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A Lecture Series on An Analytic Interpretation
of Husserl's Phenomenology

by

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ABSTRACT

The nature of this project has changed a good deal since it began. Since the changes in its form are largely reflections of the problem dealt with, it should be of some value to recount them here. In the beginning, the project was to be a comparison between phenomenology and existentialism, and contemporary analytic philosophy. The purpose of the comparison was to find common views between the two schools which have been thought to be conceptually opposite. The school of phenomenology and existentialism was then narrowed down to phenomenology, which is the philosophic theory used by the more literary existentialists. Research, then, was centered on Husserl, who is the most important and influential phenomenologist. Other phenomenologists were dealt with insofar as they were important for the project. Work in contemporary analytic philosophy is based on the works of Wittgenstein, Anscombe and Geach, or the area of English philosophy concerned with conceptual analysis. Conceptual analysis is used as a methodology in the project, as well as the main point of comparison to analytic philosophy.

A major part of this project was given as lectures on phenomenology to the contemporary philosophy class. The first part of the project is the flesh of the bone of a lecture given on Husserl's early work, with reference to Merleau-Ponty's ideas. It is an attempt to analyze Husserl's early statement of phenomenology so that it can be interpreted within the framework of analytic philosophy. In the project, as in the lectures, it was intended as a preliminary justification (in the sense
OF THERE BEING GROUNDS FOR) OF SUCH AN INTERPRETATION. PART TWO OF THE PROJECT IS LECTURES ON THE CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS, WHICH WERE BOTH EXPLICATIVE OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND AN EFFORT TO CONTINUE AN INTERPRETATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE TERMS OF ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY. THERE ARE THREE THINGS WHICH SHOULD BE NOTED ABOUT THIS SECOND SECTION. THE FOURTH LECTURE ON THE FIFTH MEDITATION SUGGESTS TWO VERY EXTRAVAGANT CLAIMS PRIMARILY TO INVITE DISAGREEMENT WITH THE LECTURE; THE CLAIMS ARE NOT THOSE THAT THE AUTHOR WISHES TO MAKE IN REGARD TO THE PROJECT. THE SECOND NOTE, WHICH SHOULD MAKE THIS FIRST POINT CLEAR, IS THAT THE SECTIONS LABELED "COMMENTARY ON LECTURE ---" ARE THE FINAL VIEW OF THE THESIS OF THE PROJECT, WHICH IS A DENIAL OF THE TWO CLAIMS IN LECTURE FOUR. THIRDLY, THE TWO PAGES PRECEDING PART TWO ON THE PARIS LECTURES ARE AN OVERALL VIEW OF THE COMMENTARIES, AS ARE THE PARIS LECTURES AN OVERALL VIEW OF THE MEDITATIONS.

THE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF THE PROJECT IS IN THE ORDER OF THE LECTURES, BUT THE COMMENTARIES WERE WRITTEN LAST. TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE FIRST LECTURE ONLY GOES SO FAR AS PRELIMINARY PARALLELS, IT HAS BECOME A PART OF THE THESIS OF THE PROJECT. WHAT WAS ATTEMPTED IN THIS LECTURE WAS BASED LARGELY ON THE FACT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A CRITICISM OF HUSSERL'S IDEAS; IT WOULD MERELY BE AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE THEM WORK IN TERMS OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, AND THUS SHOW THAT THE TWO SCHOOLS ARE NOT SO FAR APART AS IS THOUGHT. BY THE TIME I WROTE THE COMMENTARIES, IT WAS EVIDENT TO ME THAT SUCH AN UNCRITICAL APPROACH WAS EXACTLY WHAT MADE SUCH ANALOGIES POSSIBLE. AUTO-
matically, I put *Husserl*’s concepts into terms of common language. It is indeed possible to do this, as the first lecture shows. But while we can make *Husserl* look like a common language philosopher (which might, indeed, be a surprise) we cannot make him into one. This is why the analogies remain superficial, and this is why I must end up being critical of *Husserl*’s system when I look at what happens as I try to extend these analogies in the commentaries.

I did not know how this project would turn out when I began. It now might be summed up to indicate this: while similarities might be cited between *Husserl*’s phenomenology and conceptual analysis, I do not think that they can be made to be meaningful. This is the sort of criticism I would have against such articles as the one by Paul Ricoeur, cited in the text. As such, the thesis of the project has become a kind of incompleteness theorem.
Key to Abbreviations:

CM  Cartesian Meditations
PI  Philosophical Investigations
PL  Paris Lectures
IP  The Idea of Phenomenology
PR  "The Philosophical Review"

1.0,  The number before the period
2.0,  stands for the number of the
3.0,  meditation in the Cartesian
4.0,  Meditations.
5.0.
PART ONE
I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST, USING THE FIVE LECTURES IN HUSSERL'S THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE PREFACE TO MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION, THAT THERE IS SOMETHING VERY INTERESTING FOR CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, IN HUSSERL'S CHOICE AND TREATMENT OF PROBLEMS, THAT IS HIDDEN BY HIS LANGUAGE. HUSSERL WRITES OF THE MENTAL ACTIVITIES OF PSYCHOLOGY AND DISMISSES THEM AS A BASIS FOR KNOWLEDGE, HE WRITES OF THE MENTAL ACTIVITIES SEEN FROM A SOLIPSISTIC VIEWPOINT AND DISMISSES THEM AS A BASIS FOR KNOWLEDGE AS TOO SUBJECTIVE, AND THEN HE WRITES OF THE MENTAL PROCESSES INVOLVED WITH A PARTICULAR KIND OF PERCEPTION AND CLAIMS THAT THEY ARE A BEGINNING FOR KNOWLEDGE WHICH IS NEITHER PSYCHOLOGICAL NOR FALSELY OBJECTIVE AS IS NATURAL SCIENCE. IN "THE TRAIN OF THOUGHTS OF THE LECTURES HUSSERL SAYS:

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENON IN PSYCHOLOGICAL APPERCEPTION AND OBJECTIFICATION IS NOT A TRULY ABSOLUTE DATUM. THE MENTALLY ACTIVE EGO, THE OBJECT, MAN IN TIME, THE THING AMONG THINGS, ETC., ARE NOT ABSOLUTE DATA; HENCE MAN'S MENTAL ACTIVITY AS HIS ACTIVITY IS NO ABSOLUTE DATUM EITHER. (IP P. 5)

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUSSERL'S THOUGHT FALLS ALONG THE LINES OF THE DESCARTIAN CRITIQUE OF REASON AND THUS COMES TO THE QUESTION, "HOW CAN THE PURE PHENOMENON OF COGNITION REACH SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT IMMANENT TO IT?" (IP P.5) THE ORDER OF HUSSERL'S QUESTIONING IS NOT CONFUSING. THE PHRASEOLOGY OF HIS ANSWERS, HOWEVER, RETAINS A KIND OF MENTALISTIC LANGUAGE WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN A KEEPSAKE OF THE EARLY NINETEEN HUNDREDS, BUT WHICH REPELS SOME CURRENT PHILOSOPHERS OF MIND. HE PROPOSES THAT THE OBJECT IS REACHED BY A DIRECT "SEEING", WHICH RELATES TO SPECIAL MENTAL PROCESSES OF CONSCIOUSNESS SUCH AS BEING AWARE OF AND PERCEIVING. HE SAYS THAT THE OBJECT IS DIRECTLY GIVEN SIMPLY BY THE FACT
OF CONSCIOUS AWARENESS OF IT, WHICH HE BREAKS DOWN INTO "MENTAL PROCESSES": "ON THE CONTRARY, THIS 'SIMPLY BEING THERE' CONSISTS OF CERTAIN MENTAL PROCESSES OF SPECIFIC AND CHANGING STRUCTURE, SUCH AS PERCEPTION, IMAGINATION, MEMORY, PREDICATION, ET C., AND IN THEM THE THINGS ARE NOT CONTAINED AS IN A HOLE OR VESSEL." (IP. P. 9) SUCH TALK AS THIS SEEMS TO ASSUME THE EXISTENCE OF MENTAL PROCESSES AND THE NECESSITY OF THEIR EXISTENCE AS A BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE. BUT IN ASSUMING THAT THIS AND ONLY THIS IS HUSSERL'S VIEW, IT IS OVERLOOKED THAT HE NOT ONLY QUESTIONS THE EXISTENCE OF MENTAL ACTS AS WELL AS WHAT EXISTENCE MEANS HERE, BUT THAT BOTH THE PROBLEMS AND THE ALTERNATIVES THAT HUSSERL SEES GENERATED BY SUCH A CRITIQUE OF MENTAL ACTS IS STRIKINGLY PERCEPTIVE OF PRESENT PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. WHAT I HOPE TO SHOW BY REVIEWING THE READINGS MENTIONED THEN, IS WHERE THESE RESEMBLANCES SEEM TO ME TO OCCUR, AND THAT THERE IS A GOOD BASIS TO INVESTIGATE WHAT HUSSERL MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO SUCH PHILOSOPHER'S PROBLEMS, BE THEY MENTAL OR OTHER.

THERE ARE TWO PLACES IN MERLEAU-PONTY'S PREFACE WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST AS POSSIBILITIES OF SIMILARITY BETWEEN WITTGENSTEIN AND HUSSERL. THE POINT TO BE MADE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE IS THAT THE PHENOMENOLOGIST (HERE, MERLEAU-PONTY AND HUSSERL) AS WELL AS WITTGENSTEIN CAN BE INTERPRETED WITHOUT SEPARATING THE PHENOMENON OF SEEING INTO A MENTAL ACT AND A PHYSICAL ACT. ON PAGE XI MERLEAU-PONTY SAYS:

"THUS MY SENSATION OF REDNESS IS PERCEIVED AS THE MANIFESTATION OF A CERTAIN REDNESS EXPERIENCED, THIS IN TURN AS THE MANIFESTATION OF A PIECE OF RED CARDBOARD, AND THIS FINALLY IS THE MANIFESTATION OR OUTLINE OF A RED THING, NAMELY THIS BOOK."

IN TALKING ABOUT SUCH A BREAKDOWN OF PERCEPTION AS THE LEVELS
OF CONSCIOUSNESS, PHENOMENOLOGISTS HAVE BEEN THOUGHT TO MEAN THAT EACH LEVEL HAS A CORRESPONDING DEGREE OF MENTAL EXISTENCE. THIS IS TRUE WHEN HUSSERL IS TALKING ABOUT IMAGINARY OBJECTS SUCH AS DANCING BOTTLES AS OPPOSED TO NON-IMAGINARY OBJECTS SUCH AS THE *PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS*. MERLEAU-PONTY'S DESCRIPTION HOWEVER DOES NOT TALK ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF A MENTAL IMAGE OF RED SO THAT RED CAN BE PERCEIVED. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL EMPHASIS IS ON THE PERCEPTION OF AN OBJECT AS A WHOLE AND WHAT PHASES, AS HUSSERL SAYS, THAT PERCEPTION MIGHT BE BROKEN DOWN INTO IF WE WERE TO ANALYZE SOME SORT OF GRADATION IN THE PERCEPTION. THE POINT IS THAT ONE PERCEIVES THE OBJECT AS A RED BOOK, NOT AS A NUMBER OF SMALLER PERCEPTIONS, WHICH TAKEN TOGETHER, AMOUNT TO A RED BOOK.

Nowhere in this account, need we see the red book as having a mental existence. There are not two matching sets of a conscious image and the thing which one is conscious of. If the sensation is 'perceived as' the manifestation of the object, then no distinction is made between the act of perception and the perception itself. The issue of the existence of mental images is here tied to mental acts. If one were inclined to believe that a mental image of the perceived object were necessary for perceiving it, one would want to say that the act of perception is different from the perception itself. MERLEAU-PONTY'S TALK OF PERCEPTION, WHICH IS ALSO REPRESENTATIVE OF HUSSERL'S HERE, DOES NOT REQUIRE US TO PRESUPPOSE MENTAL IMAGES AND ACTS FOR US TO UNDERSTAND HIM. A WOMAN IN A RED DRESS IS NOT A BLOB OF RED ON A FEMININE FORM, WHICH WE NEED A SEPARATE IMAGE OF IN ORDER TO PERCEIVE.
This, however, anticipates Husserl more than does Merleau-Ponty. In the preface, Merleau-Ponty is concerned with distinguishing Husserl’s early view of the conscious perceiver from his later work. The difference is that Husserl began with saying that perception in the first and the third person present singular tense are the same, and then he said that they were different. In his later work, what he calls the transcendental ego, of oneself, and the alter ego, of someone else, have two different consciousnesses because of being conscious of each other. There are thus two views of the red object. In neither of these perceptions, however, does it seem necessary to get involved with mental images as separate from perceptions. We have different perceptions because we are different transcendental egos, i.e., we are different people.

On pages 365 of The Blue Book, Wittgenstein makes a similar point to what we have just made, although he is discussing the meaning of the word ‘red’. He says that in obeying the order to imagine a red patch, one realizes that it is not necessary to have an image of a red patch before imagining a red patch. So far, this, we seem to have found very little difference between this point representing a view of Wittgenstein, and our point concerning Merleau-Ponty’s explication of Husserl.

I have been trying to hint that the sort of phenomenological description he uses, a sample of which Merleau-Ponty gives us, does not entail a need for mental acts in the jargon of contemporary philosophy. An example of a mental act in contemporary philosophy is that instead of simply reading a book, one reads a reprint of the book, as it were, in one’s mind. Reading is a mental act in that there is a special case of reading going on in one’s mind instead of simply between a person and a book.
IN THE SECOND CASE, THE PERSON HAS BEEN TAUGHT HOW TO READ THE
BOOK AND NOW USES THAT TECHNIQUE.

AT THE END OF THE PREFACE, MERLEAU-PONTY SAYS SOMETHING
WHICH SEEMS TO BE AN INCLINATION TO UNWIND THIS TECHNIQUE RATHER
 THAN TO SEPARATE THE TWO WORLDS OF EMPIRICAL FACT AND IDEALISTIC
THOUGHT. ON PAGE XX HE SAYS:

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL WORLD IS NOT THE BRINGING
TO EXPLICIT EXPRESSION OF A PRE-EXISTING BEING,
BUT THE LAYING DOWN OF BEING. PHILOSOPHY IS NOT
THE REFLECTION OF A PRE-EXISTING TRUTH, BUT, LIKE
ART, THE ACT OF BRINGING TRUTH INTO BEING. ONE
MAY WELL ASK HOW THIS CREATION IS POSSIBLE, AND IF
IT DOES NOT RECAPTURE IN THINGS A PRE-EXISTING
REAISON. THE ANSWER IS THAT THE ONLY PRE-EXISTING
LOGOS IS THE WORLD ITSELF, AND THAT THE PHILOSOPHY
WHICH BRINGS IT INTO VISIBLE EXISTENCE DOES NOT
BEGIN BY BEING POSSIBLE; IT IS ACTUAL OR REAL LIKE
THE WORLD OF WHICH IT IS A PART, AND NO EXPLANATORY
HYPOTHESIS IS CLEARER THAN THE ACT WHEREBY WE TAKE
UP THIS UNFINISHED WORLD IN AN EFFORT TO COMPLETE
AND CONCEIVE IT. RATIONALITY IS NOT A PROBLEM.
THERE IS BEHIND IT NO UNKNOWN QUANTITY WHICH HAS
TO BE DETERMINED BY DEDUCTION, OR, BEGINNING WITH IT,
DEMONSTRATED INDUCTIVELY.

BY UNWINDING THE TECHNIQUE I MEAN THAT MERLEAU-PONTY BEGINS
HERE WITH PHILOSOPHY AS PART OF THE WORLD INCOMPLETE. TO BE-
GIN TO COMPLETE AND CONCEIVE THE WORLD WE DEVELOP A PHILOSOPHI-
CAL GRAMMAR, IN THE CASE OF WITTGENSTEIN, OR A PHENOMENOLOGY,
IN THE CASE OF MERLEAU-PONTY AND HUSSELR. IN NEITHER PHENOME-N-
OLOGY NOR WITTGENSTEIN'S THOUGHT CAN THE WORLD BE COMPLETE IN
CONCEPTION. FOR THE PHENOMENOLOGIST THE WORLD IS A ROUGH, DE-
LIMITED AREA; IT DOES NOT ENCOMPASS MORE THAN THAT PARTICULAR
PHENOMENOLOGIST ENCOMPASSES, NOR IS IT CLEARER THAN THE WORLD
OF WHICH HE IS A PART, OF WHICH PHENOMENOLOGY IS A PART. FROM
HUSSERL'S WORK, ONE GETS TWO OPPOSITE IMPRESSIONS: THAT WHICH
IS MOST COMMONLY EMPHASIZED IS THE ATTEMPT TO PRESENT ANY OBJECT
IN TERMS THAT ARE LOGICALLY AND SCIENTIFICALLY ANALYZABLE. PAUL
Ricoeur compares this with Wittgenstein's postulates in the Tractatus in "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language", an article in Phenomenology and Existentialism edited by Lee and Mandelbaum. What is sometimes misunderstood or forgotten in talk about Husserl's "rigorous science" is that it results from a rejection of natural science and the dependence on physical fact.

The second impression of Husserl, which I will emphasize, is that of a roughly hewn world in which any object, for example a rug, is somehow coarse when considered as a fact of reality, existence, the world or whatever. We see each object as a number of differing collections of perceptions (in the general sense of the word) of that object. If we analyze the most pervasive general collection of what we see a particular object as, we will have the phenomenological essence of that object. This sorting and analysis is what Husserl speaks of as a rigorous science. He calls the general collection the essential nature of the object and the number of interpretations of what we see the object as, the phenomenological data or the intentional constitution of the object in consciousness.

This later description of Husserl's terminology is an attempt to present Husserl without depending on mental expressions. I would like to indicate where we might get misled into thinking of Husserl in mentalistic terms. Husserl says that when we talk about "perception" of something, and believe the perceived object to be given before our eyes, if we talk about this perception as a subjective mental process then the existence of the object perceived is doubtful as well as the existence of the mental act of perception. Husserl asks, "How do I, the
Cognizing subject, knowing that I can ever really know, that there exist not only my own mental processes, these acts of cognizing, but also that which they apprehend? (IP p. 16) In answer, Husserl does not want to resort to solipsism or Hume's position. Nor does he want to swing in the "playground of these unclear and inconsistent theories" known as the theory of knowledge and the theory of metaphysics. Rather, he proposes a phenomenology of cognition, which he says is a science guided by philosophical attitudes and methods as opposed to naturalistic science. It is the nature of the problem that a critique of cognition must be phenomenology and not natural science. He gives this conclusion earlier:

If then we disregard any metaphysical purpose of the critique of cognition and confine ourselves purely to the task of clarifying the essence of cognition and of being an object of cognition, then this will be phenomenology of cognition and of being an object of cognition and will be the first and principal part of phenomenology as a whole. (IP p. 18)

The whole of this first lecture, then, as the problem of the possibility of cognition, is the question of the separate existence of each, and the connection of, thought and that which is thought of. Husserl's position is that there is no such thing as thought, there is only thought of something. He arrives at this in a Cartesian manner, by the observation that it is impossible for anyone to be conscious and not be conscious of something. At least if anyone claimed to be conscious and could not be shown to be conscious of something, in a human situation, we would not be inclined to say that he was conscious.

In Mental Acts, Peter Geach talks about popular misunderstandings concerning Wittgenstein's view of the
existence of mental acts. Using Frege's distinction between sense and reference, Geach shows that doubt about Wittgenstein's view of the existence of mental acts is misdirected. There is no question that people can have private thoughts or feelings which they do not express to others. The point is that when someone refers to his private feelings in speech, his talk cannot make sense to someone else, because the second person cannot have the same feeling and therefore cannot know what the first person is talking about.

This then is a rough rehearsal of the way contemporary philosophy treats the problem of the existence of mental acts. Frege makes the distinction between sense and reference. Wittgenstein assumes the distinction in the use of his examples when he discusses the problems the question of mental acts generates. Geach clears up Wittgenstein's view by referring to Frege's distinction. Thus when Husserl asks "How do I, the cognizing subject, know if I can ever really know, that there exist not only my own mental processes, these acts of cognizing, but also that which they apprehend?" we see that he is asking the contemporary question, but that his wording is now considered a philosophical mistake. It is mentalistic, as it were, because he questions the existence of the mental act and not the sense of a reference to private feelings or thoughts. In this brief analysis of Husserl's lecture then, we have given some provision for the preliminary claim that Husserl is dealing with some of the important questions of current philosophy, and that his language is misleadingly mentalistic from that viewpoint. That Husserl says things of interest in spite of his mentalistic language about these
PROBLEMS IS THE FURTHER CLAIM THAT WE NEED TO ESTABLISH SOME 
ground for. I AM GOING TO TRY TO DO THIS BY DISCUSSING 
Husserl's notion of "seeing" in the last four lectures. It 
is of first importance, then, to go through the lectures and 
become as clear as possible about Husserl's use of "seeing", 
or the role that "seeing" plays in phenomenology.

I AM GOING TO STATE THOSE THINGS WHICH WE CAN LEARN FROM 
the use of "seeing" in Lecture Two, and then what is added to 
the notion from each of the following lectures. "Seeing" is 
first of all, not an isolated concept. All "seeing" is "seeing" 
of some sort of object, which can be something imaginary that 
does not exist, something thought of which is not actually 
perceived, or something actually perceived. (This will be how 
I will use the term "object" in regard to Husserl.) Regardless 
of the existential status of the object "seen", it is absolutely 
given, or it provides "immediate evidence" in the sense of being 
"seen". What is required of the object is that "it is given 
as something that is, that is here and now, and whose being 
cannot be sensibly doubted." (IP p. 24) "Being", here, does 
not obviously mean "existing", but rather, "seeing" means that 
the object can be usefully communicated about between two or 
more people, when the object is understood as intended. This 
does not mean that the object cannot have being for one person, 
but that the test of its being would be whether the object 
could be a part of a language. In Husserl's phraseology, 
"seeing" is an immediate apprehension of the intended object. 
Husserl talks about the "meaning of being" and says that the 
object can be talked about or we can "make our speech conform 
to what is 'seen'".
In the context of Husserl’s use of the word, there is only one sense in which one can doubt “seeing”, and that sense is not relevant to the way he wishes to use the term. He says,

To have a phenomenon before one’s eyes, which points to something which is not itself given in the phenomenon, and then to doubt whether such an object exists, and if so show how it is to be understood that it exists—this is meaningful. But to ‘see’ and to intend absolutely nothing more than what is grasped in ‘seeing’, and then still to question and doubt, that is nonsense. (IP p.39)

What Husserl is saying about the concept of “seeing” here, harks back to the quote used at the end of Merleau-Ponty’s Preface, where he says that rationality is not a problem behind which one has to seek an unknown quantity by deduction or induction. As Husserl says in the second lecture, “‘seeing’ does not lend itself to demonstration or deduction. It is patiently absurd to try to explain possibilities... by drawing logical conclusions from non-intuitive knowledge.” (IP p.31)

Another way of clearing Husserl’s use of “seeing”, partially anticipating future comparisons, is to notice a resemblance to Wittgenstein’s use of naming. On page 172 of The Brown Book, he says, “The relation of name and object we may say, consists in a scribble being written on an object... and that’s all there is to it.,” or on page 24E of the Philosophical Investigations he says, “Naming is a preparation for description.” Naming is the very minimum—-that we must do before we can talk about relationships. Naming is not the relationship itself between an object and a word. For Husserl, “seeing” is the very minimum we must do to talk about objects. He does say, in the fourth lecture, that one “can merely talk about it
WITHOUT "SEEING" (IP P. 49) BUT THIS IS NOT MAKING SOMETHING CLEAR, IT BE "VAGUELY" SPEAKING.

HAVING GIVEN SOME EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF THE CONCEPT "SEEING" AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF AN OBJECT, IT NOW MAKES SENSE TO ASK WHERE THE OBJECT "SEEN" IS. IN THE THIRD LECTURE, HUSSERL SAYS THAT IT IS "NOT OUTSIDE COGNITION OR OUTSIDE 'CONSCIOUSNESS'". (IP P. 33) HE EXPLAINS THIS FURTHER IN THE FOURTH LECTURE:

AGAIN, THIS GIVENNESS IS ALSO SOMETHING PURELY IMMANENT, NOT IMMANENT IN THE SPURIOUS SENSE, I.E., EXISTING IN THE SPHERE OF AN INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS. WE ARE NOT SPEAKING AT ALL OF THE ACT OF ABSTRACTION IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBJECT, AND OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THIS TAKES PLACE. WE ARE SPEAKING OF THE GENERAL ESSENCE OF MEANING OF REDNESS AND ITS GIVENNESS IN GENERAL 'SEEING'...

THUS IT IS NOW SENSELESS STILL TO RAISE QUESTIONS AND DOUBTS AS TO WHAT THE ESSENCE OF REDNESS IS, OR WHAT THE MEANING OF REDNESS IS, PROVIDED THAT WHILE ONE 'SEES' REDNESS AND GRASPS IT IN ITS SPECIFIC CHARACTER, ONE MEANS BY THE WORD 'RED' JUST EXACTLY WHAT WHICH IS BEING GRASPED AND 'SEEN' THERE. (IP P. 45)

THE OBJECT IS THEREFORE NOT OUTSIDE OF CONSCIOUSNESS, NOR IS IT IN THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS. MORE SPECIFICALLY, AT THE END OF THE FOURTH LECTURE HE SAYS THAT THE OBJECT IS NOT IN THE INNER, PERSONAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS: "IT WOULD BE A FICTION TO BELIEVE THAT INVESTIGATION BY WAY OF 'SEEING' MOVES IN THE SPHERE OF A SO-CALLED INNER PERCEPTION..." (IP P. 51) BY ELIMINATION THEN, THE OBJECT IS IN SOME SORT OF GENERAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR HUSSERL TO SAY THAT THE OBJECT IS IN A GENERAL OR COMMON CONSCIOUSNESS? THERE IS A SOMewhat LENGTHY PASSAGE, WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO BASE WHAT I HAVE TO SAY ON, AND WHICH I QUOTE IN FULL BECAUSE IT IS ONE OF THE MORE SIGNIFICANT PASSAGES IN THE BOOK IN RELATION TO CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY. IN THE FIFTH LECTURE HUSSERL SAYS,
Let us consider mere imagination, even without this being fixed in memory. An imagined color is not a datum in the way a sensed color is. We distinguish the imagined color from the mental process of imagining the color. The hovering of the color before me (to put it roughly) is a 'now', a presently existing cogitation, but the color itself is not a presently existing color; it is not perceived. On the other hand, it is given in a certain way, it stands before my gaze. Just like the perceived color it can be reduced through the exclusion of all transcendent significance, so that it no longer signifies for me the color of the paper, the house, etc. It is possible here too to refrain from positing the existence of anything empirical; in that case I consider it just exactly as I 'see' it, or, as it were, 'live' it. But in spite of that, it is not a present, but a presented color. It stands, as it were, before our eyes, but not as a genuine presence. But with all this, it is 'seen' and as 'seen' it is, in a certain sense, given. Thus I do not take it to be a physical or psychological existent. Nor do I take it to be existent in the sense of a proper cogitation, which is a genuine 'now', a datum which is, as a matter of evidence, characterized as given now. Still, the fact that the imagined color is not given in this or that sense does not mean that it is given in no sense. It appears and in appearing presents itself in such a way that 'seeing' it itself in its presentation I can make judgments concerning the abstract aspects which constitute it and the ways in which these aspects cohere. Naturally these are also given in the same sense, and likewise they do not 'actually' exist anywhere in the mental process of imagining. They are not genuinely present; they are only 'represented'. ... Perception posits existence, but it also has an essence which as content posited as existing can also be the same in representation. (IP pp. 54-55)

First of all, the sense in which Husserl means that "seeing" is the same on the levels of either perception or imagination is now clear in terms of representation and the exclusion of presentation. In terms other than Husserlian language, either when we imagine something such as a garbage can, or when we perceived the garbage can, we think of a general group of characteristics of garbage cans sufficient for us to communicate about garbage cans without having to have the object actually before us. This is provided that all of us live in a world in which we use the words "garbage can" in a similar way. As has
already been suggested, if "seeing" is a concept without which we cannot usefully talk about objects, then "seeing" must also indicate, or presuppose, that we live in a human world. This is what I am interpreting Husserl as meaning when he says, "I consider it just exactly as 'see' it, or as it were, 'live' it." (IP p. 54)

So far, the discussion has just been about what Husserl means by the concept "seeing". It should be evident now that a critical examination of the term will involve the problems of universals, meaning, intention, private as opposed to public objects or language, interpretation, sense data and mental acts. In discussing some of these problems in relation to "seeing", I hope to support the second part of the claim that I began with, that Husserl adds something of interest to these problems for philosophy of mind.

In the introduction to The Idea of Phenomenology, George Nakhnianian calls Husserl's term "seeing" a mental act. Is "seeing", the way Husserl uses it, a mental act, in the way that contemporary philosophy uses the phrase? In his summary of the lectures, Husserl talks about "seeing" on two levels. Naively, it is a "direct grasping or taking or pointing to something that simply is and is there." (IP p. 9) As quoted before; after further analysis, "'simply being there' consists of certain mental processes of specific and changing structure, such as perception, imagination, memory, predication, etc., and in them the things are not contained as in a hull or vessel." (IP p. 9)

If the criteria in contemporary philosophy for seeing to be a mental act are a separation between seeing and the act of seeing, or a separation of seeing and seeing something, then I do not
THINK THAT WE CAN CALL HUSSERL'S TERM "SEEING" A MENTAL ACT,
IN VIEW OF THE FOLLOWING.

ON THE FIRST LEVEL, IT IS CLEAR THAT "SEEING" IS SEEING OF
SOMETHING. IT ACTS LIKE AN OSTENSIVE DEFINITION. THE FURTHER
ANALYSIS OF "SEEING" INVOLVES TALK OF MENTAL PROCESSES, BUT IT
DOES NOT MEAN THAT "SEEING" IS A MENTAL PROCESS. 'SIMPLY BEING
THERE' IS NOT THE SAME AS "SEEING" CONSISTS OF MENTAL PROCESSES,
BUT 'SIMPLY BEING THERE' IS NOT THE SAME AS "SEEING". EVEN
IF WE DID NOT NOTICE THIS DISTINCTION, "SEEING" WOULD NOT BE
A MENTAL ACT BECAUSE HUSSERL DOES NOT USE THE PHRASE "MENTAL
ACT" THE SAME WAY AS CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY. ALTHOUGH HUSSERL
CALLS IMAGINATION AND PERCEPTION MENTAL PROCESSES, HE ALSO SAYS
THAT TO "SEE" AN OBJECT IN "MERE IMAGINATION" IS NOT TO HAVE
AN OBJECT WHICH IS A PART OF THE MENTAL PROCESS OF IMAGINING.
THIS SHOWS, FIRST, THAT EVEN IN HIS OWN USE OF THE WORDS, "SEEING"
IS NOT DIRECTLY BOUND WITH "MENTAL PROCESSES". SECONDLY, IF
HUSSERL DIFFERENTIATES BETWEEN "MERE IMAGINATION" AND IMAGINATION,
AND HE CALLS THE LATTER A "MENTAL ACT", BUT HE SAYS THAT THE
FORMER DOES NOT DEAL WITH "PSYCHICAL EXISTENTS", THEN HE DOES NOT
USE THE PHRASE "MENTAL ACT" IN THE SAME WAY AS PRESENT PHILOSOPHY.
IF HE USED IT IN THE SAME WAY, HE WOULD NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN
"MERE IMAGINATION" AND "IMAGINATION" AND CALL ONLY THE LATTER
A MENTAL PROCESS. IF "IMAGINATION" WERE A MENTAL PROCESS IN
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY, "MERE IMAGINATION" WOULD BE A MENTAL
PROCESS ALSO. OR IN CONTEMPORARY TERMS, IMAGINATION AND THE ACT
OF IMAGINING WOULD BE CONSIDERED DIFFERENT, IF IMAGINATION WERE
A MENTAL PROCESS. THUS HUSSERL'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN "MERE
IMAGINATION" AND "IMAGINATION" MEANS THAT HE IS USING THE GEN-
ERAL TERM "IMAGINATION" DIFFERENTLY FROM CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
AS WELL. THE REASON THAT I THINK THIS IS THE CASE, IS THAT HE
IS TRYING TO AVOID USING "MERE IMAGINATION" AS A MENTAL PROCESS IN THE CONTEMPORARY SENSE. THIS EXPLAINS WHY HE EMPHASIZES THAT THE OBJECT "SEEN" DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL, MENTAL PROCESS OF IMAGINING. IN HIS SAYING THAT THE SAME OBJECT IS "SEEN" WITHOUT GIVING IT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STATUS OF PERCEPTION OR IMAGINATION, HE SAYS THAT "SEEING" DOES NOT DEPEND ON MENTAL ACTS AND HE SAYS THAT OBJECTS CAN BE IMAGINED OR PERCEIVED WITHOUT RELYING ON MENTAL ACTS OF IMAGINING OR PERCEIVING. THIS IS CLEAR FROM HIS STATEMENT, "WE DISTINGUISH THE IMAGINED COLOR FROM THE MENTAL PROCESS OF IMAGINING THE COLOR." BUT IF THE COLOR CAN BE GIVEN, WITH NO ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE, WITHOUT GOING THROUGH THE MENTAL PROCESS OF IMAGINING THE COLOR, THEN THE MENTAL ACT IS NOT NECESSARY. ONE MIGHT SAY THAT HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD IS AN EFFORT TO RID ANALYSES OF DEPENDENCE ON MENTAL ACTS, BUT BECAUSE HE THINKS THAT HE IS LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR LATER PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES, HE DOES NOT SEE HIS POSITION AS ELIMINATING MENTAL ACTS: RATHER, HE IS WRITING A PRELUDE TO THEM. THE POINT, HOWEVER, IS THAT OF WITTGENSTEIN'S EPILOGUE.

PREVIOUSLY, A SIMILARITY WAS DISCUSSED BETWEEN "SEEING" AND WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPT OF NAMING. "SEEING" IS NOT ANALOGOUS TO NAMING IN THAT IT IS PRELIMINARY TO TALK ABOUT OBJECTS, NOT THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OBJECTS. A MORE PRECISE DESCRIPTION OF "SEEING" THEN, IS THE ABILITY TO PICK OUT, OR THE ABILITY TO RECOGNIZE, A DESIGNATION, WHICH IS THE SAME AS AN OBJECT. (OR, AN OBJECT, HERE, IS NO MORE THAN A DESIGNATION.) I WILL TRY TO MAKE THIS CLEARER BY TALKING ABOUT HUSSERL'S EXAMPLE OF "SEEING" RED, WHICH WAS QUOTED BEFORE. PART OF THE LAST SENTENCE QUOTED IS "...ONE MEANS BY THE WORD 'RED' JUST EXACTLY
THAT WHICH IS BEING GRASPED AND "SEEN" THERE."

The reason why designation and object have been made equivalent is that the "there" Husserl is talking about is not an individual's psychological consciousness. And if one means by 'red' that which is being "seen", the relation of "seeing" to the designation is specialized, i.e., the ability to distinguish, recognize or pick out the designation. If one is able to recognize the designation then the word 'red' will be meaningful, and the way to tell whether someone "sees" the object is by his ability to use the word 'red'.

This account of Husserl's use of "seeing", suggests further resemblances to English analytic philosophy. It has already been shown that insofar as we do not find "seeing" to be a mental act, Husserl is making use of the distinction associated with Wittgenstein, that the act of imagination (or other 'mental acts') is not the same as, or necessary for, imagination itself.

In the discussion just finished, "seeing" was described in relation to the use of language, and thereby, the concept of meaning. But if Husserl does not talk about "seeing" as the use of a word, then he cannot mean by "meaning" what Wittgenstein does, since Wittgenstein holds that the meaning of a word is its use. How, then, can it be said that "seeing" has a relation to the use of language in the Wittgensteinian sense? Wittgenstein's concept of meaning is consistent with 1. the notion that there are no universals (we do not use the word 'book' because the universal 'book' is manifest in that particular), and 2. the notion that we do not need to see sense-data separate from the object itself to see the object. The use of a word is acquired
FROM A CONVENTION OF TEACHING OR TRAINING ONE TO TALK.

ONE IS NOT TAUGHT TO USE A WORD BY HAVING ONE'S ATTENTION DRAWN TO CERTAIN SENSE-DATA, OR A BASIC SUBSTRATE COMMON TO THE OBJECTS IN A SPECIFIC CLASS. THESE SAME STATEMENTS APPLY TO HUSSERL'S CONCEPT OF "SEEING".

HUSSERL WANTS TO FOUND THE STUDY OF AN "ABSOLUTE" WORLD APART FROM SCIENCE AND APART FROM PSYCHOLOGY. HE THEREFORE NEEDS TO FIND A PHILOSOPHIC SENSE IN WHICH OBJECTS (CONCEPTS, IMAGINED OBJECTS, PHYSICAL OBJECTS) CAN BE GIVEN A CONCRETE MEANING WITHOUT EMPLOYING THE ORDINARY USE OF "EXISTENCE." ON PAGE 24 HE TRIES TO DO THIS IN RELATION TO CONCEPTS, WHAT HE CALLS "MENTAL PROCESSES." HE TRIES TO GIVE THEM THIS SENSE BY TALKING ABOUT THEM AS "SIMPLY GIVEN" OR "HERE AND NOW." THEY ARE DATA FOR HIM BUT THEY ARE NOT SENSE-DATA DEPENDING ON SOME SORT OF MATERIAL EXISTENCE AS ANALOGY TO IT. THE WAY WHICH WE ARE AWARE OF THEM IS BY "SEEING," WHICH, SINCE IT IS NOT A PROCESS, IS A MATTER OF THE OBJECT BEING "OPEN TO INTUITION." (IP p. 24) THE EVIDENCE THAT HUSSERL GIVES FOR "SEEING" OR THE WAY BY WHICH WE CAN KNOW SOMETHING HAS BEEN "SEEN" IS FROM THE FACT THAT "WE TALK ABOUT THEM NOT IN JUST VAGUE HINTS AND EMPTY INTENTION. WE INSPECT THEM, AND WHILE INSPECTING THEM WE CAN OBSERVE THEIR ESSENCE, THEIR CONSTITUTION, THEIR INTRINSIC CHARACTER, AND WE CAN MAKE OUR SPEECH CONFORM IN A PURE MEASURE TO WHAT IS "SEEN" IN ITS FULL CLARITY." (IP p. 24)

WE MIGHT SAY THE USE OF A WORD, FOR HUSSERL, FOLLOWS FROM BEING TAUGHT HOW TO "SEE." THE METHOD BY WHICH ONE IS TAUGHT TO "SEE" IS PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION. PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION DESCRIBES A POINT OF VIEW THAT EXCLUDES THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW. FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, WHEN ONE PERCEIVES SOMETHING THE OBJECT "STANDS THERE AS A MENTAL PROCESS OF THIS
MENTALLY LIVING PERSON, AS HIS STATE, HIS ACT; THE SENSORY
CONTENT STANDS THERE AS WHAT IS GIVEN OR SENSED? (IP p. 34)

PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION EXCLUDES PSYCHOLOGICAL MENTAL
PROCESSES RELATING OBJECTS TO THE EGO. REDUCTION CHANGES THE
PICTURE FROM THE MENTAL PROCESS OR ACT OF PERCEIVING THE SENSORY
CONTENT OF AN OBJECT TO THE OBJECT BEING DIRECTLY BEFORE ONE
AS THE COMPLETE PERCEPTION. TO HAVE THE OBJECT DIRECTLY
BEFORE ONE IS THE SAME AS HAVING THE SENSORY CONTENTS OPEN TO
ONESELF BUT THERE IS NO NEED TO SPEAK OF OR DIVIDE THE SENSORY
CONTENTS APART FROM THE OBJECT, SINCE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERCEIVER
IS NOT A NECESSARY PART OF THE PERCEPTION. BEFORE REDUCTION,
PERCEPTION IS A MENTAL ACT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EGO PROCESSING
THE SENSORY DATA OF AN OBJECT. AFTER REDUCTION, PERCEPTION IS
THE DIRECT "SEEING" OF AN OBJECT BY A PERSON. IN THE LATTER,
THERE ARE NO MENTAL PROCESSES, ALL IS INTUITIVE, DIRECT AND
IMMEDIATE: "SEEING" IS NOT DISTINCT FROM HAVING SENSORY PER-
CEPTIONS; A PERSON'S SIGHT IS THE SENSORY PERCEPTION; IT IS NOT
THE HAVING OF A SENSORY PERCEPTION. THE MENTAL PROCESS IS
UNNECESSARY:

But while I am perceiving I can also look, by
way of purely "seeing", at the perception, at
it itself as it is there, and ignore its rela-
tion to the ego, or at least abstract from it.
Then the perception which is thereby grasped
and delimited in "seeing," is an absolutely given,
pure phenomenon in the phenomenological sense,
renouncing anything transcendent. (IP pp. 34-35)

I would like to end one of Husserl's sentences early and use
it as a complete statement to say, "ALL THIS DISCUSSION IS, OF
COURSE, ONLY A ROUND-ABOUT WAY OF HELPING ONE TO SEE WHAT IS
TO BE SEEN..." (IP p. 38).
So far we have attempted to show that the notion of "seeing" can be interpreted as an attempt to give sense to talk about the perception of objects that are independent of sense-data. We now need to establish evidence for the second claim that Husserl does not require the traditional concept of universal to make sense of talk about particulars.

At one point he says,

Knowledge of universals is certainly given as an absolute phenomenon; but in this we shall seek in vain for the universal which is to be identical, in the strictest sense, in the equally immanent contents of innumerable possible cases of cognition. (IP p. 44)

A universal for Husserl is that which we are simply aware of in "seeing", similar to our talk about Husserl's view of "seeing" conceptual objects before. He retains the term universal but he makes it equivalent to the particular. Thus when we "see" an object, we also see a universal.

In his discussion of "seeing" redness he says,

No longer is it the particular as such which is referred to, not to this or that red thing, but redness in general. If we really did this in pure "seeing", could we then still intelligibly doubt what redness is in general, what is meant by this expression, what it may be in its very essence? We truly "see" it; there it is, the very object of our intent, this species of redness. Could a deity, an infinite intellect, do more to lay hold of the essence of redness than to "see" it as a universal? (IP p. 45)

And further on,

We are speaking of the general essence of meaning and redness and its givenness in general "seeing." (IP p. 45)

Husserl's relation of "seeing" with the meaning of a word, the fact that he is not talking about sense-data, and the fact that he is not talking about observing some particularized quality.
OF A UNIVERSAL, IS WHAT TEMPTS US, OR SEEMS TO FORCE ON US THE CORRELATION WITH WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPT OF MEANING.

But all I have said so far is that there is a general consistency between these views of Husserl and Wittgenstein. In this respect I have been negative in that no strict analogy has been drawn between the two, "SEEING" and WITTGENSTEIN'S "MEANING", but only suggested where the explication of "SEEING" leads to considering the same problems for contemporary philosophy that eventually get involved with Wittgenstein's concept. I would like to end with a somewhat tighter comparison which will give a better sense of "SEEING" and which will further point out the relevance of "SEEING" as a contemporary problem. These points will show some of the problems that we would have with "SEEING" if we wish to use it as a contemporary term.

What I would like to do is apply some of the things Wittgenstein says about the concept 'reading' to Husserl's term "SEEING". This will not be an analogy in the strict sense; it is pointing to some of the similarities in their uses. One of Wittgenstein's points in his remarks about reading is that there is no one particular thing which must happen to say that someone is reading. 'Reading' is here used in the sense of reading words out loud, or writing something spoken. He says, "And in the same way we also use the word "TO READ" for a family of cases. And in different circumstances we apply different criteria for a person's reading." (PI p. 104) There are a number of instances of ordinary usage of "TO READ".

According to the CONTEXTS of each usage we might have a different group of reasons for saying that someone is reading. If we try to say that reading is a special mental process and
WE DISREGARD THE REASONS WE GIVE FOR THE ORDINARY USAGE OF SAYING THAT SOMEONE IS READING, SUCH AS HESITATING AND PRONOUNCING A WORD BY SYLLABLES, THEN THERE IS NO WAY TO KNOW THAT SOMEONE IS READING. READING WOULD BE A PRIVATE MENTAL AFFAIR FOR THE PERSON WHO CLAIMS TO BE DOING SO; HIS REASONS FOR SAYING HE IS READING MIGHT BE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE REASONS OF ORDINARY USAGE. OR IN OTHER WORDS, THERE WOULD NO LONGER BE ANY ORDINARY USAGE FOR THE WORD "READING", AND THIS IS CLEARLY DENIED BY THE FACT THAT WE DO HAVE SUCH A WORD WHICH WE COMMONLY USE. NOW I THINK THAT WE HAVE TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING WHAT HUSSERL MEANS BY "SEEING" FOR THE SAME REASONS THAT WE ARE LED TO THINK THAT THERE IS A SPECIAL PROCESS NECESSARILY GOING ON TO UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF READING. (THIS IS, IN A WAY, AN EXTENSION OF MY CLAIM THAT "SEEING" IS NOT A MENTAL ACT.) HUSSERL INDEED AUGMENTS THIS CONFUSION BY SAYING NOT ONLY THAT WE MEAN BY THE WORD 'RED' WHAT WE "SEE", BUT THAT REDNESS IS "SEEN" IN ITS "SPECIFIC CHARACTER". IF ONE TRIES TO APPLY WITTGENSTEIN'S POINTS ABOUT READING TWO PROBLEMS ARISE: 1. TO EXPLAIN WHAT HUSSERL MEANS BY SPECIFIC CHARACTER, OR ESSENCE, AND 2. TO UNDERSTAND HOW HE CAN CARRY OUT THE INVESTIGATION OF THESE ESSENCES BY ANALYZING HIS OWN PERCEPTIONS, OR HIS PRIVATE WORLD. THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST I THINK, IS PRIMARILY ACCOMPLISHED BY THE DISCUSSION OF HIS USE OF "UNIVERSAL" AND "SEEING" IN RELATION TO LANGUAGE. HUSSERL DOES NOT MEAN 'ABSOLUTE' BY 'ABSOLUTE': WHAT IS ABSOLUTE FOR HIM, WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF SOMETHING, IS NOT WHAT IS STABLE OR UNCHANGING, BUT WHAT IS COMMONLY "SEEN". THIS IS WHY HE DOES NOT WANT TO DEPEND ON
the ordinary notion of existence. One of the reasons why he has to avoid the notion of existence is that he is talking about both a public consciousness and a private world. We have shown from his usage of "seeing", from his connexion of "seeing" with language, and from his placement of the object in some kind of general consciousness, that he wishes to give "seeing" some common sense. But the phenomenological reduction, while being the method by which one learns to "see" (in the non-naive sense) is also something the phenomenologist, Husserl has said, performs individually. Thus if Husserl is performing investigations of his own private world, how can we make public sense out of it? This is a problem which Husserl faces to some extent in the technics of the Cartesian Meditations, and must be examined in respect to them. All I would like to say here is that I think that I have given solid grounds for an interpretation of Husserl that does not entail that "seeing" is a notion limited to a private world.
PART TWO
THE PARIS LECTURES

There is this fundamental difference between the approach of Husserl and Wittgenstein: Husserl separates the philosopher from the common world to see his way clear to doing philosophy: this is his fundamental epoché. But in terms of his system, this is a philosophical move, and a mistake. He says that he can only see his true self by backing away from his everyday self. This everyday self, one can say, is the self that cannot understand philosophy because it cannot put any phenomenon in a clear and isolated framework. And this is where Husserl gets involved in his fundamental contradiction. He wishes to maintain philosophy as part of the world, and he wishes to leave the world as it is. But what he creates by the distinction between the everyday self and the epoché self is an ideal world, which suddenly becomes clearer than the everyday one, so that there is a one-to-one correspondence between objects and what is necessary for something to be an object. Thus if Husserl succeeds in having one world, he must fail in having the other. If there is an ideal world, then it makes no sense to say that Husserl once awoke from the everyday one. As there would be two worlds, philosophy would neither be a part of the world nor leave the world as it is. If there is only an everyday world then there would be no need to convince us of an ideal one, and this conviction is one of Husserl's goals. Epoché is a fundamental philosophical mistake of confusing the grammar of a special science with everyday parlance. One cannot be translated into the other. They are different language games, in which the words only look the same. When I talk about epoché this way, I show that the basic tenets of Wittgenstein's philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology
ARE OPPOSITE; AND IF WITTGENSTEIN'S POINTS ABOUT GRAMMATICAL
MISTAKES ARE CORRECT, HUSSERL'S MAJOR TENET IS ONE OF THESE
GRAMMATICAL MISTAKES. CAN THIS BE SAID FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF
HUSSERL'S SYSTEM? NO, BUT THAT IS THE POINT OF SAYING IT.

THAT THE FIRST EPOCHÉ IS A PHILOSOPHICAL MOVE CAN BE
ILLUSTRATED BY TWO STATEMENTS. HUSSERL'S REASON FOR REJECTING SENSE-DATA IS NOT THE ANALYTIC ONE: THAT THERE IS NO WAY TO CHECK PHYSIOLOGICAL PROCESSES, OR, EVEN IF THERE WERE, SUCH AN EXPLANATION WOULD EXCLUDE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS. HUSSERL'S PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTION IS METHODOLOGICAL: "THE HONEST DESCRIPTION OF THE UNADULTERATED DATA OF EXPERIENCE MUST DISCLOSE WHAT APPEARS FIRST OF ALL, I.E., THE COGITO." THE REASON HUSSERL SAYS THIS, THE SENTENCE PRECEDING, IS, "BUT WHAT PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS FAILS TO FIND AS PRIMARY IS THE 'PERCEPTION OF AN EXTERNAL WORLD'." (PL P. 13) THE REJECTION OF SENSE-DATA CRITERIA WITHIN THE METHODOLOGY OF HUSSERL IS SHOWN IN HIS VIEW OF KNOWING OTHERS IN RELATION TO KNOWING HIMSELF; AS A PROBLEM AT THE CRUX OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOLIPSISM, IT GIVES THIS CLAIM, THAT HUSSERL'S METHODOLOGY IS A PHILOSOPHICAL MOVE, GREAT IMPACT.

I EXPERIENCE MY OWN CONSCIOUS EXISTENCE DIRECTLY AND TRULY AS IT ITSELF. THIS IS NOT TRUE OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF OTHERS, SUCH AS THEIR SENSATIONS, PERCEPTIONS, THINKING, FEELING, DESIRING. IN MY OWN SELF, HOWEVER, THESE EXPERIENCES OF OTHERS APPEAR IN A SECONDARY SENSE, AS 'CO-EXPERIENCED,' IN THE MODE OF UNIQUE PERCEPTION OF SIMILARITY. THESE EXPERIENCES SHOW CONSISTENCY IN THEIR INDICES AND IN THIS MANNER CONFIRM THEMSELVES UNANIMOUSLY. (PL P. 35)

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS METHODOLOGICAL VIEW ARE: 1) OTHERS ARE EXPERIENCED ONLY THROUGH THE SELF, AND 2) THUS THE 'INDICES' REMAIN PRIVATE, OR ARE SOLIPSISTIC CRITERIA, AND ARE THEREFORE NOT VERIFIABLE.
A general statement about these mistakes is this: There is a philosophical division between the philosopher's world and the common world which Husserl did not want to make; he wanted the division to be organizational only and did not realize how philosophical his methodology was. Such a statement is both a crippling criticism of his phenomenology and the reason why there can be no valuable analogies between phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Such a broad statement requires more detailed work: the studies of the *Cartesian Meditations* follow.
1. In the first meditation there are two concepts developed which are part of the phenomenological system: judgment and its connexion with evidence, and the transcendental ego.

1.1 The main difference between a judgment and evidence is that a judgment is a state of affairs which exists indeterminately, hypothetically, and evidence is the actual being present, or existence of that state of affairs.

1.12 If I say that the Little Theatre has burned down because I heard sirens and smelled smoke and knew that it was the worst fire-hazard on campus, then I am judging that the theatre has burnt down. If you say that, yes, you had just come back from the area of the Little Theatre and all that remained of it were burnt, charred boards and fixtures, then you would be giving evidence.

1.2 The consistency of the judgment with the state of affairs judged, or the agreement between the judgment that the building has burned down, and the fact that the building has been demolished by fire is what Husserl calls the grounding. When there is this agreement between the judgment and the state of affairs, or when the judgment is grounded, Husserl considers the judgment to have become evidence.

1.3 When one has experienced every possibility connected with the building having burnt down, then the evidence for the demolished theatre is said to be perfect.

1.4 Husserl distinguishes between two stages of judgments: 1. immediate judgments, 2. mediate judgments.

1.41 Perhaps an immediate judgment would be when I am standing next to a tree in a thunder storm and it is struck by lightning.
I suppose, when I recover, that the tree was struck. A mediate
gjudgment might then be a week later in a storm in a woods, hearing
a loud noise and crash and seeing smoke and flames at night a
couple hundred yards away, and supposing that a tree was struck
by lightning.

1.42 I think Husserl's talk about immediate and mediate judgments
is confusing. He says that mediate judgments presuppose believing
in immediate judgments. But I cannot think of an example of a
judgment that does not presuppose believing in something else
unless we talk about a judgment which has become evidence. Further-
more, unless the evidence is perfect, in Husserl's terms, we
presuppose something when we say we have evidence. Even if we
were to say that we had perfect evidence for something, that we had
experienced everything possible in connection with it, we would
have to presuppose that that particular group of experiences was
all that could be experienced. This inadequacy, I think, is what
leads Husserl to the concept of apodicticly, which I will talk
about in a moment.

1.5 There are two sorts of evidence connected with judgment. One
'we have talked about; it is the actual being of the state of
affairs that is thought or supposed to be. This Husserl calls
evidence of fulfillment or predicative evidence. The second kind
of evidence is called evidence of expression or predicative ex-
pression. The first deals with experience, the second deals
with language.

1.51 Husserl talks about the evidence of the expression as the
extent to which the expression "fits what is meant or given".
(CM p. 11) Apparently, if we look at the top of page 14 this is
why Husserl constructs the neoology of judgment, since common
LANGUAGE HAS "TOO GREAT COMPLACENCY ABOUT COMPLETENESS OF EXPRESSION." HUSSERL'S USE OF THE WORD "JUDGING" AS "MEANING" AND "JUDGMENT" AS "WHAT IS MEANT" OR "WHAT IS MEANT AS BEING", IS THUS A THEORY OF LANGUAGE AS WELL AS A THEORY OF PHENOMENOLOGY. BOTH THEORIES MUST BE EVIDENCED BEFORE A JUDGMENT IS EVIDENCE.

1.5a Does something at least have to be a judgment to exist? A judgment is something which is "meant as being". That which is evidence is considered to be, but it is also at least a judgment. Does it make sense to talk about meaning something as non-being? If being is not an attribute (or a predicate) then it does not make sense to talk about something as non-being. Meaning something as being is senseless, insofar as it ascribes non-being as well.

1.6 I suggested that there is a continuous regression in regard to Husserl's concepts of judgment as immediate and mediate, and that he attempts to stop this regression with the notion of apodicticity. That which is apodictic cannot be imagined or conceived as non-being. Husserl leaves "perfect" or "adequate" evidence questionable and suggests apodictic evidence as that for which adequate evidence is not needed.

1.61 If we take Husserl literally, everything at least imagined is apodictic, since imagination is imagination of something, and anything imagined is to that extent something which is. Or once something is imagined it cannot be imagined as non-being because to the extent that it is imagined, it is. And we know that some object of imagination, for Husserl, is not in a lesser state of existence than some actual physical object.

1.62 Clearly, however, there is only one thing which is apodictic for Husserl, the transcendental ego. Our discussion of the term
"APODICTIC" HOWEVER, WOULD LEAD TO CONSIDERING CYCLOPES AS "APODICTIC".

Either, then, we misunderstand the term "apodictic", or Husserl has not made the case for it that he thinks he has. Or, in other words, it does not seem as if Husserl can both define "apodicticity" as he does and keep his concept of existence.

1.7 Perhaps if we examine Husserl's reasons for rejecting the existence of the world as apodictic and affirming the transcendental ego as apodictic, we can become clearer about the term.

1.71 Reasons for rejecting the world as apodictic:

1. We can become doubtful of it because the evidence for it is experiential, which is not apodictic (CM p. 17).

2. The sensuous evidence for the world could be a dream (this does not mean that the world does not exist, only that it is not apodictic).

1.72 Reasons for asserting the transcendental ego as apodictic:

1. Whereas the world, culture, natural life, is lost by the questionableness of sensuous experience, one's own living, and one's consciousness of one's life is not lost, by virtue of being conscious of abstaining from believing in the sensuous existence of the world. All of this can further be shown by reflection.

2. By rejecting the world as apodictic, one gains the realm of conscious living and the world as a world of phenomena, or that which one is conscious of. This rejection or abstention from belief is reduction and the means by which the transcendental ego is obtained or recognized as apodictic.

§. In words other than Husserl's approach, which perhaps make his claim sound more reasonable, the necessary condition for the world to be retained after doubting sensuous experience is the postulation of the transcendental ego, or the non-position—
1.8 Having reviewed Husserl's reasons for apodicticity, the reasons to think he has failed to establish the notion can be given:

1. There are problems with the definition itself; Husserl seems to be equivocating in proposing something can be imagined as non-being, if we accept the way he uses the term 'existence' as inclusive of imaginary objects. Once we have imagined something it is no longer in the realm of non-being, so it is impossible to imagine anything as non-being.

2. It does not follow that one gains a realm of conscious living merely from the fact that the existence of the world is not established by sensuous experience. Husserl wishes to claim that there is only consciousness-of something, yet he also claims that nothing is in consciousness. (Cf. p. 26) If phenomena are somehow part of the world, then he has to show that there are phenomena to show that there can be the living consciousness, or transcendental ego. (This is, of course, the opposite of what he wants to do.)

3. If we do not accept the term "apodicticity," then the terms "evidence" and "judgment" fall through as well, since "apodicticity" seemed to be used to make up for their inadequacy.

2.0 The second meditation sets up terms to describe the transcendental ego.

2.1 The structure of the ego is thus:

A. Transcendental ego
   "apodictically preeliminated"

B. Ego as object, self-experience

And the structure of epoché is primarily thus:
1. EPOCHÉ

1 WORLD

2. EGO'S SUBJECTIVITY IS THE OBJECTIVE WORLD
   STRUCTURE OF EGO EXPERIENCED BY EGO
   (ONLY THE PHILOSOPHER’S TRANSCENDENTAL EGO)

3. TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY
   (OM p. 30) NOTION TO PROVIDE WAY OUT OF SOLIPSISM
   (OM p. 31) DOES NOT DECIDE ABOUT SOLIPSISM IN THIS MEDITATION

2.2 BEING LEFT WITH THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AFTER REDUCTION IS NOT
BEING LEFT WITH PSYCHIC LIFE. RATHER, THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO
INCLUDES CONSCIOUS PROCESSES: COGITO, COGITATUM.

2.3 INTENTIONALITY SIGNIFIES BEING CONSCIOUS OF SOMETHING, EGO
ONE IS CONSCIOUS OF SOMETHING ACCORDING TO THE KIND OF CONSCIOUSNESS-
PERCEPTION, MEMORY, ETC.

2.4 'NATURAL REFLECTION' IS WHEN WE ARE AWARE OF WHAT WE PERCEIVE;
'TRANSCENDENTAL REFLECTION' IS WHEN WE ARE AWARE OF THE PERCEIVING
ITSELF. THIS SAYS HUSSERL: 1. MAKES AN OBJECT OUT OF THE
SUBJECTIVE PROCESS (PERCEIVING IS THE OBJECT) 2. ENABLES EXPERIENTIAL
KNOWING "WHICH AT FIRST IS DESCRIPTIVE". (OM p. 34)

2.5 'NOETIC' SIGNIFIES MODES OF CONSCIOUSNESS; 'NOEMATIC' SIGNIFIES:
MODES OF BEING.

2.6 PHENOMENOLOGY THINKS THAT ITS GREATEST CONTRIBUTION IS A NEW WAY
OF LOOKING AT THE WORLD. THE COGITATUM OF OUR CONSCIOUSNESS ARE
SEEN AS WE ARE CONSCIOUS-OF THEM. THIS IS ONE OF THE SENSES OF
HUSSERL'S TALK ABOUT MAKING THE SUBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE. BUT WHAT
HE HAS DONE SO FAR IS TO MAKE COGITATUM PRIVATE OBJECTS- WHAT
IS TO SAY, STILL SUBJECTIVE. THE QUESTION IS HOW HE CAN TALK
ABOUT THESE OBJECTS AS UNIVERSAL. THIS IS A PROBLEM OF THE
ALTER EGO IN THE FIFTH MEDITATION.
2.7 The epoché is also intended to separate the psychic consciousness from the phenomenal consciousness. This is to avoid psychologism (2.2) and "to distinguish between a psychological and a philosophical theory of consciousness". (CM p. 38)

2.71 Reduction avoids a theory of internal sensation as a basis for internal psychological phenomena. Psychological experience does not seem to be a matter of internal emotional sensations. Rather, for the phenomenologist it begins with objective cogitatum: "I perceive this house".

2.8 The concept of identity or synthesis, or "structure of multiplicities" is: any object has a multiple number of ways of being perceived, imagined, or conceived. When talking about the same object, however, these multiple ways of being perceived will converge on a "most general trait" (CM p. 40) by virtue of its being the same object.
1.0 What is the theory of language in Husserl's phenomenology?

1.1 It is roughly like the following: Every object can be understood to be as it actually is only if every possible meaning of the object has been experienced. If the object is physical, the meanings experienced would include viewing it from every angle, understanding its physical or chemical make-up; if the object is conceptual or imaginary, the meanings might include thinking of the object in different contexts. The second criteria for an object to be perfectly understood or meant is straight-forwardly linguistic: the expression of the object must perfectly correspond to the object. Husserl's theory of language approaches the view of one-to-one correspondence between word and object suggested in the Tractatus. Husserl's later view is a form of what is sometimes said to be Wittgenstein's early view as above (as well as a rejection of Wittgenstein's later view). Husserl says,

Owing to the instability and ambiguity of common language and its much too great complacency about completeness of expression, we require, even where we use its means of expression, a new legitimation of significations by orienting them according to accrued insights, and a fixing of words as expressions of the significations thus legitimated. (CM, p. 14).

1.2 Husserl's theory of an object's being perfectly understood as meant arises from a misconception in phenomenology. As Husserl does not find perfect meaning in the common world, he introduces the notion of apodicticity by conceptually dividing a view of the world between the common world and the world of pure phenomena. The world of pure phenomena indicates that only the objects themselves are considered in speaking about what is actual; one's personal opinion does not enter. To the extent that Anscombe finds credibility in the expression
'SEEING AN APPEARANCE' (INTENTION, FOOTNOTE P. 49-50), AS DESCRIBING OR IDENTIFYING AN APPEARANCE, THE EPOCHÉ OF HUSSERL DOES A JUSTIFIABLE SERVICE. ALL OF THE SUPERFICIAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN HUSSERL'S CONCEPTS, OR THE CONCEPTS, MORE BROADLY, OF PHENOMENALISM, AND WITTGENSTEIN'S ANALYSES OF SUCH CONCEPTS BEGIN AND END HERE. HUSSERL'S 'UNPREJUDICED OBJECT' CAN BE TALKED ABOUT IN TERMS OF WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPTS OF MASTERY OF A CONCEPT-LEARNING TECHNIQUE OR TRAINING AND CONDITIONING, AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF OBJECTS AS FAMILY RESEMBLANCES. BUT HUSSERL'S CONCEPT OF PHENOMENOLOGY GOES BEYOND WHAT HE SEES AS THE FAULTS OF COMMON LANGUAGE, EXTENDING TO A RIGID CONCEPT OF OBJECTS AS ABSOLUTELY KNOWABLE AFTER THE ELIMINATION OF COMMON PREJUDICE. OBJECTS ARE NOT SIMPLY IDENTIFIED BY APPEARANCE; THEY CAN BE ABSOLUTELY IDENTIFIED BY APPEARANCE, AT THE POINT AT WHICH PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY IS COMPLETE. OF COURSE IT CAN BE SAID HERE THAT SINCE HUSSERL NEVER COMPLETED THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD OF ANALYSIS, HE INDICATED THAT IT COULD NOT BE DONE. HE DID, IN FACT, COME TO SAY THAT IT WAS ONLY AN "IDEA" (CM P. 63). BUT THIS IS ONLY A HISTORICAL COMMENT; THERE ARE PHILOSOPHICAL REASONS WHY HE FAILED TO DO SO.

1.3 THESE PHILOSOPHICAL REASONS, THE MISCONCEPTION OF PHENOMENOLOGY, ARE FOUND IN THE MOVE TO PURE PHENOMENA. THIS IS THE FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL EPOCHÉ WHICH IS TO MAKE "THE PURE EGO, WITH THE PURE STREAM OF MY COGITATIONES" (CM P. 21) THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORLD. AND THE CENTRAL REASON, TRITE AS IT IS TO DISTINGUISH IT IN TERMS OF CONTEMPORARY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY (WHICH SAYS SOMETHING PHILOSOPHICALLY ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY), IS THAT HUSSERL DOES NOT SEE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS UTTERED IN THE FIRST AND THIRD PERSON SINGULAR PRESENT TENSE. LIMITED TO THE FIRST
Meditation, Husserl arrives at the same 'I am' as did Descartes, the only difference is that he expands the use of the expression to that of seeing all objects as 'having' a special sense within it. (CM pp. 23, 24) What Husserl does not recognize is that knowing 'I am' is not the same as knowing 'He is'. One cannot have the a priori world and know it too. Husserl therefore tries to know it through intuition, which becomes knowing it through himself, through the expansion of the 'I am'. But this is as much as admitting, 'I am a solipsist', which is best discussed in regard to the last meditation's. The mistake of solipsism is the mistake of not distinguishing between knowing 'I am' and 'He is' as mentioned above. It is a mistake which conceptually ties together the reasons why it is at first possible to see many similarities between Husserl and Wittgenstein; it is also the mistake that shows up: further analysis that these similarities have false bottoms.

2.0 One of the superficial connections between Husserl and Wittgenstein might appear to be their common distinction between psychology and philosophy. The connexion arises because both wish to dissociate psycho-physical sense-data from philosophical evidence. On closer examination Husserl's reasons for this distinction are not Wittgenstein's, and the two philosophers are making two different distinctions.

2.1 Husserl wishes to distinguish between first person psychological comments and first person statements concerning self-knowledge, aimed at clarifying the transcendental subjective world. (CM p. 31-32) The latter he calls philosophy, the former he calls psychology. Wittgenstein would call both psychology, although the latter might be called psychologistic philosophy.
IN THE PEJORATIVE SENSE THAT PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY ARE CONFUSED (FROM WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEW).

2.2 THE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT HUSSERL DEPENDS ON MENTAL ACTS AS A MEANS OF KNOWING ONE'S OWN SENSATIONS AS WELL AS PERCEPTIONS AND IMAGININGS. (CM P.31, 33) HUSSERL'S GREAT DISTASTE FOR SENSE-DATA STEMS FROM HIS FAITH IN MENTAL ACTS. WITTGENSTEIN'S ATTEMPT TO BEGIN A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THE PROBLEMS OF SENSE-DATA DO NOT OCCUR IS PART OF HIS DISAVOWAL OF THE THEORY OF CAUSATION INVOLVED WITH MENTAL ACTS AND PHYSIO-Psychological Theory. (ZETTEL, P. 106)

2.3 THE FACT THAT HUSSERL THINKS THE ABOVE ARE MENTAL ACTS, THE FACT THAT HE FAILS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD PERSON SINGULAR PRESENT TENSE STATEMENTS ABOUT KNOWING, AND THE FACT THAT HE SEEMS TO BE INEXORABLY INVOLVED IN SOLIPSISM ARE ALL THE SAME PROBLEM. IN HIS OWN WORDS, HE BEGINS AS A SOLIPSIST (CM P. 30), REFLECTS ON THE GIVEN PROCESS OF KNOWING HIMSELF, SUCH AS PERCEIVING, (THE ACT OF PERCEIVING, NOT THE PERCEPTION), AND CLAIMS THAT THE ACT OF REFLECTION MAKES THE PREVIOUSLY SUBJECTIVE PROCESS OBJECTIVE. (CM P. 34) MENTAL ACTS YIELD OBJECTIVE DATA FOR HUSSERL PRECISELY BECAUSE HE DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CRITERIA OF 'I KNOW I HAVE AN ACHE' AND 'I KNOW HE HAS AN ACHE'. THE FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH LEADS TO SUCH PROBLEMS AS REELECTION ON REFLECTING ON THE ACT OF PERCEPTION. IS THE REFLECTION ON REFLECTION MORE OBJECTIVE, A DOUBLE OBJECT? SUCH A PROBLEM INDICATES THAT HUSSERL HAS NOT SOLVED THOSE PROBLEMS WHICH INVOLVE HIM IN SOLIPSISM.

2.4 WHAT AT FIRST LOOKS AS IF WE CAN TALK ABOUT PARALLELS BETWEEN WITTGENSTEIN'S AND HUSSERL'S VIEW ON DISTINGUISHING PHILOSOPHY
FROM PSYCHOLOGY, AND CAUSAL THEORY OF SENSATION FROM THE PARAGRAPH BEGINNING CM P. 38 TO P. 39, CAN BE SEEN TO BE FALSE IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE. THE REASON HUSSERL DOES NOT WANT SENSATION, "INNER" OR "EXTERNAL", TO BE A BEGINNING POINT OF KNOWING, IS THAT HE WANTS THE EGO TO SERVE THIS FUNCTION. HOW THIS MAKES A PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCE, BEGINNING WITH SENSATIONS, OR BEGINNING WITH THE EGO AS ARBITER OF THESE SENSATIONS IS NOT EXPLAINED. WHAT SEEMS TO BE THE CASE IS THAT HUSSERL DOES NOT TRY TO EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE BECAUSE HE DOES NOT SEE THAT THE EGOLOGICAL ORIENTATION LEADS BACK TO THE SAME PROBLEMS OF INTERNAL-EXTERNAL SENSATION WHICH HE HOPED TO AVOID. AND HE IS LED BACK TO THEM BECAUSE HE DOES NOT SEE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THIRD PERSON KNOWING PROBLEM MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH AGAIN, IS THE REASON HE DOES NOT OVERCOME SOLIPSISM. AT THE POINT AT WHICH ONE SEES WHY THESE FIRST PARALLELS BETWEEN PHENOMENALISM AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS DO NOT WORK, ONE'S VIEW OF PHENOMENOLOGY BECOMES CIRCULAR.

HUSSERL TREATS CONSCIOUSNESS AS A FILM-LOG INSTEAD OF THE FILM ITSELF.

2.5 RETURNING TO HUSSERL'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE WITHIN HIS PHENOMENOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK: WHAT IS HIS USE OF 'INTENTION' AND 'MEANING'? IN SECTION 20, CM PP. 46-49 THE FOLLOWING RELEVANT USES APPEAR IN THIS ORDER:

A. "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS"..."IS INTENTIONAL"
B. "INTENTIONAL ANALYSIS"
C. "EVERY COGITO IS...A MEANING OF ITS MEANT"
D. "MEANT AT THAT MOMENT"
E. "INTENDING-BEYOND-ITSELF..." IS "AN ESSENTIAL MOMENT"
F. "THIS INTENDING IS...A 'MEANING MORE' OF THE SAME"
G. "INTENTIONAL OBJECT...AND ITS MEANT FEATURES, ITS MEANT PARTS AND PROPERTIES."
H. "THE INTENTIONALITY, WHICH MAKES UP THE INTUITIVE OR NON-INTUITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS ITSELF..."
I. "...we have one intentional object, and always this definite one, continuously meant—have it, so to speak, before us as meant thus and so;"

J. "We find straight-forwardly, as explicata of what is meant, such things as a 'feature', a 'property' a 'part', or mean these implicitly and can discover them intuitively."

K. "By virtue of its intentional structure... an... object is intended in it, occurs in it as such a sense."

L. "Its being still intended while it sinks retentionally into the past..."

M. "The sense-producing intentionality"

An analysis of Husserl's concepts of meaning and intention is not necessary to show that contemporary analytic philosophy would be an argument against their being meaningful. (One can read Ansgombe's whole book on Intention and find no sense in which Husserl's concept would make sense.) Uses D., E., I., and L. involve a concept of time which leads to confusions about both intention and meaning. In these cases it is appropriate to ask, "How long did you have the intention?", "When did it begin to recede into the past?", "At exactly what moment did you first have it?", etc. Any reply, of course, would be unverifiable. Yet Husserl's concepts of intention and meaning are obviously supposed to enable him to know objects of consciousness in a way that would provide unquestionable, concrete information. When first reading these pages, one may be tempted to think of Wittgenstein's problem of ambiguous figures and his concept of 'seeing-as'. It looks as if 'intentional structure' would serve Husserl in a way that 'seeing-as' serves Wittgenstein in discussing 'ambiguous figures', or other cases of interpretation. But the questions above show that the problems that arise with Husserl's concepts are just those enigmas that

*One can write the time down, and say, "I had the intention first at 4:02 p.m.", but this would be a special case; it is not something done with every 'act of intending'.
Wittgenstein has introduced his concepts to rid the language of philosophy of. The line of reasoning Wittgenstein tries to avoid is: "This looks like a rabbit; it now looks like a duck" --- "Why does the perception change?" --- "Because I have two different physiological processes in my brain". Husserl also wants to avoid this sort of psycho-physical response. But instead of trying a new approach, he tries to make the old one good: Husserl tries to make the same sort of subjective answer objective by self-examination. Instead of trying to go at it with a machine to record neural impulses, Husserl invents a public soul. But for both Husserl and the physiologists, it's all in the mind.

2.6 Consider Husserl's use of the words 'intention' and 'meaning': 'Intention' is used to indicate 'the object's being in consciousness' (A., G., I., K., L.); 'meaning' is used to speak of 'the properties which give the object its sense' (G., J.). Thus it is correct to say, for Husserl, that 'one intends a meaning(s)' (one 'has' in consciousness, a sense, structure). Does this phrase, 'One intends a meaning', make sense philosophically? Doesn't one say, ordinarily, "What I meant by that was..."? or "I intended to say...)? To say, "What I intended to mean" introduces another concept (or the shadow of a concept); it is redundant. There may be a context in which "What I intended to mean" makes sense, but then the sense of the phrase would have to be explained further, i.e., "Consider a society in which there were no animals, then what I would like these words to mean in this case is..." — but clearly this requires some kind of distortion of social order for the phrase 'What I intended to mean' to be meaningful in an ordinary context. The
Strangeness might be seen this way: "I meant to mean..."

"Well, what did you mean to mean?" What this tries to point to is that to understand what Husserl means, one must go outside of the ordinary world, one cannot, as he prefers, 'leave the world as it is'. What world is Husserl opposing? His world seems to be the world of mental acts; to 'intend an object to have a certain meaning' is a mental act. What can the criteria be for knowing someone has intended the same meaning that one has intended (if we are to understand one another within Husserl's world)? Husserl eliminates the physiological; he says that the psychological is paralleled, but not criteria; he supplies the behavioristic (see commentary 5.3). Obviously behavior is insufficient: A bow winks at a pretty girl: Did he mean, "I love you" or "You have beautiful Max Factor eyelashes"? Even if we can point to other places where Husserl seems to see that his criteria are short (the section on learning to see a scissors), his concepts exclude sufficient criteria.
1.2.3.4.5. The first meditation established the basic concepts of Husserl's phenomenology: 'evidence' or judgment; and the transcendental ego. The second meditation established the terms for talking about the transcendental ego and made distinctions between philosophical phenomenology and psychology. The third meditation extends and fills in these terms of evidence and transcendental ego to prepare for the fourth meditation which elaborates transcendental subjectivity to the point that intersubjectivity can be introduced in the fifth meditation.

3.0 The third meditation is implicitly, and to some extent, explicitly dependent on the notion of logical possibility; that is, to the extent that phenomenology is a study of consciousness of objects, the way in which we are conscious of them necessitates distinctions between physical objects, imagined objects, etc. But in order to make these distinctions, some standard of comparison is assumed, or postulated. For phenomenology this is the logical possibility of the existence of an object, or what Husserl calls 'Reason'.

3.1 Husserl need to talk about this sort of logical principle because:

1. He wants to talk about being conscious of something as meaning that there is some degree of evidence or being of the object in question (after reduction) or consciousness exemplifies one or more of the logical possibilities of its being (see parentheses, CM p. 58)

2. Connected with the idea of consciousness being a form or evidence, is the idea that transcendental subjectivity, or consciousness after reduction, includes the whole world. By
AND HE ENDS THE SECTION WITH:

EVERY RIGHTNESS COMES FROM EVIDENCE, THEREFORE FROM OUR TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVITY ITSELF; EVERY IMAGINABLE ADEQUATION ORIGINATES AS OUR VERIFICATION, IS OUR SYNTHESIS, HAS IN US ITS ULTIMATE TRANSCENDENTAL BASIS. (CM P. 59)

3.12 BECAUSE HUSSERL USES SOME FORM OF PRINCIPLE OF LOGICAL POSSIBILITY, HE IS ABLE TO DISTINGUISH IN CONTRAST TO WHAT WOULD BE LOGICALLY NECESSARY FOR SOMETHING TO EXIST, LEVELS OF INTENTION OF AN OBJECT IN CONSCIOUSNESS, OR THE VARYING DEGREE TO WHICH WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF AN OBJECT ACCORDING TO WHAT MEANING OR SENSE IT MAKES. HE DISTINGUISHES THE MAIN LEVELS:

1. ACTUALITY 11. NON-ACTUALITY
   POSITIONALITY QUASI-POSITIONALITY
   PHYSICAL OBJECT IMAGINED OBJECT, AS-IF OBJECT,
   PHANTASY

ALL OF THESE ARE WAYS OF TALKING ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH AN OBJECT IS CLEARLY INTENDED IN CONSCIOUSNESS.

3.2 THERE ARE TWO SUB-CONCEPTS UNDER THE CONCEPT OF REALITY, OR WHAT WE HAVE SPOKEN OF AS WHAT WOULD BE LOGICALLY NECESSARY FOR SOMETHING TO BE IN CONSCIOUSNESS AS IT IS. THESE SUB-CONCEPTS, SO TO SPEAK, ARE 'BEING' AND 'SENSE' OR 'MEANING AS'.
3.21 Sometimes Husserl uses 'being' and 'existence' synonymously, but where he uses them differently, I think the following distinction might be made: when an object exists, it fulfills the logical requirements necessary for it to be what it is; there is reason, in Husserl's sense for it to be. But what which reasonably exists is not yet in evidence; it is therefore only "accepted" as existing, or one "certainly believes" that it is.

3.22 Whereas existence is primarily a way of talking about logical objects, being is a way of talking about those objects for which there is phenomenological evidence, for which constitutional structures in consciousness can be discussed. The word 'being' is not a way of speaking about objects per se but is a way of speaking of objects as meant or intended in consciousness. The two levels of intending an object in consciousness talked about before are ways of talking about the kind of being of an object. Being, then, concerns intended objects; existence concerns what an intended object would have to be like in order to be.

3.23 Husserl's phrase, "actually existing" is confirmed being. It should not be confused with existence. It indicates an intended object for which there is conclusive evidence.

3.24 As a side-dish to this discussion of the term 'being', and for those who are interested in bleeding ethics out of Husserl, one might note on p. 35, beginning the second paragraph, Husserl groups being possible and being probable with being beautiful and being good, and being useful. In the third meditation, on page 58, the end paragraph of section 24, he seems to change his mind, or else he gets more explicit, and says that being possible, probable, or doubtful are "modal variants of simple being"...

"That do not belong" with "being valuable and being morally

3.25 LAST TIME I TALKED ABOUT HUSSERL'S DEFINITION OF 'APODICTIC', AS "THAT WHICH CANNOT BE IMAGINED OR CONCEIVED AS NON-BEING." I SAID THAT THE TERM WAS NOT ONLY IMPORTANT AS A FIRST PRINCIPLE OF PHENOMENOLOGY, AS THE METHOD BY WHICH HE GETS TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVITY, BUT ALSO THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT AS A STOP-GAP TERM FOR THE NOTIONS OF EVIDENCE AND JUDGMENT, WHICH WE SEEMED TO FIND NEVER REACHED PERFECTION, AND THEREFORE REQUIRED APODICTICITY TO INVOKE THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO. THERE WERE TWO CRITICISMS OF THE DEFINITION OF 'APODICTICITY'. ONE WAS THAT ITS DEFINITION WOULD MAKE IMAGINARY OBJECTS AS APODICTIC AS PHYSICAL OBJECTS. THIS CRITICISM IS IN PART MET BY THE THIRD MEDITATION, WHERE HUSSERL DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN THE BEING OF IMAGINARY AND PHYSICAL OBJECTS, THE FORMER BEING LESS DETERMINED THAN THE LATTER. SECONDLY, THE DEFINITION ITSELF WAS CRITICIZED AS BEING CIRCULAR SINCE TO CONCEIVE OR IMAGINE SOMETHING WAS ALREADY TO GIVE IT SOME BEING. I USE THE WORD "SOME" NOW TO QUALIFY THE DEGREES OF BEING DISTINGUISHED IN THE THIRD MEDITATION. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE NOW USE THE WORD "SOME" THE CRITICISM IS MOLLIFIED BUT NOT NULLIFIED. THE CRITICISM IMPLICIT HERE IS THAT SINCE IT MAKES NO SENSE TO TALK OF AN OBJECT AS NON-BEING, IT DOES NOT ADD ANYTHING TO TALK OF IT AS BEING. THIS IS, OF COURSE, A STANDARD ARGUMENT AGAINST PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. (AQUINAS) WHAT IS PUZZLING ABOUT
It is that Husserl apparently criticized Meinong of the same, in

A Letter to Him Reported by Chisholm:

In one, dated May 20, 1891, he attempts to prove to Meinong that the concept of a non-existent object is absurd. What he proves, however, is that it is absurd to suppose that there are non-existent objects. And what Meinong had taught, when he expressed himself carefully, was not that there are objects such that there are no such objects, but rather that objects such that there are no such objects may yet have certain properties and stand in relations to objects which are such that there are such objects. (PR P. 374)

If Husserl criticizes Meinong for a concept of a non-existent object, then what could he have meant by his definition of the apodictic, since it is an object which cannot be conceived as non-being? What I would like to suggest is that by "cannot be conceived of as non-being" Husserl means something quite different than what is meant by it in the ontological argument.

3.3 What I have to say hinges on the point that what Husserl means by the being of objects is that we are conscious of them in a way that makes sense to us. He says (CM P. 60) "...it is evidence alone by virtue of which an actually existing, true, rightly accepted object of whatever form or kind has sense for us." How an object is intended, how an object is meant, is similar to asking what the object must be to make sense in the human world. Husserl talks about the object as the "object as meant", "the meant as such". There are not simply objects for Husserl, there are only objects as they make sense. He points this out at the beginning of the third meditation: P. 56 "The predicates being and non-being, and their modal variants, relate to the latter——the meant? Accordingly, not to objects simpliciter but to the objective sense."

3.31 If the distinction between being and existence is accepted, and if we accept the use of an object's being as part of the
OBJECT'S SENSE, THEN I THINK WE CAN ACCEPT THE NOTION OF
APODICTICITY AND THE APODICTIC COMING OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL
EGO AS THE NECESSARY CONDITION OF BEING, THAT IS, THE TRANSCENDENTAL
EGO, FOR OBJECTS OF SENSE OR MEANING. WE THEREBY ESCAPE RUNNING
INTO PROBLEMS WITH ABSORBING EXISTENCE, AND WE THEREBY AVOID
CIRCULARITY IN THE DEFINITION SINCE CONCEIVING OR IMAGINING
SOMETHING NO LONGER EXCLUDES CASES OF NON-BEING. THE FIRST
POINT WE FIND GROUNDS FOR IN HUSserL'S USE OF A LOGICAL PRINCIPLE;
THE SECOND POINT WE FIND GROUNDS FOR FROM THE FACT THAT, "DURING
THE PROCESS OF VERIFICATION, VERIFICATION CAN TURN INTO ITS NEG-
ATIVE; INSTEAD OF THE MEANT ITSELF, A 'DIFFERENT' CAN COME TOO
THE FORE, ... A DIFFERENT THAT WRECKS THE POSITING OF WHAT WAS MEANT..."
(CM P. 58)

3.4 A POINT FOR DISCUSSION MIGHT BE: WHEN HUSSERL TALKS ABOUT
RECALLING THE SAME OBJECT, HE PROVIDES AN EXPLANATION FOR SEEING
AN OBJECT AS MORE THAN ONE THING: "I CAN 'ALWAYS RETURN' TO THE
ITSELF-BEHOLD ACTUALITY, IN A SERIES OF NEW EVIDENCES AS RESTITU-
TIONS OF THE FIRST EVIDENCE." (CM P. 60) AMBIGUOUS CASES WOULD
BE HANDLED IN THIS WAY, WITHOUT RESORTING TO SENSE-DATA, PHYSICAL
PROCESSES, ETC.

3.41 (4.0) HUSSERL'S NOTION OF GENESIS IN THE FOURTH MEDITATION;
AN INSTANCE OF WHICH IS, "WE HAD TO LEARN TO SEE PHYSICAL THINGS"
(CM P. 79) MIGHT BE SUGGESTIVE OF THE SAME SOURCE OF COMING TO
MAKE DISTINCTIONS AMONG OBJECTS WHICH WE CONNECT WITH WITTGENSTEIN.
(NOTE: THE LECTURE CONTINUES IN A DIAGRAMATIC EXPLICATION OF
HUSSERL'S EGOLOGY FROM THE FOURTH MEDITATION. SINCE IT IS THE
SORT OF INFORMATION SUB-SUMED BY THE PROJECT, I HAVE OMITTED IT.)
There is evidence here for what will be said later in regard to solipsism and for what has been said before in regard to the parallels between Husserl and Wittgenstein which have not only begun to look flimsy, but have also been shown to be false.

In respect to evidence for the latter: Husserl talks about "a structural differentiation among the infinite multiplicities of actual and possible cogitations that relate to the object in question and thus can somehow go together to make up the unity of an identifying synthesis." (CM p. 63) Even though the phrases seem Kantian, it is easy to think of Wittgenstein's concept of 'family resemblances' here. The structural differentiations might be like family characteristics, and the vague relation of cogitations to the object might be thought of as similar to the overlapping of threads analogy in Wittgenstein's concept. One might also try to make a case for analyzing ambiguous figures in terms of "the infinite multiplicities." But again, one only needs to remember where the object is, for Husserl, to see that any such analogy is misleading:

Any consciousness, without exception, either is itself already characterized as evidence (that is, as giving its object originaliter) or else has an essential tendency toward conversion into giving of its object originaliter — accordingly, toward syntheses of verification, which belong essentially in the domain of the "I can". (CM p. 58)

The realm of the "I can" is not transferable to the realm of the "He can". Even if one could know the object originaliter, one could not know if another person was talking about knowing the same object. Husserl's "I can" is a private language, and his 'verification' is meaningless.

Since Husserl does not think he is a solipsist, he does not
TALK AS IF HE IS ONE: "EVIDENCE DENOTES A UNIVERSAL PRIMAL
PHENOMENON OF INTENTIONAL LIFE..." (CM P. 57). ALL OF WHAT
HE SAYS IN REGARD TO HIMSELF IN THE FIRST FOUR MEDITATIONS,
HE THEREFORE BELIEVES WILL STAND AFTER HE HAS ANSWERED THE
CHARGES OF SOLIPSISM IN THE FIFTH MEDITATION. THIS IS WHY HE
PRESENTS NON-SOLIPSISTIC IDEAS SOLIPSISTICALLY. THIS IS AN-
OTHER COMMENT ON WHY HIS LANGUAGE MISLEADS US INTO MAKING
ANALOGIES.

4.0 HUSSERL'S APPROACH TO THE FIRST-THIRD PERSON KNOWING PROBLEM
IS NOT ENTIRELY NAIVE. HE HAS A FORM FOR AVOIDING IT: THE
INVENTION OF HIMSELF AS AN OBJECT FOR HIMSELF. WHAT HE DOES
NOT SEEM TO SEE IS THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW ANY MORE ABOUT HIMSELF
THAN HE DID BEFORE. HE SAYS:

I EXIST FOR MYSELF AND AM CONTINUALLY GIVEN TO
MYSELF, BY EXPERIENTIAL EVIDENCE, AS "I MYSELF". THIS IS TRUE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO, AND COR-
RESPONDINGLY, OF THE PSYCHOLOGICALLY PURE EGO; IT IS TRUE, MOREOVER, WITH RESPECT TO ANY SENSE OF
THE WORD EGO. (CM P. 68)

HIS CONCEPTION, FOR HIM, PERVADES ALL OF PHENOMENOLOGY:

CONSEQUENTLY THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THIS SELF-
CONSTITUTION coincides with PHENOMENOLOGY AS A WHOLE. (CM 68)

HUSSERL TRIES TO ESCAPE HIMSELF AND BECOME SOMEONE HE CAN OBS-
ERVE IN THE THIRD PERSON SINGULAR.

4.1 HUSSERL DOES NOT INVENT THE EIDOS EGO ONLY BECAUSE OF THE
QUESTION OF LOGICAL POSSIBILITY. HE ALSO INVENTS IT TO ENABLE
THIS THIRD-PERSON-SELF TO BE PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO
SCHEMA. THE THIRD-PERSON-SELF IS ONE OF THESE "EIDOS" POS-
SIBILITIES. IT IS THE CONCEPT BEHIND THE IDEA OF EMPATHY IN
THE FIFTH MEDITATION, WHERE HUSSERL TRIES TO BRIDGE THE GAP
BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THIRD PERSON. BUT WHAT THE NOTION OF
THE EIDOS EGO LEADS HUSSERL TO SAY ABOUT CONCEPTS CLEARLY LEADS
Him to a view that is contradictory to one of the most important methods of conceptual analysis:

It [the eidos ego] is prior to all "concepts", in the sense of verbal significations; indeed, as pure concepts, these must be made to fit the eidos. (CM p. 71)

This quote points to a totally different approach to philosophy from analytic philosophy. It is not just a difference in style, it is a difference in what the "subject" of philosophy ought to be. Behind Wittgenstein’s approach to a problem, or what makes it a genuine problem is:

Here it is difficult to see that what is at issue is the fixing of concepts. A concept forces itself on one. (That is what you must not forget.) (PI p. 204)

This is connected with an earlier remark of Wittgenstein that philosophy only says what everyone admits. That Husserl takes an opposite view should now be clear. The reasons he takes an opposite view are:

1) he has a different philosophical concept of philosophy: philosophy brings concepts down from the heaven of logical possibility, and 2) within his framework itself, if one wants to study oneself as an object, but does not want to resort to 'internal' sensations, psycho-physiological sense theory, then one needs study the logical possibility of oneself.

This is why in the first meditation Husserl is led to the strange talk of 'I phantasy myself' and 'I can posit myself as being-there'.

4.2 For Husserl, even others are himself. He anticipates the fifth meditation:

If (as is in fact the case) there are transcendentally constituted in me, the transcendental ego, not only other egos but also... an objective world common to us all, then everything said up to now is true, not alone in the case of my de facto ego and in the case of this de facto inter subjectivity.
Further on, Husserl summarizes our arguments for us:

First, a self-explication in the pregnant sense, showing systematically how the ego constitutes himself, in respect of his own proper essence, as existent in himself and for himself; then, secondly, a self-explication in the broadened sense, which goes on from there to show how, by virtue of this proper essence, the ego likewise constitutes in himself something "other", something "objective", and thus constitutes everything without exception that ever has for him, in the ego, existent status as non-Ego. (GM p. 85)

Husserl appears to think that as long as he studies others, even if they are part of himself, he avoids solipsism. It is tempting to think that his phenomenology is the invention of a system of concepts to enable him to think that he is not a solipsist. The fact that he is trying to avoid being a solipsist is connected with the fact that he is trying to find a way out of the same difficulties with which analytic philosophy is concerned. This tempts us to think of analogies between the two, at the same time showing us why these analogies are impossible.
5. I WOULD LIKE TO CONSIDER FOUR AREAS IN THE FIRST MEDITATION: HOW OTHERS ARE EXPERIENCED; THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE PERSONAL EGO AND ALTER EGO; BRIEFLY, THE TERM INTERSUBJECTIVITY; AND PERCEPTION OF THE ALTER EGO, INCLUDING THE PROBLEM OF KNOWING THE ALTER EGO AND KNOWING THE OBJECTIVE WORLD, OR THE WORLD COMMON TO MORE THAN ONE PERSON.

5.1 First of all, as is obvious, a phenomenological analysis and a method of knowing other people than ourselves, is necessary to avoid solipsism. As it turns out, for Husserl, knowing ourselves is knowing other people, since the peculiar way in which we know ourselves is similar to how we know others. Husserl offers us a good description to keep this in perspective, I think, when he describes the transcendental ego as "the ego of all constitutions." (CM p. 99)

5.12 In building the general background, Husserl first claims that there are a number of experiences which would lead one to the existence of an alter ego. First there is more direct experience of other people as objects in the world. This might be called our every day experience of there being other people around, or in Husserl's terms, people are constituted in the transcendental ego. Also, more specifically, our experience of other people around us leads us to think that they are psychophysical beings similar to ourselves, and in that sense we are additionally led to suppose that they perceive and assimilate the world as we do, or they can also become phenomenologically reducing philosophers seeing the world as objects of their own consciousnesses. The less direct experiential approach to others is the recognition of many synthetic objects in the world which we have not made ourselves, and which others can as easily recognize, generally speaking, as ourselves. This is what
Husserl says is experiencing the world as "other-than-mine".

5.2 If these are more or less the experiences leading us to think of other people as existing, then they must be shown to fit into some kind of phenomenological structure. One of the first questions that might arise is if, in Husserl's methodological approach, the first step to separate one's own transcendental subjectivity form the everyday world, and others are a part of the everyday world, have we not excluded other egos in getting to know ourselves? There are two replies to this, I think, one from the viewpoint of method and one from the viewpoint of phenomenology. The first, is that, as Husserl often enough points out, epoché is simply a thematic approach to his subject, it does not do anything to the world to split it into ego camps. Epoché is an abstraction for the purpose of instruction in seeing the world phenomenologically. Even though we abstract transcendental subjectivity from the everyday world we continue to experience it. This world which we continuously experience is that which is constituted by other people as well as ourselves, or intersubjectively constituted. In Husserl's language, the transcendental ego is all there is, and so to speak, personally ours. But the horizon of transcendental experience includes both what is ours and what is other. Even though it is possible to think of transcendental subjectivity as our private realm after epoché it would not be possible to think of it as such unless there were others which constituted it. Husserl talks about the realm being personal in the first four meditations because he is setting up a way

To this Husserl now adds a third: the personal ego and the alter ego.

5.21 This third reduction is the reduced human ego and it allows us to think of a way in which other people are more solid for us than if they just remained objects thought of in the first stage of reduction. The structure Husserl gives us of what I have just said might look like this in his schema:

TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

SPHERE 1            SPHERE 2
1. OWNNESS          2. OTHER

By means of sphere 1 the transcendental ego constitutes sphere 2 as what is other: alter ego.

5.22 Sphere 1 or the reduced personal ego is an "immanent" transcendental world of "other" objects, the essence of which Husserl says is "its own, which is not my own essence and has no place as a constituent part thereof, though it nevertheless can acquire sense and verification only in my essence." (OP p. 106) In other words, the personal ego is necessary to understand the alter ego because it is only in relation to oneself that it makes sense to talk about what is other.

5.23 Now as soon as there are others as part of immediate or
Immanent transcendental spheres a term to describe their existing together is needed, and Husserl calls it an ego-community. Husserl also says (CM p. 107) that the ego-community includes himself, or the one whose personal ego is involved as the immanent transcendental sphere (which he also calls the "primordial sphere"). What Husserl means to say, I think, is that we all share a very similar world, and therefore, the world of ego-community is one which he is part of as well. But in terms of his phenomenological structure I find it puzzling because it looks as if the transcendental ego is turned inside out through the personal ego. The only way out that I can see, which would conform to what Husserl says, is that again, we must remember that this structuring is only methodological: although we speak of the personal ego as including oneself in an egoological community, it does not mean that we actually re-embryo ourselves; it means only that to make objective sense of the alter ego, as Husserl calls it, we must also be able to consider ourselves as a possible alter ego for others, and as such a possible alter ego, we are members of the same community, once there are other egos than ourselves. Here lies implied Husserl's way out of knowing ourselves as we know others and still remaining in a separate position as he who knows himself. This will become clearer when we talk about the perception of the alter ego.

5.24 One other idea which I would like to suggest here is that at this point of his structuring, Husserl performs what I will call a methodological salvation.

One idea, Husserl is attacked by such people as Ryle, by the existentialists, and by his well-known pupils, for bifurcating the natural, objective world and the personal
INDIVIDUAL WORLD IN A PERMANENT WAY. WHAT I WOULD SUGGEST HERE IS THAT THE TREATMENT OF THE EGOLOGICAL COMMUNITY AS "AN OBJECTIVE WORLD" (CM P. 107) IS WHERE ONE CAN DEFEND HUSSERL AS ACTUALLY AND METHODOLOGICALLY BINDING THE INDIVIDUAL'S WORLD AND THE OBJECTIVE WORLD TOGETHER. THE FIRST EPOCHÉ SEEMS TO HOLD THE TWO WORLDS APART, BUT IN THE THIRD EPOCHÉ ONE SEES THAT THEY ARE ACTUALLY VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER. THUS THE CRITICISM OF HUSSERL IS AIMED AT ONLY A VERY PRELIMINARY STEP IN HIS EXPLICATION OF HOW WE GO ABOUT THINKING PHENOMENOLOGICALLY.

5.3 HAVING ELIMINATED THE PROBLEM OF THE MAJOR CRITICISM LEVELLED AT HUSSERL, I WOULD LIKE TO GO ON TO THE FOURTH PROMISED LAND, THAT OF PERCEIVING, AND THEN KNOWING, THE ALTER EGO. SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT ARISE FROM THIS, MAY LEAD US TO CONSIDER WHETHER HUSSERL HAS REALLY CONSTRUCTED THE THIRD EPOCHÉ SUCCESSFULLY, AND IF HE HASN'T, MAY LEAD US TO THINK THAT THE GENIE OF METHODOLOGICAL SALVATION IS DEAD. AND IF IT IS THE CASE THAT THE THIRD EPOCHÉ IS NOT SUCCESSFUL, FROM WHICH WOULD FOLLOW THAT BRACKETING IS VALIDLY CRITICIZED, THEN WE HAVE RETURNED FULL CYCLE TO THE PROBLEM OF SOLIPSISM.

5.31 WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST IS THAT HUSSERL'S EGOLOGICAL SYSTEM HOLDS TOGETHER JUST BECAUSE HE WAS A PRE-WITTGENSTEINIAN WITTGENSTEIN. THE UPHOLD OF THE ARGUMENT IS THAT THE PROBLEM OF BRACKETING, IF YOU LIKE TO CALL IT THAT, OR THE PROBLEM OF RELAPSING TO SOLIPSISM, IS THE PROBLEM OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN KNOWING ONESELF AND KNOWING OTHERS. THE REDUCTION OF THE PERSONAL EGO IS THAT OF REDUCING IT TO THE REALM OF ONESELF WITH OTHERS. IT IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR US TO HAVE A CONCEPT OF OTHER PEOPLE IN ORDER TO HAVE THE CONCEPT OF OURSELF WHICH WE HAVE. RELATING THIS STATEMENT TO HUSSERL'S TERMS I WOULD
Put it this way: what he calls the personal ego, or a group of habitualities, what we might think of as our personality or what makes us think of ourselves as a particular individual, would be impossible without objects (in Husserl’s sense) which are part of one’s personality. For instance, if one aspect of one’s personality were that we were an ardent book-reader, there would have to be books for him to read to have this aspect of personality. Such would also be so of convictions, physical acts, etc. One is not just a personality, one is a personality of something. To the extent that one is a personality of something there has to be an objective world. Now, one of the aspects of our personalities is that they are human personalities. If there were only one human being it would make no sense to talk of the human ego or the personal ego. This is a second point, and the two points taken together mean that there must be an objective world including human beings to make sense of the concept of the personal ego.

5.32 If Husserl were to say, then, that we know ourselves in the same way that we know others, we would lose the distinction between two people, and thus the concept of the personal ego, or everything would be either subjective or objective.

5.33 There is no difficulty in showing that Husserl thinks of knowing someone else differently from knowing himself. Apperception, he says, “is not inference, not a thinking act.” (QM p. 111) It is a way of perceiving as similar. It is not perceiving as the same. As an aside, I would suggest here for possible discussion, that what Husserl gives us is a framework for understanding Wittgenstein when he talks about seeing, intending,
WILLING, THINKING, ETC., AND SAYS THAT THEY ARE NOT MENTAL
ACTS, THAT THEY DO NOT REQUIRE THE USUAL THEORY OF CAUSATION.

Husserl says that apperception is "apprehending at a glance"
(CM p. 111), that it is an every day act, and that if we look
for its genesis, it arises from the way a child learns what
objects are (for human beings) and how to differentiate among
them:

The child who already sees physical things
understands, let us say, for the first time
the final sense of scissors; and from now
on he sees scissors at the first glance as
scissors; and but naturally not in an explicit
reproducing, comparing and inferring. Yet
the manner in which apperceptions arise ---
and consequently in themselves, by their
sense and sense-horizon, point back to their
genesis---varies greatly. (CM p. 111)

5.34 When Husserl talks about what is apperceived he says that
there is "an overlaying of each with the objective sense of
the other" and that the limiting case is "that of complete
likeness". (CM p. 113) Thus we cannot know someone as the
same as ourself, only as belonging to the same family of human
beings. And this Husserlian framework of perceiving as similar
would give us a further basis for the idea of family resemblance
in Wittgenstein, which we discussed earlier in relation to
constitutional structure. As such he provides for borderline
cases with the notion of apperception, which does not involve
problems of causation.

5.35 When Husserl talks about verification, or "verifiable
accessibility" in relation to knowing others, he gives, as
what he calls a "clue", the harmonious behavior of someone else.
This behavior shows the other person as "(a physical side that
indicates something psychic appresentatively)". He uses the
word 'harmonious' to allow for cases in which a person is
FAKING, PRETENDING, OR QUESTIONABLE AS HUMAN, AND THIS IS
WHAT I UNDERSTAND HUSSERL AS SAYING WHEN HE SAYS, "THE
ORGANISM BECOMES EXPERIENCED AS A PSEUDO-ORGANISM, PRECISELY
IF THERE IS SOMETHING DISCORDANT ABOUT ITS BEHAVIOR." (CM P. 114)

5.36 STILL TALKING ABOUT KNOWING OTHERS AND THE DIFFERENCE OF
KNOWING ONESELF, I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT TO AVOID ANY
CONFUSION, THAT HUSSERL SAYS QUITE EARLY THAT ONE KNOWS THE
OTHER IS DIFFERENT BECAUSE IT IS NOT WHAT HE CALLS "ORIGINARILY"
IN ONE'S OWN PRIMORDIAL SPHERE. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE
ARE NOT ORIGINARILY OTHER PEOPLE AS HUMAN PERSONALITIES, FOR
WHICH IT IS NECESSARY TO REACH THE THIRD REDUCTION. HE SAYS
LATER ON, "WHAT IS GRASPED ORIGINATELY IS THE BODY OF A
PSYCHE ESSENTIALLY INACCESSIBLE TO ME ORIGINATELY...." (CM P. 124)

5.37 ONE LAST SPECIFIC POINT WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IS THAT
HUSSERL DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN THE LOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF TWO
OR MORE PEOPLE PERCEIVING THE OBJECT AND THE FACT THAT WE ALL
SEE SOMETHING AS DIFFERENT. OF THE LOGICAL POSSIBILITY HE SAYS,
"IN THE APPREHENDED OTHER EGO THE SYNTHETIC SYSTEMS ARE THE SAME"
AND OF THE FACT THAT WE SEE THINGS AS DIFFERENT, HE SAYS, "ACTUAL
PERCEPTIONS ARE NOT THE SAME". (CM 123) THIS IS WHY WE CANNOT
KNOW SOMEONE AS THE SAME AS OURSELF AND IT IS WHY HUSSERL
TALKS ABOUT APPRECEIVING AS SIMILAR, NOT AS THE SAME.

5.4 TO SUMMARIZE, I THINK WHAT WE ARE GIVEN IN THE FIFTH MEDITATION CAN BE PUT AS TWO CLAIMS: 1. THAT THE ORIGINAL EPOCHE DOES NOT LEAD TO SOLIPSISM AND 2. IN SUPPORTING THIS CLAIM WE SEE THAT HUSSERL WAS NOT ONLY A PRE-WITTGENSTEINIAN WITTGENSTEIN, BUT THAT HE ALSO PROVIDES US WITH A FRAMEWORK IN WHICH WE CAN MAKE SENSE OF SOME OF WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPTS. THE FIRST CLAIM
Leaves us with an intersubjective world of nature, the other's organism, and the other's psycho-physical ego paired with one's own. The second claim leaves us with the human sense of Husserl's statement "phenomenological explication does nothing but explicate the sense this world has for us all..." (CM p. 151) at least that is what I will take you as agreeing with if you do not disagree with this lecture.
5.0 Looking at the problem of solipsism as knowing oneself and knowing others. What does Husserl consider evidence for knowing oneself and for knowing others? Recollection is one means by which Husserl claims he knows himself. (CM p. 102)

What kind of knowing oneself is this? Can one know someone else in the same way? Husserl says: "The experiential verification of it, as a modification, then goes on necessarily in harmonious syntheses of recollection; only thus does a past as such become verified." (CM p. 115) Further Husserl says the 'Other' is "phenomenologically a 'modification' of myself" (CM p. 115). Thus the claim is that Husserl knows another as he knows himself, through recollection of the past. Even if it were to make sense that 'one knows oneself by recollection' (which it does not, but that is another argument), the criteria for knowing oneself and knowing another cannot be the same.

Husserl may have recollections and thereby think he 'knows recollections himself', but if another simply has ... (private thoughts) Husserl cannot know him at all. Only in the case of knowing the other is it necessary to talk about the recollections.

5.1 What does this philosophically point to as wrong in Husserl's system? Two notions make this mistake possible: 'primordial' ('immanent') transcendency, and 'apprehension'. To provide for knowing others as well as himself after the first reduction, Husserl introduces the term 'primordial world', it seems, to indicate that this reduced world of himself is also the reduced world of others. Husserl appears to want to convey by the term that although one only knows oneself directly, or primordially,
OTHERS CAN BE KNOWN IN A SIMILAR WAY (OR IN THE SAME "SPHERE") BY A NEW NOTION, 'APPERCEPTION'. (HUSserL DOES NOT SAY ENOUGH ABOUT THESE TERMS, FOR ME AT LEAST, TO EXPLICATE THEM ANY MORE CLEARLY THAN THE ABOVE. SEE CM p. 107) IT LOOKS AS IF HusseRl'S TERMS MOUNT UP UNTIL HE HAS WHAT HE WANTS. 'APPERCEPTION' LEADS TO THE NOTION OF 'ANALOGIZING TRANSFER', WHICH LEADS TO THE NOTION OF 'PAIRING'. AT THE ROOT OF THESE NOTIONS, HOWEVER, THE REASON FOR 'ANALOGIZING', 'APPREHENSION', WHICHEVER, IS "A SIMILARITY CONNECTING, WITHIN MY PRIMORDIAL SPHERE, THAT BODY OVER THERE WITH MY BODY..." (CM p. 111) THIS IS ENOUGH TO INDICATE THAT THE CRITERIA FOR KNOWING THE 'OTHER' CANNOT BE THE SAME FOR KNOWING ONESELF: "A BODY IS PRESENTED, WHICH, AS PRIMORDIAL, IS OF COURSE ONLY A DETERMINING PART OF MYSELF..." (CM p. 110)

5.2 Husserl's problem is not what he thinks it is: "AN ENIGMA HOW I CAN CONSTITUTE IN MYSELF ANOTHER EGO..." (CM p. 126) The problem of knowing others is not the problem of knowing others in the same way as oneself: IT IS THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNIZING OTHER CRITERIA FOR KNOWING. Thus Husserl's whole approach, his definition of the problem, is one which leaves him a solipsist. His definition of solipsism, which he genuinely thinks he has overcome, is different from that of contemporary philosophy which sees a philosophical mistake in his approach. He believes that as long as he gives some account, some methodology for knowing others, he has defended himself against charges of solipsism. What he does not see is that his criteria must be different, and therefore, another constituted within himself is unknowable: he only knows himself. One can see this in his
DEFINITION OF 'THE SAME': "Here, as everywhere else, 'the same' signifies therefore an identical intentional object of separate conscious processes..." (CM p. 127) In the text, Husserl is discussing objects of recollection; it is, however, a definition he extends to knowing the objects of other people's consciousness. What Husserl tries to do with his notion of intersubjectivity is to make a private language serve as a public one.

5.3 Consider Husserl's criteria for knowing someone else: "Regarding experience of someone else, it is clear that its fully-fillingly verifying continuation can ensue only by means of new appresentations... within... my ownness..." (CM p. 114) What is the criteria for appresentation? "As a suggestive clue to the requisite clarification, this proposition may suffice: the experienced animate organism or another continues to prove itself as actually an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious 'behavior'." (CM p. 114) Someone else's experience of something cannot be known by behavior in the same way that one's own experience is apparent. To screw up one's face as one has seen someone else do when he has said he was in pain is not to have an analogue of his pain.

5.4 Throughout these comments I have used 'knowing' sometimes in reference to psychological experience, sometimes not. The comments and examples have extended not only to recollecting and the experience of pain, but also to a concept of language. The reason why this happens, I think, is that in discussing Husserl's solipsism one gets into the broader topic of mental acts. This topic arises because, simply, phenomenology as conceived by Husserl is a system of mental acts because it is solipsistic. The sorts of statements which have been made then,
ARE ALSO THE SORTS OF STATEMENTS USED TO POINT OUT THE DIS-
ADVANTAGES OF RELYING ON MENTAL ACTS AS CRITERIAL.
THIS
REMARK POINTS TO BOTH THE SCOPE OF THE MISCONCEPTION OF
PHENOMENOLOGY AND TO THE VALUE OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY.
AND
SUCH A REMARK AS THIS IS A FINAL COMMENT ON HOW FRUITLESS IT
IS TO ATTEMPT MEANINGFUL ANALOGIES BETWEEN THE TWO. SUCH AN
ANALOGY IS LIKE WRITING POETRY.
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