that road. This pamphlet, which is a further effort in support of my main contention, may help them, I hope, to travel a little faster."

One might or might not, said Counsel, consider this a desirable object, but the point he wished to make was that it was the British people whom Mr. Morel primarily wished to influence.

Mr. Carr concluded by a reference to Mr. Morel’s personal career and his prolonged and self-sacrificing work on behalf of the native races of Africa, a work which had won for him a tribute from the British Foreign Office, as well as from such diverse men as Lord Cromer, Sir A. Conan Doyle, and the distinguished Belgian, M. Emile Vandervelde.

**Further Allegations by the Prosecution.**

Sir A. Bodkin said that, as Mr. Morel had pleaded guilty, he now proposed to put forward certain facts to enable the Magistrate to determine the circumstances under which the offence was committed. He was proceeding to quote copious extracts from other documents taken from the offices of the U.D.C., including one from a lady and another making arrangements for U.D.C. meetings in industrial centres, when Mr. Carr interposed, saying this procedure was irregular and oppressive. After Sir A. Bodkin had continued a little while the Magistrate stopped him, saying he ought not to use these documents at this stage, as he had not given defending Counsel the opportunity of considering them and deciding what reply could be given. Mr. Carr said that, as to the letter about “dark devices,” it did not bear the interpretation put upon it by Sir A. Bodkin, and if this were seriously pressed there was an ample explanation, but it would take a very long time to make. As to the plans for putting forward U.D.C. propaganda in industrial centres, it was ridiculous to suggest such action was improper.

**The Judgment.**

The Magistrate said that Mr. Morel could not have done other than plead guilty to the charges in face of the correspondence. He could not accept the view of the defence that it was merely a courtesy between authors; on the contrary he was quite clear that it was an organised and deliberate attempt to pass papers and pamphlets into a neutral country. Without expressing any opinion on Mr. Morel’s motives, he must regard the infraction of a regulation as very dangerous, and he therefore inflicted a sentence of six months in the second division.

**SHALL PRUSSIA RESTORE THE TSAR?**

By Vernon Lee

"... Their [the Russian reactionaries] sole purpose will be served when the revolution is overthrown and the old régime is restored, to become the creature of Potsdam and the tyrant of its own people. It was because they foreknew this that the makers of the revolution so urgently desired peace on terms which would keep the German out and save the cause of freedom."—"Daily News," September 11, 1917.

Already early in the summer I began to be haunted by a fear on the subject of Russia’s indefinitely protracted co-operation in the war; and subsequent events and pronouncements have only increased it, the finishing touches being put to this spectre of my imagination by the recent revelations concerning the Russo-Prussian coalition projected more than twelve years ago.

This fear of mine has nothing to do with Russia’s willingness or capacity to go on fighting, nor with the immediate effects to the Entente cause of a protraction or cessation of Russia’s military activities; it is concerned with dangers lying further ahead, and less in the momentary focus of attention of Russia’s Allies, although there are sufficient indications that the dangers in question, the dangers of a counter-revolution, are ominously present to the eyes of Russians themselves.

Such indications of gradually increasing and gradually more specified fears may be found, crescendo, throughout the utterances of the Provisional Government, of the Council of Workmen and Soldiers and their respective accredited spokesmen and organs. They consisted for a long time in perpetual harangues, without further explanation, on the imperative need of an early, as distinguished from a separate, peace, and its need for the avowed sake of the Russian Revolutionary cause. My attention was first called to this curious juxtaposition of ideas by a quotation, in the<i>Daily News</i> of June 15, from the "official organ of the Council of Workmen and Soldiers." The pronouncement is as follows:

"The end of the war is the salvation of the Russian Revolution, but it is not enough to talk of the need of a speedy conclusion of peace. It is necessary to move towards it, and, moreover, not towards a separate peace. Such a peace would be the same thing as the economic enslavement of Russia. Such a peace would quickly drag Russia again into war, but this time on the side of Germany, into complete dependence on whom Russia would have fallen. Such a peace could be only the last despairing act of a revolutionary country driven into a blind alley."

Now, to avoid all discussion about the literal meaning of these words, I must begin by pointing out that the sentence, "it is not enough to talk of a speedy conclusion of peace, it is necessary to move towards it," removes all possibility of the expression end of the war being a mistranslation of aims of the war. The necessity for moving towards a speedy conclusion of peace, instead of merely talking about it, shows that end of the war is here equivalent to conclusion of peace; and that it is this end of the war, in the sense of conclusion of peace, which is being invoked as "the salvation of the Russian Revolution." This being clear, I want to point out that the second half of the quotation shows that ample justice is being done to the evil results of a separate peace, because this denunciation of a separate peace makes it all the more obvious that a speedy conclusion of peace is in itself, and provided it be not a separate conclusion, regarded by these Russian Revolutionaries as indispensable for the "Salvation of the Russian Revolution."

Mind, of the Russian Revolution; not merely of Russia, in the sense of the Russian people who may be starved, or of the Russian Government, which might otherwise be exterminated. The thing which requires
saving by a speedy (though not separate) conclusion of peace, the thing, therefore, which may be jeopardised by the indefinite protraction of the war, is neither Russia's comfort nor Russia's prestige, but something very clearly specified: “The Russian Revolution.”

Now why should that be the case? To answer that question I began asking myself already early in the summer what might be the possible results of an indefinitely protracted war on Russia’s internal constitution, and in what manner could such results lead to something else which would jeopardise the Russian Revolution? Those possible results have long since become actual results, and are no longer being hidden from us. Even two additional months of prolonged warfare have been accompanied by all manner of internal dangers. The new régime has been unable to solidify and organise within the country. The new liberty has for some time already been threatened by dissension, disorder, anarchy and paralysis. These have already come, and there has appeared on a very near horizon something worse even than these evils, and which we, Allies of the Russians, are apt to overlook in our sole preoccupation of what Russia can or cannot do for ourselves.

For anarchy and internal paralysis infallibly produce Reaction.

Consider that every great popular revolution, this Russian one perhaps even more than the old French one, inevitably surrounds itself with the hostility, with the vindictive activity, of all the thousands of people who have lost anything by it; of all the men and women whose self-interest or conservative apathy was satisfied with the preceding régime; let alone those who have lost privileges, honours, influence, livelihood; who have lost what is dearest still to many hearts, the enthronement and persecuting domination of their own beliefs and prejudices.

Every revolution implies a nation within the nation, a nation of victims—from the Grand Dukes and the Aides-de-Camp and Court ladies down to the smallest police-agent or blackmailer, right through the serried ranks of the military and the bureaucracy, who have been cashiered by the Revolution.

All those people are still there, with all their evil propensities and evil habits multiplied tenfold by the very fact of their discomfiture; and they have now nothing in the world to do except to make the most of every mistake and every failure of the new régime, to foment every dissension, every lawlessness, every sabotage, every disaster; and to work upon all the weariness, the scepticism, the probably justifiable resentment and panic of the majority of the people when subjected to anarchy and civil feuds. But they have something more to do, all these legions of people who have lost or may lose by the Revolution: they can take their measures for the restoration of law and order when law and order are sufficiently longed for; they can plot with the foreigner who is to bring back the legitimate monarch.

Now who so likely to be called upon by the Russian reactionaries—indeed, by the vast majority of the Russian people if the Revolution degenerates into chaos—and who is more ready to accept that mandate than the eternal and last surviving champion of Divine Right and of the principle of Authority, the historic friend, accomplice and candle-holder of the Russian autocrat: Prussia?

Such an eventuality would be infinitely more congenial to Prussian tradition than any mere “separate peace” or even alliance with an ultra-democratic Republic, whose mere contiguity would spell pollution and contamination to a Prussia of Militarism undenied. It would surely also much more than compensate Prussian capitalistic exploitation for any losses in Asiatic Turkey or Africa. In fact, I ask myself, whether a truly Machiavellian Prussia would not gain, rather than lose, by letting Russia prolong indefinitely her military efforts, wolder into hopeless disorder, and thus prepare the restoration of a Tsar who would be not the Ally, but the lieutenant, the docile protected Sultan, of the Holy Alliance which had brought him back, like the Bourbons, to an acquiescent, a grateful, because a Revolution-weary, Russia.

Such a coalition between Prussia and a Tsar restored by her would mean, on the other hand, not only a fresh crushing, a fresh postponement, of Russia’s long-delayed liberty and progress, but also a new era of wars, military and economic, and of preparation for war, for the rest of the globe.

Is it not the fear of some such indirect, but incalculable, calamity due to indefinite prolongation of the present struggle which dictates the perpetually recurrent and pathetic appeal of the Russian Revolutionaries to their Allies; the obvious suggestion that in return for Russia’s not falling at once out of the fight for freedom, the Western democracies shall undertake to decide upon an early settlement, which, as the Russians lose no opportunity of telling us, is necessary for “the salvation of the Russian Revolution”?

War, being unintelligent and brutal, has a queer way of jeopardising and sometimes destroying the things—the countries, people and principles—which it has set out to defend. Its most shameful irony would surely be if, carried on for the preservation of European freedom and the destruction of Prussian Militarism, it were incidentally to result in the handing back of a barely liberated Russia into the keeping of a vassal of Prussia.

Sept. 15, 1917.

SECRET DIPLOMACY

“Are we to suppose that when Russian, German, and French diplomats do these things, English diplomats have some special virtue or some mysterious charm which protects them against the like offence? The truth is far more likely that such a system as secret diplomacy is far more powerful than the individuals involved in it. What is the system in its essence? It is absolutism, it is power to shape, without being subject to control, the relations between nation and nation. That is the character of secret diplomacy anywhere and everywhere, whether the Government is practised by be nominally an autocracy, a bureaucracy, a republic, or a constitutional monarchy. Now absolutism, freedom from control, is a corrupting force, which few, very few human beings have the moral strength to resist. . . . If this war ends, as Mr. Balfour desires, with secret diplomacy entrenched and perpetuated, no matter which group of Powers will have won, democracy will surely have been defeated.”—Manchester Guardian, Sept. 17.