2007

World Bank - CPA conflict: the Struggle to Define Human Rights and Development in the Philippines

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World Bank – CPA Conflict:
The Struggle to Define Human Rights and Development in the Philippines

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Senior Honors Thesis
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May 2007
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**Acknowledgements**

Thank you: Mary Beth for reading so many drafts of my thesis, more drafts than I ever thought I would write, and for helping me pull this all together. Jeff for your constructive and insightful comments. Patrice for helping arrange the research interviews that made this thesis possible. The Goldfarb Center for financially enabling those interviews. Joan for teaching me about the CPA, the Philippines, and activism. Val for keeping me company in the Diamond building. Giselle for teaching me the importance of an acknowledgements section. Finally, my roommates, for being such good role models, and for making our apartment such an intellectually-stimulating and healthy work environment.
Chapter I: Introduction

This thesis analyzes the interactions between the World Bank (hereafter, the Bank) and the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), an indigenous and environmental advocacy group based in the Cordillera region of Luzon, in the Philippines. Using data gathered through both text-based and participatory research methods, I analyze the discursive relationship and violent confrontations between the two organizations. Conflicting development and human rights values cause the majority of these conflicts. I focus on how each organization enacts development and human rights, and how this leads to conflict. Ultimately, I intend for this thesis to offer practical guidance for the reader involved in development or human rights work.

Tracing the interactions of a global multilateral organization and an indigenous peoples advocacy organization is easier said than done. To facilitate my analysis I use two pairs of oppositional terms: the state and the non-governmental organization (NGO), and consensus and policy. Each opposition reveals a field of conflict between the organizations that might have otherwise gone unnoticed. These pairs are not perfect: scholars do not universally recognize the validity of the oppositions I have presented. The reader should view these pairs as an imperfect tool that reveals significant underlying aspects of the CPA-Bank relationship.

I find these pairs useful for several reasons. The body of this thesis focuses on human rights and development in practice in the Cordillera region of the Philippines. I use the policy-consensus contrast to approach how the Bank and CPA enact human rights and development. The Bank is a bureaucratic, hierarchical institution. It implements its development strategy though policy—rules established by a bureaucracy to govern those
under its control because the bureaucracy believes it has a greater ability to govern its subjects than they do themselves. I will argue that this development practice violently conflicts with the human rights tactics of the CPA, which it implements through consensus-based networks.

The other pair of concepts that I use, the state and the NGO, reveals several significant aspects of the relationship between states, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs. Drawing upon the work of several scholars (Fisher 1995, Graeber 2004), I view the dualistic and changing nature of the contemporary state as a fundamental underlying factor in global power relations. NGOs have evolved in relation to the state, and these changes play a major role in Bank-CPA conflict in the Cordillera, as well as in the discourse the two organizations produce. Globalization has created a new transnational forum for NGO activism, and this forum lies beyond the reach of the state. This arena allows for new NGO advocacy tactics, but it has also prompted a strong state response to this newfound power, as the conflict as the Cordillera demonstrates.

Ultimately, my analysis of the Bank-CPA conflict aims to delineate a role for anthropology to engage, and perhaps deescalate, the CPA-Bank struggle, and perhaps other similar clashes around the globe. I recognizes conflicts as inherent to NGO-state relations. Yet this tension need not result in violence, as it has in the Cordillera. Anthropology can facilitate more effective communication between states ad NGOs. Anthropology can also help create more effective consensus-based networks. If constructed effectively, such networks can grow within a world controlled by policy-based institutions.
Outline

In the following chapter, I begin by presenting the research methods used in this thesis. In addition to sources cited in the literature review, I base my assertions on a unique history of participatory research with Bank and CPA officials in both the United States and the Philippines. This overview of my research methods, will help the reader contextualize the conclusions of this thesis.

The third chapter of the thesis begins by exploring the meaning of human rights, an important area of discursive conflict between the Bank and CPA. I then discuss in detail each of the oppositional pairs that I use in the rest of thesis. In current literature standard definitions of the terms I use do not exist. I devote time to each of these paired concepts, paying particular attention to their relevance for the inherent conflict within the NGO-state relationship.

In Chapter Four I present a history of the Cordillera, exploring the factors that have produced current political violence and tensions between the CPA and the World Bank. The chapter also looks at the instability of the Philippine state and the complicated relationship between the Philippines and the United States, both of which are important contributing factors in Bank-CPA tensions.

Building on this historical context, the fifth chapter, “The Rise of the CPA,” looks at how this history has produced the current cycle of violence and human rights violations in the Cordillera. This chapter considers the questions of identity raised by the ongoing
conflict between the CPA and the Bank, and it discusses how these issues are rooted in tensions arising from the NGO-state relationship.

The sixth chapter focuses on the World Bank. I describe the entry of the Bank into the Philippines and the Bank’s relationship with civil society organizations (CSOs).\(^1\) I look at the Bank’s relationship with civil society by analyzing the discourse the Bank produces in its publications about its civil society programs and through the use of interview data. This discourse highlights two different methods of promoting human rights and development: policy implementation and the consensus process. The policy and consensus models form a complicated, dynamic relationship. At times they support one another to create more effective development and human rights frameworks, but in the Cordillera policy and consensus conflict violently. Ultimately, I question whether it is possible for both systems to function concurrently under present conditions in the Cordillera.

In the seventh chapter I look more closely at the violent confrontations between the Bank and the CPA. I also address rhetorical attacks the organizations make against one another. In discussing these attacks, I consider the NGO’s mission to do good and remain non-political. The chapter explores both the Bank’s and the CPA’s attempts to build their credibility, and the methods they use to discredit one another.

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\(^1\) In this thesis I use non-governmental organization (NGO) and civil society organization (CSO) almost interchangeably. In fact, they are not always considered interchangeable terms. “CSO” is generally regarded to include a wider swath of organizations, such as informal organizations and religious groups, while many of the scholars cited in this thesis define NGOs more narrowly, as incorporated organizations whose mission focuses on the public good. The Bank uses the term CSO rather than NGO throughout its literature. For the purposes of my analysis, this distinction is unnecessary; for both CSOs and NGOs I regard their oppositional relationship to the government as their most important defining characteristic.
In the final chapter, I explore the role of anthropology in establishing and implementing human rights standards and fostering development. Cross-cultural communication remains one of the primary difficulties within the worlds of development and human rights. I argue that anthropologists must participate in transnational NGO networks if valid global human rights are to be established. Through involvement in these networks, anthropologists can provide ethnographic experience to improve the efficacy of transnational human rights networks.
Chapter II: Methodological Reflections

In September 2006 I began working at Colby as the Research Assistant of Joan Carling, Chairperson of the CPA. She arrived that fall as a Fellow of the Oak Institute for the Study of International Human Rights at Colby. Research experience in the Philippines during summer 2005 and experience in human rights advocacy work provided an important background for this work. I also enrolled in the class she taught that fall, “Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights.” This previous exposure provides familiarity with the organization, and a deeper understanding of its mission and the Philippine context. In an attempt to utilize these resources, I began researching, with Mary Beth Mills as my thesis advisor, transnational human rights NGO networking, using the CPA as a case study. Midway through the research process the literature review shifted its focus on the Philippines and expanded to include the more general role of transnational NGOs in establishing human rights standards. A lack of data focusing on human rights organizations in the Philippines, as well as a failure to locate literature written from an anthropological perspective precipitated this change. To provide field data for this research, I intended to travel to the Philippines and work with the CPA for the month of January.

A serious methodological complication occurred when I was unable to secure funding for my fieldwork in the Philippines because of security concerns. As a substitute for this fieldwork, I received support from the Goldfarb Center for Public Affairs and Civic Engagement to conduct a series of interviews with officials at public and private organizations dealing with human rights issues in Washington, D.C. To supplement
these interviews, I also arranged interviews with officials in human rights-related
positions at the World Bank and in Minneapolis. The interviews at the World Bank
revealed significant issues in the fields of human rights and development, so I refocused
the thesis to examine Bank-CPA interactions.

The change from a field-work based investigation to reliance on interviews led to
an additional shift in the project, from a single focus on the CPA and the concept of
human rights in the Philippines to a project centered on two organizations, the World
Bank and the CPA.\(^2\) It is important to consider not only that the two organizations differ
dramatically in terms of size, regional focus, structure, and political influence, but that they
also work towards very different missions. The CPA focuses on indigenous and human
rights issues in its mission statement, while The Bank’s primary focus is global economic
development. The organizations also differ drastically in that the Bank is an inter-
governmental organization with a multi-billion dollar budget rather than an NGO, while
the CPA is a Fourth World advocacy organization. Despite these differences, I will
demonstrate that the oppositional pairs that provide the analytical framework of this
thesis remain relevant to all organizations.

Data Sources

I draw from several sources of information to support this thesis, including
signiﬁcant personal experience with the CPA. The data sources for this thesis include:

\(^2\)This thesis is aided by research and interviews conducted at other NGOs, including the
Center for Victims of Torture (a Minneapolis-based NGO) and the University of
Minnesota Human Rights Center.
interviews with officials at the World Bank, Department of State, and University of Minnesota Human Rights Center; journal notes from study in the Philippines before the conception of this project; observations from class with Joan Carling, as well as observations of her lectures and other advocacy work while at Colby; printed and online media obtained from the subject organizations; and a review of relevant literature. Such an approach has allowed me to develop a holistic, multi-angle approach to this thesis.

Work with Joan Carling and observation of her class allowed for participatory observation of her advocacy work. While I do not directly cite my observations from this class in this thesis, they have informed my approach to the CPA’s advocacy methods. My experience with her helped me understand the political position of the CPA, and the networking mechanisms it uses in its attempt to affect human rights, environmental, and indigenous peoples policy, both in the Philippines and globally. The work with her granted me access to parts of the human rights network that would have otherwise gone unnoticed, including her academic and personal connections that enabled her to be a more effective lobbyist for her organization within the United States. While I rarely directly cite this experience in the body of this thesis, much of the background information I have provided is based on my experience working with Joan. If I had not had access to this important connection and data source, current published literature would have failed to provide sufficient data for many areas of this thesis.

My experience in the Philippines during 2005, supported by a Freeman Foundation research grant, offered an important perspective into the functioning of Philippine politics. I witnessed an attempt, led by a coalition of leftist NGOs, to oust President Arroyo. This movement allowed me to observe the oligarchic nature of
Philippine politics, the political power of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the involvement of the United States in domestic politics, and the political involvement of NGOs. At the time, most Filipinos believed that if either the United States or the AFP were to withdraw for President Arroyo she would be forced from power. During this time I also witnessed how the killings of leftist political activists created a climate of fear among Filipino NGO workers.3

These two experiences have created a personal sympathy for the CPA and other Philippine NGO groups. My experience in the Philippines and work with Joan Carling cast Bank projects in an extremely negative light, and I agree with many of their criticisms of multilateral development institutions. However, my time in the Philippines also revealed many of the inefficiencies of advocacy organizations, and the problems resulting from opposition to Bank projects without realistic alternatives.

This thesis draws significantly on my analysis of legal scholarship and international relations sources. These fields focus on states as the primary actors in global conflicts and ultimately see the threat of state violence as the final arbiter in human rights disputes. States, and their legal systems do play a very significant role in establishing human rights standards, but actions taken by individuals, multinational corporations, and NGOs must be considered as well. Areas where human rights violations occur, such as the Cordillera, often are geographically and socially distant from the cosmopolitan centers where formal systems of power are based. Local non-governmental actors must not be ignored.

3 For example, I met several activists who had received death threats and were living in hiding.
In response to the difficulties of reconciling this literature with an anthropological perspective, I constructed the two oppositional pairs to focus this thesis on several meaningful aspects of Bank-CPA conflict. The two pairs of oppositional terms discussed above emerged from the diverse body of literature reviewed in the previous section. None of the pairs was pre-established within that literature; rather, the pairs emerged out of my reading of multiple authors. Within a body of research that covers conflicting regional, global, and theoretical perspectives, honing in on these contrasts has allowed me to focus this research in a way that would have otherwise been impossible. While my analyses of the Bank, CPA, and the US-Philippine relationship are in many ways incomplete, the attention to these pairs I have constructed allows for a more productive focus on their interactions, and it helps elucidate the role of anthropology in the fields of development and human rights.

However, complications have arisen because of the use of these oppositional pairs. While I treat each pair as oppositional in my approach to this project, NGOs and the state, policy and consensus, and politics and “doing good” are not universally recognized as oppositional terms. In fact, interviewees have taken issue with my use of them in this manner. Several of the scholars cited in this study would similarly dispute my analytical perspective. But I do not consider this to be a convincing reason to abandon my approach. Most of the terms involved, including “NGO,” “human rights,” and the state, are not clearly defined in scholarly literature. No common definition of any of the terms exists among the scholars cited in this thesis, which is why I have included my explorations of the meaning of these terms above. While some might dispute this
approach, evidence from this case study in the Philippines demonstrates that these oppositions shape the CPA-Bank relationship.

I have established this set of definitions for use in the ongoing conflicts in the Cordillera. In this context, my definitions are meaningful and descriptive of the situation on the ground. They are based on an analysis of local conditions, so while interviewees might have disputed the applicability of my definitions or series of contrasts in the contexts of their organizations, one must remember that legalized human rights ideals do not translate cleanly into local contexts, nor is there any general pattern for the enactment of human rights. This is not a study of human rights ideals, it is a study of human rights and development practice in the Cordillera.

I conducted research interviews over a two week span in January 2007. Three of the four interviews, the two at the Bank and one at the Department of State are cited in this thesis. The fourth interview at the University of Minnesota Human Rights Center provided important background information but is not quoted here. Just as my experience in the Philippines helped contextualize the text-based data I had obtained about human rights and politics in the Philippines, the interview data helped reveal how the Bank’s relationship with CSOs, laid out in numerous publications, actually functions. The interviews revealed the roles of Bank employees in otherwise incomprehensible bureaucratic processes.

The interview at the Department of State provided much important research data. The interview was not for attribution and was not recorded. The official had met with Joan Carling, the Chairperson of the CPA, to discuss human rights concerns in the Philippines. The official was very knowledgeable about human rights issues specific to
the Philippines and participated in drafting the State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights for the Philippines. The official also corresponded regularly with the US embassy in Manila, and closely followed events in the Philippines. Consequently, the interviewee was very aware of the ongoing political violence and the nuances of the American-Philippine relationship. The interviewee seemed frustrated with the ongoing political violence, and sympathized with the CPA, revealing an important aspect of the US-CPA relationship. The interview lasted almost an hour.

I also interviewed Dr. David Freestone, Deputy General Council, Advisory Services, and Siobhan McInerney, a subordinate colleague of his who focuses exclusively on human rights law. I recorded the interview. Dr. Freestone, dominated the interview, referring to Ms. McInerney only to elaborate on issues he was unfamiliar with. The interview focused on the Bank’s human rights obligations under international law, the legal and political implications of its contractual obligations to member states. At the beginning of the interview, both interviewees voiced their disagreement with the two oppositional pairs around which this thesis is based, particularly with the assumption that the state and the NGO occupy inherently conflicting positions. Considering the Bank’s expanding partnerships with civil society, such a position would suggest the Bank is neglecting its contractual obligations to its member states. However, Dr. Freestone and Ms. McInerney maintained cordial attitudes throughout the course of the interview. Referring to our theoretical disagreement, Dr. Freestone joked, “As a Bank employee of course I disagree, but you probably don’t care as long as your anthropology department likes it.” Despite our differing orientations, Dr. Freestone very effectively outlined the
difficult position of the Bank in relation to NGOs and its member states, and in later sections I have drawn significantly from his analysis. The interview lasted 35 minutes.

Dr. Freestone referred me to another Bank colleague, Carolyn Reynolds, Coordinator of the Global Civil Society Team. Ms. Reynolds similarly disputed the two contrasting pairs presented in this thesis. She argued that the Bank’s work with CSOs aided the development process in its member states. She provided extensive information regarding the Bank’s orientation to NGOs, and described the dynamics that develop within Bank-NGO partnerships. She took a less legalistic perspective than Dr. Freestone, and was much more knowledgeable about global civil society. Ms. Reynolds had little time to spare for our interview, but it nonetheless has provided much of the data upon which the Bank-CPA conflict section is based. She also provided me with numerous Bank publications, some of which she had authored. The combination of the text data she supplied and her oral analysis of these documents offered important insights into Bank discourse of civil society. I recorded the interview, and it lasted 33 minutes.

The use of multiple research methods has led to a better understanding of the literature review. My experience in the Philippines has given me an understanding of the political and human rights situation there that would have otherwise been unattainable. Genuine fear has deeply penetrated the activist community and leftist political groups. Furthermore, the Philippine political situation is much more volatile than politics in the United States: since the 1980s, two presidents have been toppled by popular protests, and all have faced serious coup attempts. My presence in the Philippines during the July-August 2005 allowed me to witness an unsuccessful popular attempt to oust Gloria Arroyo. Now I better appreciate the instability of her position and her dependence on
both American support and her need for support from the AFP. It is widely believed among Filipinos that if either were to withdraw active support for her administration either a military coup or popular revolution would occur. Without first-hand experience in the Philippines, I would not appreciate the complexities of the US-Philippine relationship.
Chapter II: Literature Review

This chapter establishes a new understanding of transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights advocacy by exploring key themes in the relevant literature. I define these terms by arranging them in a series of two oppositional pairs: policy vs. consensus, and the state vs. the NGO. These oppositional pairs reveal contradictions within contemporary human rights and development processes, and they also help define the role of anthropology within transnational human rights advocacy. Later chapters, which describe CPA-Bank interactions, will illustrate how these pairs are useful in investigations of human rights advocacy.

First, I define human rights conceptually and pragmatically. To do so I will draw from an interdisciplinary body of literature. Anthropology provides a key conceptual guide to the interactions of culture and human rights, but current anthropological literature primarily focuses on how the cultural meaning of human rights is articulated within specific contexts (see Messer 1993, Wright 1988). Analyzing cultural meaning in singular contexts is necessary to understanding the globalization of human rights, but perhaps more important to all actors are the political effects of this process, and how the daily lives of people involved are tangibly affected by development and human rights policy. Political science more comprehensively documents global policy changes as a result of NGO human rights advocacy (See Korey 1998), so this thesis draws extensively from political science literature in its investigation of human rights practice.

Following the discussion of human rights, this chapter will explore the first major contradiction that arises in transnational NGO work—policy and consensus. My
understanding of policy derives from Graeber (2004) and Silvey (2004), who both write that policy is produced by hierarchical, political institutions. Graeber continues that policy is by definition imposed by the powerful on the less-powerful (Graeber 2004). In contrast, the consensus process functions informally, and is not officially based on hierarchical relations. This pair of terms serves as a gateway to understanding how human rights standards are implemented: the consensus process represents the functioning of informal transnational NGO networks, while states and inter-governmental organizations (e.g. the World Bank) enact Silvey and Graeber’s concept of policy.

The second pair explored below is the contrast between the state and the NGO. The functions, and therefore the de facto definition of the state, are constantly in flux as global informational and political flows redefine state boundaries. Because of this perpetual change, the space defined as “non-governmental” fluctuates correspondingly. This section of the thesis will delineate the conceptual relationship between the state and the NGO, while acknowledging that their functions change constantly in practice. It will also question the assumption of the statist world order that defines non-governmental organizations.

**Human Rights in Perspective**

“Human rights” is not a clearly defined term. This section will attempt to clarify its meaning by providing a concise history of the term’s construction and entry into international discourse. I will also briefly mention two perspectives on the relationship
between anthropology and human rights. Here, I intend background the discussions of human rights in the NGO world presented later in this thesis.

“Human rights” appears frequently in academic discourse and in the mass media. Innumerable NGOs claim to promote human rights as well. But the term’s meaning varies depending on the context in which it is used. The most prominent and authoritative definition of human rights is presented by the United Nations, an organization that claims global legitimacy and represents almost all states. The preamble of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (United Nations 1948). But this introduction gives little guidance to what human rights are in daily contexts, and how they are enacted. Other than the UDHR itself, there is little elaboration by the United Nations about how the concept of human rights must be interpreted and applied. Scholars have attempted to summarize the UDHR, stating: “Building on a foundation of natural law, political agreements, the UN concept of human rights acknowledges that in all times and places, reasonable people, regardless of political affiliation, demand certain minimum standards of behavior toward their own citizens” (Luard 1967, Paraphrased in Messer 1993). Aside from a handful of treaties targeted toward specific abuses, these standards remain unclear.

Nonetheless, the UDHR (quoted above) is widely accepted as a human rights standard, but its interpretation varies widely, depending on context. Messer notes that Western states focus on political and civil rights, socialist states advocate for labor and welfare rights, while many Third World and Asian states frame economic growth as a
right that takes precedence over other rights such as civil liberties (1993). Varying concepts of rights take precedence from one context to the next, so even though human rights as an ideal may be universal, its implementation is not. Furthermore, anthropologists have generally been absent from the debate about the cultural implications of global human rights standards. Research for this study has revealed the lack of anthropological writing in journals focusing on human rights, such as *Human Rights Quarterly*. Anthropology publications do address the concept of human rights, but they give little guidance on what role anthropology should play in promoting human rights, if it should engage the field at all.

Despite the failure of the United Nations and other formal international bodies to develop a standardized global understanding of human rights, and the failure of anthropology to provide any actionable, scholarly guidance, transnational NGOs have begun to apply their own standards of human rights on the global scale. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other human rights NGOs now claim to apply uniform human rights standards globally, and their advocacy reaches a global audience. Sally Engle Merry writes that culture circulates globally, and asserts that human rights, as a concept, is part of this flow (Merry 2006). In speaking of the application of human rights ideas internationally, Merry notes that a great diversity exists within the process of establishing human rights standards. To become accepted within specific cultural contexts, international human rights standards, which are often based on UN treaties, must draw from indigenous ideas to gain local credibility. But this process is a careful balancing act: NGOs cannot deviate too far from standard, Western human rights language because of the risk of offending their Western donors and other Western
stakeholders. Merry describes multiple forms of this process, which she calls vernacularization (2006).

Consensus and Policy

Policy drives the world’s governments and multilateral organizations; policy being top-down regulations enforced through legalistic means by hegemonic institutions. I will not present much evidence to support this claim because I believe it to be self-evident. Since Hammurabi, laws, and policy to enforce them, have formed the basis of government. The government subjects citizens to policy in most aspects of life, from the Department of Motor Vehicles to the State Department. Multilateral organizations such as the UN create international policy, which is implemented on the global level. But as Silvey writes (2004), states and multilateral organizations have done a poor job in enforcing human rights policy over global entities, such as multinational corporations. By definition states legitimately enact policy within their own territories, but the one multilateral hierarchical institution active in the human rights arena that claims global legitimacy, the United Nations, has not established actionable human rights policy (discussed in the Human Rights section). NGOs have attempted to fill the gaps in policy-driven human rights enforcement through establishing human rights standards through the consensus process.

In practice, human rights is not a concise, clearly defined idea but the product of a multiplicity of forces that constantly redefines it. The practice of human rights includes a
wide variety of actors, including states, intergovernmental-organizations, corporations, NGOs, and academics, and I will argue that it is a process of consensus. The constant re-establishment of human rights standards through translation by NGOs (Merry 2006),\(^4\) as outlined above, occurs in an unregulated, intangible space. From Graeber’s perspective, the lack of hierarchical, institutional enforcement would legitimize human rights as a philosophy. Graeber has joined a history of anarchist scholars (Bakunin, Chomsky, Proudhon) in writing that the consensus process, based on self-organization and voluntary organization, is as basic as the human condition (Graeber 2004).

Graeber discusses consensus as an interpersonal process that functions best among small groups of people, but the similarities between informal NGO networking, outlined by several scholars below, and the consensus process, outlined by Graeber, are too clear to ignore. In defining consensus, Graeber identifies two levels of objection: “one can ‘stand aside,’ which is to say ‘I don’t like this and won’t participate but I wouldn’t stop anyone from doing it,’ or ‘block,’ which has the effect of a veto. One can only block if one feels a proposal is a violation of the fundamental principles for reasons for being of a group” (Graeber 2004). The level of participation in a movement responding to a human rights violation by a corporation or other actor is determined by the number of NGOs who attempt to veto actions that they view as violating human rights norms.\(^5\) By having each group apply their own definition of human rights norms to corporate behavior, each group can choose to block human rights violations as it sees

\(^4\) NGO is not precise in this context. NGOs are composed of individuals, and this research is based upon interviews with individuals who are employees of NGOs. I am taking data from these interviews and then generalizing about the behavior of NGO as a whole.

\(^5\) After having written this section of the thesis, I came across a concise description of this process: “Campaigns are sets of strategically linked activities in which members of a diffuse principled network… develop explicit, visible ties and mutually recognized roles in pursuit of a common goal (and generally against a common target)” (Keck and Sikkink p.6)
fit. Human rights standards, consequently, are set by the ability of the responding NGOs to prevent perceived human rights violations. If the number of NGOs attempting to block perceived human rights violations succeeds, then new human rights expectations have been set for corporations, states, or other actors.

This process does not formalize the human rights standards it produces, and Graeber’s comment above speaks to human rights as an informal concept based on abstract and evolving principles. In the consensus process, community principles form the only legitimate basis for blocking an action. The strongest tools wielded by NGOs are their moral credibility and social capital, which they use to define human rights as principles fundamental to the human community. In the arena of human rights especially, which claims to be anti-political, questions of faith in abstract principles rise above precise standards clearly defined by hierarchical institutions. In their political analysis of transnational activist networks, Keck and Sikkink note: “More than other kinds of transnational actors, advocacy networks often reach beyond policy change to advocate and instigate changes in the institutional and principled basis of international interactions” (Keck and Sikkink 1997). Networks avoid advocating for changes in institutionally-driven policy, and instead focus on shifting the principles that form the foundations of these institutions. The informality of this process creates a tool well suited to the global human rights arena.

NGOs form informal networks, and this decentralized, unregulated process also mirrors the consensus process. Literature on corporate social responsibility addresses the importance of informal networks, rather than hierarchy, in campaigns to hold corporations to human rights standards. In describing the student anti-sweatshop
movement, Naomi Klein writes: “Rather than a single movement, what is emerging is thousands of movements intricately linked to one another… Thanks to the Net, mobilizations are able to unfold with sparse bureaucracy and minimal hierarchy… What is emerging is an activist model that mirrors the organic, decentralized, inter-linked pathways of the internet” (Sadler 2004). Here Klein is addressing the advantages of decentralization: standards are not rigidly defined, allowing movements to unfold, to grow from the bottom, rather than be initiated from the top. Levels of participation vary within such campaigns as movements form and disband around different issues, but such fluctuation mirrors the methods of consensus outlined by Graeber.

If such a process effectively prevents human rights violations, the establishment of global human rights standards by transnational NGOs represents the construction of a new institution following the anarchist-consensus model. Discussing anarchism, Graeber writes: “It is also a project, which sets out to begin creating the institutions of a new society ‘within the shell of the old,’ to expose, subvert, and undermine structures of domination but always, while doing so, proceeding in a democratic fashion, a manner which itself demonstrates those structures are unnecessary” (Graeber 2004). Sadler describes the emergence of new and effective standards of corporate citizenship produced by civil regulation (Sadler 2004), which indeed represents the formation of a new societal institution within pre-existing frameworks, a la Graeber. The regulation of corporate behavior by transnational NGOs fits within law-driven policy methods of regulation currently used by states. Space regulation by both the consensus and policy systems exists because they function in different contexts, and use different tools to check corporate behavior. Policy systems use legal penalties based on state power to enforce
regulations within their own borders; transnational NGOs use their moral credibility within the consensus process to enforce a soft-law\(^6\) of shame by swaying global public opinion. These two regimes do not inherently conflict with one another, allowing them to coexist.

In her study of the student anti-sweatshop movement, Rachel Silvey also identifies several elements of transnational labor rights activism that enforce human rights standards established by the consensus process. Within this movement, Silvey identifies a diverse, informal network of actors that challenges global standards of corporate behavior. Actors include student groups, labor unions, and internationally known human rights organizations (Silvey 2004). The actors within this movement are truly diverse: they have different motives for participation, different labor rights standards, and possibly even different desired outcomes. Despite these differences, they have a common target: specific corporate labor practices that each organization sees as violating its principles. They use their influence within their communities to sway public opinion by shaming corporations that violated their standards of labor rights.

Considering the successes of groups such as student anti-sweatshop groups, it appears that networks, and the consensus relationships on which they are based, proved much more effective than international labor law, a policy established by a hierarchical organization.

Other scholars discuss the implementation of human rights standards established by NGO networks. Rory Sullivan, a legal scholar, notes the failure of regulatory frameworks to ensure adequate labor rights practices by corporations on the global level.

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\(^6\) “Soft Law” typically refers to non-treaty, and therefore non-enforceable agreements between states. However, authors cited in this thesis have used the term to refer to non-binding global standards established by NGOs. See Korey (1998) for a more comprehensive definition.
In strong states, legal frameworks adequately regulate corporate behavior, but corporate behavior in international territory, as well as within weaker states, falls beyond the jurisdiction of sufficiently powerful regulatory bodies. Sullivan writes:

The vision of the powerful sovereign state has become increasingly anachronistic as government prerogatives have increasingly been limited or constrained by developments such as rapid privatisation, free trade agreements and economic integration. One of the specific concerns has been that many TNCs have outgrown the ability of individual states to regulate them effectively (2003).

The limited reach of legal standards has opened a space for NGOs to involve themselves in corporate regulation without conflicting with pre-existing state authority. Such a process mimics Graeber’s understanding of the development of anarchist-inspired institutions.

Sullivan continues that because of the failure of state-driven regulation, the vast majority of human rights monitoring is conducted by NGOs. NGOs use their social capital to sway public opinion against corporations that violate the human rights standards informally established by NGO networks. NGOs often collaborate with corporate partners to construct codes of conduct or pledges of social responsibility. In describing these codes that govern corporate behavior, Sullivan states: “They are ‘soft-law’ instruments, whose primary method of enforcement is through the shame of non-adherence” (2003). That NGOs drive “soft-law” standards, and that these standards transcend state borders, makes them an effective tool for implementing global human
rights standards of corporate behavior. That transnational NGOs derive their power from multinational constituencies makes them an effective system for tempering corporate behavior. In contrast, state regulatory bodies are inherently limited in the scope of their power.

Keck and Sikkink have identified a similar model of how NGO networks use the consensus process to enforce standards. They analyze networks as bodies that communicate information, and then disseminate this information to influence wider discourse. “To influence discourse, procedures, and policy, activists may engage and become part of larger policy communities that group actors working on an issue from a variety of institutional and value perspectives” (Keck and Sikkink 1997). NGOs use their social capital and moral credibility to reframe human rights abuses within wider public discourse as actions that violate not only the principles of the NGO, but as actions that violate the most fundamental principles of society as well. I will later use the CPA case study to illustrate this point.

The Pragmatic Location of the Consensus Process

Taking a step back from the idealism of Graber and others cited here, I am not elevating NGOs as a panacea to the world’s human rights problems. This ideal model of consensus applies cleanly only to the ideal model of transnational NGO networking. I

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7 To orient these two perspectives within the process of consensus, I’ve attached a flow chart of the consensus process, which demonstrates how NGOs apply human rights standards (See appendix—I can’t figure out how to make it fit into the body of the thesis as I would like).
will now explore several downfalls of the theory presented above, and below I will posit a role for anthropologists within the world of transnational human rights.

One of the largest difficulties in applying the consensus model to development or human rights processes is that the NGO community is not comprised only of individuals with singular motives: NGOs do not participate in a consensus process as individual actors, but as complex organizations. Consequently, there exists within NGOs a multifaceted system of micro-politics that determines the organizations’ goals and principles. While an NGO’s principles are often clearly delineated in a statement of mission, the realization of these principles depends on the organization’s staff. Many other factors also play roles in determining the actions of NGOs, including institutional and individual donors, and host states. NGO programs often extend into the global arena, beyond the control of the state, but the individuals and the physical framework that enact these programs exist within the reach of state authority. States influence these organizations by exerting power over their territory and individuals within them.

However, anthropologists who have explored state-NGO relationships have warned against any conclusion regarding relationships between these two actors. Fisher writes that one can not generalize the state attitude toward NGOs as solely antagonistic. States, as well as local governments, are influenced by too many different factors to predict how they will react to NGO activism within their territory, if they even care about it at all (Fisher 1997). Likewise, assumptions about the role of NGOs, and the principles that drive them present similar dangers because of the diversity of workers, donors, and ideologies involved in the process. Based on these two observations, Fisher concludes: “The relationships between NGOs and government are so heterogeneous that it is
difficult to generalize about the potential impact of NGOs on the state and patterns of
governance” (1997). Fisher’s writing does not address the consensus process among
NGOs, but his theory does not preclude the possibility that the consensus process could
be co-opted by the state under such conditions.

Additionally, while Keck and Sikkink, Silvey, and others refer to NGO networks
as organizations that exist within transient flows rather than confined physical spaces,
one must remember that NGO action must occur in tangible spaces. In describing the
student anti-sweatshop movement, Silvey acknowledges that labor rights campaigns
affect workers in Third World countries with political histories that influence the efficacy
of seemingly placeless advocacy campaigns:

Rather than assuming that activist networks operate harmoniously in abstract
space…members of oppositional alliances are still based in places, and that
historically sedimented power relations still influence the dynamics of decision-
making within networks. Hierarchies that exist between places condition the
operation of cross-place networks and the relative power of particular entities
working within and through such networks (2004).

Considering the imperialist history between the United States and the Philippines, and
ongoing neo-imperialist relationship, a power dynamic has been established between the
CPA and Bank even before they first began to interact. Furthermore, the grounding of
networks in places charged by political conflicts and power inequalities can negatively
influence, or even co-opt, the consensus process. These factors can threaten the
efficiencies of horizontal network model, in comparison to the efficiencies of markets or hierarchical organization, which already consider such relationships.

These faults do not completely discredit the application of the consensus model to how NGO advocacy networks determine human rights standards. Certainly, the obstacles described above prevent NGO advocacy networks from functioning with perfect efficiency, and any brief analysis of the status quo reveals that global human rights protections are not adequately enforced. But that human rights standards have evolved since the Second World War demonstrates the growing acceptance of human rights as a philosophy, as well as the networks that support it. Within the evolving field of human rights, an important role for anthropologists is emerging.

**Defining NGOs**

No clear definition of a non-governmental organization exists. Almost all authors cited here have presented their own definitions of the NGO, based on a wide variety of criteria. Gerald Clarke, who writes extensively on NGOs in the Philippines, has created a taxonomic system for organizing the diverse NGO world, based on structure, size, function, membership, and other characteristics (1998). Clarke writes that nineteenth century civic organizations served as the precursors to the contemporary NGO. Clarke cites Alexis de Tocqueville and other nineteenth century authors as the first sources to describe the right of civil association within the nation-state context. Clarke further supports his claim by noting that the Young Men’s Christian Associations, founded 1855,
and International Committee of the Red Cross, founded 1863, were civil associations that evolved into the world’s first modern NGOs. Clarke defines NGOs as “private, non-profit, professional organizations with a distinctive legal character, concerned with public welfare goals” (1998). Clarke lays out further distinctions between NGOs and people’s organizations, welfare organizations, and other non-governmental organizations that do not meet his criteria to qualify as true NGOs. Under Clarke’s classification, the CPA is an NGO that represents over 120 “people’s organizations.”

Clarke’s extensive categorization may be useful in a detailed exploration of isolated functions of civil society, but his sub-divisions within the NGO community unnecessarily complicate, rather than clarify, the process of determining the role of NGOs in human rights processes. But Clarke’s exploration of the NGO world is useful in that it highlights several key aspects and functions of NGOs.

Because the UN, a multilateral, intergovernmental organization, plays such an important role in establishing international human rights standards, the relationship between the UN and the NGO community sheds light on the functions of human rights NGOs. Within this relationship, perhaps the most important element is that NGOs are in fact non-governmental. “The negative language of the UN Charter, which simply defines NGOs as not governmental organizations, gives little guidance to the question of what constitutes an NGO. But it does reveal the defensive position of states towards NGOs and their insistence that the status of an NGO is peripheral to that of a state” (Otto 1996). Here Otto acknowledges that classifying what constitutes an NGO is anything but simple, and she deviates from Clarke’s perspective by suggesting that further classification of such organizations may be counter-productive. “At a minimum, the elusiveness of a
satisfactory definition should encourage flexibility and open-endedness… This would prioritize definitional concepts that ensure a diversity of viewpoints, legitimize a heterogeneity of NGO forms, and encourage an open and dynamic exchange of ideas and experience” (Otto 1996). This thesis recognizes Otto’s understanding of the importance of the state’s defensive relationship toward NGOs, and the utility of flexibility in defining the NGO community. Also, Otto’s attention to the diversity of the NGO world conforms with Fisher’s respect for the diversity of NGO-state relationships.

The relationship between the United Nations and NGOs helps illuminate the complicated position of multilateral, interstate organizations such as the UN, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and other development institutions. Multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank (explored in detail later), are contractually bound to their member states. Yet several of these organizations, including the UN and the World Bank, have recognized that partnering with NGOs can help accomplish their missions more effectively. Since 2000, the Bank has greatly increased its cooperation with NGOs, and have provided them with billions of dollars in grants (World Bank 2006). The number of collaborative projects has increased every year since 1990 (World Bank 2006). The Bank has acknowledged that partnering with NGOs can make its member-driven projects more effective, but more significantly, Bank officials have acknowledged in interviews that NGOs can be used to circumvent the authority and function of member states altogether.

Equally important to the structure of NGOs and their relationship to the state is their function. Neo-liberal theory defines NGOs as a public sector service industry (Silvey 2004), noting that the NGO sector is filling roles abandoned by the receding state.
Several lines of evidence support a neo-liberal view of the role of NGOs: many NGOs receive substantial funding from government agencies, both domestically and internationally. NGOs also receive significant tax breaks in many countries, further increasing their dependence on government support. Government regulations cover political activity, budget policy, and employee compensation, and NGOs consistently struggle to avoid violating NGO tax regulations. Governments often have power to regulate and modify tax policy and monetary disbursements towards NGOs, and these powers can be manipulated for political reasons. The White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, founded under President George W. Bush, funnels federal monies to NGOs because of the view that they can better serve selected constituencies. In 2005, more than $2.1 Billion were given to faith-based NGOs under the auspices of this program (GAO 2006). This program serves as an example of the government’s ability to shift the ideological orientation of the NGO community through its political, legal, and economic power.

Neo-liberal discourse supports the image of NGOs as public service contractors as well. This discourse assumes the supremacy and efficiency of the market above all else. Within such a framework, NGOs must be seen as public sector contractors, because neo-liberal discourse disregards other models for NGO work (ex. Mauss’ gift economy). Bourdieu asserts that neo-liberalism is a discourse “not like others… [I]t is… so strong and so hard to fight because it has behind it all the powers of a world of power relations which helps make it as it is” (Cited in Silvey 2004).

Yet Silvey and others challenge this interpretation of the NGO world. In her analysis of university-based anti-sweatshop NGOs, Silvey points out that anti-sweatshop
groups challenge the discourse of neo-liberalism by bonding with workers abroad, which is a refusal of the logic of globalized capitalist production. Hilhorst also challenges the role of NGOs as a service sector within the neo-liberal model (2003). She does acknowledge that NGOs provide services that receding states no longer deliver, and that NGOs form the civil society that supports liberal democracy within the neo-liberal model (Hilhorst 2003). Yet World Bank publications and interview data demonstrate the diverse and unstable relationship between the state and NGOs in providing social services. Perhaps the rigidity of the neo-liberal model provides too narrow a lens to approach NGO work. To refute the association of the NGO sector with neo-liberal development, Hilhorst writes:

By claiming that they are the outcome of a hegemonic development discourse, it is implied that NGOs operate according to a single discursive framework. This leaves no room to take into account that development organizations may be inspired by alternative ideological or religious frameworks, let alone that their practices reveal how these different frameworks intertwine. Local actors are not merely overcome by development: they interpret, bend and negotiate it (2003).

If one accepts the flexible and open-ended definition of NGOs as groups positioned in opposition to the state, as presented above by Otto and others, then one must also conclude that some NGOs refuse the discourse forwarded by the neo-liberal state. Too much diversity exists within the NGO sector to suggest that NGOs serve only one purpose, or respond to only one ideological constituency.
In addition to attempts to define NGOs as a public sector service industry, others have worked to define the NGOs, and particularly the human rights sub-sector, as a sector whose purpose is to lobby states (Korey 1998). This point of view toward NGOs dominates political science and international relations literature. Korey notes that NGOs serve a variety of functions in the human rights arena: they lobby governments, monitor rights violators, set standards, and raise awareness. But he writes that NGOs target states in all these advocacy and informational activities. Korey dismisses NGO engagement of the public as only a tactic to exert influence on the state. He provides an overview of human rights NGO activity in the United States from the Second World War to the present, describing the effectiveness of domestic and international NGOs in persuading Congress to ratify UN human rights conventions.

The perspective of human rights NGOs as bodies that serve to lobby governments applies in many senses, and many NGOs serve only that purpose. However, Korey’s perspective ignores the diversity of actors in the international human rights arena. Several prominent NGO campaigns have worked to change the behavior of multinational corporations by generating public outcry rather than through government regulation. Without relying upon state power to establish human rights standards, the international Nestle boycott in 1988 achieved significant voluntary concessions about Nestle’s marketing of its infant formula (IBFAN 2006). Other NGO groups have pursued an assortment of strategies to change corporate behavior, such as shareholder activism and direct intervention (i.e. Greenpeace physically hindering whaling operations). As this thesis will discuss below, non-state actors can often be much more effective in precipitating changes in corporate or government behavior than legally-based policies.
implemented by states, who often have much invested in the corporations they are charged to regulate. Given the diversity of human rights NGO tactics, NGOs must be recognized as actors in their own right, rather than as organizations that function in the shadow of the state.

Sally Engle Merry addresses the function of NGOs as organizations that translate international human rights law from the global level into local contexts, utilizing the hegemonic power of global institutions to do so. She considers the location of the NGO within global power structures, an aspect that must be included in any anthropological study of NGOs. Merry acknowledges that contemporary global forces are increasing inequalities in wealth and power, and NGOs, human rights NGOs not excluded, play a role within this system. If Western human rights NGOs work to implement international law, then “Is human rights law simply a strategic weapon used by powerful groups to legitimate their power grabs—a window dressing for real politik? Is it a form of neoimperialism by which the West claims to save the benighted, savage peoples of the rest of the world while actually pursuing its own interests” (Merry 2006).

Considering Merry’s critique, one can not analyze NGOs in isolation, outside overlapping global, national, and local power structures. If an organization’s function plays an important role in defining it as an NGO, then Merry’s understanding challenges Clarke’s definition of an NGO as organizations “concerned with public welfare goals.” As Merry and other authors assert (Hulme and Edwards 1997, Otto 1996), there is no doubt that human rights NGOs occupy an intermediary position between international law and local communities, and that they play a key role in the implementation of international standards. The question becomes: who does the NGO serve? Do
transnational human rights NGOs serve only the societies that fund them, or are they truly altruistic enough and serve the communities subjugated by world power orders?

Both of these statements may be true. Clearly some NGOs function as a service sector to neo-liberal government policies, as demonstrated above by financial disbursements of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Communities Initiatives. But as Hilhorst and others contend, a large diversity exists within the NGO community, and among the individuals who comprises these organizations. Also acknowledging the validity of Otto’s positioning of NGOs as organizations in opposition to the state, one must conclude that NGOs span a wide spectrum in regard to their function as pawns of neo-liberal capitalism: some NGOs work to reinforce current power inequalities, while others actively subvert them.

I have devoted much of this section to expanding the definition and orientation of NGOs to be used in this thesis. Such a broad definition is necessary to capture the diversity of functions and structures that transnational human rights NGOs represent. But returning to Clarke’s definition of NGOs as “private, non-profit, professional organizations with a distinctive legal character, concerned with public welfare goals” (Clarke 1998), there are some organizations that do not fall within my broad definition of the NGO. This thesis does not include terrorist or criminal organizations, armed groups, or any other inherently violent organization in its spectrum. While this standard is by no means perfect or clear, a meaningful definition of NGO can not be fully inclusive. Within the Philippine context, the New People’s Army (NPA), Muslim National Liberation Front (MNLF), and other armed separatist groups are excluded from this analysis of the NGO community.
The State

William Fisher writes that increasing globalization has precipitated significant changes in the current global power structures, and a key element of this process is “the sense that nation-states are no longer obvious and legitimate sources of authority over civil society” (Fisher 1997). The withdrawal of the state from the regulation of international activities, or perhaps its inability to fully regulate the increasingly large NGO sector, continues to redefine the sectors in which the state participates, allowing for the reclamation of space by non-state actors. Receding neo-liberal and former-socialist states have left a wide variety of activities for NGOs to occupy, including environmental regulation, community development, and increasingly, the establishment of human rights standards.

Other scholars point out that population changes, including increased transnational mobility, are widening the gap between the nation and the state (Otto 1996). Otto further argues that increasing mobility challenges the nation as a structure itself: “They are asserting that the multidimensional identities of the world’s peoples are not adequately represented by the unidimensional idea of nationality” (Otto 1996). Otto’s perspective helps reveal a key divide in the concept of the nation-state: the nation refers to an emotionally attached group of people, while the state refers to governmental institutions that exercise a monopoly of power within a given territory. The nation and the state rarely overlap perfectly, creating struggle between the national identity and state
bureaucracy. Globalization and the emergence of NGOs as a transnational force that people increasingly identify with exacerbates this contradiction.

Hulme and Edwards also identify the withdrawal of the state as the current trend in NGO-state relations (1997). With few exceptions, and as a result of Bank and other neo-liberal policy, NGOs around the world are filling social roles once played directly by the state. Many interpretations of this trend exist. Does the recession of the state imply that NGOs, and specifically citizens associations, are gaining in power, or are corporations and state-controlled NGOs serving as state surrogates, following the neo-liberal model (Hulme and Edwards 1997)?

David Sadler examines anti-corporate activist movements, and his analysis provides much information on transnational NGOs in general. One particularly important point is that Sadler sees NGO attempts to regulate corporate human rights behavior as struggles that occur in the international arena. That NGOs target behaviors that take place in unregulated, and sometimes virtual (i.e. online) territory outside of state power places states on the periphery of these struggles. To say that the role of the state is diminishing misses Sadler’s point: if one fully accepts Sadler’s model of transnational corporate campaigning, the state is largely irrelevant.

Following Sadler’s analysis, the NGO does not work against the state, but opposes the power of MNCs, making influence over the state just one field of struggle. This extension of Sadler’s argument conflicts with Otto’s definition of an NGO as an organization in constant conflict with the state. But Sadler’s argument can not be extended in all cases: while some states are powerless to regulate MNCs within their borders, others exercise immense power over MNCs that operate within their territories.
And even if NGO actions occur in a virtual, intangible field, the people who carry them out remain physically vulnerable to state power. Furthermore, Sadler underestimates the power of nationalism and patriotism mentioned above, and the influence of supra-statal bodies such as the UN and the Bank, which prevents MNCs from fully co-opting even the weakest of governments.

Graeber somewhat resolves the conflict between Otto and Sadler by presenting the dual character of the state (Graeber 2004), which acknowledges the validity of both perspectives. As mentioned earlier, he notes that states are utopian projects, deserving of the nationalist sentiments they inspire, while at the same time they are “forms of institutionalized raiding and extorsion” that contradict nationalism’s utopian aspirations (2004: 65). Graeber’s position on the state certainly conflicts with that of several authors presented in this thesis, because Graeber sees the state as an unnecessary structure. This juncture does not invalidate Greaber’s claim of duality, however. Contemporary anthropological literature acknowledges the split between the state and the nation, and between the ideal and actual role of governments. If anything, it is not Graeber who is at fault, but other authors who fail to recognize the complexity of “government” within the term non-governmental organization.

Authors presented here also make other assumptions that undermine their theories of state-NGO relations. Hulme and Edwards write that NGOs are filling roles once occupied by the state, but this statement assumes that NGOs function independently of the state. Often NGOs receive government funding, and instead of only occupying roles vacated by the state, they can also be used to occupy new roles and expand state power. World Bank funding of NGOs presents a second tactic used by states to influence NGO
actions. Additionally, the expansion of NGO-driven faith based prison rehabilitation programs in the United States provides a current example of government cooption (Lehren 2006). The federal government has contracted with NGOs to provide faith-based drug rehabilitation programs in prisons. Without using NGOs as an intermediary, such a program would be unconstitutional, and therefore outside the explicit power of the state. This example underscores the point that the growing presence of the NGO sector does not mean the state is receding in all cases. NGOs remain dependent on external sources for funding, and as cited above, many NGOs receive government funding. On the Global level, the Bank has effectively funneled over $4 billion in government funding to NGOs during the past 15 years (World Bank 2006). Furthermore, NGOs, even if they act in transnational spaces, are subject to the laws of the host state. The NGO exists in physical space, and NGO employees can be held accountable for the organization’s actions abroad.

And while several authors have suggested, with much validity, that new the mobility of people, information, and culture is challenging the state’s ability to maintain its legitimacy through nationalism, other authors have argued that constructions of nationalism adapt to accommodate changing populations and cultures. Evidence indicates that racism, ethnicity, and other characteristics utilized to define communities constantly evolve. For example, Paul Gilroy describes New Racism: “New racism is concerned with inclusion and exclusion – on the one hand specifying who may legitimately belong to a national community while simultaneously advancing reasons for the segregation or banishment of those whose ‘origin, sentiment or citizenship’ assigns them elsewhere” (Qtd. in Robbins 2004). Such an open definition of racism can draw
upon an infinite number of signifiers to establish identity and to exclusion. Given the evolving character of state identity, the non-governmental sector is constantly being redefined.

Considering this, one must recognize that the state has many tools at its disposal to respond to the identity crisis precipitated by mobility and globalization. NGOs have many advantages over states in constructing flexible transnational identities and horizontal communication, but states and the nationalisms outside of which NGOs construct themselves are not static entities as some authors assume. Furthermore, since the birth of the modern state, few states, if any, were ever truly homogenous, meaning that transnational identities, while accelerated by globalization, and not a completely new phenomenon for states to contend with.

**Conclusion to the Review of Literature**

In concluding the review of literature, I will summarize each of the contrasting pairs discussed in the previous section. These summaries will serve as angles of inquiry into an analysis of CPA and World Bank actions, policies, and discourse. After investigating each organization individually, I will use the contrasting pairs to explore how the two organizations interact, which is often in opposition to each other.

The policy/consensus pair draws significantly from Graeber’s writing on the consensus process. Politically speaking, Graeber’s writing and politics come from a fringe perspective. But significant evidence, which is currently being enacted in the
NGO world, confirms the validity of this model. As discussed above, Keck and Sikkink, Silvey, Sadler, and Sullivan all provide evidence for the effectiveness of the consensus process within NGO and human rights networks. In the following chapters, I will discuss the role of each organization within a human rights process that incorporates both actions and standards precipitated by the coexistence of both policy and consensus systems.

The contrast within the state/NGO pair is theoretically more straightforward. Following the working definition of the NGO that I have adopted, the NGO is oriented in opposition to the state. However, the boundaries of the state constantly shift, and taking a global perspective presents innumerable NGO/state relationships. Furthermore, despite the above definition of NGO, these organizations do not always function in opposition to the state, and often they will receive government funding or employ former government personnel. Other complications exist in that many scholars, and some of the NGO workers interviewed below, view NGOs as a public sector service industry that exists solely to help states function more effectively. This view does hold true in some cases, but it does not reflect the existing diversity among NGOs. The case studies presented in the following chapters demonstrate contradictions between the stated role and actual function of NGOs. As I reveal in the following chapters, this disconnect casts doubt on the neo-liberal theory that NGOs function as a public sector service industry (from the interviews with Freestone and Reynolds). While acknowledging the ambiguities, considering the state and the NGO together allows for more effective analysis of the role each plays in the realization of human rights standards. The role of the transnational NGO is only fully revealed when the role of the state is considered in parallel. The above
summary frames and provides focus to the following investigation of Bank and CPA interactions in the Cordillera.
Chapter IV: Conflict in the Cordillera

This chapter provides a history of the conflicts and interactions between Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) and the World Bank (the Bank) in the Philippines. The United States government also greatly affects this relationship because it is a significant political, economic, and military actor in the Philippines. The CPA is an advocacy organization active in the Cordillera region of Luzon, and the Bank is one of the world’s leading financial and development institutions. Supported economically and politically by its member states, the Bank uses the hierarchical policy system to implement its development model in middle and lower income countries around the world. In the Cordillera, the CPA uses consensus-based advocacy methods to oppose Bank infrastructure projects.

Beginning under the Marcos regime in 1980’s, the Bank became involved in infrastructure, resources extraction, and other economic development projects in the Cordillera. The CPA has been a primary opponent to these projects. Programmatically and symbolically, these two organizations have struggled to control development policy in the Cordillera region. The following chapter will pay particular attention to how these histories have exasperated the state-CPA relationship in the Philippines.

A Brief History of the Cordillera
The Cordillera is a geographically rugged region. The mountains are steep and covered by jungle, divided by narrow river valleys. While modern, American-style highways cover much of Luzon, the largest and most economically developed island of the Philippines, the Cordillera remains largely outside of this transportation infrastructure. Few roads provide access to the more remote villages in the Cordillera, and existing roads become impassible during the long rainy season.

Much of the Philippines was brought under Spanish control in the mid-16th Century. However, during their 333 years of colonization the Spanish never effectively controlled the peoples of the Cordillera because of its geography and resistance to outside rule. The Cordillera’s ethnic diversity and tribal organization contribute to this long history of resistance. The region was first incorporated into wider Luzon under the American colonization, which began in 1898. Disputes over the control of the Cordillera continue to this day. The region is officially considered under the rule of the Manila government, but few signs of government control are visible in more rural areas. The New People’s Army, a Maoist rebel group, is active in the Cordillera, and claims to provide services typically relegated to the state, including conflict resolution and education. The government and activist groups such as the CPA dispute the level of NPA activity in the Cordillera: government insists their influence is widespread, while activist groups such as the CPA assert this serves only as a pretext for militarization of the region (Corpuz 2007). Whatever the level of NPA activity, the point remains that the Cordillera region has never been under the complete influence of the national government.

Following this history of largely hostile outside attempts to control the Cordillera, the first serious efforts to develop the mountainous region occurred under the Marcos
regime in the early 1970s. Increasing national industrialization increased national
demand for electricity, and the consolidation of political power under Marcos enabled the
centralized planning of large-scale projects. A Bank-financed feasibility study conducted
in 1973 scheduled construction of four dams on the Chico river to begin in 1978. These
plans were met with local resistance, and villagers forced surveyors out of the region
(Hilhorst 2003). The survey teams returned with military protection, and the military
units, as might be expected in under a military dictatorship in one of the world’s most
corrupt countries, began to intimidate the villagers. This is how the World Bank
introduced itself and its version of development to the residents of the Cordillera.

Within this history a unified Cordillera indigenous identity has emerged. Hilhorst
Hilhorst writes that the Cordillera itself became defined as a region only under the
American colonization in the early 1900s. She suggests that American administrators
created this distinction to separate the residents of the region from the migrant laborers
used in the regions mines. The Americans created separate school systems for the
migrants, further distinguishing the Cordillera residents from the labors, who came from
other parts of Luzon. Under Marcos, the Chico River Dam again unified divided
populations within the Cordillera to oppose the project’s widespread environmental
impacts. Hilhorst writes that in addition to local indigenous groups, the anti-dam struggle
involved environmental and anti-Marcos activists from other parts of Luzon: “Moreover,
it was also clear that many people who formed part of the movement had no indigenous
identity at all. The movement attracted many followers, varying from national
politicians, a range of anti-dictatorship activists, an organization for national liberation, to
international advocates. What these people shared was not an indigenous identity, but rather a sense of identification with this movement” (2003: 32). Regardless, the CPA asserts a claim to regional identity to advocate for Cordillera regional autonomy. For example, the CPA continued to use the concept of cross-tribal regional indigenous identification, or kaigorotan, to mobilize its supporters in the Cordillera. The CPA’s role of serving as a regional indigenous group also helped it gain international prominence: the CPA established many UN-related connections in 1993, the Year of Indigenous People’s of the United Nations (Hilhorst 2003).

The policies of the Bank and other development institutions have certainly improved since its first forays into the Cordillera. The Bank now has an indigenous peoples policy: “Indigenous Peoples are a significant and important portion of humanity. Their heritage, their ways of life, their stewardship of this planet, and their cosmological insights are an invaluable treasure house for us all…” (World Bank 2007). But widespread opposition to Bank projects and extractive industry continues in the Cordillera; groups such as the CPA are the legacy of blundered attempts at economic development and regional integration. Regardless of how well conceived current and future development projects may be, current CPA publications show that Marcos’ shadow looms over any large-scale development projects.

The Philippine-US Alliance
The close relationship between the Philippines and the United States has played an important role in shaping the domestic political landscape in the Philippines. Beginning with the United States’ occupation of the Philippines after the Spanish American War, the Philippines and the United States have maintained a strong economic, political, and military alliance. After World War II, the United States established major Naval and Air Force bases on the island of Luzon, not far from the Cordillera region. Additionally, over 3 million Americans of Filipino descent currently live in the United States, with over 1 million in California (US Census Bureau 2005). This population exerts significant influence on US policy towards the Philippines, and has elected Filipino-Americans to Federal office. The two countries cooperate economically and militarily, and the Philippines is listed as a “major non-NATO ally” of the United States (Eckert 2007).

Several contradictions have arisen within this close relationship. The United States has emerged as the Philippines’ strongest supporter in some instances, and as a fierce critic in others. The AFP and the United States Military perform cooperative missions against Muslim insurgents Mindinao and the Sulu Archipelago, and the Philippines received over $220 million in military aid over the past three years (Eckert 2007). American corporations have also invested heavily in several sectors of the Philippine economy, including agriculture and natural resources. The United States influences the Philippine economy through its leverage within multilateral finance institutions as well. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank have both invested heavily in the Philippines. The United States is the largest investor in the Asian Development Bank (ADB), holding 15% of its stock (Asian Development Bank 2007).
From CPA’s perspective, such military and financial control represents the continuing negative influence of their former colonial master through imperialist globalization. The CPA describes agricultural liberalization and globalization as American imperialist policies (CPA 2007 A). The CPA has further described these programs as “development aggression” because they have resulted in internal migration and militarization. However, the US and the World Bank feel very different economic effects of the American-Philippine relationship, benefiting economically from the natural and labor resources supplied by the Philippines.

Recently the relationship between the United States and the Philippines has also suffered from a highly publicized rape case involving several American serviceman and a Filipina. The incident took place in 2005 at Subic Bay, formerly the largest US Military base overseas. In a move that has angered many Filipinos, the United States held the suspects at the US embassy in Manila, rather than leaving them in the custody of the Philippine justice system (Quismundo 2006). The incident has drawn attention to the Visiting Forces Agreement, a mutual protection treaty between the two states that some Filipinos view as a remnant of American colonialism. In a statement similar to those of other left-leaning NGOs in the Philippines, the CPA writes:

The Philippines – US Visting Forces Agreement (VFA) is up for review. The VFA provides for joint military ‘Balikatan exercises,’ which lay fertile conditions for the exploitation and rape of Filipinas by US soldiers. The concrete case of ‘Nicole’ who was raped by Cpl. Daniel Smith in Subic is still a controversial issues after the GMA [Gloria Macapagal Arroyo] government, under the cover of
night, spirited away the convicted rapist to the safety of the US embassy (CPA 2007 A).

The Subic Bay rape case highlights the many tensions that have arisen from the US military and corporate presence in the Philippines. The Subic rape case serves as a metaphor for the environmental and social damage wrought by US militarism and economic exploitation on the collective body of the Philippines. 8

Critics of the US-Philippine alliance, including the CPA, view the violence committed by US troops, environmental damage caused by extractive industries, the social harm of displacement caused by damming projects, and politically motivated killings in the Cordillera region all as manifestations of American neo-imperialism. Yet the United States has also criticized the Philippine government on its human rights record. In research interviews conducted for this thesis, State Department officials have highlighted US efforts to improve human rights in the Philippines. The State Department’s “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” for the Philippines has harshly criticized behavior of the AFP and the Philippine National Police, accusing them of a variety of human rights violations, including summary executions (US Department of State 2006). This report has added to the credibility of allegations by the CPA and other NGOs that the AFP is systematically violating human rights without repercussions from the civilian government. State Department officials also stated that they are in

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8 This is my own assertion, though it is informed by Hildson’s (1995) gendered analysis of the ongoing AFP-NPA conflict. Hildson sees the AFP as masculine, and describes their use of sexual violence as a tool of control. Considering the partnership between the AFP and US military forces, I do not believe my claim is unfounded. Further supporting this assertion is the highly visible environmental damage wrought by the US Military on the Philippines.
This dual stance of criticism and partnership between the United States and the Philippines creates a strange relationship between the CPA and the United States. On the one hand, the CPA is highly critical of United States investment and military involvement in the Philippines. American troops are currently stationed in the Philippines and conduct joint anti-terror exercises with the AFP, a practice that progressive Filipinos view as an remnant of American colonialism. However, State Department Human Rights Reports are widely respected in the Philippines (State Department interview 2007). Joan Carling, the CPA Chair Person, met with State Department officials to express her concerns about human rights violations indirectly caused by these same policies. The United States is both an evil imperialist and protector of human rights. In this case, the link between the NGO and the state has become more complicated.

The State Department testified in favor of transferring the convicted rapist in the Subic Bay case to US custody, a move that greatly angered the CPA (cite inquirer article – saved in thesis folder). Additionally, a strong case can be made that United States military aid to the AFP has increased the AFP’s political power, and therefore its ability to commit human rights violations without fear of punishment from the civilian government in Manila. During the course of this research, neither side, and none of my interview subjects, has commented on this contradiction. No apparent conflict exists within the stated missions of the involved organizations—the AFP provides security, the Bank fosters development, the Department of State promotes US interest, the CPA
protects indigenous rights—but on the ground a violent, and sometimes deadly conflict continues.
Chapter V: The Rise of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance

The CPA was founded in 1984, under the Marcos dictatorship. Rising from a politically repressive climate, and noting a history of government and Bank collusion, the CPA emerged as a group staunchly opposed to large-scale infrastructure projects within the Cordillera region, citing their detrimental environmental and cultural impacts on the region’s residents. In describing the organization’s founding, the website states: “The founders of CPA were mainly indigenous leaders and activists who spearheaded the widespread and successful opposition to the World Bank-funded Chico dams project and the commercial logging operations…” (CPA 2007 C). The organization coordinates a loose federation of indigenous, environmental, and leftist political organizations, all which take hostile stances toward the central government and large-scale development projects and extractive industries. Critics have continuously asserted that linkages exist between the CPA and local communist groups (see Bryant 2005). However, this illicit connection, if it exists at all, is greatly overshadowed by the organization’s ties with legitimate leftist political parties.

Many of the authors I have cited in this thesis have constructed typologies of NGOs, organizing them by any combination of a plethora of characteristics, including structure, funding sources, mission, size, and regional scope (See Clarke 1998, Ferguson 1991, Hilhorst 2003, Hulme and Edwards 1997, Keck and Sikkink 1998). I do not attempt to construct my own typology, nor do I utilize any the typologies of the scholars listed here; each typology offers unique benefits and flaws. Instead, I consider several characteristics of the CPA to help define what it is and does, in relation to its NGO peers.
The CPA characterizes itself as an indigenous, human rights, and environmental advocacy organization. Clarke (1998) characterizes the CPA as a membership organization, meaning that rather than representing individual constituents, smaller member organizations comprise its constituency. The CPA advocates only on issues relevant to the Philippines and its member organizations, but it draws support from a diverse body of international partners. The CPA receives much of its funding from Western-based indigenous and environmental advocacy NGOs and from Western-based private philanthropic foundations. As I discuss below, the CPA engages in a variety of advocacy tactics, making it particularly difficult to classify the CPA by its actions. It engages in street protests, but also involves technical consultants to lobby the Bank. The CPA typically associates with leftist political parties, and its advocacy typically conflicts with the Philippine government.

The CPA has emerged out of a tumultuous, unpredictable political climate. From the beginning of the American occupation until the Marcos era, a quasi-oligarchy exerted significant control over Philippine politics. During the 1980s, the decade of CPA’s founding, the Philippines was under martial law (established my Marcos in 1972), under the pretexts of anticommunism and national development. Scholars have compared Marcos’s ambitions to those of Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore because of their stated goals of economic development and willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in the process. But they have also compared Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to Lord and Lady Macbeth, because of their whimsical and self-aggrandizing style of rule (Norton 2005). As Marcos consolidated his power through expanding the domestic power of the military, over which he exerted significant control, he replaced the oligarchic political system largely
by shirting political and economic power to the military, giving immense power to individual officers.

This reshuffling of political power generated great instability. Under Marcos’ strict restrictions on personal freedoms, political and military opponents, particularly the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army, grew in number. Legal NGO opposition groups were also formed during this time, the most prominent being Task Force Detainees, a faith-based group founded to aid political prisoners. The perceived communist threat prompted a violent response from the army, which committed numerous crimes, including intimidation and extralegal killings. Although political control in the Philippines formally shifted back to civilian control in 1986, the army remains bloated and politically powerful.

**NGO-State Tensions: The Philippine Government and the CPA**

The Philippines serves as a prime example of the characteristic tensions within NGO-state relationships. Over the past twenty years NGOs have fermented movements to overthrow two presidents, and almost toppled the current President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. The constitution nominally affords many of the civil and political liberties found in Western democracy, but a corrupt and uncontrollable police and military forces use violence to severely limit these liberties. Consequently, an active NGO population collides not with the gentler restraints of many Western democracies, but with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which has changed little since the Marcos era.
The current president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, has not effectively controlled the Philippine army during her presidency. The army has received blame for hundreds of extrajudicial killings, which have primarily targeted leftist political activists, including the CPA. Filipino activists, international NGOs, the United Nations Human Rights Council, and the United States Department of State all suggest, with varying degrees of certainty, that elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are directly responsibly for the killings. However, analysts and human rights advocates debate the President’s role, and question whether she would have the power to stop the killings if she involved herself in the situation. Over the past year, the killings have drawn increased international attention, particularly from Protestant churches in the United States and Europe because of the killings of Filipino church workers. Strong ties exist between church groups and leftist organizations because of their mutual struggle against the Marcos regime (Clarke 1998). Also, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch both issued reports on the killings in 2006. The large Filipino community in the US has also been very vocal in its support for human rights improvements in the Philippines. Groups like BAYAN USA (www.bayanusa.org) advocate a progressive, anti-Arroyo position, and have worked to draw attention to the human rights abuses committed under her presidency.

Since April 2000 CPA staff have been subjected to politically motivated intimidation and other attacks, including the killings and assaults. I contend that these attacks are a manifestation of CPA-World Bank violence. While no direct connection

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9 As of March 2007, Amnesty International reports on the Philippines are located at http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/philippines/index.do and HRW reports are located at http://www.hrw.org/doc?t=asia&c=philip
between the Bank and political killings in the Philippines exists, the CPA identifies the
Philippines government and the Armed Forces of the Philippines as agents of Bank-
perpetuated imperialism and neo-liberalism. Citing possible threats from leftist groups,
over the past few years the government has imposed restrictions on civil liberties for
security reasons, in legislation similar to the USA Patriot Act. CPA press releases draw
connections between the Bank and government because these restrictions have been used
to criminalize some anti-Bank protests (CPA 2007 B).

Considering the history of violence between leftist activists and the state security
forces surrounding Bank-funded projects in the Cordillera, CPA claims of Bank
responsibility for violence have some merit. Current rights abuses against groups such as
the CPA are not a recent development, but rather the most recent phase in a history of
state-sponsored, or at the very, least state-tolerated violence. After the fall of the Marcos
regime and the transition to a more democratic government, the human rights situation
within the Philippines greatly improved. However, the Ramos government continued to
tolerate human rights abuses against progressive groups and other deviant NGOs. By
some accounts, these abuses were more targeted and more brutal than the rights
violations experienced under Marcos (Amnesty International 1992, cited in Hilhorst
2003).

Equally important as the history of state-NGO relations is the CPA’s current
location within the Philippine political climate. Hilhorst writes that the Philippines has a
remarkably dense and diverse NGO population, even compared to Western democracies
(2003). Hilhorst cites several factors that have led to such a vibrant civil sector. She
notes that the turbulent political climate has led to the growth of political advocacy
groups, and the government’s failure to address a myriad of social problems, including prostitution and gender-based violence, have led to the growth of NGOs concerned with these issues (2003). Additionally, both the Catholic and Protestant churches, which together claim almost 90% of Filipinos as members (CIA 2007), actively participate in local and national political debates. All of these factors have led to the high density of NGOs in the Philippines.

Hilhorst writes that the best way to locate an NGO within its local political environment is to consider its stakeholders (2003). To locate the CPA within the Philippine NGO community, one must consider that the CPA represents more than 120 “community organizations,” and that these organizations span multiple Cordillera provinces. Additionally, the CPA also represents “sectoral federations of youth, women, elders, peasant, and cultural workers” (CPA 2007 C). Considering the convergence of diverse organizations represented under the CPA name, the differing domestic views of the CPA—from an indigenous advocacy organization, to an environmental organization, to a progressive political group, to a communist front—are more understandable.

The CPA’s diversity, and its wide representation of marginalized groups, provides a large target for political oppression. Considering the abusive history and political power of the AFP and police in the Philippines, it is unsurprising that the CPA has become a subjected to political pressure, which often takes the form of violence. Philippine history has been characterized by corruption, oligarchic politics, and militarism. CPA’s relationship with the government and security forces remind us these forces continue to dominate power relations in the Philippines.
In regard to development, since the 1970s the Cordillera has become a conflict zone between different economic development strategies. Hilhorst describes the contrary approaches to development held by the central government and the primarily indigenous residents of the Cordillera (2003). Hilhorst writes that residents of the Cordillera have sympathized with the New People’s Army, a national communist insurgency active in the region, while the central government has pursued a Neoliberal economic plan:

In the 1970s, protests against the construction of hydrological dams in the area spurred the growth of People’s Organizations and movements, and the formulation of an indigenous discourse. At the same time, the region became a stronghold for the revolutionary struggle of the National Democratic Front and its armed wing, the New People’s Army, enjoying for years much support among villagers. A high level of militarization by the government, including the bombing of areas in the 1990s, accompanied by extensive propaganda against development NGOs, further sharpened ongoing debates…Meanwhile, the Philippine government increasingly pushed for the ‘development’ of the Cordillera, which in practice mainly meant the exploitation of its natural and cultural riches through dams, mines and tourism. This notion of development has constantly been challenged by NGOs, which supported small-scale projects and introduced concepts like participatory and sustainable development to the communities. Hence, the concept of development has become highly contested (Hilhorst 2003).
Hilhorst convincingly explains why NGOs such as the CPA have consistently clashed with development institutions such as the Bank. One could not conceive of a relationship more antagonistic than that between neo-liberal economists and Maoist insurgents. The CPA finds itself caught in the middle, and the organization and the individuals who support it feel pressure from both sides. The history of United States imperialism in the Philippines and the current close cooperation between the two governments helps shed more light on the conflicts in the Cordillera.

The violence described above is but one manifestation of the tensions inherent in the NGO-state relationship. As the state works to expand its power, other arenas become involved in this conflict. The following section will describe struggles over Cordillera identity central to the CPA-state relationship.

Development of the Cordillera as an Attack on Indigenous Identity

One result of damming projects that the Bank and CPA do not dispute is the significant lifestyle changes they have caused for the populations directly affected by them. The Bank measures change—development—in megawatts, miles of paved road, and jobs created. These are all described as improvements over the status quo by the Bank. The CPA depicts local change through “before” and “after” photos of dammed regions. The “after” photos show flooded valleys and flattened mountaintops, but the CPA also acknowledges that the dams will create wage jobs on newly irrigated plantations and new concrete houses with electricity for those displaced by the flooding.
Whether or not this would be an improvement for the mostly indigenous Cordillera residents, the Philippine government has not presented this different lifestyle as an option, but has forced it upon them. The Marcos government ignored the popular resistance in the Cordillera to damming and mining projects, and the Aquino government actually militarized the region (she sent 20,000 soldiers) more intensively than Marcos had (Hilhorst 2003). Furthermore, the indigenous people’s policies of both of the development banks active in the region, the ADB and the World Bank, do not require prior informed consent of local populations, but only prior informed consultation. Even then, this consultation policy was not implemented until the early 1990s, after many development projects had already been undertaken in the Cordillera. According to Bank officials, the consultation process is more of a courtesy than a meaningful dialogue regarding Bank policy: “We haven’t historically done a very good job of consulting people. We do consult people, but a lot of times we do it half-assed, or we do it very short time frame or we do it very last minute, or we don’t follow through the on the recommendations” (Reynolds Interview). After all, inherent to the Bank’s existence is the assumption that it improves impoverished areas better than local governments. The Bank sees its development model as “naturalized, legitimate, and durable” (Goldman 2005). Neo-liberalism dictates that the Bank’s development model, designed by economists, can make better planning decisions for the Cordillera than the residents can themselves.

The Bank’s failure to consult with the local populations has generated such a hostile reaction from the Cordillera residents not only because of the economic and environmental affects of infrastructure projects, but also because of the subtextual
meaning of these actions. Racism against indigenous groups of the Cordillera and militarization of the region combine to create a feeling that indigenous identity is under attack. Similar to other situations of Bank-state partnership, both institutions are considered by affected populations to be equal actors in these harmful policies, justifiably or not.

One fairly simple line of evidence supporting this assertion is the projects’ displacement of people because of flooding caused by dams and environmental harm caused by logging and mining operations. Indigenous peoples are forced from historic mountain homes into lowland villages and cities. Such migration forces a change from subsistence farming to participation in the cash economy, often through cultivating cash crops or laboring on plantations, irrigated by water supplied by the reservoirs created by new dams. While the Bank and government argue that economic necessity precipitates such changes, the affected Cordillera peoples see it as an attack on their identity.

That Cordillera residents are subjected to violence also serves as an attack on their identity as residents of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (rather than citizens of the Philippines).\footnote{Officially, the Cordillera is located in the Cordillera Administrative Region. Many residents support the creation of a Cordillera Autonomous Region, but this proposal has met opposition from the Manila government.} In creating a functional definition of violence, Keppley-Mahmood writes that that violence is not only a physical attempt at social control, but is also used to control religion, loyalty, culture, and most basically to define the identity of the subjects of violence (Keppley-Mahmood 2002). For Nordstrom, violence is an attempt to control the mind and body through “the destruction of home and humanity, of hope and future, of valued traditions and the integrity of community” (Keppley-Mahmood 2002). Violence in the Cordillera has assumed each of the forms described by Keppley-Mahmood and
Nordstrom: destruction of homes by damming projects, removal of tradition by forcing populations from sustenance farming into wage labor, and destruction of community by forcing whole villages to relocate. The heavy militarization of the region has also led to more physical forms of violence.

CPA actions and publications have also suggested that many view the struggle over the Cordillera’s development as a struggle over indigenous identity. CPA publications have described the successful halting of the Chico river damming project as a triumph of indigenous technology over the Philippine state. CPA documents describe not only the indigenous victory over armed opponents but the assertion of the indigenous self in the face marginalization in wider Philippine and global society. These publications portray a story of resistance through the establishment of self-respect:

The Kalinga and Bontok tribes people managed to stop the construction of the four huge hydroelectric dams which were a priority energy project of the Marcos government through the long years of martial rule. They were able to stop construction against fearsome odds by asserting their tribal people’s power. In their steadfast and uncompromising defense of their ancestral lands and their indigenous way of life, they earned the respect and support not only of the other national minorities in the region, but also the progressive and democratic forces both here in the Philippines and abroad (CPA 2007 D).

Considering the discrimination faced by indigenous peoples worldwide, radical resistance to damming projects is not just part of a battle for local control, but a call for recognition
in a neo-liberal world where indigenous identity is systematically marginalized and devalued. In light of the underlying meanings of development products felt by the peoples of the Cordillera, it is unsurprising that they hold neo-liberalism and globalization responsible for the attacks on their identity, rather than blaming failures on poor implementation of sound development policy on local political failures such as corruption, as Bank officials do.

The question of who blames whom offers significant insight into the state-NGO relationship. That the Bank, as a hierarchically dominant, intergovernmental organization, blames the poor functioning of the global statist system, while the CPA blames “globalization” reveals how NGO-state tensions affect each organization. The CPA and its constituency have suffered at the hands of policy implemented by the partnership between the Philippine government and the Bank. The Bank’s credibility has suffered from the opposition of advocacy groups such as the CPA, but the Bank remains one of the world’s dominant institutions. The following section will discuss some of the bureaucratic complexities of the Bank-CPA relationship, and how poor communication within these bureaucracies leads to conflict.

The Philippines, the Bank, and the CPA: A Curious Relationship

One possible explanation for the disconnect appears within the bureaucratic structures of the institutions involved. While discussing the indigenous rights obligations of Bank members under international law, Carolyn Reynolds pointed out that although
these groups may have committed to a “prior informed consent” in the UN context, a variety of factors have prevented this commitment from applying in practice. Reynolds notes that government, Bank, and UN bureaucracies are comprised of individuals with personal agendas that do not always conform to the organizations’ missions. One government agency pursue its own agenda while another, knowingly or unknowingly, works to contradict it. When I mentioned the ongoing debate within the Bank and the wider development industry about “prior informed consent” (in contrast to “prior informed consultation”) from communities affected by development projects, Reynolds responded:

So they [Bank members] will never accept that [prior informed consent] language [within the Bank context], even though they many have accepted that language in the UN Context. But in the Bank’s context because there’s money involved… I mean as a principle it’s easy to say that [a country is committed to prior informed consent], but when it comes to whether this is going to affect money, people… countries make different decisions… See that’s another problem that you have with these global organizations… And the same governments sit on the boards of these organizations but they send different representatives so the people who sit at the UN representing Botswana or India are from the foreign affairs ministry, the people who sit on the board of the Bank or the IMF are from the ministry of finance or planning and they don’t see the world in the same way… In their own countries they have different roles to play (Reynolds 2007).
Several CPA publications have called for the implementation of prior informed consent standards, which many indigenous rights NGOs advocate for. The gap between rhetoric calling for prior informed consent policies from bodies such as the UN and the failure of international finance organizations to implement them has not gone unnoticed by CPA. In a letter to the ADB, the CPA and partner organizations, including the International Rivers Network, urged the ADB to adopt a standard of prior informed consent, following the recommendations of the UN and transnational NGOs (CPA 2004). This action by the CPA and its partners represents an attempt to use the consensus process to shift Bank policy. The UN and ADB represent many of the same governments, yet they have constructed different policies for development projects. Organizations such as the CPA, and their constituent member organizations, are caught within the bureaucratic disconnect of government agencies. Better horizontal integration among governments and multilateral organizations might have lessened the intensity of the Bank-CPA conflict.

Reynolds’ wording also highlights a difficulty with modeling the behavior of NGOs and other transnational organizations. While ideally an organization makes decisions so that it may effectively achieve its mission, in reality organizations can not make decisions; people make decisions. So Reynolds’ self-correction of her comment is indicative of the difficulties of her position as a Bank employee: “when it comes to whether this is going to affect money, people… countries [emphasis added] make different decisions…” (2007). As she later elaborates, countries do not actually make decisions, individuals working within distinct agencies carry out the functions of government bureaucracy. Violence, such as the political killings described above, protest
at meetings of international finance organizations, and destructive development policies, results from this disconnect.

In applying Reynolds’ example to the Philippines—where the death of political activists at the hands of Filipino soldiers trained by American forces is condemned by the American Embassy in Manila—no ideological conflict exists between the State Department and the CPA. Yet current American policy exacerbates NGO-state tensions by creating a bureaucratic gap between two arms of the American government attempting to implement a supposedly uniform foreign policy.
Chapter VI: The World Bank

Because of its size and complexity, I will not attempt to provide a detailed history of the Bank and its mission. Much of the Bank’s history and programs are not directly relevant to this research. But the Bank has played an influential role in the Cordillera region of the Philippines. Because of close ties between the United States and the anti-communist Marcos regime, the Bank and other international finance organizations became especially active in the Philippines. The Bank is also a dominant force in creating global neo-liberal discourse, which has permeated Philippine government programs. Perhaps the largest effect of the Bank in the Philippines has not been its infrastructure programs but its influence on government policy towards the development of extractive industries and damming projects.\(^{11}\) Considering the importance of these industries in the Cordillera region, and CPA’s opposition to them, the Bank does conflict very directly with the CPA.

The Bank uses the publications of its Civil Society Team to construct its discursive relationship with civil society organizations, and to keep NGOs and bank members aware of its evolving NGO policy. Several issues relevant to transnational NGOs are debated within this literature.\(^{12}\) “Issues and Options for Improving Engagement Between the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations,” a Bank report published in 2005, discusses many of the problems that have arisen from the Bank’s trend of increasing civil society organization (CSO) participation in its projects. Bank projects

\(^{11}\) For example, the Mining Act of 1995 greatly reduced restrictions on investment in mining projects by foreign corporations.

\(^{12}\) The World Bank Uses the term CSO throughout its literature. Refer to the Appendix for a comparison of the two terms.
have revealed tensions inherent within state-NGO relationships, and support the Bank’s method of development implementation: top-down policy. The report also discusses, in general terms, the ongoing relationship between the Bank and CSOs, which can be applied to Bank-CPA conflict in the Philippines. More often than not, this conflict occurs discursively, as the following examples illustrate.

The report immediately addresses the question of the Bank’s decision to engage CSOs at all: according to its 1945 Articles of Agreement, the Bank’s members and supporting clients are states, and no formal role for NGOs was established. The Bank only began to significantly engage CSOs in the 1990s (World Bank 2005). Interviewees at the Bank have presented varying perspectives on whether its engagement of CSOs displeased its member states because of the shift of economic and political support away from state governments. The Bank’s official position, as presented in Bank publications, remains that CSO engagement, by aiding the implementation of development policy, has bolstered the power of its member states.

But in spite of this position, the Bank has found it necessary to address this possible conflict of interest between funding states and non-governmental organizations that, by definition, function in opposition to them. The Bank, acknowledging its position as an inter-governmental organization, caught between its state clients and CSO partners, portrays its delicate position in positive language:

As the influence of CSOs continues to grow, they are also attracting greater public scrutiny, prompting calls for greater accountability. Some government

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13 Twice, once at the very beginning of this report in the second paragraph of the Executive Summary, and again in the Introduction.
authorities, notably parliamentarians in developing countries, have begun to question who CSOs represent and how much weight should be given to their views vis-à-vis the views of elected officials and other stakeholders (p. X).

The above statement demonstrates government resentment toward the engagement of CSOs in Bank projects. One must assume that the call for “greater accountability” implies CSO accountability to the governments of the states in which they operate, which is, in effect, a call for greater government control over CSOs. Additionally, that governments in developing countries are calling for further control of CSOs is not surprising, considering that their typically weaker states are more likely to feel threatened by the expanding role of the non-governmental sector.

The Bank also portrays itself as a scapegoat within CSO-government disputes, as an innocent entity caught in the middle of preexisting conflicts. Bank policy, directed by its Articles of Association, requires that it does not involve itself in domestic political issues. Yet funding large-scale infrastructure projects often has political ramifications. “Even when the responsibility for the decision or process in question rests with an individual government, CSOs often believe that targeting the Bank, with its political and financial clout and international media scrutiny, is more likely to get attention and force change than targeting the government involved” (World Bank 2005). The Bank might view its position as non-political because it provides funding and technical advice for projects, and it is formally subordinate to the host state. Yet the effects of its projects, such as the damming projects in the Cordillera, affect thousands of people, drawing both legal and extralegal reactions.
Stakeholders negatively affected by Bank projects, or the CSOs that support them, do not always care to distinguish the Bank’s role from that of its governmental partners. The Bank drew much criticism in the Cordillera for funding dam projects under the Marcos regime. Indeed, the struggle between CSOs and the Philippines government over the Chico River Dam demonstrated that the Bank can prove to be more responsive than the client state in which it operates, especially when it partners with an authoritarian government, or a government of questionable legitimacy, like the Marcos regime. The Bank retains a negative image throughout the Cordillera because of its partnership with the Marcos regime, despite its self-assessment that it has become more responsive to local concerns raised by CSOs. The CPA website repeatedly mentions that the Bank once cooperated with the Marcos government, even though he was deposed over twenty years ago.

Yet considering the extensive control that institutions such as the Bank exert over indebted states such as the Philippines, some of civil society’s criticisms of international finance organizations are legitimate. The Bank’s explicit mission focuses solely on economic development, but since the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions, its economic influence has expanded into many government programs only vaguely related to government policy. As James Ferguson writes: “It should be noted that direct impositions of policy by banks and international agencies have involved not only such broad macroeconomic interventions as setting currency-exchange rates, but also fairly detailed requirements for curtailing social spending, restructuring state bureaucracies, and so on” (2006). Ferguson continues that states often receive blame for the negative consequences of policies they enact at the behest of international finance organizations,

14 Joseph Stiglitz provides a particularly detailed account in Globalization and Its Discontents
regardless of their inability to ignore requests of multilateral organizations. States that have successfully shunned Bank support and have continued to develop, such as Botswana or China, are few and far between. So while angry citizenries often fail to hold accountable the responsible institution in individual cases, both the state and the Bank are often viewed as equally culpable partners, and receive blame for one another.

This conflict between the state, Bank, and CSOs can be approached from several different angles. As I have described in the literature review, the term NGO, at its most basic level, can be understood through its oppositional position to the state. One common approach to state-CSO struggle constructs a vertical hierarchy, placing the state at the top and CSOs below (Ferguson 2006). After presenting this model, Ferguson argues that it oversimplifies state-CSO relationships. Fisher’s (1997) discussion of the great variety of state-NGO relationships supports Ferguson’s perspective.

However, much evidence indicates that a vertical hierarchy between the Bank, Philippine state, and CPA exists, and it would be ludicrous to assert that a tandem of the state and international finance institutions is not located near the top. While some states more effectively exert power over their territories than others, and some states can afford to ignore the requests of international finance institutions, the state-Bank alliance remains more powerful than civil society in all cases. The imposing World Bank headquarters in Washington D.C., with its armed guards and extensive security measures, visibly demonstrates the Bank’s position. The expansion of Washington Consensus-style development policies by the Bank and its member states, often in the face of popular opposition (as in the Cordillera) provide the most fundamental example within this context. In fact, few places on earth exist where the Bank is not a dominant political
power, and these states (Cuba, Iran, North Korea) are ostracized by the international community.

**Bank Discourse**

Bank discourse provides evidence demonstrating the institution’s dominance over civil society. This discourse supports the Bank’s use of policy implementation rather than the consensus process as a development method. Policy is the current development strategy of states, regional development banks, and other international financial institutions. Bank discourse assumes policy as the desired status quo, and works more to attack the consensus process than defend its policy methods. This section describes how the Bank attacks the consensus networking process, used by student groups, NGOs, and other allies (Keck and Sikkink 1997, Silvey 2004).

The Bank uses several metaphors that assert a dominant power relationship over its NGO critics. In “Issues and Options for Improving Engagement Between the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations,” the Bank describes a lack of growth and maturity among World Social Forum (WSF) protestors: “Whether the WSF will mature enough to become a space that influences the scope and pace of economic globalization remains to be seen” (24). The Bank also suggests that protesters oppose the Bank because of their naivété: “Students and youth in particular have been easily recruited to the anti-Bank bandwagon, when they hear simplistic messages that Bank staff are responsible for

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15 The World Social Forum is an anti-globalization meeting created in response to the World Economic Forum.
decisions that actually rest with governments” (25). The Bank also acknowledges its
more powerful discursive position through its discussion of who understands the global
economic reality, and its opponents simplistic “perceptions.”

Bank publications repeatedly attempt to redefine the Bank-civil society
relationship. In describing street protests against international financial institutions, one
report states:

Protests that have occurred around World Trade Organization, Bank, IMF and
other international summit meetings in recent years have focused on a plethora of
issues, including denouncing the war in Iraq and other conflicts, and particularly
on the negative effects they perceive resulting from globalization… They accuse
the IMF, Bank, and WTO of being the agents of the rich governments and
multinational corporations, which they perceive as benefiting most from
globalization and trade liberalization. Some protestors believe there is an
inevitable conflict between the role of lending institutions and the goal of
reducing poverty (25).

Many protestors do indeed accuse the Bank of being agents of rich governments and
believe that an inevitable conflict exists between lending institutions such as the Bank
and reducing poverty. Others critics suggest that neo-liberal ideology plays a larger role
than development goals in shaping bank policy (the following section includes interview
data to support this assertion). That the Bank can refute these assertions simply by
denying them demonstrates its superior discursive position. In contrast, anti-Bank
protesters and NGOs do not have comparable access to media, allowing the Bank to describe its position in relation to these groups in contemporary global society.

Goldman helps outline the superior discursive position of the Bank by noting that development is considered a necessity of modern human existence (2005). With few exceptions, NGOs, such as the CPA, do not question the necessity of development, they only dispute the best path towards economic development. Goldman continues that the question “is economic development the appropriate path to follow” is never raised. The only critique of economic development commonly accepted by academia, governments, and the general public is whether countries are developing in a sustainable manner. Following this discourse, development becomes the primary paradigm for understanding interactions between the global North and South. By focusing on formalized financial interactions (i.e. bilateral foreign aid, multinational western-based NGOs, Bank projects), other global flows of people and ideas, as well as significant informal economies, are ignored.

The Bank also determines the grounds on which it engages NGOs, which also points to its more powerful position in relation to civil society. Currently there are no formal guidelines for Bank-CSO engagement. Rather, the Bank determines with whom it works on an ad hoc basis.

The use of the terms policy and consensus further play into the top-bottom hierarchy locating the Bank-state tandem and civil society. Policy, as discussed previously, refers to rules established by a bureaucracy to govern those under its control because the bureaucracy believes it has greater ability to govern its subjects than they themselves (roughly, Graeber 2004). While the Bank does not describe its actions in
such a cynical tone, it nonetheless contrasts its “policy” with the consensus process. In one example, the Bank describes its efforts to more fully engage CSOs:

With these more militant groups, there is little basis for the Bank to expect that constructive relations are possible or desirable. However, the evolution of the World Social Forum (WSF) and other civil society forums suggest that even some of the more radical social movements may be maturing, recognizing the need to move beyond using protest as an advocacy tool and engaging policy makers in serious debate about policy alternatives” (World Bank 2005).

“Policy alternatives” implies modifying Bank policy, rather than adopting different approaches to economic development, such as processes based on consensus or indigenous technologies. Again, the condescending tone indicates a superior hierarchical position.

Later, the Bank discusses the need to “promote public consensus” for its reforms and development policy (World Bank 2005). As a publicly funded institution, the Bank sees public approval of its policy as relevant (though not always necessary) to its mission. The usage of consensus in this context becomes significant when one considers the role of veto, or the individual’s ability to prevent a group action, within the formal consensus model. Such an action can only be taken when an individual believes the action to be taken violates the fundamental principles of the group. Within the Bank-CPA context, the primary method of expression of a lack of public consensus, among both CSOs and individuals, is street protest, and other physical or violent forms of resistance.
Significantly, the Bank sees street protest as non-productive, and describes it in a condescending tone, which again points to the Bank’s more powerful position: “There is also little basis for the Bank to expect that constructive relations are possible or desirable with obstructionist-minded groups, unless their aims and tactics change significantly… The protestors have posed a dilemma for some of the Bank’s more constructive critics” (World Bank 2005). The Bank also suggests that protesters oppose Bank actions only because they are unaware of the Bank’s self-described non-political role as an advisor and lender to its member states (World Bank 2005). In effect, the bank imposes its policy on those below it because it knows what is best for global development and is willing to use its superior power to do so.

The formal consensus model does somewhat validate the Bank’s view of street protesters as irreconcilable with Bank goals. If the protesters do indeed believe Bank actions violate the fundamental principles of society, as a consensus-based approach to CSO-state conflict dictates, then negotiation might be impossible. Many protesters (which often includes the CPA) unmistakably aim to block Bank actions. But the Bank has enough power to circumvent the consensus process and to block any truly global discussion of development policy.

Additionally, the language used to describe “protest” points out protest’s apparent reactive nature. While Bank literature describes those who oppose its work solely as “protesters,” many opposition CSOs describe their action using other, more positive terms. The world “protest” further implies that bank opponents do not offer alternative positive methods of development, but only attempt to block Bank actions for political reasons. CPA literature frequently describes their anti-Bank campaigns as “direct
“Direct action” as a tactic for action,” which suggests initiative rather than reaction. “Direct action” as a tactic for social change does include a wider range of actions, such as graffiti or violent conflict, but CPA’s anti-Bank campaigns mainly involve street protest, educational initiatives, and other legal activities.

The Bank also creates a hierarchy of civil society organizations, from “radical advocacy groups” (a commonly occurring term in Bank literature), such as anarchist and communist groups, to “more constructive CSO critics” (World Bank 2005), such as Oxfam and the World Council of Churches. The Bank has established the Monterrey/Doha/Johannesburg agenda (MDJ), which calls for deepening ties with “constructive” critics of the Bank. “These groups would include what some analysts have termed as the ‘hearts’ –groups which advocate generally peaceful and constructive approaches—or “reformers,” which are informed critics of the Bank but are also interested in dialogue toward further reforming, not abolishing, the international financial institutions” (World Bank).

The Bank on Development and Civil Society

The Bank understands the growing prominence of NGOs in the development and human rights fields. While the Bank does not recognize it, the consensus process drives these NGO networks. As Graeber (2004) writes, consensus-driven networks can effectively grow within the shadow of a policy dominated world. But the Bank’s work with CSOs does not represent a full acceptance of consensus networks as a method for
fostering development. In fact, one could view the Bank’s partnership with CSOs and attempts to involve them in its projects as cooption of these networks. As I described earlier (in the NGO and Consensus sections of the first chapter), NGOs are subject to the political and economic pressures of the societies in which they exist. The Bank’s ability to engage, and possibly co-opt CSO partners serves as a testament to this reality.

In its publications and website, the Bank emphasizes its increasing work with civil society, despite the fact that the majority of its projects are conceived and implemented in coordination with its member states, with minimal input from CSOs. Michael Goldman observes that the growing relationship between civil society and the Bank benefits the Bank in multiple ways, some superficial and others substantial. He notes the view of civil society, particularly from an anthropological perspective, as a contemporary manifestation of the “local” (Goldman 2005). Rather than pursuing a policy top-down administration from outside, the involvement of civil society demonstrates that local actors are involved in the development process. Rhetorically, civil society, democracy, globalization, and development appear together, and the presence of one indicates that the others must also be involved. In interviews, Bank officials utilized this rhetoric, effectively verifying this claim (Freestone and Reynolds interviews).

Consequently, the Bank sees its involvement with civil society as non-political. But a variety of factors prevent the Bank’s relationship with CSO’s to simply promote “doing good.” Instead, the Bank’s relationship with CSOs descends into political conflict. Carolyn Reynolds, Coordinator the Bank’s Global Civil Society Team,
acknowledged to me the contradiction between the Bank’s mission and the Bank’s
difficulty in understanding the needs of local, minority, and indigenous populations:

The bank is much more politically astute than it used to be, but its still not as
politically astute as it should be and I don’t know if it ever will be…Because of
the mandate we were given initially, because…traditionally the bank has been
staffed by economists, people from finance ministries of other countries, and
because its main orientation is with government who has its own interest in
protecting its power we have been, historically, blind to the politics affecting the
environments in which we work. We are less…we are much smarter about it
now, but we still have some real constraints in that and that has to do with the
kind of organization we are. We are an intergovernmental organization (Reynolds
interview).

Reynolds has acknowledged that while the Bank attempts to meaningfully involve civil
society, a lack of local political awareness makes this effort almost impossible. As Fisher
argues (presented in the first chapter), the diverse relationships between NGOs and states
can not be generalized (1995).

If the Bank is to make a meaningful attempt at engaging civil society, it must
develop a significant local presence in its project regions. Reynolds described Bank
attempts to move country directors from Washington into their respective countries
(interview), but within the Philippines, Manila and the Cordillera remain very different
regions. Further complicating the relationship is the lack of horizontal integration among
the various Bank divisions. Economists, Advisory Services (a legal arm which considers
the implications of local and international law), and the Civil Society Team all have
different perspectives on development projects and the engagement of civil society.

And even if the Bank does meaningfully engage some elements of civil society,
such as Transparency International and the World Council of Churches, I doubt it would
ever work with a group such as the CPA. Unless it adapts a perspective based more on
Philippine history, the Bank will not be able to understand the complex struggles over
land, indigenous identity, and the environment, which has given rise to groups like the
CPA. Considering that the Bank is a Western-dominated intergovernmental institution
that exists to draw peripheral states into global capitalist systems (this is unquestionably
its mission, whether or not this leads to development is the debatable issue), the Bank
would probably cease to exist if it were to adopt a peripheral, or even more extreme, an
indigenous perspective of development.

Given the CPA’s position as a politically marginalized NGO within a globally
marginalized state, there is little reason to think that collaboration between the Bank and
the CPA is possible. Such a partnership might be possible if the Bank were more
responsive to civil society, but the Bank’s structure limits the effects of civil society
consultation on Bank policy, as Reynolds revealed in her interview.

One could analyze the Bank’s probable unwillingness to work with an
organization such as the CPA within the framework of policy and consensus. The Bank’s
ability to work with NGOs represents the existence of the consensus model within the
policy-driven status quo. Coexistence can occur for multiple reasons, possibly because
the state views the NGO’s actions as “doing good,” and therefore non-political, or
because the NGO has been co-opted by the state. However, in the case of the CPA, both
coopetion and a perceivably non-political approach to advocacy seem unlikely.
Chapter VII: The Bank and CPA: Doing Good and the Struggle to Rise above Politics

Hilhorst has written that an NGO’s most important asset is its credibility (2003). Credibility in its ability to complete its mission, which as a non-profit and non-governmental organization must be to do good. Because of the NGO’s definitional contrast with the state, one of the most powerful critiques of an NGO is to accuse it of involvement in politics, to in effect accuse it of forsaking the economic and political privileges it receives from the state in exchange for its pledge to do good. I view the struggle of the NGO to portray itself as non-political as an element of the state-NGO struggle: the NGO can engage in activities for the common good, but its activities can not enter the political arena, basically, they cannot in any way challenge the political authority of the state.

Such an understanding of the NGO’s mission to do good sheds further light on the concept of human rights. Human rights can be viewed as a field of social development that does not interfere with the mechanisms of control of the state. Conflict arises when the state believes the NGO has deviated from its stated public mission to do good. In the case of the United States, state-imposed consequences might include loss of tax-exempt status as a private charity or financial penalties imposed by local or federal authorities. In a highly militarized, dysfunctional state such as the Philippines, consequences for upsetting the state-NGO balance are much more extreme. The following section documents this conflict—of the supposed missions of the CPA as an
NGO that works for the common good because of its indigenous heritage, and the Bank as an institution that utilizes Western economic skills to promote the common good.

The CPA and the Bank conflict in two ways: since CPA’s founding, it has worked to oppose two major World Bank funded infrastructure projects: the Chico River Dam project and the San Roque Dam. This conflict has involved physical violence on both sides, such as violent attempts by area residents to stop dam construction, and militarization of the area by the Philippine government, which can be viewed as a Bank agent. The other major arena of conflict is discursive. The CPA identifies most government incursions into the Cordillera as neo-liberal, Bank inspired projects (neo-liberal is a pejorative term, like imperialist). In describing the Chico River Dam project, the CPA identifies an amalgamated, corporate-government-Bank opponent. Recounting its activities in the 1980s: “This was during the Marcos dictatorship period, when the government and its corporate partners pursued destructive projects in the Cordillera region, coupled with worsening militarization and political repression” (CPA 2007 C). For its part, the Bank blames opposition to its development projects as the work of “radical advocacy groups” (Reynolds Interview, this term also appears in Bank publications). In the Philippine context, “radical advocacy group” could refer to the National Democratic Front and other communist groups that CPA critics accuse it of colluding with. The Bank and CPA use each other as a catch-all, ideological enemy.

The Bank divides its civil society opponents into two distinct groups: constructive critics who are open to dialogue, and non-productive adversaries, the “radical advocacy groups” mentioned above. The Bank states that while its more constructive critics engage in dialogue to improve Bank policy, its non-productive adversaries violently
protest Bank actions without even fully understanding the Bank’s mission or ongoing projects (World Bank 2005). Certainly, there are NGOs that fit perfectly into each of the categories, such as Transparency International and the Global Justice Movement, respectively (Transparency International works with governments to reduce corruption, while the Global Justice Movement is a lose association of anarchist-inspired, anti-globalization activists). But the CPA does not fit exclusively into either of these categories.

Adding to the perception of the CPA as a “radical advocacy group,” the CPA participates regularly in anti-globalization protests, and CPA representatives have traveled internationally to protest at WTO and Bank meetings. The CPA does not oppose specific WTO policies; rather, it protests the WTO policies and its mission in general (CPA 2005). These protests include acts of civil disobedience, such as the “die-in” at the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005. Quoting a CPA protester in Hong Kong, the CPA website states: “Both the WTO and the GMA [Gloria Macapagal Arroyo] should both be junked” (CPA 2005). The CPA does not oppose specific WTO policies, it believes the WTO’s actions inherently conflict with the interests of CPA stakeholders. The Bank is highly critical of protests against all international finance organizations, suggesting that protesters are motivated by publicity rather than social change (World Bank 2005).

A second step towards classification as a “radical advocacy group,” in the eyes of the Bank, is its propensity to criticize international finance institutions and the government of the Philippines as if they are equally culpable for the negative effects of development projects. While the Bank would like to be seen as solely a technical
consultant and lender (explained above in the World Bank section), the CPA considers the Philippine government to be an agent of the Bank, implying that the Bank plays a more active role than the central government in determining government policy in the Cordillera. The CPA websites quotes a CPA supporter as saying that the Philippine governments subservience to the WTO makes the government even more unpopular in the Cordillera region (cite B). A second CPA report discusses the ongoing political killings of leftist activists in the Philippines, presumably by the rogue elements of the AFP. The report links the killing of one indigenous activist with the ADB through describing the victims role in protesting the construction of the Laiban Dam, an ADB-funded project. Quoting the victim’s son, the report states:

‘They killed my father, they said he was an NPA but he was a leader of those opposing Laiban Dam. He was killed by the military under Task Force Panther…Today my brothers and I will continue to fight for our land that our father began [sic].’ The Laiban Dam is a project of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Other cases of killings of indigenous leaders who were protesting and leading actions of opposition against development projects, mining and forestry projects were reported. (CPA 2007 B)

No direct linkage exists between the ADB and the AFP. They have drastically different goals and stakeholders. Yet in the report the CPA effectively portrays the killers as agents of the ADB. The report continues by citing residents of the Cordillera who have been negatively affected by Bank infrastructure projects. The report blames the ADB,
the Arroyo government, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This position would draw ire from the Bank, which describes itself as uninvolved in national politics. Also, a large distance separates rogue AFP officers and Bank officials in Washington. But the Cordillera region would not be as highly militarized if it were not for World Bank and ADB projects.

From the perspective of the rural farmers affected by damming and other infrastructure projects, a linkage between the Bank and AFP might appear undeniable. Aside from the presence of an occasional military unit, almost no government presence is detectable in many of the indigenous, rural, and mountainous areas of the Philippines. Many Cordillera communities are accessible only by foot. But with the initiation of large-scale infrastructure projects, the area became more militarized because of the threat of sabotage by separatist groups (the NPA in the Cordillera, and Islamic groups in the southern Philippines as well). The sudden appearance of both the heavy-handed AFP and colossal Bank-funded projects, in contrast to the previous complete absence of even the most basic government services, suggests a close relationship between the two. From this perspective, it would not be illogical to blame the Bank for increasing AFP violence.

The CPA has also referred on its website to violent resistance against development projects, which it describes as a “vital ingredient in the people’s struggle” in its report on damming projects in the Cordillera. The report, titled “A History of Resistance: The Cordillera Mass Movement Against the Chico Dam and Cellophil Resources Corporation,” frames the violent resistance to the Bank-funded Chico Dam Project as a triumph of indigenous culture over outside interference. Discussing the armed resistance: “This was but a logical step for these warrior societies in the escalation
of the struggle for the defense of ancestral land and their self-determination to continue their existence as indigenous communities” (CPA 2007 D). The anti-dam campaign succeeded in preventing the Bank from proceeding with the project.

Each organization uses a variety of tactics to attack the legitimacy narrative—the “doing good” narrative—of the other organization while supporting its own credibility. The Philippine state radicalizes the CPA by suggesting the CPA illicitly works with violent communist insurgent groups. The Bank also attacks NGO critics and popular protests at its meetings alleging ties with anarchist or uninformed student organizations. In response, the CPA questions the Bank’s self-appointed role as a global development expert, and has questioned the Bank’s motives, suggesting that big business and American foreign policy control the Bank’s actions more than a genuine desire for development. In each criticism, the CPA and Bank accuse the other of deviating from their missions to do good. The accusations are based on supposed deviations from the NGOs social obligation of public service.

In many ways the CPA overtly engages in political activities. The question is whether the wider public assumes this to be a deviation from its general mission as an NGO to “do good.” In the contemporary context, its staunch opposition to the Arroyo government and close association with leftist political parties has drawn critics’ attention. However, the CPA does not cast this opposition as politically motivated; rather, they point to the regime’s corruption scandals and human rights abuses as non-political reasons for this opposition.

16 While the Bank is not an NGO, both Freestone and Reynolds asserted in interviews that the Bank is obligated, as a publicly-funded institution, to work for the public good.
The CPA also cites indigenous heritage as another “non-political” reason for its opposition to government and Bank projects. CPA publications include land rights, traditional lifestyles, respect for the environment, and cultural preservation as crucial factors in their opposition to ADB and Bank infrastructure projects (CPA 2007 D). Using the language of indigenousness allows the CPA to advocate for positions that the Philippine public and international sympathizers might otherwise consider too radical, because it allows the CPA to remove itself from the left vs. right spectrum of political conflict. But the invocation of human rights language centered around indigenous heritage allows for the CPA to counter pro-development arguments by discussing the “right” to self-determination.

The Bank also claims to follow a mission to “do good,” and uses this claim to justify its development projects, even, in some countries, in the face of widespread public opposition. Such a situation appears to be a contradiction: can the Bank really “do good,” if those who are to benefit from its projects strongly oppose it? Chandler (2001) writes that Western-based human rights and development organizations attempt to discredit this concern by blaming opposition on corrupt and politicized Third World elites. Chandler writes “The citizens of non-Western states were seen as easily manipulated by their corrupt and inefficient elites and ill-versed in the skills of political decision making and economic exchange” (Chandler 2001). Indeed, the capitalist system views the market as an inherently efficient mechanism, so from the Bank’s perspective, local interference with market function presents the only explanation for failure of neo-liberal Bank policy.
The Bank’s self-affirming view of its policy, and its dominant location within this system effectively make Bank policy non-negotiable. Bourdieu supports such a claim, describing neo-liberalism as a “strong discourse” because “it has behind it all the powers of a world of power relations which helps make it as it is” (Quoted in Silvey 2005). In her interview, Reynolds confirmed this position by describing the Bank’s prior-informed consultation policy as only a formality (interview).

The irreconcilability of Bank policy with the CPA’s consensus-based advocacy has significantly contributed to violence in the Cordillera: the American and Philippine governments see the Bank as a successful economic institution that will develop the Cordillera. The regional history of violence, the CPA’s alliance with opposition political parties, and the national government’s membership in American-inspired neo-liberal institutions all exasperate this conflict.

The CPA as a Constructive Development Partner

As I have described, the CPA is highly antagonistic toward the Bank and other international finance institutions, denouncing them for their greed and the harm they have caused to the Cordillera region. But at the same time, it also attempts to meaningfully engage these same organizations through “more constructive” means. Returning to Fisher (1995), one must remember that NGO-state relationships constantly evolve, and can not be captured within one paradigm of violence or cooperation. The CPA lobbies international finance organizations though informational campaigns, and draws upon an
international network of NGO supporters to add credibility to its efforts. Often, these coalitions enlist technical advisors and NGOs with expertise in major infrastructure projects to help lobby the Bank. For example, The CPA joined 34 NGOs from 18 countries in lobbying the Asian Development Bank to modify its policy on Large Water Resources Projects. This coalition included Western-based NGOs that the Bank views as “constructive development partners,” including Oxfam (CPA 2004). The diversity of advocacy techniques, from protest at Bank meetings, to networking with more economically and politically powerful Western-based NGOs, and lobbying using technical experts demonstrates the difficulty of classifying the CPA within the Bank’s framework of NGO advocacy as either “constructive” or “counterproductive.”

An additional point related to the debate over productive and non-productive advocacy is that “non-productive” advocacy (in the eyes of the Bank), such as street protest, can have latent benefits. In discussing the large, and sometimes violent resistance to the Chico Dams project, the CPA points out that successful protest can have positive effects on the involved communities. The CPA report describes the “greater unity among the various ethnolinguistic groups, and tribes in the region” (E). The report continues to describe a series of peace pacts (Kalinga vochong) that resulted from the unified campaign against the Chico Dams project. The CPA describes the process as a triumph of indigenous methods over foreign interference.

The Marcos dictatorship, with its World Bank funding for the project, was caught flat-footed. They did not reckon with the strong communal ethos still existing between the Bontok and Kalinga, which allowed them to forge agreements among
the *binodgan* – peace pact – practicing communities along the Chico river in opposition to the project. Nor did they expect the people to muster widespread national and international support. Because of the sheer determination and courage of the dam-affected peoples to stop the project by all means, the World Bank decided to withdraw its funding for the dam project. In fact, it was the experience of the World Bank on the Chico Dam that it formulated its operational guidelines of projects affecting indigenous peoples (E).

The CPA suggests that the Bank formulated its indigenous peoples policy because of extensive protest in the Cordillera, which is an important, productive step toward increasing understanding between the Bank and advocacy organizations such as the CPA. It demonstrates the positive and long-lasting results of protest rather than engagement.

The coexistence of the policy and consensus models has multiple facets. At times they support one another to create more effective development and human rights frameworks, or they can function concurrently in different spheres. In the case of CPA and Bank development and rights practice in the Cordillera, policy and consensus conflict violently. The concluding chapter will discuss the role of anthropology in lessening this conflict and promoting more effective rights and development practices in the Cordillera.
Chapter VIII: Discussion

At the beginning of this thesis, I presented two perspectives from which to view human rights advocacy and development: policy and consensus. I also analyzed the relationship between states and NGOs active in these fields, and addressed their motives for pursuing human rights and development work. One important recognition that emerges from this discussion is that these issues—policy, consensus, the state, and the NGO—are contested terms. They constantly evolve, rising and falling in contrast to one another. Globally, they are enacted in diverse ways—there is no typical NGO-state relationship or development process.

In the first two chapters I constructed the framework necessary to approach the relationship between the NGO, state, and multilateral organization from an anthropological perspective. The following chapters covering the Cordillera People’s Alliance and World Bank have placed this discussion in the Philippine context. They have demonstrated how the state-NGO relationship in the Philippines is marred by a long history of imperialism, political violence and authoritarian governments. The multifaceted relationship between the United States and the Philippines further complicates the curious relationship between the Philippine state, the CPA, and the Bank. Political conditions unique to the Philippines, such as the entry of the Bank into the Cordillera region under the Marcos regime, his legacy, and ongoing insurgencies, have raised the stakes in this ongoing struggle.

But similar conflicts occur around the globe. The political ties between the Philippines and the United States, the Marcos regime, and the long history of colonialism
in the Philippines have complicated the relationships between the Bank, the United States, the Philippines, and the CPA, but development bank projects disproportionately affect indigenous and marginalized peoples, often detrimentally. This neglect is a product of the Bank’s focus, an institution that often forgets that economics should serve only as a means to benefit actual people. The Bank institutionally marginalizes its Civil Society Team, and contributes to the typically oppressive relationship between the world’s states and indigenous peoples.

This chapter analyzes the role of anthropology within development and human rights. Understanding what anthropology can offer within the Cordillera context and to the Bank, CPA, and government of the Philippines will help indicate how to de-escalate the ongoing violent and discursive conflict. I will also consider what steps anthropology must take within human rights and development debates. Through analysis of how institutions such as the state and the NGO influence the construction of identity within the Cordillera, anthropology could be used to create a more effective model of development and human rights.

The Role of Anthropology

Anthropology can play an important role in deciphering the complex relationships present in the Bank-CPA conflict, as well as helping elucidate the issues at stake in other collisions between “local” advocacy groups and global financial institutions. The convoluted histories of the Cordillera and the Bank can only be contextualized from an
anthropological perspective. The Bank uses economics to approach problems of
development, and the state focuses more on political relationships, but for Cordillera
residents, questions of identity underlie any political or economic concerns.

Wider global conflicts overshadow the specifics of the Bank-CPA relationship.
The Bank and CPA interact within global systems dominated by unclear yet powerful
interactions between the state, multilateral organization, and the NGO. The
contradictions within this relationship have grown as globalization redefines state
boundaries and, in conjunction, the non-governmental sector. The overlapping human
rights and developmental systems of policy and consensus also background the Bank-
CPA relationship. The Bank functions largely within the realm of policy; policy being
top-down regulations enforced through legalistic means by hegemonic institutions. Its
member states, other development banks, and the UN are all policy-driven. In contrast,
the CPA works to exert its influence through the consensus process. It draws upon a
constituency of over 120 peoples organizations, and a network of international partners to
do so. Graeber (2004) argues that policy and consensus systems can coexist, and the
current cooperation between the CPA and the policy-driven State Department
demonstrate this partnership.

Clearly, however, the global mechanisms for protecting human rights and
fostering sustainable development do not function perfectly. As I have mentioned earlier,
no inherent conflict exists between the stated missions of Bank and CPA—development
and indigenous rights could even promote one another—yet this conflict has led to
widespread human rights abuses in the Cordillera. Graeber discusses the duality of the
state, and might blame its contradictory nature, its idealistic goals and social control
functions, for Bank-CPA conflict. Yet Fisher (1995) has argued that one can not generalize NGO-state relations; in the United States, for example, NGO-state conflict does not produce widespread human rights abuses.

Anthropologists define their advocacy in terms of speaking out, offering guidance and knowledge. Etymologically, such an application of the term advocacy is correct, but if the purpose of advocacy is to produce change, anthropologists’ actions fall far short. Graeber’s call for anthropological advocacy follows this dominant pattern. He writes that anthropologists must “Look at those who are creating viable alternatives… and then offer those ideas back… as gifts” (2004). But Graeber’s commentary is not a call for change because anthropologists already occupy this role: my perusal of the *Annual Review of Anthropology* and other prominent anthropological publications revealed several articles on the need for anthropologists to speak out on a variety of issues.

The problem with this form of advocacy is that it positions anthropologists as commentators, and not as actors. The actors are the subjects that anthropologists constantly study and “speak” down to. If horizontal networks are an effective tool for promoting human rights, and a growing number of social scientists support this view (Keck and Sikkink 1998), than the current position of the anthropology establishment amounts to a preference to discuss the status quo rather than change it. Anthropologists must involve themselves in activist networks, just like all other members of society.

Involvement includes engaging development banks and governments, not only indigenous groups and NGOs. Wright (1988) discusses the movement within anthropology to provide a voice for, indigenous “fourth world” groups, and the anthropological support of indigenous advocacy campaigns. She traces this movement
within the discipline as a reaction to anthropology’s historic role of facilitating colonial expansion. A significant role exists for anthropologists in working with local NGOs and indigenous populations, but anthropologists must engage all actors within the development and rights fields. Working with and helping provide a voice for the subaltern is important, but creating more equitable indigenous peoples policies on the state and global levels might have a greater effects.

The World Bank is a leading contemporary institution of Western expansion. Some anthropologists do participate in the Bank’s work, but anthropology has not fully engaged the Bank or other multilateral financial institutions. Hazards exist in doing so, such as the cooption of anthropology as an independent discipline, a loss of academic credibility, and a loss of the bottom-up perspective unique to anthropology. Yet engaging only the subaltern, or in the context of this thesis only the CPA, a much more amicable and needy partner, carries a major hazard as well—marginalization of the discipline. Anthropologists will not stop destructive development and rights violations by partnering only with the weaker of the two conflicting parties.

To facilitate effective communication and lessen conflict between the two, anthropology must engage both sides of the conflict. As contradictory as it might sound, anthropology must involve itself in reconstructing (or deconstructing) Bank and government policies. Anthropology must work with the Bank to adapt local perspectives to development and rights issues, as well as work with the CPA to create effective methods of global engagement, so that they do not fulfill the Bank’s image of the Fourth World as needy and helpless recipients of development. Rather than protesting the Bank’s existence, anthropologists could do a greater public service through conveying
that Bank support is often unwanted—and perhaps counterproductive—in many regions of the world.

Anthropologists, as members of the Western elite, occupy a position that allows them to influence the policy of global institutions much more significantly than the position of groups such as the CPA. To present an anecdotical example, I easily arranged meetings with multiple State Department and high-level Bank officials as a part of this research process. Fourth World advocacy organizations do not have access to the personal and academic networks that facilitated these interviews. Anthropologists can use these networks, their greater political and economic capital, and smaller personal risks (in contrast to speaking out in violent areas such as the Cordillera), to engage, rather than simply oppose, organizations such as the Bank. As I mentioned in the second chapter, Merry (2006) addresses the role of anthropology in transnational human rights networks. She notes that often these networks carry Western ideas of human rights to the indigenous context, and that anthropologists also help express the views of indigenous groups on the global level. Given the ongoing conflict within the Cordillera, anthropologists must play an important role in facilitating communication between the Bank and CPA.

Engagement offers a variety of opportunities for anthropologists; there is no uniform position that anthropologists can assume. Advocacy networks function because of the diversity of actors they convene; each actor offers unique abilities, reaches a different constituency, and carries a different level of moral credibility. Anthropology, despite its grandiose self-image, is only one node within these networks.

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17 This is my assumption, and it might not be true in all cases. But anthropology is a product of universities, bastions of the elite. In contrast, indigenous peoples are often described as residents of the Fourth World.
Of greater importance is the question of whether anthropologists are wanted or needed in conflict situations such as in the Cordillera. Ultimately, I believe anthropologists should engage such situations, but let us consider several related issues. In a way, anthropology’s belief that it will aid indigenous communities through its presence and expertise is not unlike the Bank’s insistence that its policies will lead to development. Both claims arise from self-described benevolent Western “experts” attempting to aid marginalized communities. Additionally, both claim to not impose their views upon their subjects: the Bank offers only funding and technical advice, and it consults with affected populations; likewise, anthropologists are culturally sensitive observers who aid their subjects of study. The history of both the Bank and anthropology refute these claims of benevolence. Anthropologists have accompanied and often facilitated a long history of Western colonial expansion (Wright 1988), while recipient states of Bank aid are arguably not any more developed than those that shun it.

Despite these similarities, I identify one important difference between the discipline of anthropology and the actions of the Bank: the Bank is a hierarchical institution that imposes its will through non-negotiable policy, while anthropologists typically engage their field of study through horizontal networks formed around consensus principles. The Bank provides little recourse for indigenous peoples and other stakeholders negatively affected by its policy decisions. Moreover, the Bank and its member states use violence to suppress opposition to its policy. Anthropologists, by engaging marginalized communities through consensus networks, present little or no threat. Anthropologists must meaningfully contribute to consensus-based advocacy
networks. The participation of anthropologists within these networks strengthens them, making them a more viable alternative to policy institutions.
Bibliography


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**Interviews**

