to muddle things in such a way that we shall also be left on the "outbreak of peace" with a smaller proportion of well-educated youngsters on the threshold of their working life?—Yours, &c.,

REGINALD LENNARD.


THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.

To the Editor of THE NATION.

Sir,—In your yesterday's issue, Mr. Bertrand Russell has expressed so perfectly what I had myself wished to say in support of Professor Pigou's "Plea for the Statement of the Allies' Terms" that it became unnecessary to cumber your columns with the letter I have already sent you on the subject. But there are two points which Mr. Russell has not touched upon, and for which I would therefore ask for a little of your space.

The first is that a statement of England's terms, or, more strictly, of the terms which English democracy would consider it wise and honorable to insist upon—that such a statement, made in the press and in Parliament is desirable, not only to take the wind out of the German war party's sails, but also to take the wind of unlawful hopes out of the sails of the war parties among our Allies. Judging by the Socialist and Radical papers, there is at present in France little or no liberty of democratic discussion. There is probably not much more, despite all the promised reforms, in still autocratic Russia. Hence, it is possible that in both those countries there will not exist a sufficiently organized party in favor of a moderate and in so far enduring settlement, when the moment for diplomatic pourparlers arrives; and that a dangerous preponderance may be left to the parties of aggrandisement and international coercion, which exist, alas! in a good many places besides Germany. Is it not therefore wise to make our Allies understand betimes, and have leisure inwardly to digest, that British democracy does not intend to permit any new Alsace-Lorraines, or abet any such "crushings" as Napoleon inflicted on Germany, with the result of Germany putting all her strength, enthusiasm, and organization, not only into crushing him a few years later, but also into establishing that permanent habit of military preoccupation which has placed Prussia at the head of Germany and allowed Prussia to remain a militaristic semi-despotism?

Surely, it is necessary that British democracy should prepare the mind of our Allies for what it will claim as its share in a joint victory—namely, that victory should not be soiled or jeopardized by self-righteous vindictiveness or short-sighted self-seeking. Moreover, in the case of a joint settlement, each ally will doubtless require to bring some friendly pressure to bear upon partners whose interests or whose ideals may not spontaneously coincide on every point with its own. In fact, it is necessary publicly to discuss, and then publicly to state, England's terms, in order to disarm not only the officially exploited fears of our adversary, but possibly, also, the similarly exploited hopes of one or other of our friends.

The other point concerns our party system. The war has resulted in uniting parties at home; parties which, except in the face of a common national danger, are absolutely antagonistic, not only in avowed policy, but in the spirit underlying such. One of these parties has ideals and habits of mind differing only in degree from those we are all denouncing as Prussian. They might as well, like their rhapsoedic spokesman, the late Professor Cramb, have been brought up on Trenschke. What they undoubtedly have been brought up on, and would even more undoubtedly educate the rest of us into, is belief in Imperialism, Protectionism, and Conscription, with all the police regulations which Conscription entails. Between this section of British opinion and that represented by a Liberal Cabinet a great gulf is fixed. And the cleavage between democratic and Imperialistic policies will have to show itself, as it did towards the end of the South African War, in this matter of the terms of peace. Such being the case, and considering that reluctance on this subject will only strengthen the German war party's hands, while accommodating our Allies to possibly exaggerated belief in England's submissiveness
to those Allies' demands, it may surely be expected that the statement of Britain's terms of settlement become the test question on which British democracy will judge whether it is again represented by the present Government, or whether we are still in the presence of a party coalition, such as was desirable at the beginning of the war, but might be dangerous in view to a durable peace.—Yours, &c.,

Vernon Lee.

February 14th, 1915.

THE FUTURE OF DALMATIA.

To the Editor of THE NATION.

SIR,—Referring to the article on Dalmatia and Serbian national claims, recently published in The Nation, and to the letters which have been sent to you as a comment of the same, may we be allowed, as natives of Dalmatia, to make some remarks on the subject?

We would like to ask the author of the article, who has compared Uskueb and Belgrade with our country, (1) if he ever visited Dalmatia; (2) if the ancient and modern history and civilization of that country (totally Latin and Venetian) are familiar to him; (3) if he knows anything about the violent suppression of the Italian nationalitiy, which Austria, following her dynastic policy of the Drang nach Osten, has constantly pursued there during the last fifty years (after Lissa), in favor of the Croatians, in order to become a Slav monarchy, and to exclude Russia from the Balkans, and Italy from the Adriatic.

We are sure no English Liberal, being acquainted with the appalling suffering inflicted upon the unfortunate Dalmatian Italians, whose schools had been completely suppressed from one day to the other in all the towns (excepting Zara, which, therefore, has been able to remain the most Italian of the Italian towns), and whose political and national rights have been violently trodden upon, would overlook the fact that, notwithstanding the incredible Austrian policy of the last half-century, the Italians of our country, though a minority now, have the right to existence and to be incorporated by Italy as soon as Italy will move and fight for her national interests on the side of England and the Allies.

We Italians of Dalmatia are not so blind as to deny the rights both of Serbia and Croatia to have good outlets in the Adriatic. We should feel, however, deeply grieved to those Englishmen who seem to cherish so dearly the Pan- Slav cause, if they would refrain from encouraging with such not very precise statements the Pan-Slav appetites, causing, even without intention, a mutual friction between us and the real Slavs, and between Italy and Serbia.

Italy and Serbia must be friends. Anybody suggesting that the whole of Dalmatia should fall to the lot of future Serbia would unwillingly serve the cause of Austria and her ally. Prince Bubow, in fact, is apparently offering now to Italy the Trentino—without war; just a little less of the share which the Panslavs and their friends would like to give Italy if she participates in the war.

There are a great number of Italian names in our country belonging to people who call themselves Slavs, and there are quite as many Slav names of people who are in reality Italians. The explanation of this fact is that Dalmatia is a country of two nationalities, and of two bloods. There is scarcely any cultured Dalmatian whose origin might not be traced in both races, the Italian and the Slav.

Dealing with such a mixed population, it would not be fair to consider the present majority of one of them, as stated by Austrian statistics ad unum Creatorum.—Yours, &c.,

Antonio Ciprico.

(Lecturer in Italian Literature at University College).

O. V. Barotch.

February 16th, 1915.

CATHOLICISM IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

To the Editor of THE NATION.

SIR,—Dean Hensley Henson does not matter much; but many of your readers would indeed be sorry if they thought