national population holding constant at 13%.

The Pew Hispanic Center uses a variant of the cohort-component model (which carries forward the current population by adding births and immigrants, while subtracting

deaths and emigrants), modified by Edmonston and Passel to incorporate immigrant generations (Passel and Cohn 2008; Edmonston and Passel 1992). It predicts the national population will rise from 296 million in 2005 to 438 million in 2050, with 82% of that growth attributable to new immigrants and their U.S.-born descendants (Passel and Cohn 2008, 1). According to their projections, the Hispanic share of the population will increase from 14% to 29% over that span, and by 2050 whites will become a minority (Passel and Cohn 2008, 1).

The three different sets of projections use complex forecasting models to estimate generally similar results, with the most notable difference being that the Cooper Center's model projects a slightly slower overall population growth rate. Variation between the three models can be attributed not only to complex methodological differences in estimating long-term birth, death, and immigration rates, but also to the use of different datasets. The Congressional Research Service and Pew Hispanic Center cited 2008 projections based off 2000 Census data, while the Cooper Center utilized data from the 2010 Census for its forecasts. None can be proved to be objectively more accurate than the other, but all reach similar conclusions about national trends and especially the explosive growth of the Hispanic population over the next three decades.

Latino Voting

Literature examining historical Latino voter turnout and patterns has largely agreed on two main conclusions: first, that lack of citizenship and socioeconomic factors have lowered the number of eligible and likely voters, causing the Latino share of the electorate

to lag significantly behind its population percentage (Highton and Burris 2002) and, second, that the Latino vote skews reliably Democratic (Espino et al. 2007).

As of 2014, a record 25.2 million Latinos were eligible to vote, comprising 11% of all eligible voters nationwide (Lopez et al. 2014). It is important to note here the difference between voting age population (VAP) and voting eligible population (VEP). The VAP is defined by the Census Bureau as anyone over the age of 18 residing in the United States. VEP is a term coined by Michael McDonald of the United States Election Project that adjusts the VAP to remove adults who are ineligible to vote, mostly noncitizens and felons (McDonald 2014). The large immigrant share of the Hispanic population and high incarceration rates for minorities cause VEP to underrepresent Hispanics and blacks relative to their shares of the population, and so has specific relevance when analyzing voting and elections. From here on, statistics for shares of the electorate and voter turnout rates refer to the VEP.

The Hispanic electorate is growing rapidly, with that 11% share up from 10.1% in 2010 and 8.6% in 2006 (Lopez et al. 2014). Despite this increasing share of the electorate, overall turnout for the group remains low; in the most recent presidential election, for example, fewer than half of eligible Latinos, 11.2 of 23.3 million, cast a vote (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013). In the same year, the turnout rate was 66.6% for blacks and 64.1% for whites but for Hispanics has never cracked 50% and is only up four percentage points over the past five presidential elections (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013). A common explanation for this disparity is socioeconomic, with DeSipio (1996) writing, “Latinos are more likely to have large components of the population with characteristics that predict high levels of nonvoting: relative youth, low levels of income, and low levels of

formal education" (61). Previous research by Calvo and Rosenstone (1989) found that higher income and educational levels correlated to an increased probability of Hispanic voting, but this correlation is weaker for Hispanics than for other groups, implying that socioeconomic factors fail to fully explain low Hispanic turnout. Arvizu and Garcia (1996) suggest that Calvo and Rosenstone's class bias has been further compounded by a type of generation gap—one in which lower levels of income combine with the relative youth of Hispanic voters to depress turnout, which reflects "society's failure to adequately retain and educate young Latinos for those socioeconomic positions that pave the way for future political participation" (122).

A parallel but contentious approach focuses on psychological and nativity factors as drivers of low turnout. Espino et al. (2007) argue that two centuries of discrimination as well as Latinos' desire to maintain aspects of their cultural identity have prevented their full assimilation into the American political system. Similarly, Nelson (1979) has offered the explanation of a "weak participation culture," although that hypothesis has since been refuted (Garcia and Arce 1988). Also in dispute is the effect of nativity on turnout. Tam Cho (1999) hypothesizes that foreign-born citizens have less experience with and exposure to the American political system than the native-born, making voting more difficult. But DeSipio (1996) disagrees, arguing that naturalized citizens have historically made a conscious choice and effort to transfer their loyalty to the United States, and that this choice demonstrates psychological and patriotic factors that—in addition to proficiency in English and knowledge of U.S. civics—often correlate to higher turnout. Despite the low turnout rate, the 11.2 million Latino voters in 2012 represented an all-time high, with the

Hispanic share of the electorate increasing from 7.4% in 2008 to 8.4% in 2012 (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013).

Yet while that 8.4% Hispanic share of the electorate is exceedingly low given that Hispanics make up 17.2% of the nation's population (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013), there are reasons to believe Latino turnout will increase drastically in the near future. With a median age of 27 compared to 42 for whites, generational replacement is predicted to fuel a rapid increase in Latino turnout (Taylor et al. 2012). Of the 40 million Hispanics in the U.S. who did not or were not eligible to vote in 2012, 17.6 million were under the age of 18. Of those, 800,000 are turning 18 each year and the vast majority (93%) are U.S.-born citizens—which could potentially add 16 million new Latino voters to the electorate by 2030 (Taylor et al. 2012).

An additional 5.4 million are adult legal permanent residents who currently have the potential to become naturalized citizens, while an estimated 7.1 million unauthorized immigrants could become eligible if Congress were to pass an immigration reform package that creates a pathway to citizenship (Taylor et al. 2012). With a Pew Hispanic Center survey finding that nearly all (93%) of Hispanic immigrants say they would naturalize if they could, the latent potential to considerably expand the Latino electorate in the coming years is significant (Taylor et al. 2012).

It is important to note that these changes are purely demographic and do not necessarily imply any effect on individual participation or voting rates; indeed Arvizu and Garcia (1996) have questioned whether society is adequately preparing young Latinos for political participation. But even if turnout rates do not improve, the sheer magnitude of this expansion in population numbers has the potential to alter the electoral landscape, as

projections have Hispanics accounting for 40% of the growth in the eligible electorate between now and 2030, nearly doubling in size from 23.7 million to 40 million (Taylor et al. 2012).

That news bodes well for Democrats because Hispanic voters have historically supported their party by wide margins. Barack Obama won 71% of the Hispanic vote in 2012, and only once in the past eight presidential elections has the Democratic candidate failed to garner at least 60% of the Hispanic vote (John Kerry received 58% in 2004).

Recent support for Democrats has been portrayed as a combination of both demographics and policy. Young and poor voters tend to skew strongly Democratic, and Latino voters are both younger and have substantially lower incomes than the average voter (Lopez and Taylor 2012). The most common policy explanation is the solidifying party alignment of Democrats and Republicans as, respectively, for and against immigration reform, which a third of Latino independents view as one of the top two political issues for their community (Preuhs 2012).

Hispanic support for immigration reform is nearly unanimous, with recent polls finding that 86% of Latino voters support a path to citizenship (Roque 2012), and Le (2012) suggesting that in the 2012 election Governor Romney's stance against immigration reform drained away his support among Hispanics. A poll of Hispanic independents supported these conclusions, finding that Governor Romney's immigration positions made 57% "less enthusiastic" about voting for him, and only 8% "more enthusiastic" (Preuhs 2012). The same poll found that President Obama's executive order on deferred action had a positive impact on 46% of Hispanic independents and a negative impact on only 6% (Preuhs 2012). If Republicans were to embrace comprehensive immigration reform, 40%

say they would be more likely to vote for a Republican candidate (Preuhs 2012). With the Latino electorate set to double by 2030, continued opposition to such reform may prove politically untenable for Republican presidential candidates.

Black and White Voting

Although not growing as rapidly as its Hispanic counterpart, high voter turnout rates and strong party identification help make the black electorate the bedrock of the Democratic voting base. Currently just under 40 million, the black population in America continues to grow, but at a decreasing rate—dropping from 17% growth in the 1990s to 12% in the first decade of the 2000s (Esri 2012). In strong contrast to Hispanics, black population growth is not being fueled by children; between 2000 and 2010 the black child population actually decreased, indicative of an aging population (Esri 2012). Blacks currently comprise 12.5% of the population, a figure that is expected to stay roughly constant through 2040, which means they will account for around 10 million of the 75 million-person increase in the total national population, including those below the voting age (Cooper Center 2012). As the U.S. pushes closer to becoming a majority-minority nation sometime in the 2040s, a vast majority of that change will be attributable to Latino growth decreasing the white share of the population, while the black share stays constant (Cooper Center 2012).

Yet while other minority groups punch below their weight in presidential elections, the black turnout rate in 2012 actually surpassed white turnout for the first time in history. Blacks accounted for 13% of the votes as 12% of the eligible electorate, a "growing electoral clout" the Pew Center attributes to participation more than demographics (Taylor

2012). As turnout rates for other demographic groups have stagnated or minimally increased over the past five presidential elections, black turnout has risen rapidly and consistently—from 53% in 1996 to 66.2% in 2012. (Census Bureau 2013).

Much of that increase can certainly be attributed to Barack Obama's historic presence on the ballot in 2008 and 2012, as previous studies (Herron and Sekhon 2005; Atkins et al. 1985) have found that black candidates significantly increase interest and turnout among black voters. But it is also key to note that while black turnout increased 6.6% in the two elections President Obama was on the ballot (from 60% in 2004 to 66.2% in 2012), it actually increased *more* in the two previous elections (from 53% to 60%), without an African American on the ballot—a result in conflict with Philpot's (2009) finding that blacks' sense of government's responsiveness and their own political efficacy has significantly declined over the past few decades. In comparing shares of the voting population to that of the eligible electorate, blacks have in fact gone from being underrepresented by one percent to becoming overrepresented—a term not historically associated with black voting—by roughly one percent (Census Bureau 2013).

Despite these encouraging increases in black voter turnout, significant obstacles and limitations remain. One out of every 13 otherwise eligible African Americans is disenfranchised due to a past felony conviction, a rate four times greater than the rest of the nation (Morris 2014). In Florida, a key presidential swing state, that figure is nearly one in four (Morris 2014). A recent slew of voter identification laws pushed by Republican legislatures has further depressed black turnout, with a report by the Government Accountability Office finding that fewer blacks have the necessary identification to obtain a ballot and that black turnout is significantly more adversely affected by recent changes in

the law than is white turnout (Wilson 2014). A quarter of elderly African Americans lack the necessary voter identification under new laws, compared to only 8% of whites (Morris 2014). Examining the restrictions of these laws, Barreto, Nuno, and Sanchez (2007) found that blacks were significantly less likely than whites to have the required identification, and Alvarez et al. (2008) discovered blacks are much more likely than whites to be asked for identification, regardless of a state's law.

Ostensibly politically neutral, these Republican-supported laws are often alleged to be motivated by concealed partisan motivations. High minority—especially black—turnout is indeed usually bad for Republicans, as none of their presidential candidates has gotten more than 15% of the black vote since the passage of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts a half-century ago. Fauntroy (2008) bluntly attributes this dismal showing to a message from Republicans to African Americans that "the party embodies a racial conservatism and behavioral norms that oppose black progress and equality" (128).

While the black electorate may not be growing as rapidly as its Hispanic counterpart, improving turnout and a solidified share of the population should continue to fuel substantial voting power for the foreseeable future.

Electoral Scenarios

While much attention is devoted to the growing demographic share and electoral clout of America's minorities, the fact remains that roughly two-thirds of the population and three-quarters of our nation's voters are white—a share of the electorate three times the size of the Hispanic and African American shares combined—comprising a significant, albeit shrinking, majority over the next several decades (Abrajano 2014).

The rapid growth of minority groups, coupled with those groups' strong support for Democrats, represents a ticking demographic time bomb for Republican presidential aspirations, but the party has not yet decided whether to reach out to these blacks and Latinos, or to "double down" on the white vote.

Some point to a long-term decline of white support for Democrats, culminating with Governor Romney's 20-point advantage in 2012, to suggest that a "racial polarization scenario" could benefit Republican candidates. In this scenario, Republicans would essentially concede the minority vote to gradually widen their margin of victory among white voters. This margin would increase from Romney's 20-point advantage in 2012 to 30 and then eventually even 40 points, with the GOP candidate winning the white vote in 2036 and beyond by a margin of 70-30 (Trende 2013). According to Trende, Republicans would win an electoral majority in every presidential election through 2040.

A main criticism of that theory, however, is that it relies on a metric called the Partisan Voting Index, which measures the gap between the Democratic margin in the overall electorate and the Democratic margin among white voters (Abramowitz and Teixeira 2013). The Trende (2013) theory points to the PVI becoming increasingly negative over time as proof of white flight from the Democratic Party, but Abramowitz and Teixeira's rebuttal argues that PVI fails to account for the increasing nonwhite share of the electorate, making it seem that white voters are becoming more Republican than they actually are.

To illustrate their point, Abramowitz and Teixeira point out that the PVI of the white vote in 2012 (-24) was far more negative than it was in 1988 (-13). In Trende's eyes, this "worse" showing among white voters would indicate white flight from the Democratic

Party, but Abramowitz and Teixeira note that Democratic margins among both whites and nonwhites were essentially the same in each election, and that the PVI change is a statistical illusion propagated by the fact that the nonwhite share of voters nearly doubled over that period (from 15% to 28%). Even if Democratic margins among white voters were held constant, in other words, their PVI would decrease artificially as minority population growth increased the overall Democratic margin, thus making white support look diminished only in comparison.

This rebuttal study argued further that in this party polarization scenario, Republicans would need to win ever-increasing and near-historic shares of the white vote, a task made exceedingly difficult by strong party loyalty and polarization, and concluded that "doubling down" on white voters could prove politically disastrous for Republicans in the long term (Abramowitz and Teixeira 2013).

Only one interactive model exists that is comparable to the one developed for this thesis, a model built by Nate Silver at *FiveThirtyEight* (2013). Silver's model projects presidential elections through 2048, and includes sliders to adjust growth rates and levels of party support for demographic groups manually. However, his model had to compensate for incomplete poll data, with Silver choosing to rely on, in his words, "various forms of extrapolation and interpolation to fill in the missing data points" although he did not offer much explanation of those techniques.

Aside from potentially using different methods to predict voter behavior, one major difference between my model and Silver's is that his predicts racial population growth on a standardized national level—meaning that Hispanic population grows across time at the same annual rate in California as it does in Alabama. This methodology contrasts sharply

with the more detailed and heterogeneous state-level data of the Cooper Center, which predicts national Hispanic growth of 111% between 2010 and 2040, but has state-by-state growth rates ranging widely from New York and New Mexico at 74% and 79% to North Carolina and Nevada at 174% and 180%. If the Cooper Center's estimates are correct, using state-level data (which my model does) should result in more accurate and representative projections than Silver's over the long run.

III. Model Methodology

Estimating Population

The Demographics Research Group at the University of Virginia's Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service has released detailed decennial population projections for the years 2020-2040 (Cooper Center 2012).[1] Their calculations are based on 2010 census data and project trends at national and state levels, detailing changes in subgroups by race and ethnicity.

The first challenge in building my comprehensive model was that the Cooper Center produces separate projections for race and ethnicity, with the ethnicity subgroups divided as Hispanic and non-Hispanic and the race groups as white, black, Asian, and other, but with no category for Hispanics. To build a comprehensive model, I had to reconcile those two sets of projections to find the appropriate shares of the population that are white, black, Hispanic, and Asian.[2] This was done by examining 2010 census data, by state, of non-

[1] Unlike the other national projections cited in the literature review, the Cooper Center provides detailed datasets for replication and manipulation.

[2] Asians are the fourth largest racial/ethnic group in America, casting 2.9% of the votes in 2012. Far less literature and data are available on Asian voting, so for simplicity this paper

Hispanic citizens (Appendix I). For the nation and each state, the number of white, black, and Asian non-Hispanic residents was then divided by the total number of non-Hispanic residents in each state to estimate shares of the population for each group. For example, Florida in 2010 had 10,925,528 white residents, 2,873,547 black residents, and 456,558 Asian residents, out of a total of 14,577,504 non-Hispanic residents. The population of each group was divided by the non-Hispanic total to create shares for each group: 74.9% white, 19.7% black, and 3.1% Asian.[3] Nationally, these ratios were 76.4% white, 14.7% black, and 5.7% Asian. These race shares are then multiplied by the Cooper Center's 2010 non-Hispanic populations to create estimates for each group in each state. Because the Cooper Center uses the same 2010 census data, these shares are not required for 2010, but will be needed to calculate group shares in all future years, since the Cooper Center's ethnicity projections are divided only into Hispanic and non-Hispanic categories.

These non-Hispanic shares change over time, but future estimates only exist at the national level. The Census Bureau has projected estimates for every five years and over the course of this study (2010-2040) the white share is expected to decrease from 76.4% to 67.6% as the black and Asian shares rise from 14.7% and 5.7% to 17.5% and 9.9%, respectively. To capture this demographic shift at the state level, 2010 state estimates are weighted by the change in the national ratio. For example, to calculate the 2040 state ratios

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will focus on the three largest groups. In 2012, Asian voting patterns were remarkably similar to Hispanic patterns: 67.6% of adults were eligible to vote, 47.3% of eligible voters cast a ballot, and 73% supported President Obama (compared to 66%, 48%, and 72% for Hispanics). Included to produce correct vote totals and maximum accuracy in the 2012 model, those figures will be held constant for future projections.

[3] The shares do not add up to 100% because a small fraction of the population—3.2% nationally—identified as American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or multiple races. Those groups are not included in this model, but the results section will discuss possible effects of their omission.

in Florida, the 2010 white ratio (74.9%) is multiplied by the overall change in the national white ratio (which decreased from 76.4% to 67.6%, so 67.6/76.4 = .8848) to estimate a 2040 Florida ratio of 66.3% white (74.9% * .8848). The calculations are repeated for each racial group in each state, and are factored into the Cooper Center's decennial projections. Extrapolating racial shares in this manner allows us to account for national demographic shifts while still preserving the proportional racial distributions unique to each state.[4]

Once the ratios are used to separate the Cooper Center's non-Hispanic estimates into white and black groups, we now have total population estimates by state for each major racial/ethnic group. For the 2012 projection, population statistics are interpolated from the Cooper Center's 2010 and 2020 projections, weighing 20% of the change that will occur over that period (2010 numbers + [2020 numbers-2010 numbers] * .2). For a 2016 projection, that weight would thus be .6.

Projecting Vote Totals

The next step is to calculate the voting age population (VAP) and voting eligible population (VEP). The Census Bureau conducts an annual American Community Survey that includes data on the "Voting Age Population By Citizenship and Race." Results include the total, adult, citizen, and voting age citizen populations for each racial and ethnic group in each state. To calculate VAP ratios for each group, adult population was divided by total population, and to calculate group's VEP ratio, citizen voting age population was divided by

[4] The Cooper Center's data track geographic movement of Hispanics and non-Hispanics, but do not separate the non-Hispanic group into separate racial cohorts. No other data were found projecting future changes to the white/black composition of the non-Hispanic population at the state level, so 2012 white/black state compositions are held constant through this model.

total population. Thus the VAP share represents the adult population and VEP the adult citizen share.[5] The calculated VAP shares highlight the age differences between the groups, as just 66% of Hispanics were 18 or older, compared to 73% of blacks, 78% of Asians, and 80% of whites.[6] VEP shares capture differences in both age and citizenship status, with only 44% of Hispanics and 53% of Asians eligible to vote, compared to 71% of blacks and 79% of whites. Also important to note is that while the Hispanic electorate reached a record size of nearly 24 million in 2012, more than 12 million adult Hispanics remained ineligible to vote. Some iterations of this model will estimate the potential effects of immigration reform on this cohort.

Voter registration and reported voting statistics come from the Census Bureau's November 2012 Current Population Survey, and provide detail at the state level and by racial groups (Appendix I). In 2012, turnout as a percentage of VEP was 66.2% for blacks, 64.1% for whites, 48% for Hispanics, and 47.3% for Asians. Most states had race-specific rates, but for some small groups in certain states (e.g. Black voters in Maine) the sample size was not large enough for a reliable result and the national rate for that racial group was substituted in its place. For each state, turnout rates for each group were multiplied by that group's state VEP to produce vote total estimates. Each rate can be manipulated manually in each iteration of the model, and the Hispanic Turnout Projection will examine

[5] The Census Bureau's data here did not account for the millions of disenfranchised felons. The voting rates used in this model (also from the Census Bureau) are measured as a percentage of *all* adult citizens, thereby endogenizing the disenfranchisement effect in voting rates.

[6] These ratios are almost certain to change, especially for the Hispanic population. They are a variable that can be played with in various iterations of the model, but I could not find specific data for future projected race-specific VAP ratios.

the effect of Hispanic turnout rates potentially rising to converge with the rates for the other races.

Party Voting

With the number of votes for each group calculated, the next step is to estimate which party they go to. The problem here is the lack of comprehensive state-level, race-specific exit polling. Although such exit polling was conducted in every state and the District of Columbia in 2008, only 31 states were surveyed in 2012.[7] Many of those polls also failed to collect adequate sample sizes for minorities. State-level polling is only available for blacks in 28 states in 2008 and 18 states in 2012, and for Hispanics only in 13 states in 2008 and 14 in 2012.

The next section will cover the methodology used for predicting voting patterns in states without polling data, but it is important to note that the states with polling data for minority groups generally correlated to either the presence of a large minority group population in a state or the state's role as a battleground state. Thus there is Hispanic polling data available for Colorado, Florida, and Virginia, but not for Alaska, Idaho, or Utah. General results will be covered later, but for potential swing states with a sizeable Hispanic minority, it is significant that the model correctly predicted 2012 voting margins in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia within 1% of the actual results (Colorado was the only one of these states off by greater than 1%, at 1.82%) and the model correctly predicted the victorious party in all of these states. The states with

[7] Polling statistics are a composite of CNN and New York Times exit polling results. For the purposes of analysis, D.C. will be considered the 51st state.

the greatest potential bias were those least likely to affect the model: states either with a minute Hispanic population or so partisan that nobody bothered to pay for detailed polling.

For states with complete 2012 polling data, those results were plugged into the model and multiplied by the number of voters in each group for that state. For example, in Pennsylvania 43% of white voters voted for the Democrat, President Obama. Pennsylvania's 4,869,755 white voters times .43 meant 2,093,993 white voters for the Democrat, and the remaining 2,775,761 for the Republican. The same calculation was then repeated for black and Hispanic voters to produce the vote total and winner for that state.

The challenge came in filling in the blanks for 2012, because only 63 of the 153 state ratios across the three groups were actually observed in 2012 polling, and the trends between groups varied widely. Estimates of the unobserved rates relied on trends in the 2012 polling, comparisons between 2012 and 2008, and various methods of interpolation and extrapolation similar to those used by the Silver Model (which faced the same issue).

Although, as noted, exit polling for whites was available in all 51 states in 2008, 20 states lacked data in 2012. President Obama's share of the white vote nationally slipped from 44% in 2008 to 39% in 2012, with strong state-level correlation to the national trend. Thus for the 20 states lacking 2012 polling, 2008 ratios were weighted by the national change to produce estimates for 2012. As in 2012 President Obama won 39/44ths of the support from white voters that he received in 2008, 2008 state ratios were weighted by .886 (39/44) to produce estimates for 2012. For example, President Obama won 40% of the white vote in Nebraska in 2008, which multiplied by .886 produced a 2012 state estimate of 35.5%. Actual 2012 polling data was inputted into the model for the states where it existed, and these estimates were then used to fill in the missing data points.

While the white vote had the most data and strongest correlation, predicting Hispanic voting patterns proved trickier. Here the paucity of the data was severe, because only 13 states were polled in 2008 and 14 in 2012. Those 14 could be used to some extent for extrapolation, but three states had only 2008 polling and the other 34 had none. Although Silver never specified the "various forms of extrapolation and interpolation" he used for his model, he did note that variation in "the share of the Hispanic vote going to Mr. Obama in each state was modestly correlated with the share of the white vote he won in those states" (Silver 2013). The spread of the 2012 polling data showed the state results varied substantially from the national mean of 72% for Obama, but not as much as the white vote did. Indeed, had I weighted the Hispanic vote assuming full correlation with the white vote, this would have overestimated the variation and yielded unrealistic and occasionally impossible ratios (such as a Hispanic vote of 26% for Mr. Obama in Louisiana but nine states over 100%, including 105% in Massachusetts). To capture this "modest correlation" for missing data points effectively, a modified version of that weighting variable was utilized. This process started by creating that full correlation variable. This variable was created by comparing the white vote in a state to the national rate for whites (39% Democrat), creating a ratio that would be then multiplied by the national rate for Hispanics (72% Democrat) to produce a state estimate for Hispanics. For example, in Minnesota 48% of whites voted for President Obama in 2012. Dividing that by the national rate for whites produces a weighting of 1.23 (48/39), which when multiplied by the national Hispanic rate yields an estimate of 88.6% (1.23 * 72) Democrat.

Although Minnesota is a relatively liberal state, where we would expect Hispanic support for President Obama to be greater than the national average, 88.6% seems

exceedingly high—indeed a higher ratio than any state actually polled except New York (89%). So this variable appeared to capture the direction of trends effectively, but needed to be tempered to prevent "bad" estimates like those in Louisiana and Massachusetts. To do this, I took the square root of the difference between this variable and the national rate. In Minnesota, the difference between the weighted estimate (88.6%) and the national rate (72%) was square rooted ($\sqrt{16.6} = 4.07$) and the result is added back to the national rate to produce a final estimate (72 + 4.07 = 76.07%). All nine states previously over 100% came back below 90%, and Louisiana's 26% rose to a more reasonable 65%.

This methodological choice to use the square root of the difference was decided on after reverse-testing a variety of weights on actual 2012 results. For the 14 states with polling data, estimates were created without the use of that state-specific polling, and then those estimates were compared to the actual results. The two best-fitting methods were the square root method and another using one half of the difference instead of its square root. Between those two, the square root estimates tied or outperformed the one-half method—by producing estimates closer to the observed results—in 11 of the 14 states with 2012 exit polling. It also exhibited a more reasonable range, of 65-80%, than the one-half method's range showing 46-117% (102% if not counting D.C.) of Hispanics voting for Democrats.

This method is surely imperfect—as is any attempt to estimate voting behavior in the complete absence of polling—but has three advantages: it captures Silver's "modest correlation;" it avoids producing grossly unreasonable estimates; and it appears to lead to accurate results in the most recent presidential election. These estimates are being created for states with relatively low Hispanic populations, now and into the future. No polling data

exists to verify the validity of future estimates, but when stacked up against actual 2012 results they produce estimates within one percentage point of voting margins in eight of the nine most important states where the Hispanic voters can have a sizeable impact.

Producing estimates of the missing data points for black voters was easier, as their variation is minimal. President Obama received 95% of the black vote in 2008 and 93% in 2012, and in 46 state exit polls over those two elections *not once* did he receive below 90%. Beyond the statistics, Silver's research suggests that variation in the share of the black vote won by Obama "was not correlated with the white vote and instead was relatively constant from state to state" (Silver 2013). Attempting to model any correlation would prove problematic, since weighting the data would quickly yield estimates over 100%. Because of this minimal variation and lack of correlation, this model utilizes available polling data and fills in missing data points with the national 2012 rate of 93% for President Obama.

Once all the voting patterns are inputted, the model tallies up the votes for each state and declares a victor.[8] Each state's electoral votes are added up to produce a full Electoral College estimate.[9] The University of Michigan's Population Studies Center has created an "Apportionment Calculator," and Cooper Center population projections were input into this calculator, updating electoral apportionment on a decennial basis to match

[8] The American Indian and Alaska Native (less than 1% of the non-Hispanic population) and Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander (less than ¼%) categories are not included in these projections. Polling is extremely sparse, and the Census Bureau's voter turnout data does not include rates for these groups. Of the states with the largest American Indian and Alaska Native populations—Alaska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and South Dakota—New Mexico is the only one that could be remotely considered a swing state, although President Obama won it by 10 points in 2012 and 15 in 2008.

[9] Maine and Nebraska use the District Plan to apportion their electoral votes. But since only one district in Nebraska and none in Maine have ever gone in any direction other than the rest of the state, and because we do not have data that would allow us to estimate the racial composition (or indeed the geographic boundaries) of congressional districts into the future, this model will assume this potential variation away.

population distribution. Unsurprisingly, the "winners" of reapportionment are the states projected to see the greatest Hispanic population growth: California, Florida, and Texas will each pick up four seats over the next 30 years, while New York and Pennsylvania will each lose three.

Once the electoral vote is tallied, the predicted results are compared to the actual electoral result in 2012, with correct predictions marked in green and incorrect predictions in red (Table 1; full Baseline Model and variable key can also be found in Appendix I).

Comparison with 2012 Election Results

Table 1 correctly predicts both the national result and those for 50 of 51 states. The only mistake is Pennsylvania, which it incorrectly predicts President Obama to lose—by a margin of 12,952 votes, or 0.2% of the nearly six million votes cast. Misattributing the state's 20 electoral votes, it projects the Democrats to cruise to victory with 312 electoral votes (they actually won 332). The model also accurately depicts the racial composition of the voters, slightly overestimating the share of white voters as 75.2% (actual: 73.7%), but nearly perfectly estimating the black share at 13.47% (13.4%), Hispanic share at 8.49% (8.4%) and Asian share at 2.8% (2.9%).

At the state level, the vast majority of the estimated margins lie within one or two points of the actual 2012 results. Most of the states with larger variations were solidly red or blue states with a paucity of exit polling (Rhode Island, Utah, Wyoming). Although the

Table 1: 2012 Baseline Projections

	Dvotes	Rvotes	Winning Party	Dem Evotes	Correct?	Actual D Margin	Projected D Margin	Difference
United States	69,160,101	63,893,409	1	312	50	51.96%	51.98%	-0.02%
Alabama	819,334	1,406,943	0	0	1	38.78%	36.80%	1.98%
Alaska	95,127	176,185	0	0	1	42.68%	35.06%	7.62%
Arizona	1,072,451	1,306,652	0	0	1	45.39%	45.08%	0.31%
Arkansas	448,108	733,332	0	0	1	37.85%	37.93%	-0.08%
California	7,807,365	5,377,594	1	55	1	61.87%	59.21%	2.66%
Colorado	1,293,215	1,245,867	1	9	1	52.75%	50.93%	1.82%
Connecticut	936,738	699,814	1	7	1	58.77%	57.24%	1.53%
Delaware	259,278	185,707	1	3	1	59.45%	58.27%	1.18%
District of Col	268,477	43,266	1	3	1	92.59%	86.12%	6.47%
Florida	4,172,647	3,969,011	1	29	1	50.44%	51.25%	-0.81%
Georgia	2,014,625	2,350,956	0	0	1	46.04%	46.15%	-0.10%
Hawaii	277,323	117,836	1	4	1	71.70%	70.18%	1.52%
Idaho	249,558	511,891	0	0	1	33.58%	32.77%	0.80%
Illinois	3,226,463	2,298,787	1	20	1	58.58%	58.39%	0.18%
Indiana	1,350,998	1,557,124	0	0	1	44.80%	46.46%	-1.66%
Iowa	850,009	761,556	1	6	1	52.96%	52.74%	0.22%
Kansas	504,689	813,701	0	0	1	38.89%	38.28%	0.61%
Kentucky	730,022	1,248,799	0	0	1	38.46%	36.89%	1.57%
Louisiana	901,665	1,325,185	0	0	1	41.25%	40.49%	0.76%
Maine	426,468	289,626	1	4	1	57.86%	59.55%	-1.69%
Maryland	1,688,690	1,013,811	1	10	1	63.32%	62.49%	0.84%
Massachusett	2,082,915	1,352,479	1	11	1	61.79%	60.63%	1.15%
Michigan	2,572,185	2,410,349	1	16	1	54.80%	51.62%	3.18%
Minnesota	1,491,669	1,426,465	1	10	1	53.94%	51.12%	2.82%
Mississippi	762,109	921,749	0	0	1	44.20%	45.26%	-1.06%
Missouri	1,262,170	1,681,691	0	0	1	45.22%	42.87%	2.35%
Montana	193,801	291,479	0	0	1	42.97%	39.94%	3.03%
Nebraska	337,793	507,900	0	0	1	38.87%	39.94%	-1.07%
Nevada	572,738	479,326	1	6	1	53.41%	54.44%	-1.03%
New Hampshi	371,909	344,254	1	4	1	52.83%	51.93%	0.90%
New Jersey	2,126,409	1,637,645	1	14	1	58.99%	56.49%	2.49%
New Mexico	438,287	375,686	1	5	1	55.30%	53.85%	1.45%
New York	4,962,400	2,997,786	1	29	1	64.30%	62.34%	1.96%
North Carolin	2,365,180	2,394,544	0	0	1	48.97%	49.69%	-0.73%
North Dakota	127,833	197,194	0	0	1	39.88%	39.33%	0.55%
Ohio	2,792,137	2,741,082	1	18	1	51.51%	50.46%	1.05%
Oklahoma	438,227	886,701	0	0	1	33.23%	33.08%	0.15%
Oregon	1,066,774	802,385	1	7	1	56.27%	57.07%	-0.80%
Pennsylvania	2,972,097	2,985,049	0	0	0	52.73%	49.89%	2.84%
Rhode Island	274,096	198,023	1	4	1	64.02%	58.06%	5.96%
South Carolin	1,005,089	1,243,414	0	0	1	44.69%	44.70%	-0.01%
South Dakota	142,663	226,634	0	0	1	40.78%	38.63%	2.15%
Tennessee	1,163,684	1,532,219	0	0	1	39.65%	43.16%	-3.52%
Texas	3,834,725	5,103,765	0	0	1	41.99%	42.90%	-0.91%
Utah	370,643	816,049	0	0	1	25.37%	31.23%	-5.86%
Vermont	208,645	100,958	1	3	1	68.25%	67.39%	0.86%
Virginia	2,020,786	1,887,249	1	13	1	51.97%	51.71%	0.26%
Washington	1,783,501	1,331,806	1	12	1	57.63%	57.25%	0.38%
West Virginia	280,887	419,823	0	0	1	36.33%	40.09%	-3.76%
Wisconsin	1,662,328	1,504,823	1	10	1	53.52%	52.49%	1.03%
Wyoming	83,170	176,511	0	0	1	28.84%	32.03%	-3.19%

predictions for some of these states may be less reliable, they are also the among the least likely to affect the electoral map. The model overestimated President Obama's 2012 vote share in Wyoming, for example, by roughly three points—giving him 32% instead of the 29% he actually won—but the odds that those three points would have erroneously put him, in any iteration of the model, over the 50% required to flip the state blue were miniscule. Battleground or potential battleground states such as Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin were all predicted within 1% of the correct margin; Colorado is at 1.8%, and only Michigan, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania were off by more than 2% (Pennsylvania was the only state the model attributes to the wrong party). Due to their potential for error, the latter three states will receive special attention when discussing their results.

For the 2012 national popular vote, the model predicts 51.98% of the vote going to the Democrat, compared to the actual total of 51.96%.

IV. Baseline Projections

The projected scenarios will now be divided into three main sections. The first, "The Baseline Projections" (Tables 2-4 and Figures 1-3), will project three models without assuming changes in party strategies. The first iteration (Table 2, Figure 1) will be a straightforward projection of current trends through 2040. The second, the "Hispanic Turnout" (Table 3, Figure 2) projection, will estimate the effect of the Hispanic voting rate gradually increasing to match that of the other races by 2040. Third, the "Neutral Candidate" (Table 4, Figure 3) scenario will set the 2012 national vote total exactly even (to model both parties putting forward "equal" candidates).

The second and third main projection sections will then attempt to model the effects of changing party strategies. The second models Trende's "double down" or "white flight" strategy (Tables 5-6, Figure 4), where Republicans essentially write off the minority vote to put all their chips on white voters continuously flocking to them in historic numbers, keeping them over the bar of 270 electoral votes even as that demographic steadily dwindles. The third models the opposite, assuming the Republican Party adopts a "diversifying coalition" approach (Tables 7-10, Figures 5-6), tailoring their policy platform and electoral outreach to win back enough of the minority vote to win the White House.

The Baseline Projections

The first baseline model combines 2012 voting rates and patterns with projected demographic growth and shifts to predict presidential elections through 2040. The results confirm our *a priori* expectations: minority population growth is good for Democrats, purple states turn blue, and some red states turn purple. Table 2 shows a breakdown of vote margin and electoral vote distribution for each state across this period, mapped out in Figure 1. Over these next seven elections, the Democratic electoral vote total steadily increases from 312[10] in 2012 to 374 in 2040, a commanding majority. Not a single state flips from blue to red, but Pennsylvania in 2016, North Carolina in 2024, and Arizona and Georgia in 2040 all flip for Democrats. The electoral change in these states is largely powered by robust Hispanic growth: North Carolina and Georgia rank #2 and #3 respectively in Hispanic growth rate, while Arizona is projected to see the fourth largest absolute increase in its Hispanic population (after only California, Florida, and Texas, all

[10] In actuality 332, with Pennsylvania misattributed by the model.

Table 2

Baseline Model Projections: Popular Vote Margin for Democrats

	2012	2012	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032	2036	2040	2040	Net Change
United States		51.98%	52.12%	52.79%	53.33%	53.47%	54.49%	54.64%	54.79%		2.81%
Alabama		36.80%	36.85%	36.90%	38.73%	38.78%	40.35%	40.41%	40.46%		3.65%
Alaska		35.06%	35.22%	35.37%	36.27%	36.44%	37.48%	37.67%	37.85%		2.79%
Arizona		45.08%	45.69%	46.25%	47.42%	48.05%	49.22%	49.91%	50.55%		5.48%
Arkansas		37.93%	38.04%	38.14%	39.23%	39.35%	40.34%	40.47%	40.60%		2.67%
California		59.21%	59.55%	59.87%	60.97%	61.28%	62.35%	62.64%	62.92%		3.71%
Colorado		50.93%	51.24%	51.52%	52.19%	52.52%	53.21%	53.58%	53.93%		2.99%
Connecticut		57.24%	57.43%	57.62%	58.32%	58.52%	59.20%	59.41%	59.62%		2.38%
Delaware		58.27%	58.35%	58.43%	59.39%	59.48%	60.34%	60.44%	60.54%		2.27%
D.C.		86.12%	86.11%	86.09%	86.41%	86.40%	86.60%	86.59%	86.57%		0.45%
Florida		51.25%	51.38%	51.50%	52.49%	52.60%	53.47%	53.59%	53.69%		2.44%
Georgia		46.15%	46.23%	46.30%	48.20%	48.28%	49.91%	49.98%	50.05%		3.91%
Hawaii		70.18%	70.29%	70.39%	70.89%	70.99%	71.45%	71.55%	71.64%		1.46%
Idaho		32.77%	33.01%	33.22%	33.69%	33.95%	34.47%	34.76%	35.03%		2.26%
Illinois		58.39%	58.56%	58.72%	59.80%	59.97%	60.97%	61.14%	61.32%		2.93%
Indiana		46.46%	46.55%	46.64%	47.36%	47.46%	48.14%	48.26%	48.37%		1.91%
Iowa		52.74%	52.81%	52.87%	53.12%	53.19%	53.46%	53.54%	53.62%		0.88%
Kansas		38.28%	38.40%	38.51%	39.09%	39.22%	39.83%	39.97%	40.12%		1.84%
Kentucky		36.89%	36.94%	36.99%	37.58%	37.63%	38.19%	38.26%	38.32%		1.43%
Louisiana		40.49%	40.54%	40.58%	42.65%	42.69%	44.45%	44.49%	44.53%		4.04%
Maine		59.55%	59.57%	59.58%	59.67%	59.69%	59.78%	59.80%	59.82%		0.27%
Maryland		62.49%	62.54%	62.59%	63.94%	63.99%	65.13%	65.18%	65.23%		2.74%
Massachusetts		60.63%	60.75%	60.87%	61.34%	61.47%	61.94%	62.08%	62.23%		1.60%
Michigan		51.62%	51.68%	51.73%	52.52%	52.58%	53.31%	53.37%	53.44%		1.82%
Minnesota		51.12%	51.17%	51.21%	51.69%	51.74%	52.29%	52.35%	52.41%		1.30%
Mississippi		45.26%	45.28%	45.30%	47.59%	47.61%	49.49%	49.51%	49.53%		4.27%
Missouri		42.87%	42.94%	43.01%	43.86%	43.94%	44.72%	44.81%	44.89%		2.02%
Montana		39.94%	40.01%	40.07%	40.24%	40.33%	40.52%	40.63%	40.72%		0.79%
Nebraska		39.94%	40.11%	40.28%	40.89%	41.07%	41.70%	41.92%	42.13%		2.19%
Nevada		54.44%	54.77%	55.06%	56.21%	56.53%	57.66%	57.97%	58.26%		3.82%
New Hampshire		51.93%	51.97%	52.01%	52.17%	52.22%	52.41%	52.46%	52.52%		0.59%
New Jersey		56.49%	56.73%	56.96%	58.13%	58.34%	59.46%	59.68%	59.89%		3.40%
New Mexico		53.85%	54.38%	54.87%	55.76%	56.25%	57.11%	57.61%	58.08%		4.23%
New York		62.34%	62.64%	62.94%	64.07%	64.35%	65.40%	65.70%	66.00%		3.66%
North Carolina		49.69%	49.76%	49.82%	51.31%	51.38%	52.66%	52.73%	52.80%		3.11%
North Dakota		39.33%	39.39%	39.44%	39.63%	39.70%	39.91%	39.99%	40.07%		0.74%
Ohio		50.46%	50.47%	50.48%	51.23%	51.24%	51.91%	51.91%	51.92%		1.46%
Oklahoma		33.08%	33.21%	33.34%	34.24%	34.39%	35.28%	35.45%	35.61%		2.53%
Oregon		57.07%	57.20%	57.32%	57.68%	57.83%	58.23%	58.40%	58.57%		1.50%
Pennsylvania		49.89%	50.01%	50.12%	50.91%	51.03%	51.79%	51.94%	52.08%		2.19%
Rhode Island		58.06%	58.21%	58.36%	58.87%	59.03%	59.55%	59.73%	59.91%		1.85%
South Carolina		44.70%	44.75%	44.79%	46.51%	46.55%	48.01%	48.07%	48.11%		3.41%
South Dakota		38.63%	38.70%	38.76%	38.98%	39.05%	39.29%	39.38%	39.47%		0.84%
Tennessee		43.16%	43.24%	43.31%	44.49%	44.58%	45.63%	45.72%	45.81%		2.64%
Texas		42.90%	43.35%	43.77%	45.38%	45.80%	47.28%	47.70%	48.10%		5.20%
Utah		31.23%	31.40%	31.56%	32.02%	32.19%	32.73%	32.92%	33.11%		1.87%
Vermont		67.39%	67.40%	67.41%	67.47%	67.49%	67.55%	67.56%	67.58%		0.19%
Virginia		51.71%	51.77%	51.83%	53.01%	53.07%	54.16%	54.22%	54.28%		2.57%
Washington		57.25%	57.38%	57.50%	58.05%	58.19%	58.83%	58.99%	59.14%		1.89%
West Virginia		40.09%	40.12%	40.16%	40.51%	40.55%	40.90%	40.95%	41.00%		0.91%
Wisconsin		52.49%	52.52%	52.56%	52.98%	53.02%	53.43%	53.48%	53.52%		1.04%
Wyoming		32.03%	32.24%	32.44%	32.87%	33.10%	33.58%	33.86%	34.12%		2.10%

States where the Democrat margin is greater than 53% are colored light blue.

States where the Democrat margin is less than 47% are colored light red.

Darker shades of blue or red represent a state "flipping," as shown on accompanying map.

Figure 1.
Baseline Projection Map: 2012-2040

Electoral Vote Count for Demorats (270 to win)								
2012	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032	2036	2040	Net Gain
332	332	332	346	346	346	344	374	42



States That Flip	Year	Color	E Votes
Arizona	2040	Blue	13
Georgia	2040	Blue	17
N. Carolina	2024	Blue	16

Red and Blue states are solid Republican/Democrat throughout
Gray states "flip" during this period
States with names in yellow are 2012 swing states

much larger states). While these states turn blue, other red states will turn purple: by 2040 Indiana (48.4% Democrat), Mississippi (49.5%), South Carolina (48.1%), and Texas (48.1%) will all be within striking distance for Democrats. The purpling of Texas should be especially troubling for Republicans, because the state is absolutely indispensable to any feasible Republican electoral majority, and once it and its then-41 electoral votes turn blue "the bottom drops out" (Trende 2013).

While these results fit the hypotheses, they may be surprising to some, since even with these tectonic demographic shifts and overwhelming minority support for Democrats, the party only picks up three states over the next 30 years. Increasing their share of the national vote by nearly three percentage points from 52% to a commanding 54.8%, where Democrats would carry over 14 million more ballots, seems like it should effect more changes on the electoral map. The difference, 2.8 percentage points, is greater than the difference between the percentage with which George W. Bush won over Kerry (51.3%) and his father won over Dukakis (53.9%). But the elder Bush won 426 votes to his son's 286 (with Dukakis at 111 and Kerry at 251), while our model predicts a generic Democrat in 2040 picking up only 42 more electoral votes than President Obama's 332 in 2012.

This minimal electoral change makes more sense contextualizing the swing state results in 2012, and the fact that President Obama won all but one of them. Obama won ten of the eleven closely-divided states (i.e. States decided by a margin of fewer than eight points), losing only North Carolina. Even as Democrats increased their share of the popular vote nationwide, they could not pick up many purple states because they already "owned" them. While those states will not change columns in the electoral vote total, they will reliably turn from purple to clearer hues of blue as Democrats pick up several points in

each state to open up some breathing room. The effects on these swing states will be examined in more detail in the Neutral Candidate Projection (Table 4, Figure 5).

Unlike the 2012 model, there are obviously no actual results to compare these projections to, and no objectively "right or wrong" predictions for elections 30 years in the future. But one way to test the reliability of these results is to measure them against the "gold standard" of the Nate Silver model, built with all the resources of *The New York Times* by arguably the world's most acclaimed electoral forecaster. Comparing the two, this model stacks up very favorably. The baseline Silver Model predicts the same three states (discounting Pennsylvania) to be the first to turn blue: North Carolina in 2024 (2024 in our model), Arizona in 2036 (2040), and Georgia in 2048 (2040). Our model predicts Democrats will win 54.8% of the popular vote nationally in 2040, and his predicts 54.3% (and 54.8% in the next election), with the only electoral difference being Georgia.

One other small check is the Pew Hispanic Center's projections, which predict the size of the Hispanic electorate but not its national or state-by-state voting patterns. These projections predict that by 2030 "40 million Hispanics will be eligible to vote, up from 23.7 million now" (Taylor et al. 2012). There is no presidential election in 2030, but our model estimates a Hispanic VEP of 23.6 million in 2012 and projects it to grow to 39.6 million by 2032.

Indeed, the underlying numbers show Hispanic population growth to be the main driver of these electoral vote changes. While the black share of voters will hold constant and the white share declines, the Hispanic share will nearly double from 8.5% in 2012 to 15% in 2040, their numbers from 54 million to 106 million, and their votes from 11 to 22 million. With Hispanics doubling their weight while supporting Democrats by a nearly

three-to-one margin, these results illustrate that if current voting patterns hold constant, the GOP's demographic problem is very, very real.

Hispanic Turnout Projection

As serious as that demographic problem is now, one way it could get much worse is if Hispanics increase their participation as voters to levels similar to those of blacks and whites. The baseline projections, which predicted Hispanic population growth splashing a healthy dollop of blue ink across the electoral map, were predicated on the expectation that eligible Latinos would continue to vote at a rate nearly 20 points below that of their white and black counterparts. Over the past five presidential elections, white turnout has risen then fallen, starting at 60.7% in 1996, growing to peak at 67.2% in 2004, and then dropping again over the next two elections to 64.1% in 2012. In the same period, black turnout has increased steadily and rapidly from 53% in 1996 to 66.2% in 2012, when it eclipsed white turnout for the first time in U.S. history. By contrast, Hispanic turnout has been low and its growth slow, rising steadily from 44% in 1996 to 49.9% in 2008, but then decreasing to 48% in 2012, well below the rates of the other racial groups.

But what if that were to change? What if Hispanic population growth was accompanied by an increase in political participation, similar to the 13-point increase in black turnout over the past two decades? If in 2012 eligible Hispanics had voted at 64% instead of 48%, just below the levels for the other groups, they would have increased their electoral heft by a third. Putting an additional four million Hispanics in the voting booth in 2012 would have fast-forwarded Latinos to just shy of their projected 2020 ballot total, essentially accelerating the Hispanic electoral ascendance by a decade.

It's obviously unrealistic to expect such a dramatic change to occur overnight, but fast-tempoed incremental change is not unprecedented and would have the same long-run effects. Black turnout increased by 13.2 points over the four elections since 1996, more in the two elections *without* a black candidate than the two with Mr. Obama on the ballot. By adding 3.3 points per presidential election to their turnout base, African Americans now have the highest of any demographic group's turnout.

That rate may be too high for Hispanics to emulate, but it is certainly not unreasonable to assume that as the underlying Hispanic population explodes, immigrants naturalize, native-born Latinos embrace American political culture, and Hispanic policy issues gain salience, the Hispanic turnout rate will inevitably begin to rise. If the turnout rate were to increase by two points per presidential election—which is more slowly than the black rate has grown—Hispanic turnout in 2040 would reach 62%, just below the current rates for whites and blacks. This projection will test just that, examining how a "normalizing" increase of the Latino turnout at a rate of two points per election over the next seven elections will affect the electoral map (Table 3, Figure 2).

On the surface, we'll see that not much changes. In fact, the model projects 2040 to yield 374 electoral votes for Democrats, exactly the same total from exactly the same states as the baseline model. Arizona and Georgia will each flip Democratic two cycles earlier, in 2032 instead of 2040, but North Carolina will still stay red until 2024 and no other state will change. The Democratic share of the national popular vote will tick up roughly an extra half-point, to 55.4% instead of 54.8%, but in 2040 the electoral map will look exactly the same as under baseline assumptions.

Table 3

Hispanic Turnout Model Projections: Popular Vote Margin for Democrats

	2012	2012	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032	2036	2040	2040	Net Change
United States		51.98%	52.19%	52.94%	53.57%	53.81%	54.91%	55.18%	55.44%		3.46%
Alabama		36.80%	36.87%	36.94%	38.79%	38.87%	40.47%	40.56%	40.65%		3.84%
Alaska		35.06%	35.29%	35.52%	36.51%	36.78%	37.93%	38.25%	38.56%		3.50%
Arizona		45.08%	45.97%	46.83%	48.34%	49.33%	50.88%	51.96%	52.99%		7.91%
Arkansas		37.93%	38.08%	38.23%	39.37%	39.55%	40.62%	40.83%	41.04%		3.12%
California		59.21%	59.68%	60.14%	61.36%	61.80%	62.96%	63.38%	63.79%		4.58%
Colorado		50.93%	51.35%	51.75%	52.57%	53.06%	53.94%	54.49%	55.03%		4.10%
Connecticut		57.24%	57.51%	57.79%	58.58%	58.89%	59.69%	60.03%	60.39%		3.15%
Delaware		58.27%	58.38%	58.50%	59.50%	59.64%	60.55%	60.71%	60.87%		2.61%
D.C.		86.12%	86.10%	86.08%	86.39%	86.36%	86.56%	86.52%	86.49%		0.37%
Florida		51.25%	51.43%	51.60%	52.63%	52.79%	53.70%	53.87%	54.03%		2.77%
Georgia		46.15%	46.26%	46.36%	48.30%	48.42%	50.08%	50.20%	50.33%		4.18%
Hawaii		70.18%	70.33%	70.48%	71.02%	71.17%	71.66%	71.81%	71.97%		1.79%
Idaho		32.77%	33.09%	33.41%	34.01%	34.40%	35.10%	35.57%	36.04%		3.26%
Illinois		58.39%	58.64%	58.89%	60.07%	60.35%	61.47%	61.78%	62.11%		3.71%
Indiana		46.46%	46.59%	46.72%	47.50%	47.67%	48.43%	48.63%	48.84%		2.38%
Iowa		52.74%	52.83%	52.91%	53.20%	53.31%	53.63%	53.76%	53.90%		1.16%
Kansas		38.28%	38.46%	38.66%	39.34%	39.58%	40.32%	40.62%	40.92%		2.64%
Kentucky		36.89%	36.96%	37.03%	37.65%	37.73%	38.33%	38.44%	38.55%		1.66%
Louisiana		40.49%	40.56%	40.62%	42.72%	42.79%	44.56%	44.64%	44.71%		4.22%
Maine		59.55%	59.58%	59.60%	59.69%	59.72%	59.83%	59.86%	59.90%		0.35%
Maryland		62.49%	62.56%	62.63%	63.99%	64.06%	65.23%	65.30%	65.37%		2.89%
Massachusetts		60.63%	60.79%	60.95%	61.46%	61.65%	62.19%	62.40%	62.61%		1.98%
Michigan		51.62%	51.69%	51.77%	52.57%	52.65%	53.41%	53.50%	53.60%		1.97%
Minnesota		51.12%	51.19%	51.26%	51.76%	51.85%	52.43%	52.54%	52.65%		1.53%
Mississippi		45.26%	45.29%	45.32%	47.61%	47.64%	49.53%	49.57%	49.60%		4.34%
Missouri		42.87%	42.97%	43.06%	43.93%	44.05%	44.87%	45.00%	45.13%		2.26%
Montana		39.94%	40.03%	40.13%	40.35%	40.48%	40.74%	40.90%	41.07%		1.14%
Nebraska		39.94%	40.17%	40.41%	41.11%	41.40%	42.15%	42.50%	42.86%		2.91%
Nevada		54.44%	54.87%	55.28%	56.55%	57.01%	58.24%	58.70%	59.14%		4.70%
New Hampshire		51.93%	51.99%	52.05%	52.23%	52.31%	52.53%	52.62%	52.72%		0.79%
New Jersey		56.49%	56.81%	57.14%	58.42%	58.75%	59.97%	60.32%	60.67%		4.18%
New Mexico		53.85%	54.59%	55.29%	56.37%	57.07%	58.09%	58.76%	59.39%		5.55%
New York		62.34%	62.76%	63.19%	64.45%	64.90%	66.09%	66.56%	67.04%		4.70%
North Carolina		49.69%	49.78%	49.87%	51.38%	51.48%	52.79%	52.90%	53.02%		3.32%
North Dakota		39.33%	39.41%	39.49%	39.71%	39.82%	40.08%	40.20%	40.34%		1.01%
Ohio		50.46%	50.47%	50.48%	51.24%	51.25%	51.92%	51.93%	51.94%		1.48%
Oklahoma		33.08%	33.29%	33.52%	34.53%	34.82%	35.86%	36.20%	36.55%		3.48%
Oregon		57.07%	57.24%	57.42%	57.84%	58.06%	58.55%	58.82%	59.09%		2.02%
Pennsylvania		49.89%	50.05%	50.23%	51.07%	51.28%	52.12%	52.36%	52.61%		2.72%
Rhode Island		58.06%	58.27%	58.48%	59.07%	59.32%	59.94%	60.23%	60.53%		2.47%
South Carolina		44.70%	44.77%	44.83%	46.57%	46.64%	48.13%	48.21%	48.30%		3.60%
South Dakota		38.63%	38.72%	38.81%	39.07%	39.19%	39.48%	39.63%	39.77%		1.14%
Tennessee		43.16%	43.26%	43.36%	44.57%	44.69%	45.78%	45.91%	46.05%		2.88%
Texas		42.90%	43.58%	44.24%	46.08%	46.76%	48.43%	49.10%	49.76%		6.85%
Utah		31.23%	31.51%	31.78%	32.40%	32.73%	33.46%	33.86%	34.25%		3.02%
Vermont		67.39%	67.41%	67.42%	67.49%	67.51%	67.58%	67.61%	67.64%		0.25%
Virginia		51.71%	51.79%	51.87%	53.07%	53.15%	54.26%	54.35%	54.44%		2.73%
Washington		57.25%	57.42%	57.60%	58.22%	58.43%	59.16%	59.41%	59.67%		2.42%
West Virginia		40.09%	40.13%	40.19%	40.56%	40.63%	41.01%	41.09%	41.17%		1.09%
Wisconsin		52.49%	52.54%	52.59%	53.03%	53.10%	53.54%	53.62%	53.70%		1.21%
Wyoming		32.03%	32.32%	32.63%	33.19%	33.56%	34.21%	34.66%	35.11%		3.09%

States where the Democrat margin is greater than 53% are colored light blue.

States where the Democrat margin is less than 47% are colored light red.

Darker shades of blue or red represent a state "flipping," as shown on accompanying map.

Figure 2.

Hispanic Turnout Projection Map: 2012-2040

Electoral Vote Count for Demorats (270 to win)							
2012	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032	2036	2040	Net Gain
332	332	332	346	346	374	374	374	42



The importance of this increased turnout is not in red and blue terms as such, but in terms of the numbers underlying those colors. Increased participation will add over 6.5 million Hispanic ballots in 2040, bringing the total from just over 22 million in the baseline model to nearly 29 million, and thereby widening the Democrat's margin of victory in the popular vote by over 2.5 million. This extra boost runs up the score for Democrats in those states that are currently purple but by 2040 will be vibrantly blue, but that's not its main value.

Rather, the importance of this increased Hispanic turnout lies in the states preparing to tip. By 2040 Indiana (48.9% Democrat, 11 electoral votes) and Mississippi (49.6%, 6 electoral votes) will be fully in play, but by far the most important development is that Texas will start to teeter precariously, jumping from 48.1% Democrat in the baseline model to 49.76% with higher Latino turnout. With that quarter of a point well within any margin of error for a 30-year projection, increased Hispanic turnout could turn Texas into a virtual toss-up, one with the possibility to move the margin of victory from an Obama-McCain solid-but-respectable thumping to a Bush-Dukakis-level full-on rout of the GOP candidate (in this case the parties would be reversed, but no Democrat win in the past 50 years—since Johnson beat Goldwater—approaches the scale of such a victory). In other words, in the baseline model it takes Democrats 28 years to wrestle 46 electoral votes from Republicans in Arizona, Georgia, and North Carolina; in this Hispanic Turnout scenario they could nearly match that in a stroke by winning Texas' 41. In short, a significant boost of Hispanic turnout to white/black levels could potentially devastate the Republicans' chances of winning the White House—and guarantee that by 2040 the GOP's hopes would be hanging by a bare thread.

Neutral Candidate Projection

In any election, the final vote total reflects a complex amalgamation of demographic drivers, party allegiances, the economic and political climates, and the personal strengths and weaknesses of the candidates themselves. Thus far, baseline projections have been predicated on the results of the 2012 election, in which President Obama won nearly 52% of the popular vote.[11] But how much of that margin was won in the surface battle between Romney and Obama, and how much predetermined by deeper demographic and historical factors? Mr. Obama was a sitting president, albeit with plenty of baggage, while Governor Romney survived a bruising primary, ran what was seen at times as an inept campaign, and made a series of unforced errors (including his disparaging comments about 47% of Americans) that together contributed to a perception of him as uncaring and unconnected. It is certainly possible to imagine the macro-political environment as 50-50 or perhaps 51-49 for Democrats, with President Obama's personal appeal relative to Governor Romney adding a point or two to the Democratic margin.

If that had in fact been the case, future projections of presidential elections featuring unknown candidates but based on 2012 will be inherently biased towards Democrats—especially because we've seen that his 52% winning margin put President Obama on top in ten of the cycle's eleven nominal swing states. The question of what fractions of votes can be attributed to candidate strength versus demographic or macro-political factors may be impossible to answer empirically, but this model can at least be used to project future partisan election results in a landscape unweighted by the personal strengths of individual candidates.

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[11] In this section, "popular vote" or "percentage of the popular vote" excludes third party candidates to focus solely on Democrats and Republicans.

This Neutral Candidate Projection model (Table 4, Figure 3) will make the assumption that, for whatever reasons, President Obama was simply a stronger candidate than Governor Romney, and that the actual "candidate neutral" electoral landscape in 2012 was split exactly 50-50 between the two parties. It then models an alternative scenario where Romney and Obama were candidates of equal caliber and the popular vote was a perfect tie. By "taking the candidates out," while keeping proportional racial voting rates and trends, this model allows us to analyze an alternative reality 2012 presidential election, and then project those results forward to see how that alternate scenario changes over time in the absence of candidate bias.

Before starting, it is important to note that, as 2012 baseline projections may be biased *towards* Democrats, this "neutral candidate" projection may be biased *against* them. Democrats have won the popular vote in five of the past six presidential elections (2004 the exception), and President Obama's 2012 margin of 52% was actually the second smallest of those five wins, topping only Gore's margin of 50.26% in the 2000 race when he famously lost the electoral vote in the Supreme Court. Whether those Democratic wins are an early warning of the GOP's burgeoning demographic problem, a natural vicissitude of American political cycles (Republicans had won the popular vote in five of the preceding six elections), or simply a reflection that recently Democrats have been presenting stronger candidates, this trend in the popular vote suggests that today the candidate-free margin may not be exactly 50-50. Republicans may count on this advantage being cyclical, but unless they can peel off part of the minority vote or consolidate a monolithic bloc of whites, demographic change is set to break the cycle and widen the gap.

In the absence of an exact, impossible-to-ascertain margin, 50-50 is an equitable starting point. In the baseline projections, President Obama won 51.98% of the vote.[12] To weigh down that ratio to exactly 50.00% without biasing the relative political leanings of each racial group, each group's margin of support was multiplied by a weighting variable of .5/51.98. At the national level, the white ratio decreased from 39% to 37.52%, the black ratio from 93% to 89.46%, the Hispanic ratio from 72% to 69.26%, and the Asian ratio from 73% to 70.22%, with this weighting process extend to all groups in each state. By weighing each group equally, the proportional relationships between the groups were preserved, with the end result of exactly 66,526,755 votes for each party.

For comparison, 2012 FEC vote totals were weighted using a similar process. Although not broken down by race, the state ratios were each multiplied by a similar variable of .5/.5196 to equalize the national vote total and obtain state-level ratio estimates.

At first blush, the results were somewhat disappointing from the point of view of the model's projection accuracy. The model projected Democrats to win 213 electoral votes, but the FEC data indicated they would have won 285—by far the largest discrepancy between projection and actual data in any iteration of the model. The 72 electoral vote difference came from the model predicting that Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Virginia would turn red, but the FEC indicating they would hold steady. But a closer examination of the margins showed that there was no glaring increase in inaccuracy; instead, setting the national margin to 50-50 put the margins of error under a microscope, where a prediction could be within a fraction of a point but

[12] The model rounded numbers to the 14th decimal point for exactness, but for brevity this paper will round to the 2nd.

"wrong" if it strayed just over the 50/50 dividing line. For example, the model projected Democrats to win 49.8% of the vote in Virginia, while the FEC indicated they would take home 50.0003%. Considering the lack of polling and voting data available for minorities, the required synthesis of multiple datasets, and all the estimations and assumptions that went into building this comprehensive model, it was expected that there would undoubtedly be imperfections and some variation from exact vote totals. Even if technically "wrong" for 2012, calculating a margin within 0.2%, and one based on group specific demographic and voting data, can still be highly instructive in predicting and analyzing future elections.

Created predominantly for forward-looking projections, this model was built with the methodological choice not to calibrate results so that vote totals would flawlessly match 2012 results (as the Silver Model was). With the inevitable small degrees of randomness and fluctuation in predicting the voting patterns of 130 million people, the numbers were never going to add up perfectly. Introducing a "magic coefficient" to weigh the number of Democrat votes in Pennsylvania to exactly match 2012 FEC returns would maximize accuracy in 2012, but in projecting out to 2020 and 2040 there would be no theoretical or explanatory justification for that coefficient besides "it made the numbers add up." Instead of manually bending the curve to touch every individual data point, this model predicts results to the most accurate degree allowed by available data, sacrificing perfection for projections that can be broken down, justified, and explained.

Of the other states differing from FEC results, the common denominator was a lack of available data. CNN and *New York Times* exit polling often struggled to obtain statistically significant sample sizes for minority voters, especially in smaller states. All states polled

had statistically significant samples for white voters, but neither Minnesota nor New Hampshire had exit polling results for black or Hispanic voters in 2008 or 2012, Michigan lacked 2012 Hispanic polling, and Colorado had no black polling data in 2012. To recall, Minnesota, Michigan, and Pennsylvania were identified at the beginning of my analysis as the three potentially problematic states, the only potential swing states whose 2012 results differed from my model's projected margins by more than 2%.

Even if this "neutral candidate" projection underestimates Democrats' chances, it still shows their long-term future looking bright (Table 4, Figure 3). Over the next two elections they struggle, picking up only New Hampshire's four electoral votes in 2020. But that lack of demonstrable electoral success overshadows the steady marginal gains they make over those years, which set the stage for a major, irreversible coup in 2024. In that election they grab back Colorado, Florida, Michigan, and Virginia—68 electoral votes in total—to surge into power with 285 electoral votes. Never relinquishing conquered territory, in 2032 they pick up 25 electoral votes from Minnesota and North Carolina, then 18 more from Pennsylvania in 2040. By then they settle at a comfortable 328 electoral votes and 52.7% of the popular vote, fully recouping their "losses" from 2012, when they won 332 electoral votes with 52% of the national vote. The only state they fail to win back is Ohio, the state they won by the second smallest margin in 2012 (after Florida) and which is projected to be 36th in Hispanic population growth and 37th in black growth. Without robust minority population growth, the state sits steady at a stubborn 49.9% over the last

Table 4

Neutral Candidate Model Projections: Popular Vote Margin for Democrats

	2012 Baseline	2012 NC	2012	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032	2036	2040	2040	Net Change
United States			50.00%	50.13%	50.78%	51.30%	51.43%	52.41%	52.56%	52.70%		2.70%
Alabama			35.40%	35.45%	35.49%	37.26%	37.30%	38.82%	38.87%	38.92%		3.52%
Alaska			33.73%	33.88%	34.02%	34.89%	35.06%	36.05%	36.23%	36.41%		2.68%
Arizona			43.36%	43.95%	44.49%	45.61%	46.22%	47.35%	48.01%	48.63%		5.27%
Arkansas			36.48%	36.59%	36.69%	37.74%	37.85%	38.81%	38.93%	39.05%		2.57%
California			56.96%	57.29%	57.59%	58.65%	58.94%	59.98%	60.26%	60.53%		3.57%
Colorado			48.99%	49.29%	49.56%	50.20%	50.52%	51.19%	51.54%	51.87%		2.88%
Connecticut			55.06%	55.25%	55.43%	56.10%	56.29%	56.94%	57.15%	57.35%		2.29%
Delaware			56.05%	56.13%	56.21%	57.13%	57.22%	58.04%	58.14%	58.23%		2.18%
D.C.			82.84%	82.83%	82.82%	83.12%	83.11%	83.31%	83.29%	83.27%		0.43%
Florida			49.30%	49.43%	49.54%	50.49%	50.60%	51.44%	51.55%	51.65%		2.35%
Georgia			44.39%	44.47%	44.54%	46.37%	46.44%	48.01%	48.08%	48.15%		3.76%
Hawaii			67.51%	67.61%	67.71%	68.19%	68.29%	68.73%	68.82%	68.91%		1.40%
Idaho			31.53%	31.75%	31.96%	32.41%	32.65%	33.16%	33.44%	33.70%		2.17%
Illinois			56.17%	56.33%	56.49%	57.52%	57.68%	58.65%	58.82%	58.99%		2.82%
Indiana			44.69%	44.78%	44.86%	45.56%	45.65%	46.31%	46.42%	46.53%		1.84%
Iowa			50.74%	50.79%	50.85%	51.10%	51.16%	51.42%	51.50%	51.58%		0.84%
Kansas			36.82%	36.93%	37.04%	37.60%	37.72%	38.31%	38.45%	38.59%		1.77%
Kentucky			35.49%	35.54%	35.58%	36.15%	36.20%	36.74%	36.80%	36.86%		1.37%
Louisiana			38.95%	38.99%	39.03%	41.03%	41.07%	42.75%	42.79%	42.83%		3.88%
Maine			57.29%	57.30%	57.32%	57.40%	57.41%	57.50%	57.52%	57.55%		0.26%
Maryland			60.11%	60.16%	60.21%	61.50%	61.55%	62.65%	62.70%	62.74%		2.64%
Massachusetts			58.32%	58.44%	58.56%	59.00%	59.13%	59.58%	59.72%	59.86%		1.53%
Michigan			49.66%	49.71%	49.76%	50.52%	50.58%	51.28%	51.34%	51.40%		1.75%
Minnesota			49.17%	49.22%	49.26%	49.72%	49.77%	50.30%	50.36%	50.42%		1.25%
Mississippi			43.54%	43.56%	43.58%	45.78%	45.79%	47.60%	47.62%	47.64%		4.10%
Missouri			41.24%	41.31%	41.37%	42.19%	42.26%	43.02%	43.10%	43.18%		1.94%
Montana			38.42%	38.48%	38.55%	38.71%	38.79%	38.98%	39.08%	39.17%		0.76%
Nebraska			38.42%	38.58%	38.74%	39.33%	39.51%	40.12%	40.32%	40.52%		2.10%
Nevada			52.37%	52.68%	52.96%	54.07%	54.37%	55.46%	55.76%	56.04%		3.68%
New Hampshire			49.95%	49.99%	50.03%	50.18%	50.23%	50.41%	50.47%	50.52%		0.57%
New Jersey			54.34%	54.57%	54.79%	55.91%	56.12%	57.20%	57.40%	57.61%		3.27%
New Mexico			51.80%	52.31%	52.78%	53.63%	54.11%	54.93%	55.41%	55.87%		4.07%
New York			59.97%	60.26%	60.54%	61.63%	61.90%	62.91%	63.20%	63.48%		3.52%
North Carolina			47.80%	47.87%	47.93%	49.35%	49.42%	50.65%	50.72%	50.79%		2.99%
North Dakota			37.83%	37.89%	37.94%	38.12%	38.19%	38.39%	38.47%	38.54%		0.71%
Ohio			48.54%	48.55%	48.56%	49.28%	49.28%	49.93%	49.94%	49.94%		1.40%
Oklahoma			31.82%	31.95%	32.07%	32.93%	33.08%	33.94%	34.10%	34.25%		2.44%
Oregon			54.90%	55.02%	55.14%	55.48%	55.62%	56.02%	56.18%	56.34%		1.44%
Pennsylvania			47.99%	48.10%	48.22%	48.97%	49.09%	49.82%	49.96%	50.09%		2.10%
Rhode Island			55.85%	55.99%	56.14%	56.63%	56.78%	57.28%	57.45%	57.63%		1.78%
South Carolina			43.00%	43.04%	43.09%	44.74%	44.78%	46.19%	46.23%	46.28%		3.28%
South Dakota			37.16%	37.22%	37.28%	37.49%	37.57%	37.80%	37.88%	37.96%		0.80%
Tennessee			41.52%	41.60%	41.67%	42.80%	42.88%	43.90%	43.98%	44.06%		2.54%
Texas			41.27%	41.70%	42.10%	43.65%	44.06%	45.48%	45.88%	46.27%		5.00%
Utah			30.04%	30.21%	30.35%	30.80%	30.97%	31.49%	31.67%	31.85%		1.80%
Vermont			64.83%	64.84%	64.85%	64.90%	64.92%	64.98%	64.99%	65.01%		0.18%
Virginia			49.74%	49.80%	49.86%	50.99%	51.05%	52.10%	52.16%	52.21%		2.47%
Washington			55.07%	55.19%	55.31%	55.84%	55.97%	56.59%	56.74%	56.89%		1.82%
West Virginia			38.56%	38.59%	38.63%	38.97%	39.01%	39.35%	39.39%	39.44%		0.88%
Wisconsin			50.49%	50.52%	50.56%	50.96%	51.00%	51.40%	51.44%	51.49%		1.00%
Wyoming			30.81%	31.01%	31.20%	31.62%	31.84%	32.31%	32.57%	32.82%		2.02%

States where the Democrat margin is greater than 53% are colored light blue.

States where the Democrat margin is less than 47% are colored light red.

Darker shades of blue or red represent a state "flipping," as shown on accompanying map.

Figure 3.
Neutral Candidate Projection Map: 2012-2040

Electoral Vote Count for Demorats (270 to win)								
2012	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032	2036	2040	Net Gain
213	213	217	285	285	310	310	328	115



States That Flip	Year	Color	E Votes
Colorado	2024	Blue	9
Florida	2024	Blue	29
Michigan	2024	Blue	16
Minnesota	2032	Blue	10
New Hampshire	2020	Blue	4
North Carolina	2032	Blue	16
Pennsylvania	2040	Blue	20
Virginia	2024	Blue	13

three elections.

Compared to the baseline model, by 2040 Democrats in this scenario only fail to pick up Arizona, Georgia, and Ohio, and still win both the electoral and popular vote by a wide margin. Current swing states aren't as solidly blue and potential game changers like Texas have not yet started to teeter, but this Neutral Candidate scenario—despite shaving two points from Democrats—still presents a map that will become completely untenable for Republicans. Even without increasing Hispanic turnout or legalizing unauthorized immigrants, erasing Democrats' five-million-vote margin of victory, and handicapping them over 70 election votes from the FEC's projection, Democrats still manage to surge ahead to an insurmountable lead.

For Republicans, the demographic math just doesn't add up. Putting forth stronger candidates can suppress and mitigate these trends in the short run, but is not a long term fix. With anything approximating current racial voting patterns, Republicans will lose—and begin to lose badly. The impressive stability of our two-party system is rooted in the parties' abilities to recognize when the American people are turning against them, and then reinvent or realign the party to rebuild a competitive coalition. Clinton-led Democrats were able to do just that after a disastrous 1980s, and now it's the GOP's turn to try. Having lost the popular vote in five of six elections and now staring down the barrel of demographic change, Republicans need a new strategy. The rules of the game are changing, the electoral landscape shifting underneath them, and Republicans are losing. That's not to say they've lost, but that they need to change the game.

V. The Double Down Strategy

Although the data seemingly paint a clear and vivid picture, not everyone agrees with that hypothesis. Some Republicans and a few political scientists either deny the existence of a demographic problem for the party or argue that it can be overcome by concentrating ("doubling down") on the GOP's reliable white vote. *RealClearPolitics*' Sean Trende presents the most empirical version of that argument, using the Silver Model to postulate a scenario in which Republicans can concede as much as 90% of black *and* Hispanic voters to Democrats but still win the White House in every election through 2040 by consistently solidifying near-historic shares of the white vote. In his own words:

> "Let's assume that immigration reform doesn't pass, that the Democratic share of African-Americans reverts to 90 percent, that black voter participation drops somewhat, and that white participation picks up a notch. Let's assume that the GOP share of the white vote continues to improve according to trend, about 1.5 points per year, with a "kicker" of a couple points for our "missing whites" returning in 2016. We'll cap the Republicans' share of the white vote at 70 percent. Let's also assume that Hispanic and Asian voters gradually react to this by voting increasingly like African-Americans. To accomplish this, we'll add three points to the Democrats' share of the Hispanic and Asian votes each cycle (Trende 2013)."

The full table of Trende's hypothesized ratios for each election and the resulting electoral vote totals (as he derived them using the Silver Model) are detailed in Table 5. Rebuttal studies raise questions about his methodology and the feasibility of this scenario, but first let us see how it plays out in our model.

In short, Trende turns out to be technically "correct," in that the scenario he envisions would allow Republicans to hold onto the White House for the next several decades (although our model projects them losing it one election earlier, in 2040 not

Table 5: Trende's Racial Polarization Scenario

Year	Electoral Votes (R)	Electoral Votes (D)	Dem White %	Black %	Hispanic %	Asian %	Other %
2016	296	242	37%	90%	75%	79%	64%
2020	304	234	35%	90%	78%	82%	67%
2024	304	234	34%	90%	81%	85%	70%
2028	329	209	32%	90%	84%	88%	73%
2032	296	242	31%	90%	87%	90%	76%
2036	300	238	30%	90%	90%	90%	79%
2040	270	268	30%	90%	90%	90%	82%
2044	257	281	30%	90%	90%	90%	85%
2048	185	353	30%	90%	90%	90%	88%

2044). But this result simply reflects the similarities between this model and the Silver Model, without rendering judgment on the feasibility of Trende's chosen ratios. In fact, the detailed estimates cast light on the underlying trends that make this strategy "work," while at the same exposing just how tenuous and fraught with risk such an approach would be.

While the electoral vote totals never perfectly converge, the general patterns projected by both models are similar: Republicans win a relatively narrow victory in 2016, then surge out to consistently comfortable victories over the next two decades, nearly always collecting more than 300 electoral votes. But by 2040, Democrats make a dramatic recovery to jump ahead (in my model they win, in Silver's they lose 270-268). In 2036, Trende's rates stabilize, with Democrats receiving 30% of white votes and 90% of black, Hispanic, and Asian ballots. His projections continue out to 2048, and illustrate "the bottom falling out" with Republicans losing 353-185 in that year and the trend only getting worse as the growing Hispanic population bolsters Democrats to increasingly lopsided victories.

But the promise of future victories may feel hollow and distant to Democrats, if they are first forced to suffer six or seven consecutive losses.[13] Victory, however, may not be quite so long in coming: the simple mathematical explanation for Trende's scenario "working" for Republicans—even using the unfavorable baseline environment of 2012—is his rapid reapportionment of the white vote. By taking the 39% share of white voters supporting the Democrat in 2012 and ratcheting it down to 32% over the next four elections through 2028, he is essentially pulling a fast one on the Democratic Party by stealing a historic share of the white vote before Hispanic population growth has enough time to effectively counterbalance that effect. In other words, he compensates Democrats for his seven-point reduction in their white support over that period (and his shaving off three percentage points of their black support) with a 12-point increase in the Hispanic margin, from 72% to 84%. But whites made up 75% of the 2012 voters and are projected to still comprise over 70% in 2028, compared to 8.5% and 12%, respectively, for Hispanics. Compared to current trends, in 2028 this has the effect of transplanting over seven million of the 101 million white votes to Republicans and replacing them with barely two million of the 17 million Hispanic votes. This racial polarization nets Republicans five million votes in 2028, enough to comfortably cruise to electoral victory.

In the short run, Republicans in 2016 win back Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, and come within a tenth of a percent of capturing Florida.[14] Over the next three elections, Republicans add onto their lead by picking up Iowa,

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[13] Depending on which model you trust. Mine has Democrats regaining the White House in 2040; the Silver model in 2044.

[14] Michigan, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania are the three battleground states in which the model may contain a slight bias against Democrats. But by 2020 none of these races are within even a four-point margin, suggesting that their flip to Republicans is legitimate.

Maine, Virginia, and Wisconsin—knocking Democrats down to 223 electoral votes in 2028 (Tables 6, Figure 4).

This rapid reapportionment peaks in 2028, when Republicans near a Trende-imposed ceiling of 70% support from white voters, and a floor of 10% minority support. A solid wall of white voters had until then sheltered them from the tide of demographic change, but after 2028 it can no longer hold back the flood. Over the next twelve years minorities begin to approach a majority share of the population and a third of voters, and losing 90% of them quickly becomes untenable for Republicans.

Democrats lose Oregon in 2036 but win it back in 2040, also picking up Arizona, Colorado, and Texas, and approaching striking distance in Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia. They win with 287 electoral votes in 2040, and Silver's model captures the eventual Republican deterioration leading to a 353-185 Democrat blowout in 2048. The short-term benefits of a successful "double down" are impressive, but it appears they have an inevitable expiration date.

If Trende's hypothesized voting rates are indeed achievable for Republicans, this strategy could produce consistent short and mid-run success for the party. But in the long-run, Republicans would just be kicking their demographic problem down the road by—to mix metaphors—putting all their eggs in a shrinking basket. As opposed to a friendlier, "big tent" strategy, the inherent and grave danger of a racial polarization approach is the tautology that it is, in fact, polarizing. Tendrils of outreach could be withdrawn, but a near-complete abandonment and potential antagonizing of America's two largest minority groups could prove nearly impossible to reverse. By placing all their chips on the white vote, Republicans may forfeit the capability to hedge their bets, and they must recognize

Table 6

Trende Model Projections: Popular Vote Margin for Democrats

	2012	2012	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032	2036	2040	2040	Net Change
United States		51.98%	50.59%	50.11%	50.57%	49.83%	51.07%	51.14%	51.51%		1.11%
Alabama		36.80%	35.57%	35.13%	36.76%	36.37%	37.82%	37.71%	37.80%		2.29%
Alaska		35.06%	34.13%	33.24%	33.97%	33.23%	34.36%	34.26%	34.56%		0.61%
Arizona		45.08%	44.80%	44.67%	46.16%	46.48%	48.40%	49.77%	50.88%		6.77%
Arkansas		37.93%	36.59%	35.66%	36.38%	35.55%	36.31%	36.12%	36.35%		-0.12%
California		59.21%	59.32%	59.51%	61.69%	62.30%	65.02%	66.18%	66.90%		8.00%
Colorado		50.93%	49.61%	48.43%	48.87%	48.05%	48.88%	49.29%	50.01%		0.77%
Connecticut		57.24%	55.35%	53.81%	54.03%	52.72%	53.23%	53.13%	53.63%		-1.48%
Delaware		58.27%	56.13%	54.59%	55.02%	53.65%	54.22%	53.82%	54.06%		-1.96%
D.C.		86.12%	83.08%	81.63%	81.59%	80.32%	80.42%	79.94%	80.01%		-3.06%
Florida		51.25%	50.09%	49.44%	50.52%	50.11%	51.37%	51.74%	52.12%		2.21%
Georgia		46.15%	44.78%	44.36%	46.17%	45.84%	47.52%	47.52%	47.68%		2.99%
Hawaii		70.18%	71.79%	72.20%	74.83%	75.68%	78.73%	78.88%	79.11%		7.45%
Idaho		32.77%	31.76%	30.77%	30.86%	30.05%	30.38%	30.42%	30.87%		-0.62%
Illinois		58.39%	56.67%	55.47%	56.31%	55.33%	56.45%	56.37%	56.77%		0.30%
Indiana		46.46%	44.59%	43.04%	43.10%	41.66%	41.83%	41.32%	41.54%		-2.95%
Iowa		52.74%	50.36%	48.07%	47.29%	45.09%	44.46%	43.55%	43.73%		-6.55%
Kansas		38.28%	36.83%	35.52%	35.57%	34.38%	34.62%	34.28%	34.54%		-2.16%
Kentucky		36.89%	35.31%	33.93%	33.89%	32.57%	32.59%	32.04%	32.15%		-3.10%
Louisiana		40.49%	39.23%	38.96%	40.92%	40.68%	42.40%	42.37%	42.44%		3.26%
Maine		59.55%	56.63%	53.74%	52.44%	49.59%	48.37%	47.01%	47.07%		-9.54%
Maryland		62.49%	60.49%	59.40%	60.52%	59.58%	60.76%	60.47%	60.63%		0.22%
Massachusetts		60.63%	58.43%	56.42%	56.23%	54.44%	54.61%	54.15%	54.54%		-3.73%
Michigan		51.62%	49.59%	47.96%	48.11%	46.60%	46.89%	46.35%	46.54%		-2.98%
Minnesota		51.12%	49.04%	47.01%	46.73%	44.82%	44.86%	44.01%	44.14%		-4.84%
Mississippi		45.26%	43.77%	43.50%	45.64%	45.40%	47.19%	47.12%	47.16%		3.41%
Missouri		42.87%	41.17%	39.83%	40.10%	38.85%	39.20%	38.74%	38.90%		-2.19%
Montana		39.94%	38.13%	36.35%	35.69%	33.99%	33.45%	32.77%	32.95%		-5.10%
Nebraska		39.94%	38.51%	37.24%	37.35%	36.23%	36.53%	36.34%	36.71%		-1.61%
Nevada		54.44%	53.85%	53.44%	55.12%	55.15%	57.31%	58.11%	58.80%		5.35%
New Hampshire		51.93%	49.51%	47.11%	46.17%	43.84%	43.05%	42.01%	42.13%		-7.33%
New Jersey		56.49%	55.31%	54.54%	55.82%	55.30%	56.94%	57.18%	57.65%		2.63%
New Mexico		53.85%	54.33%	55.02%	57.02%	58.13%	60.56%	62.56%	63.55%		9.85%
New York		62.34%	61.08%	60.37%	61.63%	61.19%	62.78%	63.25%	63.86%		3.14%
North Carolina		49.69%	47.97%	47.02%	48.17%	47.34%	48.46%	48.23%	48.40%		0.52%
North Dakota		39.33%	37.52%	35.74%	35.10%	33.39%	32.84%	32.10%	32.24%		-5.21%
Ohio		50.46%	48.31%	46.56%	46.57%	44.90%	44.97%	44.23%	44.31%		-3.98%
Oklahoma		33.08%	31.98%	31.11%	31.69%	30.94%	31.67%	31.54%	31.81%		-0.02%
Oregon		57.07%	54.87%	52.72%	52.31%	50.40%	50.35%	49.83%	50.24%		-4.47%
Pennsylvania		49.89%	48.02%	46.47%	46.66%	45.25%	45.63%	45.19%	45.47%		-2.41%
Rhode Island		58.06%	55.95%	54.06%	53.91%	52.24%	52.42%	52.07%	52.52%		-3.24%
South Carolina		44.70%	43.15%	42.48%	43.92%	43.32%	44.62%	44.43%	44.53%		1.43%
South Dakota		38.63%	36.88%	35.18%	34.60%	32.96%	32.48%	31.80%	31.95%		-4.86%
Tennessee		43.16%	41.57%	40.51%	41.26%	40.29%	41.06%	40.75%	40.92%		-0.56%
Texas		42.90%	42.89%	43.35%	45.58%	46.31%	48.74%	49.97%	50.71%		8.33%
Utah		31.23%	30.21%	29.21%	29.30%	28.41%	28.73%	28.58%	28.87%		-1.16%
Vermont		67.39%	64.10%	60.82%	59.33%	56.11%	54.72%	53.18%	53.24%		-10.84%
Virginia		51.71%	50.05%	48.92%	49.85%	48.86%	49.98%	49.68%	49.85%		-0.12%
Washington		57.25%	55.42%	53.56%	53.70%	52.11%	52.81%	52.36%	52.72%		-2.54%
West Virginia		40.09%	38.24%	36.53%	36.08%	34.41%	34.02%	33.27%	33.36%		-4.85%
Wisconsin		52.49%	50.19%	48.08%	47.59%	45.58%	45.25%	44.40%	44.54%		-5.59%
Wyoming		32.03%	31.01%	30.04%	30.09%	29.27%	29.53%	29.55%	29.98%		-0.79%

States where the Democrat margin is greater than 53% are colored blue.

States where the Democrat margin is less than 47% are colored red.

Darker shades of blue or red represent a state "flipping," as shown on accompanying map.

Figure 4.
Trende Double Down Projection Map: 2012-2040

Electoral Vote Count for Demorats (270 to win)								
2012	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032	2036	2040	Net Gain
332	255	197	227	223	223	215	287	-45



Republican Pickups	Year	E Votes	Dems Regain?
Colorado	2016	9	2040
Florida	2020	29	2024
Iowa	2020	6	No
Maine	2028	4	No
Michigan	2016	16	No
Minnesota	2016	10	No
N Hampshire	2016	4	No
Ohio	2024	18	No
Oregon	2036	7	2040
Pennsylvania	2016	20	No
Virginia	2020	13	No
Wisconsin	2020	10	No

Democrat Pickups	Year	E Votes	Reps Regain?
Arizona	2040	13	No
Texas	2040	41	No

the three greatest risks of such a strategy: if they go all in on the white vote, they will need to win it, consistently by historic margins; the electoral calculus justifying this approach is dependent on Hispanics continuing to "punch below their weight" in the voting booth; and finally, the bridges this strategy will burn could prove catastrophic for the party in the long run.

The first risk is the simplest: the margins of victory Republicans will need from white voters are absolutely critical to this strategy but will be far from easy to attain and provide little room for error. Trende argues that because George H.W. Bush in 1988 and Mitt Romney in 2012 both won the white vote by 20 points, he can't "see any compelling reason" why a Republican "couldn't begin to approach Ronald Reagan's 30-point win with whites from 1984" (Trende 2013). Reagan in fact won the popular vote that year by 18 points overall, by far the largest blowout of the last 40 years, but Trende is suggesting Republicans could replicate that 30-point white victory in a neutral environment as soon as 2020 and could reach and consistently maintain a 40-point margin from 2032 on. Abramowitz and Teixeira have already cast doubts on Trende's questionable use of PVI to justify his methodology and pointed out that today's greater polarization and stronger party loyalties make it much more difficult to peel off white voters at the margin (Abramowitz and Teixeira 2013).

The goal of my thesis is not to explicitly challenge Trende's hypotheses, but to cast light on the fragility of his strategy. If Republicans can indeed swipe an additional 2.8% of the white vote in 2016, bringing the Democrat share down from 39.8 to 37, they will win with 283 electoral votes. But falling just a single point short of that goal would cost them Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, and New Hampshire, a total of 39 electoral votes, resulting

in a 294-244 loss. Even just half a point shy of their goal, with Democrats down to 37.5%, the GOP would lose all those states except for Minnesota, falling 284-254.

This pattern then continues. In 2020, Trende expects the Democrat margin to drop to 35%, a swing of 4.8 points over two elections that would bring Republicans to the 30-point margin of victory matched only by Reagan's 1984 blowout. In this scenario they would win with a crushing 341 electoral votes. But if Republicans fall two points shy of their goal, putting Democrats at 37% and slightly reducing the margin of white victory to 26 points, they will barely squeak by with 274 electoral votes. Anything less, and they lose. In Trende's scenario, Republicans will indeed win the electoral vote—sometimes by impressive margins—in every election through 2036. But in every year except 2028 they will do so without the popular vote, and their margins leave little room for disobedience or disaffection among white voters.

As the demographics turn against them, Republicans will continuously need to push the historic ceiling of their white support. Trende suggests it can be done while Abramowitz and Teixeira argue that it's highly unlikely, but both would probably agree that Republicans would have miniscule margin for error. This strategy also does not exist in a vacuum. Democrats have access to polling and the Silver Model as well, and the potentially scorched-earth polarization strategy Republicans would have to adopt to woo those white voters they have rarely, if ever, won before would be readily apparent. If Democrats can hold even one or two percent of the white voters targeted by this GOP offensive, or if the voters themselves prove noncompliant, the Republican Party will be up a creek without a paddle. They will have doubled down on a losing hand, alienating the growing minority vote with little to show for it.

There is also the potential that this minority vote may realize its sizable latent potential more quickly than expected. This entire strategy is predicated on a base electorate where, in 2016, whites make up two-thirds of the population but cast three-quarters of the vote. Hispanics are drastically underrepresented, representing nearly 20% of the population but casting barely 9% of the votes. If these gaps begin to close, Republicans will see their margins of victory quickly evaporate. Any combination of an increase in anemic Hispanic turnout, natural aging of the youthful Hispanic population, or increased rates of naturalization for legal immigrants could close this gap naturally. Or, as party politics adapts to this racially-polarized environment, any Democrats in power would have extremely strong incentives, through legislative or executive action, to take steps to increase minority voting power: returning the franchise to felons, rolling back voter ID laws, and taking myriad steps on immigration reform to get the nearly 14 million (in 2016) ineligible Hispanic adults into voting booths. With these voters supporting Democrats nine-to-one, any increase in their electoral weight could quickly shatter Republican presidential aspirations.

The third, and perhaps most significant, concern is long term. What will be the cost of alienating and perhaps antagonizing 90% of demographic groups that will become, in combination, a majority by 2044? Trende attempts to allay these concerns with the reasonable point that "making policy decisions based on what might happen in 35 years crazy [sic]" (Trende 2013). As Republicans see their electoral prospects dim around 2040 they will inevitably need to recalculate, but they may find themselves victims of the racially polarized electorate of their creation. No data can predict attitudes that far in the future, but it seems highly unlikely that if the GOP throws open its doors in 2040, minorities

spurned and abandoned by the party for 30 years—many who will have lived their entire adult lives voting nine-to-one to defeat it—will come flocking back in meaningful numbers.

It *is* "crazy" to make policy decisions based on what might happen in 35 years, but it is even more myopic and self-destructive to make decisions specifically predicated on completely abandoning and alienating groups unquestionably set to become a majority of the population. If Republicans decide to burn all bridges to cling solely to the shrinking iceberg of the white population, they can hardly expect their adversaries to throw them a life vest when it begins to sink.

VI. Diverse Coalition Projections

Alternatively, Republicans could adopt the completely opposite approach: recognizing that splitting their cards and widening their reach is a wiser long-term bet than doubling down, embracing rather than resisting demographic change, and building a new Grand Old Party that can survive and thrive in the new and changing American electorate of the 21st century. As the 2016 Republican primary begins to take shape, the divergent early-campaign approaches of Scott Walker and Jeb Bush perfectly illustrate the larger choice facing the party: "the two dueling visions" of how the Republican Party can retake the White House "by extending its reach, or by energizing more of the sorts of people who have sided with Republicans in the past" (Martin 2015).

Walker, the conservative and pugnacious governor of Wisconsin, has come out swinging, appearing wholly to embrace a polarizing double down strategy. Touting his conservative credentials and taking tough stances on immigration and public assistance

programs, he is "counting on [the party's] urge to fight," and embracing "a populist strategy that doubles down on turning out white men"—a characterization one of his advisors did not directly dispute (Martin 2015).

Bush, the bilingual former governor of Florida, has adopted nearly the opposite approach. If Walker is trying to galvanize base voters to win the primary, Bush is striving to widen the party's reach to win the general election. If Walker is counting on the party's urge to fight, Bush is counting on their hunger to win. If Walker "wants to re-energize the party from within," Bush "wants to re-energize the party from without" (Martin 2015). When running for president, his brother George won 36% of the Hispanic vote in 2000 and improved that to 41% in 2004.[15] For Jeb, anything approaching those numbers would represent a massive improvement over Mitt Romney's 27%. Such an improvement could be enough to tip the scales in a closely contested election, a theory punctuated by the reality that just a few hundred votes in Florida (with America's third largest Hispanic population) kept Al Gore from becoming America's 43rd president.

Courting Hispanic voters, embracing immigration reform and inclusiveness, and preaching the gospel of unity rather than division, Bush is willing to "gamble that conservatism can win in the free market of ideas amongst a diverse and changing 21st-century America" (Martin 2015). Rejecting the politics of populism and polarization, Bush is betting that the Republican Party can assemble a diverse electoral coalition that will capitalize on rather than defy America's demographic destiny.

The political differences in these strategies would likely produce divergent electoral strategies. *The New York Times'* Jonathan Martin hypothesizes that Walker's entreaties to

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[15] Percentages exclude third party votes.

working-class whites would target Midwestern, Great Lakes, and Rust Belt states—especially the crucial swing states of Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania (Martin 2015). Bush's softer, more inclusive strategy, would instead focus on more diverse swing states like Colorado, Florida, Nevada, Mexico, North Carolina, and Virginia, all states where the VAP is at least a quarter nonwhite (Martin 2015).

The goal in this section (and the previous one) is to project how these divergent strategies will play out on the electoral map, on a scale much larger than these two men and far wider than a single election. Specifically for this section, what policy outcomes could this diverse coalition strategy entail? How can we model the effects of immigration reform (almost certainly a main pillar of such any such strategy)? And in this scenario what margins of minority voters would Republicans need to reclaim to win the White House—and at what cost to their white support?

Any serious Republican attempt to appeal to Hispanic voters would need to begin with an immigration reform package that includes some version of a path to citizenship. The polling highlighted in the literature review has shown the salience of this issue for Hispanics, and the politics of "self-deportation" have become a non-starter. Senate Republicans worked with Democrats to write and pass a bipartisan immigration reform bill (S. 744) in 2013, but the bill languished in the House of Representatives when Republicans refused to support "amnesty" for undocumented immigrants. The framework is there, and Congressional Republicans pulling together to pass a reform bill would represent a substantial step towards making inroads to the Hispanic population. With this major obstruction removed, Republicans would be able to make political appeals to Hispanics from a more level playing field with Democrats. Democrats would undoubtedly retain a

considerable advantage among Hispanic voters, at least in the short term, but this gesture of openness and friendship would likely shave at least a few points off Republicans' untenable 44-point loss of Latino voters in 2012. If potential candidates like Jeb Bush listen to Hispanic issues and reach out to Latino voters—especially in Spanish, as Bush has been doing—this margin is likely to shrink further.

Of course, passing immigration reform comes with substantial risk, chiefly that Republicans would theoretically be providing a path to citizenship to 12 million potential voters mostly of a demographic group that votes three-to-one against them. These projections will analyze potential Hispanic voting effects of immigration reform, but an additional concern for Republicans is that supporting a path to citizenship could cost them with their anti-amnesty base, if not by their voting for Democrats, then at least by their simply staying home. With the degree of polarization that exists today, this risk to white support is inherent in any effort to reach out to minorities—although this does not necessarily mean that the game is zero-sum.

The other main group Republicans would target in a diverse coalition approach is African Americans. There is no single policy issue as salient for blacks as immigration reform is for Hispanics, but the party could potentially improve its standing by softening its stances on issues like criminal justice reform, income inequality, and safety net programs. African Americans have been voting for the Democratic Party much longer and at far higher rates than Hispanics, but a friendlier policy platform, minority outreach and voter targeting, and the absence of President Obama on the ballot could allow Republicans to shave at least a few points off the colossal Democratic margins (or at least give blacks less incentive to come out against them).

Republicans may never win over a majority of black or Hispanic voters, but they also may not need to. With their 20-point margin of victory, Romney netted a formidable 19 million white votes than Obama did in 2012.[16] But he lost because receiving only 17% of the non-white vote cost him a net of roughly 24 million minority voters. If Republicans can maintain anywhere near that 20-point margin of white voters, they will never (in the foreseeable future) need to "win" minorities. They will just need to substantially soften their margins of defeat among these groups to avoid the kind of net loss that crushed them in 2012. Even if Republicans had lost the minority vote by "just" three-to-one in 2012, roughly 24 million-8 million, they would have carried the overall popular vote by a comfortable three million.

In this scenario, the model's projections will assess how much of the minority vote Republicans will need to pick up to make this strategy viable, with success manifested by winning the White House in every election through 2040.

A number of difficulties complicate the process of predicting the effects of potential immigration reform. Specifically, how many people will be eligible for citizenship? How many will apply for and receive it? Of those, how many will vote? And finally, which party will they vote for and how will their votes affect the electoral map?

This analysis will focus mainly on the stalled S. 744 as the primary legislative avenue for immigration reform, and will consider its effects on the citizen and voting populations.[17]

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[16] In this paragraph, all statistics are based on the Baseline Projection Model.

[17] Other versions and reform bills are possibilities, most prominently the DREAM Act. But S. 744 is designed to address *all* unauthorized immigrants, while the DREAM Act is specifically targeted at minors, who will be required to complete some level of higher education or military service. In addition to the complexities involved with many DREAM

The Baseline Model (Appendix I), using VEP rates, estimates the adult, voting ineligible Hispanic population in 2012 as 12.3 million. This number is in line with the Pew Center's estimate of 12.5 million, which is split between 5.4 million adult legal permanent residents and 7.1 million adult unauthorized immigrants. In the Baseline Model, VEP rates are used to project this statistic out through 2040. This section's projection model will shift large portions of this ineligible cohort into the voting-eligible group to assess the electoral impact of reform.

The immigration reform projections are based on a Congressional Budget Office cost estimate commissioned specifically for S. 744 (CBO 2013). In five-year increments through 2033 (assuming the bill was passed in 2013) this report estimates cumulative changes in legal and illegal U.S. residents that would occur specifically as a result of this bill. The CBO finds that the legal resident population will spike by 12.7 million in the first five years, a figure that will double to 24.1 million by 2033.[18] But this increase includes temporary workers and Registered Provisional Immigrants, millions of legal permanent residents (LPRs) who still lack citizenship and thus cannot vote. For our purposes, the more useful statistic the CBO estimates is "Additional Naturalized Citizens and LPRs in the Country for more than Five Years Under S. 744," which remains essentially zero through 2018, then increases to 4 million in 2023, 10.7 million in 2028, and 15.5 million in 2033. Using this statistic may slightly overestimate the increase in Hispanic citizens, as even after five years many LPRs will not apply for citizenship, but the data are not specific enough to split this

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Act beneficiaries currently being too young to vote, S. 744 is projected to initially lead to legal status for 8 million residents, compared to only 825,000 for the DREAM Act (CBO 2013; Hinojosa and Takash 2010).

[18] Population changes are specifically those attributable to this bill. Changes are not absolute, but relative to a scenario in which this bill is not passed.

category into separate groups for naturalized citizens and long-term LPRs, and no better estimate is available.

These statistics are relatively simple to incorporate into the model. This addition can be done without modifying VEP rates or the number of ineligible Hispanics (who cannot vote, and are thus not utilized anywhere in the projections). First, each of these estimates are multiplied by the Hispanic VAP rate of .665 to remove those too young to vote. Then, starting with 2018 as zero, a combination of linear interpolation and extrapolation is used to fit these estimates into election years through 2040, and then add them to the existing Hispanic VEP.[19]

The 2020 figure is calculated as two-fifths of the 2.66 million increase (4 million from 2018-2023, multiplied by .665) from 2018 to 2023 (two-fifths because 2020 is two years into the five year period), for a final addition of 1.06 million to Hispanic VEP. This increase in VEP is not spread evenly across the country. Because this national increase largely represents the legalization of undocumented immigrants, distribution of this increase to the states must be done in accordance with the current distribution of undocumented immigrants. To accomplish this, each state's count of ineligible Hispanic adults in 2012 was calculated as a percentage of the 12.3 million nationally. Each state then gets their percentage of the 1.06 million increase. Thus California, home to 28% of the nation's undocumented immigration population, received 28% of the 1.06 million—roughly 300,000 "new" potential voters.

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[19] Roughly 80% of illegal immigrants potentially affected by this bill are Hispanic, and another 10% are Asian (Silver 2013). For the sake of simplicity, especially as the model already treats Asian and Hispanic voting similarly, these projections will attribute all changes in illegal immigrants to Hispanics.

The same interpolation was applied to elections in 2024-2032, and estimates for 2036 and 2040 were achieved by extrapolating an addition of 1.03 million citizens/long-term LPRs per year, the average annual increase from 2018-2033 (the full range of CBO projections).

In an intriguing coincidence, the baseline results for this immigration-reform-configured model (Table 7, Figure 5) nearly perfectly mirror those for the Hispanic Turnout Projection (Table 3, Figure 2): Arizona and Georgia flip in 2032, two cycles earlier than previously expected, North Carolina still turns blue in 2024, and Texas becomes a virtual toss-up. In every election, these two projections predict exactly the same electoral vote counts and national popular vote margins with two-tenths of a percent. Democrats pick up the same states in the same years and by 2040 see their electoral vote total rise to 374 and their share of the popular vote rise to roughly 55.5% (55.58% in the immigration reform model and 55.44% in the turnout). The turnout model projects that increasing the turnout rate from 48% now to 62% in 2040 will lead to 28.8 million votes being cast by Hispanics that year, while the CBO immigration projections expect the addition of 15.1 million potential voters to the Latino VEP will produce a total of 29.5 Hispanic ballots cast that year. Essentially, the maps and numbers say that immigration reform would have nearly the exact same effect as Latino voters increasing their turnout rate by two percentage points per election. Immigration reform would widen the pool of eligible Hispanics while higher turnout rates would increase its potency, with each method leading to the same end result.

As we would expect, reforming immigration without modifying partisan voting patterns would expand Republican demographic problems, deepening their

Table 7

Baseline Immigration Reform Model Projections: Popular Vote Margin for Democrats

	2012	2012	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032	2036	2040	2040	Net Change
United States		51.98%	52.12%	52.86%	53.55%	53.90%	55.03%	55.31%	55.58%		3.60%
Alabama		36.80%	36.85%	36.93%	38.85%	39.01%	40.64%	40.77%	40.89%		4.09%
Alaska		35.06%	35.22%	35.39%	36.33%	36.55%	37.62%	37.84%	38.05%		2.99%
Arizona		45.08%	45.69%	46.41%	47.92%	48.99%	50.42%	51.35%	52.21%		7.13%
Arkansas		37.93%	38.04%	38.21%	39.45%	39.77%	40.90%	41.17%	41.43%		3.50%
California		59.21%	59.55%	60.00%	61.33%	61.94%	63.12%	63.57%	63.98%		4.77%
Colorado		50.93%	51.24%	51.59%	52.44%	52.99%	53.82%	54.32%	54.80%		3.86%
Connecticut		57.24%	57.43%	57.67%	58.47%	58.81%	59.58%	59.89%	60.20%		2.96%
Delaware		58.27%	58.35%	58.46%	59.49%	59.68%	60.59%	60.75%	60.90%		2.64%
D.C.		86.12%	86.11%	86.08%	86.38%	86.32%	86.50%	86.45%	86.40%		0.28%
Florida		51.25%	51.38%	51.55%	52.62%	52.85%	53.76%	53.93%	54.09%		2.84%
Georgia		46.15%	46.23%	46.36%	48.38%	48.61%	50.30%	50.47%	50.63%		4.48%
Hawaii		70.18%	70.29%	70.39%	70.90%	71.01%	71.48%	71.58%	71.68%		1.50%
Idaho		32.77%	33.01%	33.30%	33.96%	34.45%	35.15%	35.59%	36.02%		3.24%
Illinois		58.39%	58.56%	58.80%	60.03%	60.42%	61.56%	61.89%	62.23%		3.83%
Indiana		46.46%	46.55%	46.68%	47.49%	47.72%	48.49%	48.69%	48.89%		2.44%
Iowa		52.74%	52.81%	52.89%	53.21%	53.37%	53.71%	53.86%	54.01%		1.26%
Kansas		38.28%	38.40%	38.56%	39.25%	39.54%	40.26%	40.52%	40.78%		2.50%
Kentucky		36.89%	36.94%	37.02%	37.68%	37.83%	38.46%	38.59%	38.73%		1.84%
Louisiana		40.49%	40.54%	40.60%	42.72%	42.83%	44.62%	44.71%	44.80%		4.31%
Maine		59.55%	59.57%	59.59%	59.67%	59.70%	59.79%	59.82%	59.85%		0.29%
Maryland		62.49%	62.54%	62.63%	64.05%	64.20%	65.38%	65.49%	65.60%		3.11%
Massachusetts		60.63%	60.75%	60.91%	61.44%	61.66%	62.21%	62.42%	62.63%		2.00%
Michigan		51.62%	51.68%	51.75%	52.56%	52.67%	53.42%	53.51%	53.61%		1.99%
Minnesota		51.12%	51.17%	51.24%	51.78%	51.91%	52.51%	52.63%	52.75%		1.63%
Mississippi		45.26%	45.28%	45.31%	47.62%	47.68%	49.57%	49.61%	49.65%		4.39%
Missouri		42.87%	42.94%	43.03%	43.93%	44.07%	44.91%	45.04%	45.17%		2.29%
Montana		39.94%	40.01%	40.08%	40.26%	40.35%	40.56%	40.67%	40.78%		0.84%
Nebraska		39.94%	40.11%	40.36%	41.15%	41.59%	42.40%	42.79%	43.18%		3.24%
Nevada		54.44%	54.77%	55.18%	56.57%	57.19%	58.44%	58.90%	59.32%		4.88%
New Hampshire		51.93%	51.97%	52.02%	52.20%	52.27%	52.47%	52.55%	52.62%		0.69%
New Jersey		56.49%	56.73%	57.05%	58.41%	58.90%	60.16%	60.55%	60.93%		4.44%
New Mexico		53.85%	54.38%	54.95%	56.00%	56.70%	57.66%	58.26%	58.82%		4.97%
New York		62.34%	62.64%	63.05%	64.42%	65.04%	66.29%	66.81%	67.33%		4.99%
North Carolina		49.69%	49.76%	49.88%	51.48%	51.71%	53.07%	53.24%	53.40%		3.71%
North Dakota		39.33%	39.39%	39.44%	39.65%	39.73%	39.96%	40.05%	40.14%		0.81%
Ohio		50.46%	50.47%	50.48%	51.23%	51.25%	51.92%	51.93%	51.94%		1.48%
Oklahoma		33.08%	33.21%	33.40%	34.44%	34.78%	35.81%	36.11%	36.41%		3.33%
Oregon		57.07%	57.20%	57.39%	57.89%	58.23%	58.77%	59.07%	59.36%		2.29%
Pennsylvania		49.89%	50.01%	50.14%	50.97%	51.16%	51.97%	52.16%	52.35%		2.46%
Rhode Island		58.06%	58.21%	58.42%	59.06%	59.40%	60.05%	60.37%	60.68%		2.62%
South Carolina		44.70%	44.75%	44.83%	46.61%	46.75%	48.26%	48.37%	48.48%		3.78%
South Dakota		38.63%	38.70%	38.78%	39.04%	39.18%	39.46%	39.60%	39.73%		1.09%
Tennessee		43.16%	43.24%	43.37%	44.67%	44.91%	46.06%	46.26%	46.45%		3.28%
Texas		42.90%	43.35%	43.92%	45.82%	46.62%	48.27%	48.89%	49.48%		6.58%
Utah		31.23%	31.40%	31.64%	32.29%	32.71%	33.41%	33.76%	34.09%		2.86%
Vermont		67.39%	67.40%	67.42%	67.48%	67.49%	67.56%	67.58%	67.60%		0.21%
Virginia		51.71%	51.77%	51.86%	53.11%	53.26%	54.39%	54.51%	54.62%		2.91%
Washington		57.25%	57.38%	57.55%	58.21%	58.50%	59.24%	59.49%	59.73%		2.48%
West Virginia		40.09%	40.12%	40.16%	40.53%	40.59%	40.96%	41.03%	41.09%		1.01%
Wisconsin		52.49%	52.52%	52.57%	53.02%	53.11%	53.55%	53.62%	53.70%		1.21%
Wyoming		32.03%	32.24%	32.48%	33.00%	33.35%	33.93%	34.29%	34.65%		2.62%

States where the Democrat margin is greater than 53% are colored blue.

States where the Democrat margin is less than 47% are colored red.

Darker shades of blue or red represent a state "flipping," as shown on accompanying map.

Figure 5.
Baseline Immigration Reform Projection Map: 2012-2040

Electoral Vote Count for Demorats (270 to win)								
2012	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032	2036	2040	Net Gain
332	332	332	346	346	374	374	374	42



States That Flip	Year	Color	E Votes
Arizona	2032	Blue	13
Georgia	2032	Blue	17
N. Carolina	2024	Blue	16

projected 2040 vote deficit from 14.2 million without immigration reform to 17.4 million in this more diverse electorate. But GOP cooperation would be predicated on the hope that embracing reform would, by robbing Democrats of their trump card with Latino voters, allow them to win over at least a more palatable share of the Hispanic vote. For immigration reform to net positive dividends for Republicans, they must improve their margins with Hispanic voters enough to outweigh the combined costs of a larger Hispanic electorate (that they will still likely lose) and whatever backlash support for reform may provoke among their anti-amnesty base.

Nate Silver posits one example of such a scenario. Looking at 2028, he examines the potential result of Republican support for immigration reform improving their shares of the Hispanic and Asian votes to 35%, the share of the Hispanic vote George Bush won in 2000, and five points fewer than he won in 2004. In our model, by 2028 the additional 7.1 million citizens enfranchised by immigration reform, vis-à-vis baseline projections, will net Democrats 1.5 million additional votes in that election (holding voting patterns constant). But if, as Silver suggests, Republicans can build on this reform to improve their Hispanic and Asian margins to 35%, they will shift back nearly 3.7 million votes, thereby reversing the total effect of immigration reform from costing them 1.5 million votes to netting them 2.2 million (Table 8).

Those 35% ratios seem realistic and a net of 2.2 million votes would be a boon for Republicans, but it is not nearly enough to rescue the party from the magnitude of its demographic problem. Without immigration reform, pure demographic growth will net Democrats nearly 4.8 million votes from 2012-2028 (Silver thinks this may be even higher, at 6.3 million). But this net gross is on top of the five-million-vote advantage Democrats

already had banked from 2012, and even if Republicans can win back 2.2 million in this immigration reform scenario, they will still find themselves 2.6 million votes worse off than in 2012 and nearly eight million short of Democrats. And these numbers are just through 2028; as the Hispanic population continues to explode throughout the 2030s, 65% of new Latino voters will be pulling the lever for Democrats.

Alarm bells should be ringing at this point. Even if Republicans—whose best performance with Hispanics in the past 35 years was Bush's 18-point loss to Kerry in 2004—can win *half* of the Hispanic and Asian votes in 2028, effectively neutralizing those groups, they will still lose. Democrats would win just over half of the popular vote and 277 electoral votes (the Silver Model projects 285). Republicans would be erasing their 44-point deficit with Hispanic voters without sacrificing a single white vote, but it would still not be enough to outweigh monolithic opposition from America's black voters.

For Republicans, black voters are an inescapable but often overlooked problem. Most of the focus on the party's long-term demographic problem is on Hispanic population growth. While the black population is projected to grow a modest 7.5 million through 2040, Hispanics will double to 106 million over that span. In pure population terms, Latinos are the ascendant minority group, strategically appetizing as less politically entrenched than blacks and potentially "winnable" on the single, highly salient, and race-specific policy issue of immigration reform. But while Hispanics may possess the long-term potential and receive the attention, blacks clearly hold the crown as the most politically powerful minority. With the baseline model projecting them to cast more votes than Hispanics in every election until 2040, it appears they have no plans to relinquish it anytime soon.

In 2012, Mitt Romney's 20-point victory among America's 100 million white voters, who cast 75% of the votes, netted him a commanding 18.4 million votes. If not for black voters, he could have lost every single Hispanic and Asian vote cast and still won the popular vote by 3.5 million. But fewer than 18 million black voters wiped out nearly all (over 17 million) of the 18.4 million net he accrued from five times as many white voters. The black population is projected to grow modestly and the white population anemically (peaking in 2028, and then slightly declining). Even without a single Hispanic or Asian vote cast, under 2012 voting patterns Republicans would lose every election after 2016, by virtue of losing the black vote by margins greater than they win the white vote. Their demographic problem may cause massive headaches for Republicans in the future, but it's a separate racial problem that has cost them the past two elections. As these projections show, any successful long-term strategy will need to address both.

Identifying the racial problem is easy: with blacks turning out at higher rates than whites, Republicans simply cannot afford 93% of them voting for Democrats. As with Hispanics, Republicans' levels of white support means they may never need to "win" the black vote. But they desperately need to cut down on their margins of defeat and can do that both by peeling a few percentage points off the margin and through lowering turnout by reducing the motivation for blacks to come out against them. Taking steps discussed earlier like toning down provocative rhetoric and softening the GOP's stance on criminal justice reform, income inequality, and the social safety net would be crucial to improving Republican standing with black voters.

Going back to the 2028 immigration reform projection, improving Republican margins of Hispanic and Asian voters to 35% helped with the Party's demographic

problem, but did nothing to resolve the crippling problem posed by black voters.[20] Democrats are projected to win with 52.7% of the popular vote and a comfortable 346 electoral votes (Silver Model: 334 electoral votes). Republicans net 19 million votes from whites and only lose about 7.5 million to Hispanics and Asians, but the 19.5-million-vote loss of the black vote proves insurmountable.

Table 8

Table 8: 2028 Election Example (my Immigration Reform Model)

Scenario	E Votes (D)	Popular Vote (D)	Dem White %	Black%	Hispanic %	Black Turnout %
Baseline Voting	346	53.90%	39	93	72	66
Silver Scenario	346	52.65%	39	93	65	66
Silver Plus	264	51.27%	39	87	65	60

E Votes are electoral votes, race percentages represent the percent won by Democrats, and black turnout is voters as a percentage of VEP.

But the election can still be salvaged, provided this diverse coalition strategy can make substantial inroads with black voters. The margins they need are not as daunting as one might expect. If in this scenario Republicans can pick up six points of the black vote—bringing the ratio to a still-grossly-lopsided 87-13—and blacks turn out at a rate of 60% instead of 66% the GOP will win (in Table 8, the "Silver Plus" model combines these black voting assumptions with Silver's hypotheses for Hispanic voting in his 2028 scenario). These changes will be enough for Republicans to win back the key swing states of Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, improving its electoral vote total from 192 to 274.

[20] In the absence of the time or space to comprehensively cover every election, this scenario uses 2028 as the test case election year. It is far enough down the line to capture the effects of demographic trends and immigration reform, but not so far that current trends lose their predicative power—presumably the same reasons Silver chose it for his scenario.

They are also not so farfetched, because they nearly perfectly reflect black voting behavior in the 2004 election, the last presidential election without a black candidate on the ballot.

That year, blacks voted for Kerry 88-11% and turned out at a rate of exactly 60% (CNN Exit Polling). It is unknown exactly how much of the increase in black participation and bolstered support for Democrats is attributable specifically to Barack Obama's presence on the ballot, and how much to deeper racial and political factors. More importantly, it is impossible to predict with certainty how much, if any, of these changes will reverse without him on the ballot, if the surge of black voters washes away without his historic presence to feed it. But it would be incredibly unwise for Republicans not to try, to continue essentially writing off the black vote, when scraping up even a miserly 13% can prove the key to electoral success.

I used the model to assemble a table similar in style to Trende's, a table of potential vote and turnout percentages the GOP would need to get to win every election through 2040. But while Trende's scenario models targets for Republicans in a racially polarized electorate, mine highlights minimum goals for the party as it follows a "diverse coalition" approach. If they can improve their standing with minority voters to hit these targets, this diverse coalition strategy will win Republicans the White House in each of the next seven elections (Table 9).

In this scenario, I envision black turnout reverting briefly back to the 2004 rate after the first black candidate/president comes off the ballot in 2016, but then rising gradually at a rate of one point per election. By 2040, it will be back up to the actual 2012 rate of 66%, which is higher than the rate for whites.

Table 9: Diverse Coalition Scenario							
Year	E Votes (R)	E Votes (D)	White %	Black %	Hispanic %	Asian %	Black Turnout%
2016	273	265	39	89	70	70	60
2020	273	265	39	89	69	69	61
2024	274	264	39	86	66	66	62
2028	274	264	39	86	64	64	63
2032	274	264	39	84	62	62	64
2036	276	262	39	83	62	62	65
2040	276	262	39	83	61	61	66

E Vote are electoral votes, race percentages reresent the percent won by Democrats, and black turnout is voters as a percentage of VEP

Without Obama on the ballot, Republicans manage to creep up to 11% of the black vote—the same number they won in 2004—and the party's more inclusive stance and support for immigration reform help swing back three percentage points of the Hispanic and Asian votes. From the 2012 map, they pick up the "Holy Trinity" of presidential swing states—Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania—to squeeze by with 273 electoral votes (Table 10, Figure 6).

From there, they scratch and claw to hold on. As black turnout begins to creep back up and the Hispanic population boom ramps up, the GOP finds itself needing to the maintain momentum to continually pick off additional points of black and Hispanic support. After getting the "kicker points" in 2016, they will need to gradually win over six more points of the black vote and nine points of the Hispanic vote over the next six elections (respectively, 1.5 points and 1 point per election). A tall order, but certainly not impossible, they would win the 2040 election despite losing the black vote 83-17% and the Hispanic and Asian votes 61-39%.

Table 10

Diverse Coalition Projection: Popular Vote Margin for Democrats

	2012	2012	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032	2036	2040	2040	Net Change
United States		51.98%	50.76%	51.48%	51.20%	51.20%	51.46%	51.55%	51.56%		-0.42%
Alabama		36.80%	34.37%	34.66%	35.76%	36.06%	37.07%	37.10%	37.35%		0.55%
Alaska		35.06%	34.66%	34.77%	35.23%	35.24%	35.79%	35.95%	36.00%		0.94%
Arizona		45.08%	45.00%	45.49%	46.02%	46.37%	46.81%	47.47%	47.74%		2.67%
Arkansas		37.93%	36.74%	36.97%	37.63%	37.90%	38.51%	38.66%	38.87%		0.94%
California		59.21%	58.22%	58.29%	57.99%	57.55%	57.21%	57.41%	57.10%		-2.11%
Colorado		50.93%	50.72%	50.92%	51.07%	51.12%	51.22%	51.52%	51.57%		0.64%
Connecticut		57.24%	56.57%	56.72%	56.79%	56.80%	56.86%	56.98%	57.00%		-0.24%
Delaware		58.27%	56.83%	56.97%	57.14%	57.21%	57.36%	57.32%	57.37%		-0.89%
D.C.		86.12%	83.55%	83.51%	81.89%	81.66%	80.37%	79.75%	79.56%		-6.56%
Florida		51.25%	49.87%	49.96%	49.98%	49.80%	49.79%	49.77%	49.63%		-1.62%
Georgia		46.15%	43.44%	43.76%	44.70%	44.97%	45.80%	45.77%	45.98%		-0.17%
Hawaii		70.18%	68.59%	68.13%	66.50%	65.34%	63.86%	63.91%	63.28%		-6.90%
Idaho		32.77%	32.82%	33.04%	33.38%	33.61%	33.94%	34.27%	34.46%		1.69%
Illinois		58.39%	57.04%	57.24%	57.47%	57.55%	57.74%	57.84%	57.91%		-0.49%
Indiana		46.46%	45.66%	45.81%	46.14%	46.29%	46.61%	46.70%	46.83%		0.37%
Iowa		52.74%	52.55%	52.61%	52.69%	52.72%	52.79%	52.86%	52.89%		0.15%
Kansas		38.28%	37.88%	38.03%	38.36%	38.51%	38.85%	39.02%	39.15%		0.87%
Kentucky		36.89%	36.27%	36.38%	36.73%	36.86%	37.20%	37.28%	37.39%		0.50%
Louisiana		40.49%	37.57%	37.87%	39.00%	39.28%	40.33%	40.28%	40.53%		0.04%
Maine		59.55%	59.47%	59.47%	59.47%	59.45%	59.44%	59.44%	59.43%		-0.12%
Maryland		62.49%	60.13%	60.29%	60.46%	60.49%	60.62%	60.47%	60.49%		-2.00%
Massachusetts		60.63%	60.17%	60.22%	60.15%	60.06%	59.96%	60.02%	59.95%		-0.68%
Michigan		51.62%	50.57%	50.66%	50.88%	50.90%	51.12%	51.09%	51.12%		-0.50%
Minnesota		51.12%	50.72%	50.76%	50.91%	50.90%	51.07%	51.12%	51.12%		0.00%
Mississippi		45.26%	41.78%	42.10%	43.28%	43.58%	44.66%	44.52%	44.80%		-0.46%
Missouri		42.87%	41.89%	42.02%	42.42%	42.54%	42.94%	42.98%	43.09%		0.21%
Montana		39.94%	39.92%	39.96%	40.02%	40.04%	40.11%	40.19%	40.22%		0.28%
Nebraska		39.94%	39.60%	39.80%	40.19%	40.42%	40.79%	41.06%	41.25%		1.31%
Nevada		54.44%	53.59%	53.78%	53.92%	53.79%	53.81%	54.03%	53.90%		-0.54%
New Hampshire		51.93%	51.84%	51.87%	51.90%	51.89%	51.92%	51.96%	51.96%		0.03%
New Jersey		56.49%	55.23%	55.45%	55.67%	55.69%	55.87%	56.03%	56.04%		-0.45%
New Mexico		53.85%	53.42%	53.54%	53.05%	52.64%	52.26%	52.63%	52.43%		-1.42%
New York		62.34%	61.04%	61.32%	61.39%	61.46%	61.51%	61.74%	61.81%		-0.53%
North Carolina		49.69%	47.57%	47.83%	48.49%	48.70%	49.28%	49.26%	49.41%		-0.29%
North Dakota		39.33%	39.25%	39.29%	39.38%	39.40%	39.50%	39.56%	39.60%		0.27%
Ohio		50.46%	49.34%	49.41%	49.64%	49.65%	49.88%	49.80%	49.82%		-0.65%
Oklahoma		33.08%	32.35%	32.55%	33.14%	33.37%	33.96%	34.17%	34.36%		1.29%
Oregon		57.07%	56.91%	57.00%	57.05%	57.05%	57.05%	57.19%	57.17%		0.10%
Pennsylvania		49.89%	49.07%	49.21%	49.47%	49.54%	49.83%	49.90%	49.99%		0.10%
Rhode Island		58.06%	57.62%	57.74%	57.79%	57.80%	57.80%	57.93%	57.93%		-0.12%
South Carolina		44.70%	42.23%	42.50%	43.35%	43.61%	44.39%	44.34%	44.55%		-0.15%
South Dakota		38.63%	38.54%	38.60%	38.72%	38.78%	38.92%	39.01%	39.06%		0.43%
Tennessee		43.16%	41.69%	41.90%	42.52%	42.75%	43.32%	43.38%	43.55%		0.39%
Texas		42.90%	41.65%	42.09%	42.75%	42.95%	43.49%	43.90%	44.05%		1.15%
Utah		31.23%	31.18%	31.35%	31.71%	31.91%	32.27%	32.53%	32.68%		1.44%
Vermont		67.39%	67.31%	67.30%	67.25%	67.21%	67.15%	67.15%	67.12%		-0.27%
Virginia		51.71%	50.10%	50.23%	50.58%	50.58%	50.91%	50.85%	50.86%		-0.85%
Washington		57.25%	56.91%	56.95%	56.98%	56.87%	56.86%	56.98%	56.90%		-0.35%
West Virginia		40.09%	39.72%	39.77%	39.95%	39.99%	40.18%	40.21%	40.26%		0.17%
Wisconsin		52.49%	51.96%	52.01%	52.10%	52.09%	52.18%	52.17%	52.17%		-0.32%
Wyoming		32.03%	32.04%	32.21%	32.44%	32.58%	32.84%	33.11%	33.27%		1.24%

States where the Democrat margin is greater than 53% are colored blue.

States where the Democrat margin is less than 47% are colored red.

Darker shades of blue or red represent a state "flipping," as shown on accompanying map.

Figure 6.
Diverse Coalition Projection Map: 2012-2040

Electoral Vote Count for Demorats (270 to win)								
2012	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032	2036	2040	Net Gain
332	265	265	264	264	264	262	262	-70



Republican Pickups in 2016	
State	E Votes
Florida	29
Ohio	18
Pennsylvania	20
*No states flip after 2016	

Instead of doubling down, Republicans would be hedging their bets; building a coalition with roughly 60% of the white vote, 40% of the Hispanic vote, and 15% of the black vote instead of one with 70% of the white vote and essentially nothing else. If they can preach the politics of ideas rather than the polarization of race, they should have greater success reaching voters at the margins—ideologically, that 71st percentage point of white voters would almost certainly be more naturally liberal than that 16th percentile of black voters. Splitting their eggs into multiple baskets, they maintain flexibility in their strategy, not beholden to any particular group and with more latitude to compensate for setbacks. In the long run, they would be embracing America's demographic change rather than resisting it. Even the most diverse of diverse Republican coalitions would still be built upon a bulwark of white support, but appealing to all races would allow them to contest and win elections on the open battlefield of ideas instead of deep in the dark trenches of race.

VII. Conclusions

> "I am a Republican, a black, dyed in the wool Republican, and I never intend to belong to any other party than the party of freedom and progress."
>
> -Frederick Douglass

The Republican Party has some soul searching to do. This conclusion is not exactly a secret; the party has been in open internecine warfare since the Tea Party surge of 2010, with the establishment and conservative wings constantly battling each other on politics and policy. The pro-business establishment wing is generally more cooperative and pro-immigration reform, while the conservative wing is more pugnacious, more demanding of

ideological purity, and at times prone to racially inflammatory rhetoric. In the party's current state Jeb Bush and the establishment tilt towards a big-tent approach cognizant of the looming specter of demographic change, while Scott Walker and the Tea Party wing are fully doubled down and ready to fight.

The party's actions have put it in this untenable position, but its principles indicate that the choice it faces is manufactured. There is nothing inherent about the core conservative principles of free markets and small government that make them anathema to minorities or gospel to whites. True, political ideology may lead to some natural stratification on cultural or socioeconomic lines, but conservatism alone fails to justify the Republican Party's descent from the party of emancipation, Lincoln, and his "better angels of our nature" to the party of the Southern Strategy, Willie Horton, and self-deportation. Democrats are not blameless—indeed up until the 1960s they were the party of blatant and egregious racial politics—but in recent years the decline of moderation in the Republican Party has inflamed its tone and hardened its heart, risking a deep polarization of the electorate on racial lines.

Even if Trende is right that stoking racial polarization can benefit the Republicans in the short run, such a strategy would be incredibly damaging to both the racial fabric of our citizenry and the principles of our democracy. In a nation split relatively evenly across ideological lines, Republican efforts to pick up a 70th percentage point of white voters would likely have to transcend traditional political arguments to wade into the murky waters of racial fear and prejudice. Our politics of ideas—liberal vs. conservative, big government vs. small government, responsible regulation vs *laissez faire*—would tilt towards the politics of tribalism, where "us versus them" would be increasingly determined

by race rather than beliefs, and parties would be tempted to play to our darkest fears rather than appeal to our highest hopes. For nearly two and a half centuries, the melting pot of American democracy has flourished on the bedrock principle that our elections are determined not by the color of the voter's skin, but by the quality of the parties' ideas and the content of the candidates' characters.

As America moves towards its destiny as a minority-majority nation, that principle will become more important than ever before. The 2012 election was the first in our history in which minorities cast a quarter of the votes, and that share is set to grow rapidly, a rise that will pose a major challenge to the Republican Party as currently constructed. With the stability of our two-party system, it is highly unlikely that the Grand Old Party will go the way of the Whigs—but how Republicans respond to this challenge will shape the American electoral and political landscape for decades and centuries to come, molding the framework for policy decisions that will come to affect us all.

Demographics are destiny, and they are inescapable. The Republican Party can stubbornly try to hold back this unstoppable wave, or it can embrace change and ride this wave into the future. It can practice the politics of Lincoln or the politics of tribalism. For the legacy of our competitive and representative American democracy, we should all hope that Republicans emerge from this period of soul searching touched by the better angels of their nature.

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Appendix I: Full 2012 Baseline Model

Key:

Any variable preceded by **W**, **B**, **H**, or **A** is that rate for Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, or Asians.

Share White is the percentage of the state's population that is white.
Total is the total population in that state.
VAP is the population of voting age.
VEP Ratio is the percentage of a state's VAP that is eligible to vote.
VEP is the eligible voting population in a state.
H inelig is a variable unique to Hispanics and is the number of Hispanic adults ineligible to vote due to citizenship factors.
Wvote is the voting rate for whites, as a percentage of their VEP.
Votes represents the total number of votes this model projects a group to cast.
Sum is the total number of votes for all groups combined.
Dem% is the percentage of a group's votes cast for the Democratic candidate.
Weight is a weighting variable that can be used to manipulate patterns to model specific scenarios. In the baseline model it is set at one and does not affect voting patterns.
Final is the weighted voting pattern for a group. In this model, it is the same as Dem%.
DvotesW is the total number of votes cast by whites for the Democratic candidate.
RvotesW is the total number of votes cast by whites for the Republican candidate.
Dvotes is the total number of votes cast by all groups for the Democratic candidate.
Rvotes is the total number of votes cast by all groups for the Republican candidate.
Dem? Is the overall result for each state, where the indicator of 1 represents a Democrat victory and the indicator of 0 represents a Republican victory.
Evotes is the number of electoral votes a state has.
DemEvotes is the number of electoral votes this model projects the Democrat to win
RepEvotes is the number of electoral votes this model projects the Republican to win.
RealDem is the actual number of electoral votes won by President Obama in 2012.
Correct indicates whether or not the model correctly predicted the 2012 results, with green signaling correct and red signaling incorrect.
Actual Dem% is the percentage of the popular vote President Obama won in 2012.
Estimated Dem% is the model's prediction for the Democrat's share of the popular vote.
Difference subtracts the estimated percentage from the actual percentage to assess the model's accuracy.

The full model is spread across the next four pages, detailing every input used to project the 2012 election.

Geography Name	Total Population	Ethnicity, 2010 (Number)		Projected Ethnicity, 2020		Weighted Population Projection, 2012									
		Non-Hispanic	Hispanic	Non-Hispanic	Hispanic	Non-Hispanic	Hispanic	Share White	Share Black	Share A	W Total	B Total	H Total	A Total	
United States	**308,745,538**	**258,267,952**	**50,477,600**	**267,858,906**	**67,746,537**	**260,186,143**	**53,931,387**	0.7640087	0.146834	0.0567686	198,784,477	38,204,179	53,931,387	14,770,410	
Alabama	4,779,736	4,594,134	185,602	4,805,247	261,619	**4,636,357**	**200,805**	0.6982741	0.2712701	0.0116616	3,237,448	1,257,705	200,805	54,067	
Alaska	710,231	670,982	39,249	754,691	57,027	**687,724**	**42,805**	0.6801881	0.0330218	0.0562564	467,782	22,710	42,805	38,689	
Arizona	6,392,017	4,496,868	1,895,149	4,892,785	2,711,597	**4,576,051**	**2,058,439**	0.8239152	0.0535808	0.0383385	3,770,278	245,189	2,058,439	175,439	
Arkansas	2,915,918	2,729,868	186,050	2,857,120	263,605	**2,755,318**	**201,561**	0.7970041	0.1640603	0.013219	2,196,000	452,038	201,561	36,422	
California	37,253,956	23,240,236	14,013,719	23,329,991	18,385,531	**23,258,187**	**14,888,081**	0.6466651	0.0941075	0.2072626	15,040,259	2,188,769	14,888,081	4,820,552	
Colorado	5,029,196	3,990,509	1,038,687	4,282,545	1,450,505	**4,048,916**	**1,121,051**	0.8844428	0.0476811	0.0343031	3,581,035	193,057	1,121,051	138,891	
Connecticut	3,574,097	3,095,010	479,087	3,087,584	636,029	**3,093,525**	**510,475**	0.8261663	0.1097425	0.0442096	2,555,766	339,491	510,475	136,763	
Delaware	897,934	824,713	73,221	891,924	105,604	**838,155**	**79,698**	0.7128819	0.2273409	0.034954	597,506	190,547	79,698	29,297	
District of Columbia	601,723	546,974	54,749	523,692	64,881	**542,318**	**56,775**	0.3846417	0.5522219	0.0386691	208,598	299,480	56,775	20,971	
Florida	18,801,310	14,577,504	4,223,806	15,990,812	5,793,770	**14,860,166**	**4,537,799**	0.7494786	0.197122	0.0313194	11,137,377	2,929,266	4,537,799	465,411	
Georgia	9,687,653	8,833,964	853,689	9,811,685	1,266,324	**9,029,508**	**936,216**	0.6143486	0.3306824	0.0358486	5,547,265	2,985,899	936,216	323,695	
Hawaii	1,360,301	1,239,459	120,842	1,322,381	167,393	**1,256,043**	**130,152**	0.2507191	0.0161966	0.4162582	314,914	20,344	130,152	522,838	
Idaho	1,567,582	1,391,681	175,901	1,517,518	255,094	**1,416,848**	**191,740**	0.947258	0.0064383	0.0134391	1,342,121	9,122	191,740	19,041	
Illinois	12,830,632	10,803,054	2,027,578	10,641,371	2,635,936	**10,770,717**	**2,149,250**	0.7573619	0.170263	0.0545692	8,157,331	1,833,854	2,149,250	587,749	
Indiana	6,483,802	6,094,095	389,707	6,268,413	535,633	**6,128,959**	**418,892**	0.8687441	0.0959911	0.016888	5,324,497	588,326	418,892	103,506	
Iowa	3,046,355	2,894,811	151,544	2,881,173	204,399	**2,892,083**	**162,115**	0.9338803	0.030298	0.0183753	2,700,860	87,624	162,115	53,143	
Kansas	2,853,118	2,553,076	300,042	2,603,007	408,412	**2,563,062**	**321,716**	0.8748412	0.0640568	0.0265272	2,242,272	164,182	321,716	67,991	
Kentucky	4,339,367	4,206,531	132,836	4,373,557	184,672	**4,239,936**	**143,203**	0.8914925	0.0795696	0.0116495	3,779,871	337,370	143,203	49,393	
Louisiana	4,533,372	4,340,812	192,560	4,389,341	245,731	**4,350,518**	**203,194**	0.6314441	0.3332876	0.0161389	2,747,109	1,449,974	203,194	70,213	
Maine	1,328,361	1,311,426	16,935	1,370,876	23,143	**1,323,316**	**18,177**	0.9573754	0.0117834	0.0103574	1,266,910	15,593	18,177	13,706	
Maryland	5,773,552	5,302,920	470,632	5,622,597	659,706	**5,366,855**	**508,447**	0.597039	0.3169648	0.0605938	3,204,222	1,701,104	508,447	325,198	
Massachusetts	6,547,629	5,919,975	627,654	5,969,309	837,565	**5,929,842**	**669,636**	0.8508994	0.0704736	0.059846	5,045,699	417,897	669,636	354,877	
Michigan	9,883,640	9,447,282	436,358	9,497,539	577,078	**9,457,333**	**464,502**	0.802299	0.1469363	0.0253749	7,587,609	1,389,626	464,502	239,979	
Minnesota	5,303,925	5,053,667	250,258	5,348,543	355,523	**5,112,642**	**271,311**	0.8727765	0.0536278	0.0425705	4,462,194	274,180	271,311	217,648	
Mississippi	2,967,297	2,885,816	81,481	2,999,734	111,443	**2,908,600**	**87,473**	0.5973648	0.3792816	0.0089354	1,737,495	1,103,178	87,473	25,990	
Missouri	5,988,927	5,776,457	212,470	6,041,248	294,897	**5,829,415**	**228,955**	0.840648	0.119345	0.0170243	4,900,486	695,711	228,955	99,242	
Montana	989,415	960,850	28,565	1,015,781	39,511	**971,836**	**30,754**	0.9048436	0.003933	0.0064412	879,360	3,822	30,754	6,260	
Nebraska	1,826,341	1,658,936	167,405	1,681,041	227,734	**1,663,357**	**179,471**	0.905223	0.0493835	0.0194149	1,505,709	82,142	179,471	32,294	
Nevada	2,700,551	1,984,050	716,501	2,240,225	1,088,323	**2,035,285**	**790,865**	0.7392218	0.1055891	0.0971654	1,504,527	214,904	790,865	197,759	
New Hampshire	1,316,470	1,279,766	36,704	1,393,529	52,568	**1,302,519**	**39,877**	0.95112	0.0108379	0.0223416	1,238,851	14,117	39,877	29,100	
New Jersey	8,791,894	7,236,750	1,555,144	7,230,713	2,021,983	**7,235,543**	**1,648,512**	0.7238573	0.1569166	0.1012865	5,237,500	1,135,377	1,648,512	732,863	
New Mexico	2,059,179	1,105,776	953,403	1,112,937	1,194,624	**1,107,208**	**1,001,647**	0.7579953	0.0324713	0.0241242	839,259	35,953	1,001,647	26,711	
New York	19,378,102	15,961,180	3,416,922	15,682,790	4,269,884	**15,905,502**	**3,587,514**	0.7107651	0.1770172	0.0906336	11,305,076	2,815,548	3,587,514	1,441,574	
North Carolina	9,535,483	8,735,363	800,120	9,549,407	1,186,706	**8,898,172**	**877,437**	0.713842	0.232013	0.0239706	6,351,889	2,064,492	877,437	213,295	
North Dakota	672,591	659,124	13,467	660,166	17,958	**659,332**	**14,365**	0.9079263	0.0118976	0.0104578	598,625	7,844	14,365	6,895	
Ohio	11,536,504	11,181,830	354,674	11,290,359	473,506	**11,203,536**	**378,440**	0.8382081	0.1247363	0.0173278	9,390,895	1,397,488	378,440	194,132	
Oklahoma	3,751,351	3,419,344	332,007	3,526,584	460,372	**3,440,792**	**357,680**	0.7541189	0.0798422	0.0189376	2,594,766	274,720	357,680	65,160	
Oregon	3,831,074	3,381,012	450,062	3,579,153	644,447	**3,420,640**	**488,939**	0.8909602	0.0193563	0.0415831	3,047,654	66,211	488,939	142,241	
Pennsylvania	12,702,379	11,982,719	719,660	11,997,895	963,123	**11,985,754**	**768,353**	0.8436259	0.1112796	0.0293307	10,111,493	1,333,770	768,353	351,550	
Rhode Island	1,052,567	921,912	130,655	913,092	172,865	**920,148**	**139,097**	0.8792933	0.0616078	0.0331789	809,080	56,688	139,097	30,529	
South Carolina	4,625,364	4,389,682	235,682	4,777,550	340,760	**4,467,256**	**256,698**	0.6760314	0.2921988	0.0134946	3,020,005	1,305,327	256,698	60,284	
South Dakota	814,180	792,061	22,119	823,235	30,708	**798,296**	**23,837**	0.8711993	0.0127048	0.0096432	695,475	10,142	23,837	7,698	
Tennessee	6,346,105	6,056,046	290,059	6,498,718	421,248	**6,144,580**	**316,297**	0.7936996	0.1737132	0.0151214	4,876,951	1,067,395	316,297	92,915	
Texas	25,145,561	15,684,640	9,460,921	16,182,786	12,555,326	**15,784,269**	**10,079,802**	0.7286516	0.1848869	0.061241	11,501,233	2,918,304	10,079,802	966,644	
Utah	2,763,885	2,405,545	358,340	2,679,158	513,872	**2,460,268**	**389,446**	0.9255129	0.0109447	0.0227782	2,277,009	26,927	389,446	56,040	
Vermont	625,741	616,533	9,208	650,225	12,545	**623,271**	**9,875**	0.9584077	0.0097464	0.012906	597,348	6,075	9,875	8,044	
Virginia	8,001,024	7,369,199	631,825	7,970,561	900,923	**7,489,471**	**685,645**	0.7054541	0.2076303	0.059928	5,283,479	1,555,041	685,645	448,829	
Washington	6,724,540	5,968,750	755,790	6,473,338	1,103,140	**6,069,668**	**825,260**	0.819064	0.0387806	0.0803773	4,971,446	235,386	825,260	487,863	
West Virginia	1,852,994	1,830,726	22,268	1,789,373	28,480	**1,822,455**	**23,510**	0.9436606	0.0341094	0.0067984	1,719,779	62,163	23,510	12,390	
Wisconsin	5,686,986	5,350,930	336,056	5,537,865	466,533	**5,388,317**	**362,151**	0.8863168	0.0657856	0.0241693	4,775,756	354,474	362,151	130,232	
Wyoming	563,626	513,395	50,231	527,744	66,282	**516,265**	**53,441**	0.9436633	0.008549	0.0084282	487,180	4,414	53,441	4,351	

	W VAP	B VAP	H VAP	A VAP	W VEP ratio	B VEP ratio	H VEP ratio	A VEP ratio	W VEP	B VEP	H VEP	H inelig	A VEP	Wvote	Bvote	Hvote	A vote
United States	159,027,581	27,942,536	35,877,855	11,596,839	0.98198275	0.96943287	0.65660498	0.676950867	156,162,341	27,088,413	23,557,579	12,320,277	7,850,490	64.1	66.2	48.0	47.3
Alabama	2,589,958	919,885	133,586	42,450	0.99539933	0.99423768	0.44768078	0.565247651	2,578,043	914,585	59,804	73,782	23,995	62.0	63.1	48.0	47.3
Alaska	374,225	16,610	28,476	30,376	0.98674274	0.93227092	0.86351947	0.653068105	369,264	15,485	24,589	3,886	19,838	63.9	66.2	48.0	47.3
Arizona	3,016,223	179,331	1,369,376	137,744	0.97828424	0.9372401	0.70463913	0.660649565	2,950,723	168,076	964,916	404,460	91,001	62.4	46.0	40.4	27.1
Arkansas	1,756,800	330,621	134,088	28,597	0.99537412	0.9954412	0.49767503	0.55766526	1,748,673	329,114	66,732	67,356	15,947	55.7	49.4	48.0	47.3
California	12,032,207	1,600,866	9,904,296	3,784,808	0.96300158	0.96758908	0.64702728	0.740490854	11,587,034	1,548,980	6,408,350	3,495,946	2,802,616	64.3	61.1	48.5	48.6
Colorado	2,864,828	141,202	745,779	109,049	0.98478937	0.91244543	0.72811382	0.676578035	2,821,252	128,839	543,012	202,767	73,780	75.2	55.6	52.1	31.6
Connecticut	2,044,613	248,304	339,594	107,378	0.9671717	0.87924491	0.74597367	0.568005572	1,977,492	218,320	253,328	86,266	60,992	65.8	62.2	47.0	29.0
Delaware	478,005	139,366	53,019	23,002	0.98877861	0.96332939	0.61830796	0.583475662	472,641	134,255	32,782	20,237	13,421	69.9	63.7	48.0	47.3
D.C.	166,878	219,039	37,770	16,465	0.9398735	0.96348467	0.55769231	0.695179234	156,845	211,041	21,064	16,706	11,446	76.7	76.8	48.0	47.3
Florida	8,909,901	2,142,465	3,018,771	365,413	0.971037	0.88810454	0.6844733	0.681935927	8,651,844	1,902,733	2,066,268	952,503	249,188	61.9	57.6	62.2	43.0
Georgia	4,437,812	2,183,887	622,818	254,146	0.98611503	0.97114115	0.44472118	0.584244469	4,376,193	2,120,862	276,980	345,837	148,483	62.0	65.0	47.8	41.9
Hawaii	251,931	14,879	86,584	410,501	0.96453137	0.97868217	0.94160175	0.854617834	242,996	14,562	81,527	5,056	350,822	68.2	66.2	48.0	49.7
Idaho	1,073,697	6,672	127,555	14,950	0.99134841	0.83540925	0.6445192	0.655644623	1,064,408	5,574	82,211	45,343	9,802	66.4	66.2	48.0	47.3
Illinois	6,525,865	1,341,281	1,429,788	461,466	0.97442835	0.98068727	0.61389641	0.653025973	6,358,988	1,315,377	877,742	552,046	301,349	62.2	71.8	38.3	55.4
Indiana	4,259,597	430,301	278,668	81,267	0.99386537	0.97456222	0.60334829	0.487837187	4,233,466	419,355	168,134	110,534	39,645	59.3	68.4	41.1	47.3
Iowa	2,160,688	64,088	107,847	41,725	0.99447753	0.90607131	0.6017761	0.525940876	2,148,755	58,069	64,900	42,947	21,945	70.7	66.2	48.0	47.3
Kansas	1,793,818	120,082	214,022	53,382	0.99362652	0.95246486	0.61125925	0.558430561	1,782,385	114,374	130,823	83,199	29,810	67.0	52.4	30.2	47.3
Kentucky	3,023,897	246,752	95,266	38,781	0.99472077	0.97538928	0.52008596	0.510849183	3,007,933	240,680	49,546	45,719	19,811	59.7	56.9	48.0	47.3
Louisiana	2,197,687	1,060,511	135,175	55,127	0.99346104	0.99457498	0.6217435	0.635161347	2,183,316	1,054,758	84,044	51,131	35,014	65.2	69.5	48.0	47.3
Maine	1,013,528	11,405	12,092	10,761	0.99085414	0.7180068	0.87620298	0.611163671	1,004,259	8,189	10,595	1,497	6,577	69.1	66.2	48.0	47.3
Maryland	2,563,378	1,244,188	338,244	255,326	0.9824802	0.93646965	0.48504045	0.658925868	2,518,468	1,165,144	164,062	174,182	168,241	65.6	67.5	58.7	50.4
Massachusetts	4,036,559	305,650	445,475	278,629	0.96396556	0.79846327	0.73209003	0.610089767	3,891,104	244,050	326,128	119,347	169,988	73.2	65.6	62.7	44.5
Michigan	6,070,087	1,016,372	309,010	188,417	0.98332907	0.98781966	0.74601728	0.571061349	5,968,893	1,003,993	230,527	78,483	107,598	67.9	63.3	70.3	51.6
Minnesota	3,569,755	200,535	180,490	170,884	0.99229716	0.8215431	0.54830839	0.666174109	3,542,258	164,748	98,964	81,526	113,838	74.5	62.1	45.7	78.1
Mississippi	1,389,996	806,865	58,192	20,405	0.99646655	0.99845785	0.54815968	0.587837838	1,385,085	805,620	31,898	26,293	11,995	71.8	82.4	48.0	47.3
Missouri	3,920,389	508,843	152,313	77,919	0.99241388	0.98037988	0.68242553	0.581383289	3,890,648	498,860	103,942	48,371	45,301	64.2	67.3	60.7	47.3
Montana	703,488	2,796	20,459	4,915	0.99298924	0.88909091	0.92498026	0.689134809	698,556	2,486	18,924	1,535	3,387	67.2	66.2	48.0	47.3
Nebraska	1,204,567	60,079	119,393	25,355	0.99457605	0.90914754	0.58376696	0.530467363	1,198,034	54,621	69,698	49,695	13,450	63.6	66.2	48.0	47.3
Nevada	1,203,622	157,181	526,123	155,269	0.97735917	0.9625943	0.59354681	0.731201676	1,176,371	151,301	312,279	213,844	113,533	60.3	61.8	52.0	58.8
New Hampshire	991,081	10,325	26,528	22,848	0.98741334	0.72794118	0.78226621	0.519130632	978,607	7,516	20,752	5,776	11,861	70.0	66.2	48.0	47.3
New Jersey	4,190,000	830,414	1,096,672	575,400	0.96497484	0.92202091	0.64922478	0.632062274	4,043,245	765,659	711,987	384,686	363,689	63.4	68.5	51.1	48.1
New Mexico	671,407	26,296	666,346	20,972	0.98631884	0.97162872	0.84506174	0.681374826	662,221	25,550	563,103	103,242	14,289	70.5	66.2	56.2	47.3
New York	9,044,061	2,059,292	2,386,594	1,131,837	0.96310648	0.86234116	0.68763709	0.627535594	8,710,394	1,775,812	1,641,111	745,483	710,268	59.4	69.2	53.9	39.2
North Carolina	5,081,511	1,509,969	583,715	167,466	0.98940273	0.98472695	0.40628276	0.591847876	5,027,661	1,486,907	237,153	346,562	99,114	66.3	80.2	56.0	47.3
North Dakota	478,900	5,737	9,556	5,414	0.99311775	0.66504461	0.891	0.41729639	475,604	3,816	8,515	1,042	2,259	66.0	66.2	48.0	47.3
Ohio	7,512,716	1,022,122	251,757	152,421	0.9925456	0.97330586	0.75537505	0.579494464	7,456,713	994,838	190,171	61,586	88,327	61.9	71.7	56.9	47.3
Oklahoma	2,075,813	200,931	237,947	51,160	0.99428255	0.97501469	0.58198364	0.623869105	2,063,945	195,910	138,481	99,466	31,917	55.9	54.6	28.7	47.3
Oregon	2,438,123	48,427	325,267	111,679	0.98434321	0.92427365	0.54871173	0.687160783	2,399,950	44,760	178,478	146,789	76,741	70.2	66.2	50.0	47.3
Pennsylvania	8,089,194	975,519	511,147	276,016	0.99015519	0.95775207	0.79919911	0.617463876	8,009,558	934,306	408,508	102,639	170,430	62.5	65.2	45.1	47.6
Rhode Island	647,264	41,462	92,534	23,970	0.98065504	0.83963386	0.63968388	0.576884623	634,743	34,813	59,193	33,342	13,828	63.3	66.2	48.0	47.3
South Carolina	2,416,004	954,716	170,768	47,331	0.98921255	0.99422702	0.46688351	0.645534041	2,389,942	949,205	79,729	91,039	30,554	63.5	69.3	48.0	47.3
South Dakota	556,380	7,418	15,857	6,044	0.99598631	0.71712329	0.69705185	0.464686998	554,147	5,320	11,053	4,804	2,809	64.3	66.2	48.0	47.3
Tennessee	3,901,561	780,692	210,416	72,951	0.99266613	0.98618347	0.45729332	0.605635729	3,872,947	769,906	96,222	114,194	44,182	54.8	61.1	62.3	47.3
Texas	9,200,986	2,134,448	6,705,588	758,951	0.98348008	0.96655355	0.68580099	0.633811757	9,048,987	2,063,058	4,598,699	2,106,889	481,032	60.9	63.1	38.8	42.4
Utah	1,821,608	19,694	259,079	44,000	0.98845693	0.83755032	0.59112202	0.639711592	1,800,581	16,495	153,147	105,932	28,147	61.0	66.2	32.1	47.3
Vermont	477,879	4,443	6,570	6,316	0.98911405	0.78378378	0.85972524	0.646579805	472,676	3,482	5,648	922	4,084	63.2	66.2	48.0	47.3
Virginia	4,226,783	1,137,357	456,125	352,393	0.98346245	0.96679745	0.5431213	0.670175191	4,156,882	1,099,594	247,731	208,394	236,165	67.5	67.2	66.8	53.0
Washington	3,977,157	172,161	549,004	383,041	0.97614831	0.89793241	0.60019116	0.688810791	3,882,295	154,589	329,507	219,497	263,843	68.0	48.3	46.6	66.0
West Virginia	1,375,823	45,466	15,640	9,728	0.99723778	0.97180162	0.80853735	0.60216642	1,372,023	44,184	12,646	2,995	5,858	48.1	66.2	48.0	47.3
Wisconsin	3,820,605	259,262	240,921	102,250	0.99391045	0.98129201	0.63794562	0.63486717	3,797,339	254,412	153,695	87,227	64,915	75.0	78.5	43.9	47.3
Wyoming	389,744	3,228	35,552	3,416	0.99451129	0.89646465	0.80535714	0.613071895	387,605	2,894	28,632	6,920	2,094	62.3	66.2	48.0	47.3

	VotesW	VotesB	VotesH	Votes A	Sum	W Dem%	Black Dem%	H Dem%	A Dem%	W Weight	B Weight	H Weight	A Weight	W Final	B Final	H Final	A final
United States	100,100,061	17,932,530	11,307,638	3,713,282	133,053,510	39	93	72	73	1	1	1	1	39	93	72	73
Alabama	1,605,774	580,448	28,706	11,350	2,214,928	15	95	65	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	15	95	65.3436	73
Alaska	239,130	10,996	11,803	9,383	261,929	29	93	69	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	29.25	93	68.6718	73
Arizona	1,882,123	82,492	389,826	24,661	2,354,441	36	93	77	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	36	93	77	73
Arkansas	978,538	163,327	32,032	7,543	1,173,896	27	93	68	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	27.477	93	68.1569	73
California	7,736,709	978,129	3,108,050	1,362,071	11,822,888	47	96	72	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	47	96	72	73
Colorado	2,154,351	78,508	282,909	23,314	2,515,768	46	93	75	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	46	93	75	73
Connecticut	1,345,355	154,445	119,064	17,688	1,618,864	51	93	79	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	51	93	79	73
Delaware	334,125	88,776	15,735	6,348	438,637	48	93	77	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	47.864	93	77.2623	73
D.C.	127,996	168,222	10,111	5,414	306,329	78	93	82	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	78	93	81.5111	73
Florida	5,515,229	1,234,060	1,285,219	107,151	8,034,508	39	95	60	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	39	95	60	73
Georgia	2,751,444	1,419,526	132,397	62,215	4,303,366	20	93	67	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	20.386	93	66.5651	73
Hawaii	171,817	9,850	39,133	174,358	220,800	64	93	80	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	63.818	93	79.8053	73
Idaho	712,935	4,417	39,462	4,636	756,813	30	93	69	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	30.136	93	68.9618	73
Illinois	4,059,088	963,040	336,175	166,947	5,358,303	47	96	81	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	47	96	81	73
Indiana	2,525,941	294,326	69,103	18,752	2,889,370	40	93	77	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	40	93	77	73
Iowa	1,527,606	42,427	31,152	10,380	1,601,185	51	93	77	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	51	93	76.7068	73
Kansas	1,201,858	62,923	39,508	14,100	1,304,290	34	93	69	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	34	93	68.9618	73
Kentucky	1,805,267	140,402	23,782	9,371	1,969,451	32	93	70	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	31.909	93	69.6466	73
Louisiana	1,432,892	737,055	40,341	16,562	2,210,288	12	93	65	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	12.409	93	65.2063	73
Maine	700,348	7,550	5,086	3,111	712,984	59	93	78	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	59	93	78.0764	73
Maryland	1,681,576	839,827	96,304	84,793	2,617,707	44	97	75	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	44	97	75.0382	73
Massachusetts	2,954,761	200,506	204,482	75,645	3,359,750	57	92	78	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	57	92	77.7646	73
Michigan	4,121,589	643,364	162,060	55,520	4,927,013	44	95	66	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	44	95	66	73
Minnesota	2,659,468	124,532	45,227	88,908	2,829,227	48	93	76	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	48	93	76.0762	73
Mississippi	998,017	664,856	15,311	5,674	1,678,185	11	96	65	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	11	96	64.8103	73
Missouri	2,516,890	342,452	63,093	21,427	2,922,434	35	94	69	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	35	94	69.2825	73
Montana	472,744	1,851	9,084	1,602	483,678	39	93	72	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	39	93	72	73
Nebraska	766,105	39,772	33,455	6,362	839,332	35	93	73	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	35.455	93	73.3587	73
Nevada	725,784	97,138	162,385	66,757	985,306	44	92	71	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	44	92	71	73
New Hampshire	693,757	6,835	9,961	5,610	710,553	51	93	77	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	51	93	76.7068	73
New Jersey	2,656,460	568,834	363,825	174,934	3,589,119	44	96	78	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	44	96	78	73
New Mexico	473,342	17,408	316,464	6,759	807,214	42	93	69	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	42	93	69	73
New York	5,372,172	1,425,030	884,559	278,425	7,681,761	49	94	89	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	49	94	89	73
North Carolina	3,369,042	1,210,995	132,806	46,881	4,712,843	32	96	68	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	32	96	68	73
North Dakota	316,074	3,798	4,087	1,069	323,959	38	93	75	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	38.114	93	74.7175	73
Ohio	4,650,371	732,862	108,207	41,779	5,491,440	43	96	54	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	43	96	54	73
Oklahoma	1,160,380	109,708	39,744	15,097	1,309,832	26	93	68	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	25.705	93	67.7033	73
Oregon	1,711,563	32,059	89,239	36,299	1,832,860	55	93	77	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	55	93	77.4349	73
Pennsylvania	5,055,746	636,039	184,237	81,125	5,876,022	43	93	80	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	43	93	80	73
Rhode Island	409,718	27,448	28,412	6,541	465,578	54	93	78	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	54.068	93	78.373	73
South Carolina	1,534,163	661,618	38,270	14,452	2,234,051	23	93	67	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	23.045	93	67.101	73
South Dakota	357,752	4,911	5,306	1,328	367,969	37	93	74	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	37.227	93	74.3534	73
Tennessee	2,138,055	477,003	59,946	20,898	2,675,005	31	93	69	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	31.023	93	69.2825	73
Texas	5,603,401	1,346,836	1,784,295	203,958	8,734,532	23	93	64	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	23.045	93	64	73
Utah	1,111,181	13,038	49,160	13,314	1,173,379	28	93	68	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	28.364	93	68.4051	73
Vermont	302,019	2,941	2,711	1,932	307,672	67	93	79	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	67	93	79.1897	73
Virginia	2,853,078	764,304	165,484	125,168	3,782,867	39	93	64	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	39	93	64	73
Washington	2,704,467	83,154	153,550	174,136	2,941,171	54	93	77	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	54	93	77.2623	73
West Virginia	661,771	30,098	6,070	2,771	697,940	37	93	74	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	37.227	93	74.3534	73
Wisconsin	2,865,453	203,521	67,472	30,705	3,136,446	49	94	66	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	49	94	66	73
Wyoming	242,811	2,137	13,743	991	258,691	29	93	69	73	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	29.25	93	68.6718	73

	DvotesW	DvotesB	DvotesH	Dvotes A	RvotesW	RvotesB	RvotesH	Rvotes A	Dvotes	Rvotes	Dem?		Evotes	DemEvo	RepEvot	Real Dem			Correct		Actual Dem%	Estimated Dem%	Difference
United States	40,860,468	17,491,333	8,073,565	2,734,735	59,239,592	441,197	3,234,073	978,546	69,160,101	63,893,409	1	1	538	312	226	332			50	United States	0.51963864	0.519791633	-0.02%
Alabama	240,866	551,425	18,757	8,285	1,364,908	29,022	9,948	3,064	819,334	1,406,943	0	0	9	0	9	0	1	1	1	Alabama	0.38783771	0.368028733	1.98%
Alaska	69,946	10,226	8,105	6,850	169,184	770	3,698	2,533	95,127	176,185	0	0	3	0	3	0	1	1	1	Alaska	0.4268471	0.350617267	7.62%
Arizona	677,564	76,718	300,166	18,003	1,204,559	5,774	89,660	6,659	1,072,451	1,306,652	0	0	11	0	11	0	1	1	1	Arizona	0.4538662	0.450779578	0.31%
Arkansas	268,875	151,894	21,832	5,506	709,662	11,433	10,200	2,037	448,108	733,332	0	0	6	0	6	0	1	1	1	Arkansas	0.37845595	0.379289579	-0.08%
California	3,636,253	939,004	2,237,796	994,312	4,100,456	39,125	870,254	367,759	7,807,365	5,377,594	1	1	55	55	0	55	1	1	1	California	0.61872811	0.592141766	2.66%
Colorado	991,001	73,013	212,182	17,020	1,163,349	5,496	70,727	6,295	1,293,215	1,245,867	1	1	9	9	0	9	1	1	1	Colorado	0.52748007	0.509323894	1.82%
Connecticut	686,131	143,634	94,061	12,912	659,224	10,811	25,003	4,776	936,738	699,814	1	1	7	7	0	7	1	1	1	Connecticut	0.58772577	0.57238488	1.53%
Delaware	159,924	82,562	12,157	4,634	174,201	6,214	3,578	1,714	259,278	185,707	1	1	3	3	0	3	1	1	1	Delaware	0.59446955	0.582666935	1.18%
D.C.	99,837	156,447	8,241	3,952	28,159	11,776	1,869	1,462	268,477	43,266	1	1	3	3	0	3	1	1	1	D.C.	0.92587649	0.861213238	6.47%
Florida	2,150,939	1,172,357	771,131	78,220	3,364,290	61,703	514,087	28,931	4,172,647	3,969,011	1	1	29	29	0	29	1	1	1	Florida	0.50442252	0.512505843	-0.81%
Georgia	560,919	1,320,159	88,130	45,417	2,190,524	99,367	44,267	16,798	2,014,625	2,350,956	0	0	16	0	16	0	1	1	1	Georgia	0.46043351	0.461479286	-0.10%
Hawaii	109,651	9,161	31,230	127,282	62,167	690	7,903	47,077	277,323	117,836	1	1	4	4	0	4	1	1	1	Hawaii	0.71703849	0.701801781	1.52%
Idaho	214,853	4,108	27,213	3,385	498,082	309	12,248	1,252	249,558	511,891	0	0	4	0	4	0	1	1	1	Idaho	0.33578613	0.327740874	0.80%
Illinois	1,907,771	924,518	272,302	121,872	2,151,317	38,522	63,873	45,076	3,226,463	2,298,787	1	1	20	20	0	20	1	1	1	Illinois	0.58577523	0.583948745	0.18%
Indiana	1,010,376	273,723	53,209	13,689	1,515,565	20,603	15,894	5,063	1,350,998	1,557,124	0	0	11	0	11	0	1	1	1	Indiana	0.44799625	0.464560257	-1.66%
Iowa	779,079	39,457	23,896	7,577	748,527	2,970	7,256	2,803	850,009	761,556	1	1	6	6	0	6	1	1	1	Iowa	0.52959352	0.527443214	0.22%
Kansas	408,632	58,519	27,246	10,293	793,226	4,405	12,263	3,807	504,689	813,701	0	0	6	0	6	0	1	1	1	Kansas	0.38886673	0.382807269	0.61%
Kentucky	576,044	130,574	16,564	6,841	1,229,222	9,828	7,219	2,530	730,022	1,248,799	0	0	8	0	8	0	1	1	1	Kentucky	0.38457228	0.368917665	1.57%
Louisiana	177,809	685,461	26,305	12,090	1,255,083	51,594	14,036	4,472	901,665	1,325,185	0	0	8	0	8	0	1	1	1	Louisiana	0.41253174	0.404906127	0.76%
Maine	413,205	7,021	3,971	2,271	287,143	528	1,115	840	426,468	289,626	1	1	4	4	0	4	1	1	1	Maine	0.57859921	0.595547686	-1.69%
Maryland	739,893	814,632	72,265	61,899	941,682	25,195	24,039	22,894	1,688,690	1,013,811	1	1	10	10	0	10	1	1	1	Maryland	0.63321726	0.624861935	0.84%
Massachusetts	1,684,214	184,466	159,015	55,221	1,270,547	16,041	45,467	20,424	2,082,915	1,352,479	1	1	11	11	0	11	1	1	1	Massachusetts	0.61785681	0.606310357	1.15%
Michigan	1,813,499	611,196	106,960	40,530	2,308,090	32,168	55,101	14,991	2,572,185	2,410,349	1	1	16	16	0	16	1	1	1	Michigan	0.54800532	0.516240265	3.18%
Minnesota	1,276,545	115,815	34,407	64,903	1,382,923	8,717	10,820	24,005	1,491,669	1,426,465	1	1	10	10	0	10	1	1	1	Minnesota	0.53941226	0.511172093	2.82%
Mississippi	109,782	638,262	9,923	4,142	888,235	26,594	5,388	1,532	762,109	921,749	0	0	6	0	6	0	1	1	1	Mississippi	0.44198101	0.452596885	-1.06%
Missouri	880,911	321,904	43,712	15,642	1,635,978	20,547	19,381	5,785	1,262,170	1,681,691	0	0	10	0	10	0	1	1	1	Missouri	0.45221333	0.428746414	2.35%
Montana	184,370	1,721	6,540	1,169	288,374	130	2,543	433	193,801	291,479	0	0	3	0	3	0	1	1	1	Montana	0.42965768	0.399358862	3.03%
Nebraska	271,619	36,988	24,542	4,644	494,486	2,784	8,913	1,718	337,793	507,900	0	0	5	0	5	0	1	1	1	Nebraska	0.3887061	0.399427555	-1.07%
Nevada	319,345	89,367	115,293	48,733	406,439	7,771	47,092	18,024	572,738	479,326	1	1	6	6	0	6	1	1	1	Nevada	0.53407542	0.544394455	-1.03%
New Hampshire	353,816	6,357	7,641	4,095	339,941	478	2,320	1,515	371,909	344,254	1	1	4	4	0	4	1	1	1	New Hampshire	0.52833752	0.519307414	0.90%
New Jersey	1,168,842	546,081	283,784	127,702	1,487,618	22,753	80,042	47,232	2,126,409	1,637,645	1	1	14	14	0	14	1	1	1	New Jersey	0.58986851	0.564925203	2.49%
New Mexico	198,804	16,189	218,360	4,934	274,538	1,219	98,104	1,825	438,287	375,686	1	1	5	5	0	5	1	1	1	New Mexico	0.55295205	0.538454245	1.45%
New York	2,632,364	1,339,528	787,257	203,250	2,739,808	85,502	97,301	75,175	4,962,400	2,997,786	1	1	29	29	0	29	1	1	1	New York	0.64300895	0.623402531	1.96%
North Carolina	1,078,093	1,162,556	90,308	34,223	2,290,948	48,440	42,498	12,658	2,365,180	2,394,544	0	0	15	0	15	0	1	1	1	North Carolina	0.48965965	0.496915381	-0.73%
North Dakota	120,467	3,532	3,054	780	195,607	266	1,033	289	127,833	197,194	0	0	3	0	3	0	1	1	1	North Dakota	0.39882105	0.393299955	0.55%
Ohio	1,999,660	703,547	58,432	30,498	2,650,712	29,314	49,775	11,280	2,792,137	2,741,082	1	1	18	18	0	18	1	1	1	Ohio	0.51514599	0.504613555	1.05%
Oklahoma	298,270	102,029	26,908	11,021	862,109	7,680	12,836	4,076	438,227	886,701	0	0	7	0	7	0	1	1	1	Oklahoma	0.3322768	0.330755585	0.15%
Oregon	941,359	29,814	69,102	26,498	770,203	2,244	20,137	9,801	1,066,774	802,385	1	1	7	7	0	7	1	1	1	Oregon	0.56271167	0.570724121	-0.80%
Pennsylvania	2,173,971	591,516	147,390	59,221	2,881,775	44,523	36,847	21,904	2,972,097	2,985,049	0	0	20	0	20	20	0	0	0	Pennsylvania	0.52731934	0.49891292	2.84%
Rhode Island	221,527	25,526	22,268	4,775	188,191	1,921	6,145	1,766	274,096	198,023	1	1	4	4	0	4	1	1	1	Rhode Island	0.64016746	0.580565341	5.96%
South Carolina	353,555	615,305	25,679	10,550	1,180,608	46,313	12,590	3,902	1,005,089	1,243,414	0	0	9	0	9	0	1	1	1	South Carolina	0.44691745	0.447003747	-0.01%
South Dakota	133,181	4,567	3,945	970	224,571	344	1,361	359	142,663	226,634	0	0	3	0	3	0	1	1	1	South Dakota	0.40781501	0.386309833	2.15%
Tennessee	663,283	443,613	41,532	15,256	1,474,772	33,390	18,414	5,642	1,163,684	1,532,219	0	0	11	0	11	0	1	1	1	Tennessee	0.39648928	0.431649035	-3.52%
Texas	1,291,329	1,252,558	1,141,949	148,889	4,312,072	94,279	642,346	55,069	3,834,725	5,103,765	0	0	38	0	38	0	1	1	1	Texas	0.41992103	0.429012628	-0.91%
Utah	315,171	12,125	33,628	9,719	796,009	913	15,532	3,595	370,643	816,049	0	0	6	0	6	0	1	1	1	Utah	0.25373811	0.312333182	-5.86%
Vermont	202,353	2,735	2,147	1,410	99,666	206	564	522	208,645	100,958	1	1	3	3	0	3	1	1	1	Vermont	0.68247259	0.673911769	0.86%
Virginia	1,112,701	710,803	105,910	91,372	1,740,378	53,501	59,574	33,795	2,020,786	1,887,249	1	1	13	13	0	13	1	1	1	Virginia	0.51967377	0.51708492	0.26%
Washington	1,460,412	77,333	118,637	127,119	1,244,055	5,821	34,914	47,017	1,783,501	1,331,806	1	1	12	12	0	12	1	1	1	Washington	0.57628298	0.572496097	0.38%
West Virginia	246,359	27,992	4,513	2,023	415,412	2,107	1,557	748	280,887	419,823	0	0	5	0	5	0	1	1	1	West Virginia	0.36325702	0.400860041	-3.76%
Wisconsin	1,404,072	191,309	44,531	22,415	1,461,381	12,211	22,940	8,290	1,662,328	1,504,823	1	1	10	10	0	10	1	1	1	Wisconsin	0.53516382	0.524865305	1.03%
Wyoming	71,022	1,987	9,438	723	171,788	150	4,306	267	83,170	176,511	0	0	3	0	3	0	1	1	1	Wyoming	0.28839366	0.320278611	-3.19%